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This collection of high policy documents charts Britain's difficulties in defending the Empire in a time of'imperial overstretch'. The 20th century saw the rise of several great maritime and military powers and the relative decline of British strength, which created major defence problems for the British Empire. Various solutions were attempted, such as ententes with France and Russia, the settling of differences with the USA and an alliance with Japan. These sufficed until after World War I, when the Empire gained several new territorial responsibilities, all to be defended on a declining economic base. The dominions were encouraged to pay for their own navies, although the Admiralty wished to assume control of them. The increasing threat from Japan made Australia, New Zealand and other Asian colonies nervous and the promised'main fleet to Singapore'became less and less likely as the 1930s wore on.

Charts the British government's changing perception of the utility of naval control of trade between 1854 and the late 1960sThis collection of departmental files and treaties reviews the changing perceptions in the British government of the utility of naval control of trade over the period from the outbreak of the Russian or'Crimean'war in 1854 to the United Nations mandated Beira patrol, established in 1966 to stop the flow of oil to Southern Rhodesia. The capacity of navies to influence world events through control of seaborne trade was profoundly affected by nineteenth-century developments in economic theory, commercial organization and naval technology. Although the number of relevant documents from the nineteenth century are relatively few, the apparatus for study of naval strategy was significantly improved by the formation of the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) in 1904. Thereafter, until the Second World War, the question of belligerent rights at sea was under almost continuous scrutiny. The naval wars with France had been fought with the old mercantilist strategic tools. The resultant collateral damage to Britain had been a declaration of war by the United States in 1812 while Napoleon's'Continental System'had even more disastrous consequences for the French Empire. From that time, questions about belligerent rights were the most divisive issue in Anglo-American relations, and the degree of attention the British government had to devote to the legal restraints on naval strategy kept pace with the growing naval and economic potential of the United States, the only country in a position to pose a serious threat to British sea power. The focus of this collection is on the work during the years of peace in preparation for war, marked by a series of milestones: the need to find a modus vivendi with France on the eve of the Russian War; the first effort at recodification of prize law in the Declaration of Paris of 1856; the need to deal with the consequences of the American Civil War; the Declaration of London of 1909; the apparent effect of the use of economic controls to deny enemy access to supply on the outcome of the First World War; the formation of the League of Nations in 1919; and the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1927. The First World War vastly enhanced the prestige of naval blockade but circumstances during the Second World War correspondingly deflated the value accorded to it. Post Second World War the British government had to respond to the exercise of belligerent rights by other states on a number of occasions but in the nuclear age there was no longer any expectation that naval control of commerce could provide decisive protection of British interests. In any event, with the formation of the United Nations, the concept of neutrality all but disappeared and resolutions of the Security Council became all the law of belligerency which was required.

In the first major study of the Royal Canadian Navy's contribution to foreign policy, Nicholas Tracy takes a comprehensive look at the paradox that Canada faces in participating in a system of collective defence as a means of avoiding subordination to other countries. Created in 1910 to support Canadian autonomy, the Royal Canadian Navy has played an important role in defining Canada's relationship with the United Kingdom, the United States, and NATO. Initially involved with participation in Imperial and Commonwealth defence, the RCN's role shifted following the Second World War to primarily ensuring the survival of the NATO alliance and deflecting American influence over Canada. Tracy demonstrates the ways in which the Navy's priorities have realigned since the end of the Cold War, this time partnering with the US and NATO navies in global policing. Insightful, detailed, and grounded in solid historical scholarship, A Two-Edged Sword presents a complete portrait of the shifting relevance and future of a cornerstone of Canadian defence.

Anthony Lockwoods story is at the heart of the Georgian Navy though the man himself has never taken centre stage in its history. His naval career described by himself as twenty five years incessant peregrination followed a somewhat erratic course but almost exactly spanned the period of the French wars and the War of 1812. Lockwood was commended for bravery in action against the French; was present at the Spithead Mutiny; shipwrecked and imprisoned in France; appointed master attendant of the naval yard at Bridgetown, Barbados, during the year the slave trade was abolished; and served as an hydrographer before beginning his three-year marine survey of Nova Scotia and the Bay of Fundy. Against the odds he managed to finesse a treasury appointment as Surveyor General of New Brunswick and became the right hand man of the Governor, General Smyth.Deeply ingrained in his character, however, was a democratic determination that was out of step with the authoritarian character of the Navy and the aristocratic one of New Brunswick. His expectation of social justice verged on madness, and when he finally succumbed to lunacy it was in the defence of democracy. The turbulence of the times inspired Lockwood to stage a one-man coup detat which ended with him being jailed and shipped back to London to live out his days as a pensioner and mental patient. Truly a dramatic rise and a tragic fall.

This authoritative history chronicles the Royal Navy's decisive yet little-known victory over the French during the Seven Years'War. In the mid-18th century, with virtually no regular troops at home, Britain was especially vulnerable to the immanent threat of French invasion. In a cunning naval offensive, the British fleet under Admiral Edward Hawke intercepted French ships on their way to rendezvous with invasion troopships gathered at the mouth of the Loire. Unfairly overlook in history books, the Battle of Quiberon Bay not only spoiled the planned French invasion, but also established British naval dominance. Once under attack, the French changed course for Quiberon Bay, assuming the British would not follow them among its treacherous shoals in stormy weather. Yet Hawke pursued them under full sail. The French ships were destroyed, captured, run aground or scattered—while the British only suffered two ships run aground. In this insightful narrative, Nicholas Tracy studies the battle, its strategic consequences, and its effect on the war for North America.

From his first dramatic initiatives at the Battle of St. Vincent in 1797 to his last battle at Trafalgar in 1805, Horatio Nelson was a force to be reckoned with and a hero to his countrymen. This illuminating study of the battles that played such an important role in Napoleon's defeat also takes a close look at the admiral's art of naval warfare. It shows that Nelson was quick to adapt new ideas and technical developments. This prowess, and a remarkable ability to lead and a genius for making decisive moves, made him the consummate master of naval warfare. This newly revised edition provides the most up-to-date analysis of Nelson's victories available.