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Technology-based ("FinTech") lenders increased their market share of U.S. mortgage lending from 2 percent to 8 percent from 2010 to 2016. Using market-wide, loan-level data on U.S. mortgage applications and originations, we show that FinTech lenders process mortgage applications about 20 percent faster than other lenders, even when controlling for detailed loan, borrower, and geographic observables. Faster processing does not come at the cost of higher defaults. FinTech lenders adjust supply more elastically than other lenders in response to exogenous mortgage demand shocks, thereby alleviating capacity constraints associated with traditional mortgage lending. In areas with more FinTech lending, borrowers refinance more, especially when it is in their interest to do so. We find no evidence that FinTech lenders target marginal borrowers. Our results suggest that technological innovation has improved the efficiency of financial intermediation in the U.S. mortgage market.

The purpose of the paper is to present a more granular view of such projects through the in-depth focus on a limited number of case studies, with a view to understanding what factors in the design of such lending have helped achieve objectives of expanded access, and what forms of interventions may have been less successful. It examines the nature of Bank lending vehicles, the partnering borrower institutions, the country environments in which its loans were extended, as well as broader elements of good practice that make for loan success. It examines the beneficiaries targeted and results achieved. It aims to draws lessons that suggest what factors could lead to success or failure in Bank operations focused on financial access. The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section two briefly describes the set of the Bank s projects selected for detailed review. Sections three to six contain the core findings of the review. Section 3 focuses on alternative forms of borrower institutions that have served as vehicles for Bank projects, particularly, public sector banks, apex bank structures that include the private sector, rural banks, nonbanks, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and microfinance institutions, in terms of the degree to which the Bank has been able to successfully partner with such institutions to expand financial access. It also looks at alternative forms of Bank loan design, policy-based loans, investment loans and lines of credit, Learning and Innovation Loans (LILs), matching grants, technical assistance and combinations thereof, and reviews evidence on the role of loan structure (including partnerships with other donors/lenders) and project success. Section four considers the effect of the broader business environment, in terms of financial regulation. Section five reviews elements of good practice that have contributed to success in lending that could be applicable to loans with any objective, and examines their application in the present context. Section six tries to construct a bottom line, reviewing available evidence on outcomes and impact; especially in terms of the ultimate beneficiaries reached. Section seven, the final section, summarizes the main messages emerging from the review and concludes with observations about ways forward.

Sri Lanka's population is still largely rural, nearly 85 percent lives outside of cities. There will probably be rural-to-urban migration in the future, which represents a potential opportunity to m-money providers. People working in cities often wish to repatriate their savings to their rural families conveniently and at a low cost. Income is fairly evenly spread across Sri Lanka s provinces, with the exception of the Western Province where Colombo, the largest city, is situated. Its GDP per capita places Sri Lanka near the average of comparable Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia is clearly an outlier with a considerably higher GDP per capita, but Sri Lanka s GDP is higher than that of the Philippines, where m-money has taken off dramatically. Poverty is less of a problem in Sri Lanka relative to countries like Bangladesh or Cambodia, where GDP per capita is much lower. The key point is that Sri Lanka is at a different stage in its economic development and is unlikely to have the same socioeconomic conditions that made m-money in Kenya accelerate so rapidly.

This assessment forms part of the joint International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank Indonesia Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP) which is being undertaken during 2009-2010. The assessment which covers the Bank Indonesia's real time gross settlement (BI-RTGS) system's observance of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems (SIPS) and the Central Bank's Responsibilities in applying the Core Principles was conducted during the first mission. The assessment which was conducted with the cooperation of the Bank Indonesia and other key players in the payment systems area was undertaken by Alice Zanza, Senior Payment Systems Specialist, World Bank with the assistance of Bruce Summers, Senior Payment Systems Advisor, World Bank. Although there are several systems in operation in Indonesia, BI considers the Bank Indonesia Real Time Gross Settlement (BI-RTGS) system to be the only systemically important payment system in the country. BI-RTGS is owned by BI and operated by the Payment Systems Department in the Directorate of Accounting and Payment Systems. To date, the assessment team does not have any information to expand the scope of systemically important payment systems in Indonesia and has conducted the assessment of the RTGS system, as the sole SIPS in the country.

Economists seeking explanations for the global financial crisis of 1997-99 are reaching consensus that a major factor was weak financial institutions, which resulted in part from inadequate government regulations. At the same time many developing countries are struggling with an overregulated financial system-one that stifles innovation and the flow of credit to new entrepreneurs and that can stunt the growth of well-established firms. In particular, too many countries are relying excessively on capital adequacy standards, which are inefficient and sometimes counterproductive. The author argues that financial systems can be reformed successfully using a 'dynamic portfolio approach' aimed at managing the incentives and constraints that affect not only financial institutions exposure to risk but also their ability to cope with it. The article sets out general principles of financial regulation and shows how the dynamic portfolio approach can help countries deal with the special problems that arise during the transition to a more liberalized economy as well as those that arise in dealing with a financial crisis similar to the 1997 crisis in East Asia.

Politics and regulatory capture can play an important role in financial institutions distress. East Asia's financial crisis featured many distressed and closed financial intermediaries in an environment with many links between government, politicians, supervisors, and financial institutions. This makes the East Asian financial crisis a good event for studying how such connections affect the resolution of financial institutions distress. The authors investigate distress and closure decisions for 186 banks and 97 non-bank financial institutions in Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand. They find that after July 1997, 42 percent of the institutions experienced distress (were closed, merged, or re-capitalized, or had their operations temporarily suspended). By July 1999, 13 percent of all institutions in existence in July 1997 had been closed. Using financial data for 1996, the authors find that: 1) Traditional CAMEL-type variables - returns on assets, loan growth, and the ratio of loan loss reserves to capital, of net interest income to total income, and of loans to borrowings - help predict subsequent distress and closure. 2) None of the foreign-controlled institutions were closed, and foreign portfolio ownership lowered an institutions probability of distress. 3) Connections - with industrial groups of influential families - increased the probability of distress, suggesting that supervisors had granted forbearance from regulations. Connections also made closure more, not less, likely - suggesting that the closure processes themselves were transparent. 4) But larger institutions, although more likely to be distressed, were less likely to be closed, while (smaller) non-bank financial institutions were more likely to be closed. This suggests a too big to fail policy. 5) These policies, together with the fact that resolution processes were late and not necessarily comprehensive, may have added to the overall uncertainty and loss of confidence in the East Asian countries, aggravating the financial crisis.