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Presented at the U.S. Army War College 23rd Annual Strategy Conference, 10-12 April 2012, Carlisle, PA.

As the withdrawal of U.S. and allied forces continues, the post-2014 allied manning and assistance levels in Afghanistan have yet to be defined. The Afghan national security forces -- soon to be 350,000 strong -- have grown in quantity and quality, but they will still need logistical support and financial aid, as well as advice on operations, training, and force management. Allied assistance will allow the United States to avoid the catastrophe that followed the end of the Soviet-Afghan war, when we turned our back on the Afghans and allowed the fighting there to be controlled by warlords supported by various regional powers, most notably, Pakistan. Blowing the endgame in Afghanistan could be as bad after 2014 as it was in the 1990s. Our interests dictate the need for a secure, independent, decent Afghanistan, an ally in the war on terrorism and a force for good in its troubled region. The United States and its allies must develop a plan to provide targeted economic and security assistance to Afghanistan after 2014. The 15:20 Program, calls for an allied commitment of 20 billion dollars per year, and more importantly, the stationing of 15,000 allied military personnel on the ground for military assistance, air and logistical support, and counterterrorist activities. Financially, this initial 20 billion dollar allied commitment will include 6 billion to support the Afghan National Security Forces, and 4 billion dollars for economic assistance to the government and people of Afghanistan. The remaining half of the funds will go for equipment and the support of allied men and women in uniform. The 15,000 personnel would include 6,000 unit and training advisors; and 4,000 headquarters, intelligence, and logistics personnel. The remaining 5,000 would be split among an international helicopter support unit, a Ranger-like quick reaction force to protect allied personnel and embassies, counterterrorist forces, and a robust air support element., Published in Small Wars Journal, 8 January 2012. The original document contains color images.

On January 31, 2007, just a few weeks after the surprise announcement that Robert Gates would replace Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense, Secretary Gates was briefed on military plans and the key role envisioned for him in the development of those plans. This was not a detailed briefing of the 50-plus contingency plans then in existence. It was an overview of the planning process itself and an introduction to the 15 or so top priority plans that the Secretary would review in greater detail in the months ahead. At the meeting, Secretary Gates confirmed his commitment to play an active role in the process for developing and reviewing plans. This would be a priority for him. As he saw it, involvement in the planning process was one of his core responsibilities as Secretary -- indeed, it is one of the few responsibilities of the Secretary enumerated in Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Whoever replaces Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense must be prepared to immerse himself in the DOD planning process. This article first considers some barriers to the Secretary's involvement in planning and then looks at the benefits of planning beyond just the production of plans. It next describes how the Adaptive Planning process improves civilian control of the military -- bringing military planning into tighter alignment with administration policies and priorities. After explaining the current plan development and review process, the article highlights the vital role that the Secretary plays in the planning process., Published in Joint Force Quarterly (JFQ), n62 p52-58, 3rd quarter 2011.

Today's global conflict environment is permeated by the existence of a diverse range of violent nonstate actors (VNSA). These groups utilize subversive means to exploit and disrupt the international system, frequently committing heinous acts of violence against innocent civilians in the process. Short of war, how can nation-states effectively counter the actions of VNSA? This paper examines the proposition that VNSA can be coerced by the threat or limited use of military force. By defining the problem, adapting strategy to the problem and assessing the historical record the author makes the case that coercion is a viable option for confronting VNSA.

The focal point of the war on terror has shifted from Baghdad to Kabul, from Mesopotamia to the Hindu Kush. It is in the United States' national interest to pursue a balanced counterinsurgency and state-building policy in Afghanistan. This policy -- neither cheap nor quick -- should be focused on the defeat of hardcore Taliban and its associated movements, which include al Qaeda, and the simultaneous creation of a capable and effective state in Afghanistan. There are no quick-fix or silver-bullet solutions to the problem. To accomplish this policy, we will have to pick up the pace and creativity of our efforts. We -- the United States and its coalition partners -- must do this with all deliberate speed and in close coordination with our efforts to support Pakistan. The urgency of strategic reform stems from one key fact of life: we are in serious (but not grave) trouble in Afghanistan. Violence is up, and despite a doubling of U.S. forces and the recreation of the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, security incidents have increased more than ten-fold since 2004. Last year, a provincial capital was attacked, and rumors of Taliban shadow governments in many provinces abound. President Hamid Karzai's approval rating has slipped -- by the most favorable estimates to around 50 percent. Inefficiency and corruption are rampant. Urged on by reports of collateral damage and civilian casualties, Afghans who rate U.S. performance as "good" or better have slipped to only a third of the population. Some suggest that we should just focus on what is important for us, counterterrorism, and not worry about state-building. In the world of academic theory, this might be possible -- but in reality, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, reconstruction, stabilization, and state-building in Afghanistan are all strands in the same rope. In the end, if we do not help to create a stable, decent Afghan state, our counterterrorism efforts will be required there perpetually., Published in Joint Force Quarterly, n54 p58-61, 3rd Quarter, Jul 2009.

Insurgent leaders commit strategic mistakes that can significantly retard their efforts, and if properly leveraged by counterinsurgent forces, may lead to the insurgents' defeat. Despite the pivotal role these mistakes play in the trajectory of internal conflicts, they have been afforded little attention in academic and practitioner literature. This article seeks to fill that void by establishing a typology of insurgent strategic errors, outlining a framework for understanding when certain mistakes are made, and offering a brief case study to help illustrate the typology and timing framework. Insurgent strategic mistakes come in two basic forms: "original sins" and "situational miscalculations." Original sins are fundamental errors in the initial design of an insurgency. This article, however, is concerned with situational miscalculations. These are mistakes that are made by insurgent leaders during the course of an insurgency and principally involve decisions regarding intermediate objectives and tactics to be employed. Most mistakes in this category have a common root in overreach. Simply put, insurgent leaders overestimate their own capacity with respect to the level of popular support for the movement and the government's capacity and willingness to respond in a forceful and effective manner. The 10 situational miscalculations commonly made by insurgent leaders that are discussed in this work are as follows: Imprudent Armed Actions, Zealotry, Dysfunctional Terror, Exporting Terror, Overreliance on External Support, Holding Ground, Conventional Orientation, High Stakes Offensive, Security Lapses, and Enmeshing in Crime. The article also explores the timing of mistakes and insurgent mistakes made in Iraq by al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Including the concept of insurgent mistakes in evolving counterinsurgency doctrine will enhance the counterinsurgent's ability to take advantage of insurgent mistakes while "playing for the breaks.", Published in Parameters, v39 n3, p49-64, Autumn 2009.

For the past eight decades, many progressive-minded airmen have argued that bombers offer a way to win wars more quickly and more cheaply than a reliance on surface forces. Vastly improved technology has reinforced the notion that bombing can achieve almost antiseptic results, and the idea of a near-bloodless victory has had a special appeal to Presidents as well as to Air Force pilots. That is not to say that progressive ideals have always dictated how America has used airpower. In some cases during the previous 80 years, progressive notions have remained dormant or been transformed; in others, they have been loudly articulated. Still, as the al-Zarqawi raid shows, they have never completely disappeared from the way American political and military leaders think about bombing. Thus, the progressive assumptions that have helped to shape the American approach to airpower merit close scrutiny. Airpower is a term that includes both lethal and nonlethal uses of military force above the Earth's surface, but in this article, the term denotes bombing, the lethal application that has triggered the greatest amount of debate regarding its utility. The article's purpose is threefold: first, to examine the progressive roots of American airpower and how they have helped mold bombing concepts during the past eight decades; second, to explore why and how wartime Presidents have periodically embraced progressive tenets and married them with their war aims; and third, to show that the central premise of progressive airpower -- that bombing is a rational, just military instrument because it makes war cheaper, quicker, and less painful for all sides than surface combat -- is a flawed notion that frequently undercuts American political objectives and helps to achieve the antithesis of the desired results., Published in the Joint Force Quarterly, v49 p24-31, 150-160 [19 p], 2nd Quarter 2008. The original document contains color images. All DTIC reproductions will be in black and white.

This reports contains a presentation with the Department of Defense and USAID(United States Agency for International Development). There is a greater understanding through training, joint conferences, and senior/technical staff visits. Showing interests in programs held in Africa, the mid-East and Euopean countries major risks can be identified and resolution gained. With DOD's contributions there will be secure/stable environments that remain critical for successful foreign assistance. Building professional/accountable militaries will improve the security of local populations in unsecured regions., Presented at the 2008 Topical Symposium: Meeting Complex Challenges Through National Security Reform, held at Fort Lesley J. McNair, Washington, DC on 16-17 Oct 2008. The original document contains color images.

Much has changed in the 50 years since Samuel Huntington wrote "The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations." The prospect of a large standing army in peacetime is no longer viewed as an aberration but as the normal state of affairs. Furthermore, this force is no longer conscript-based, but totally professional; Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, and Marines are all volunteers, adequately paid, and many serve full careers through retirement. Despite the shift away from a manpower system based on civilian-soldiers serving short enlistments, the officer corps is not viewed as a threat to society. Although this is the product of the officer corps and society's acceptance of Huntington's argument, his model remains trapped in time; it does not allow for adaptation of the officer corps as the world changes. In addition, Huntington's model does not account for Service differences and inter-Service rivalry since it treats the Services as monolithic. It is important to have a working model of profession for the officer corps because neither society nor the officer corps is enamored with the implications of the alternatives. The author begins with the traditional works on concepts of profession within the military -- Samuel Huntington's "The Soldier and the State" and Morris Janowitz's "The Professional Soldier" -- to establish the foundation of military officership as a profession. He then turn to Andrew Abbott's "The System of Professions," paying particular attention to Abbott's major concept that professions are dynamic, competitive, and evolving in a world of changing jurisdictions. The resulting descriptive model of profession provides a new perspective for studying the evolution, or transformation, within the individual Service officer corps, inter-Service competition, as well as changing concepts of war and combatants., Pub. in Joint Force Quarterly, n45, p104-110, 2nd Quarter 2007.

For planners and bureaucrats, Afghanistan and Iraq appear to present a puzzle. In Afghanistan, on one hand, we had little time for planning; we did lots of innovative things on the cheap; our relatively small, international force has taken few casualties; we have had great local and international support; and we are, by most accounts, on the way to a good outcome. On the other hand, in Iraq, we had over a year to plan; our national policy has been expensive and often unimaginative; a relatively large, primarily American force has taken over 18,000 casualties, most of them in the so-called postconflict phase; we have had severe problems with local and international support; and the outcome, although looking up, is still in doubt. A wag might conclude from the above that Americans should avoid planning at all costs. While the wag's conclusion is flawed, problems in planning indeed contributed to serious shortcomings connected with Operation Iraqi Freedom. Successful innovation and favorable circumstances on the ground made the war in Afghanistan markedly easier than the one in Iraq, but the planning problems in both cases have had much in common with other complex contingencies in recent years (Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo). All of these cases have demonstrated the limitations of our stovepiped, single agency planning systems. Thus, in the future, we will have to adapt planning to a dynamic security environment and numerous challenges. Not only will we have to do better in mid-range interagency planning, but we will also have to develop and refine new capabilities to deal with the nonmilitary aspects of contingencies. In turn, this will require changes in the organizational cultures of the Armed Forces and the Department of State. The first step in understanding this challenge will be to appreciate the environment in which it will take place., Published in Joint Force Quarterly, n41, p10-14, 2nd Quarter 2006.

Sunni Islam is a big tent, and there always have been insiders and outsiders within Sunnism playing out their rivalries with clashing philosophies. Throughout the past century, the most important of these clashes have occurred between Sunni reformers and the traditional Sunni clerical establishment. The ideology espoused today by al Qaeda and similar groups can be traced directly from the 19th-century founders of modernist reform in Sunnism. Al Qaeda's leading thinkers are steeped in these reformers' long struggle against the establishment. The teaching of the reformers has been heterodox and revolutionary from the beginning; that is, the reformers and their intellectual descendants in al Qaeda are the outsiders of today's Sunni world. For the most part this struggle has been waged in Egypt, Sunni Islam's center of gravity. On one side of the debate, there is Cairo's Al-Azhar, a seminary and university that has been the center of Sunni orthodoxy for a thousand years. On the other side, al Qaeda's ideology has its origins in late-19th century efforts in Egypt to reform and modernize faith and society. As the 20th century progressed, the Sunni establishment centered on Al-Azhar came to view the modernist reform movement as more and more heterodox. It became known as "Salafism," for the supposedly uncorrupted early Muslim predecessors ("salaf," plural "aslaf") of today's Islam. The more revolutionary tendencies in this Salafist reform movement constitute the core of today's challenge to the Sunni establishment, and are the chief font of al Qaeda's ideology. This article focuses on the following topics: A Century of Reformation; Theology and Politics: Ibn Taymiyya; Muslim Rationalist: Al-Afghani; Sunni Reformers: Abduh and Ridha; Al-Banna and the Muslim Brotherhood; Reform Movements beyond Sunnism's Core; Sayyid Qutb; Mustafa, Zawahiri, and Bin Laden; Al Qaeda Strategy Today; Overcoming Class Conflicts; Saudi Arabia; and Strategic Implications for the United States., Published in Parameters, U.S. Army War College Quarterly, v35 n1, p69-80, Spring 2005.

The focus of this paper is the Army's Strategic Readiness System (SRS), a relatively new system the Army is in the process of implementing to more effectively measure readiness of individual Army units and the collective readiness of the Army as an institution. I believe the study of SRS is instructive for several reasons relevant to NWC Course 5603. It provides real-world examples of the course's framework of people, organization and process and SRS remains both a topical and contentious issue within the Army. As I discussed when getting approval for this topic, although there has been some inter-agency coordination with the Department of Defense (DoD) and Congress, implementing SRS is primarily an example of intra-agency challenges because it is so different from the long-standing readiness reporting system the Army has had for decades.

The world may be on the verge of a new era of warfare, one where battles are not fought only within the biosphere of the Earth, but also in the space surrounding it. Recent conflicts have shown the tremendous advantages conferred upon those who have the advantage of space-based assets, helping forces navigate, communicate and spy upon their enemies. Some argue that fighting in space itself is inevitable, while others hold that space should be maintained as a sanctuary, free of weapons. In discussing the expanding role of the military in space, the term weaponization implies an increase in the capability to conduct warfare in, from, or through space. It is appropriate to use the term weaponization, rather than militarization, because both the United States and Russia have already militarized space. Since man's earliest days in space, intelligence and communications satellites have had military missions. What space has not been, at least to this point, is weaponized. The purpose of this paper is to explore the arguments for and against the weaponization of space, and the political implications involved. The methodology of this paper will be to summarized both sides of this argument and present the key political challenges at the strategic level. I hope to convince the reader that after consideration of both arguments, it seems to be in the best interest of the United States to advocate a treaty banning space-based weapons entirely. Given the current international climate of antipathy toward weaponizing space, such a treaty is entirely plausible. Admittedly, space-based weapons are probably inevitable in the long term, however their eventual deployment can probably be delayed for decades, If not longer, with a carefully written treaty.

Did the fundamental nature of national security change with the collapse of the Soviet Union? Can the spread of western values, the rewards of free market economies, and collective security eventually afford the world sufficient security? Is it time now to throw the old playbooks out and start to uphold Woodrow Wilson's vision of the world? The answer to each of these questions is distinctly no. Many of the problems we see around the world today -- inter-ethnic genocide; random acts of political violence; corruption or malfeasance leading to poverty; and regional hegemonists, to name but a few -- morally outrage the core values of most Americans. Unfortunately, tragedies like these, as dreadful as they are, cannot be prevented, only controlled. Herein lies the crux of the debate between idealists and realists. Though world conditions are different now, the basic assumptions and tenets that differentiate idealists from realists remain the same as they have for nearly two centuries. This paper will test five basic assumptions pertaining to the international security system against present conditions. It argues that realism is the optimal choice for the present setting and ultimately proposes some guideposts for development of a realist strategy for the United States.

We barely stopped to celebrate the end of the Cold War. First, the Berlin Wall came down in 1989. Two years later the Soviet Union dissolved. But our national security strategists took no time off to party. Instead, they issued dour warnings about the new, more dangerous and complicated world before us. The new threats included uncontrolled nuclear weapons in the Ukraine and Kazakhstan, weapons of mass destruction hidden somewhere in Iraq, anarchy and starvation in Somalia, continued support of terrorism from Iran, thwarting of the people's will in Haiti and ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia. The same grim and pessimistic realism that won the Cold War, we were told, would be more necessary than ever in this dangerous new era. Realistic pessimism has tended to be the prevailing attitude and philosophy for national security strategists in the 20th century. Idealists and optimists have not fared well: Wilson and the League of Nations, the disarmament conferences of the 1920s, British pacifists and America Firsters in the run-up to World War II, "Ban the Bomb" activists in the 1950s, Jimmy Carter in the 1970s. All have been ridiculed for naive and ineffectual idealism and/or optimism. But is it foolish to be an optimist as we close out this century? Not at all. The most striking feature of the world in recent times has been the demise of the dictator. This was most clearly articulated by Francis Fukuyama in his landmark 1992 book, The End of History and the Last Man. He said the worldwide trend towards liberal, capitalist democracies is no fluke or passing phenomenon. Drawing on the works of Immanuel Kant and Georg Hegel, Fukuyama postulated that neither a series of random events nor endlessly repeating cycles, but rather a straight line evolution in the direction of capitalism and democracy. In short, there is a direction to history and it is going our way.

The purpose of this paper is to assess the non-violent instruments of statecraft that will likely be of greater and lesser value to the United States over the next ten years. Rather than trying to make sweeping generalizations that could apply to all of the United States' foreign relations, this paper will examine the value of non-violent instruments of statecraft to one critical concern: United States relations with China. The rationale for this case study approach is that the value of each of the non-violent instruments of statecraft can vary greatly depending on the context. Instruments that are appropriate for relations between the United States and a friendly, democratic, industrialized market economy country may not be as appropriate for relations with a non-aligned, authoritarian, developing country.

Public diplomacy, already a substantial tool in America's foreign policy, could become a more effective instrument in the next ten years. Much of its potential success rides on a bureaucratic change that takes place on October 1, 1999. The U.S. Information Agency, hitherto an independent "sister agency" to the State Department, will become fully integrated into State. If conceptualized and managed properly, the reorganization could lead to more public diplomacy successes.

The (neo)realist balance of power model stipulates that states seek to provide for their own security in an essentially anarchic international system by balancing the power of other states that pose or could pose a threat to their national interests. Consistent with that proposition, this essay endeavors to show that the United States' current status as the world's sole superpower is impelling other states, including some U.S. allies, to seek to balance U.S. power. This dynamic likely will contribute to the reemergence of a multipolar or bipolar world in the 21st Century. The U.S. should prepare for this likelihood. This thesis raises several questions that will be addressed in turn. First, what other states view the U.S. as a current or potential threat such that they seek to balance U.S. power, and why? Second, how do these states seek to balance U.S. power? Third, what do these efforts portend for the nature of the next century's international system? Finally, what are the implications for U.S. statecraft?

The United States stands alone at a critical crossroad in the evolutionary and revolutionary journey of the nation-state system. As the sole surviving superpower, at the close of the most war-ravaged century in the history of mankind, we possess the opportunity to decide which path we will pursue into the next millennium. Our choices are basic: lead, follow, or get out of the way. Superficially, all of these choices appear as realistic philosophies of statecraft; however, a deeper analysis reveals that assuming the leadership role is fundamentally idealistic. Considering the savage history of the nation-state system, the United States has an obligation to pursue a philosophy of statecraft that promotes our humanistic values if we are to survive and progress as a race of people in the global community.

While realists and liberals hold fundamentally different world views, there is one area in which they both agree: the interactions among states in the post-Cold War world will be extremely complex. It is this complexity which defies attempts by realists and liberals to simply make the world fit into existing paradigms and frameworks. The purpose of this essay is to introduce the concept of Webs of Interaction as an organizing framework for understanding the post-Cold War environment and examine the strategic implications of this framework as an alternative to existing realist and liberal paradigms.

Of all the momentous consequences of the collapse of the Soviet Union, none is as significant for the geostrategist as the emergence of the United States as the world's sole superpower. America's unrivaled primacy in the post-Cold War era has sparked comparisons with classic Rome and ancient China and even prompted the French to coin the new phrase "hyperpower." By every traditional measure of power, both "hard" and "soft," the U.S. towers above all other nations. The American military is unsurpassed in technological sophistication and unique in its capacity to reach into any region of the globe. The American economy is the world's largest and most productive. English has become the language of choice in science, diplomacy, and world business, while American media, popular culture and computer technology have penetrated virtually every society regardless of geographic boundaries. And the fundamental precepts of free market democracy are now championed as ideals by new-found converts on every continent. As we approach the end of the 20th century, the U.S. appears increasingly like Gulliver in the land of the Lilliputians, and Henry Luce's famous declaration of "the American Century" now rings truer than ever before. The paradox of power after the Cold War, illustrated most vividly by the specter of a muscle-bound America, bursting with inherent capability yet unable to achieve many of its foreign policy objectives, can be explained largely by three factors: the changed nature of the international system; the changed dynamic of U.S. statecraft, and the enduring phenomenon of power balancing among states.

In Fundamentals of Statecraft, we have studied various and competing models for examining international relations: realism and neorealism, idealism and neoidealism, constructivism, functionalism, world federalism, etc., and it seems new models are being introduced every day. More is not always better, however. The true value of any new international relations model lies in its practical consequences: that is, the ability of the model to expose previously unknown or ill-considered opportunities and risks. Such a philosophy, or method, for measuring the value of a model is referred to as pragmatism.

Air power is both a promise and a problem. The promise is that strategic bombing may shorten wars by striking at the heart of the enemy and sapping either his will or his ability to continue hostilities. In theory, aircraft have a more direct approach to an opponent's center of gravity and are less susceptible, once air superiority has been attained, to defensive counter measures. The result should be a faster, and therefore more humane, end to the conflict. But the problem with bombing, aside from still unanswered questions about its actual effectiveness, is that in both planning and execution, it tends to blur or erase the distinction between combatants and civilians. At the very least, collateral damage claims unintended victims, especially in urban areas. While precision weapons may reduce the likelihood of noncombatant deaths, air power doctrine itself, which since the First World War has legitimated attacking enemy population centers, makes them all but certain. This unpleasant fact leaves strategists with a dilemma. The potentially most effective use of air power also may be the most morally questionable. In wars for national existence, such as the Second World War, the suffering of innocents may be proportionate to necessary military objectives. But in the limited conflicts that have been fought since the end of the cold war, civilian deaths, especially if they outnumber combatants', may undermine the political influence sought. In the late twentieth century, the problem with strategic bombing may eclipse its promise.

A recently published survey on civil-military relations revealed that a large majority of military officers claim an affiliation with the Republican Party. The finding suggests that officers have violated their professional ethic by abandoning the tradition of political neutrality. This paper first examines the reasons for the Republican bias, which include the conservatism of the GOP vis-a-vis the Democratic Party and institutional changes within the military. Second, it assesses the effect of the Republican bias on officer professionalism. I argue that the officer corps' voting preference does not constitute partisan activity and is not, by itself, harmful to professionalism and civil-military relations., The original document contains color images.

"We've decided to destroy the Soviet Union; bombing begins in five minutes."The above unintended, on-the-air, radio remark made by President Reagan in the 1980s captures the frightening aspect of the Cold War and just how close the world may have come to total annihilation. However, since this destruction never came in the form of a Hot War, the Cold War has been viewed by many as something very different from real war. But was it really? What would the renowned thinker, Carl von Clausewitz, who defined "What is War", have to say about our modern day Cold War? Could he explain it? Would it fit the nature of war as he theorized war should be? In this short paper, I will explore and analyze the Cold War in light of three key Clausewitzian elements and show that indeed, the Cold War was a real war. *Wars Are Violent. Was the Cold War period really non-violent? Does blood and intensity in war matter to Clausewitz? *Wars Are a Test of Wills. Was the Cold War a battle of wills? How important is will to Clausewitz? Can it be sustained for half a century? *Wars Are Won in the Minds of Men. Why did the Cold War end? Does Clausewitz's thoughts on how will can be broken explain what actually occurred in the Soviet Union?

The current Annual Certification process is a series of formalized reviews, conducted each year with multiple participants from various government and contractor organizations, culminating in a written certification letter from the Secretaries of Defense and Energy to the President that the nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable in the absence of underground testing. The process serves to provide the President, and also the Secretary of Defense through Department of Defense participation, a measure of confidence that the nuclear deterrent is still safe and militarily effective., The original document contains color images.

During 1995, the Administration and Congress wrestled over the Administration's legislative proposal to transfer excess U.S. Navy frigates to U.S. friends and allies. This case study does not concern one of the great national security issues of the late twentieth century, like the Persian Gulf War or NATO's intervention in the Balkans, nor does it involve the very highest levels of the government, such as the President, his Cabinet-level advisers, the Speaker of the House of Representatives or the Majority Leader of the Senate. Rather, it is about a second tier national security issue that engages primarily two departments and decision-makers up to the level of Under Secretary and Committee Chairman. Its modest dimensions notwithstanding, this case study provides insight into how an Administration reacts to an unexpected Congressional rebuff and how Executive and Legislative branches interact to achieve workable compromises.

The Information Age challenges old paradigms and severely tests the government's ability to devise appropriate and effective national policies. The federal government s encryption export policy highlights a complex information age issue involving seemingly insurmountable conflicts between national security, law enforcement, privacy, and business interests. Encryption employs mathematical algorithms, implemented in either hardware or software, to encode or scramble a sequence of data. Although cryptography has been used for centuries, the rise of the Internet and electronic commerce pushed the issue of encryption control to the forefront of public debate during the 1990s. Formerly the near-exclusive domain of governments, the majority of today's encryption products flow from private industry backed by private funding for use in the private sector. While encryption rose to increasing importance in cyberspace to secure communications and establish trustworthiness, the federal government continued to follow the traditional national security paradigm of export controls. A series of policy decisions by the Clinton Administration on encryption export controls during the 1990s ignited a heated public discourse and a continuing search for a balance between competing interests. The Administration s pursuit of balance apparently reached its end-state with an announcement on September 16, 1999 to reverse US export restrictions on strong encryption, a radical departure from previous reliance on export controls. The federal government's search for balance among competing interests in its encryption export policy illustrates the substantial difficulties facing policy makers in the Information Age. While the search for policy balance appears to prove the ultimate adequacy of the Constitutional framework and the policy making process to deal with complex issues in cyberspace, it clearly highlights the imperative for national policy makers to recognize Information Age realities. 7

The scene is set in the Elysian Fields, the fields of honor and afterworld for Earth's warriors. This is not a boisterous Valhalla, however: more in keeping with the traditions of the Greek afterworld, of all arrivals there is required an appropriate atonement for earthly actions. The act of atonement meted out to Major General Carl von Clausewitz (of the nineteenth century Prussian Army) is to present over and over again his unfinished manuscript, On War, to his peers for their comment. Von Clausewitz's interlocutor on this occasion is Sun-zi (Master Sun), who is perhaps Sun Wu, legendary general of fifth century B.C. China and author of (or inspiration for) The Art of War. The specified atonement for Sun-zi is, apparently, to have his actual identity obscured.

For most of the past two decades, the U.S. accepted Indonesia's incorporation of East Timor without acknowledging that a valid act of self-determination had taken place. That formulation arose from a 'realist' evaluation that Indonesia was key to U.S. interests in Southeast Asia, that Indonesia's sovereignty over East Timor was a fact not likely to be reversed, and that legitimate human rights concerns would be most effectively addressed within the context of the larger Washington-Jakarta relationship. This year, a U.N.-sponsored referendum brought a 78 percent East Timorese vote for independence. Resulting pressures eventuated in a reluctant Indonesia s acceptance of international peacemakers. While Washington was not central to most of those developments, it was supportive, and at times instrumental, for them. This was an apparent change from the earlier policy. This paper briefly recalls (from the author s memory) the U.S. policy process of the early '90s, fast-forwards to 1999 to describe current players and their influences (based on interviews with participants), and evaluates how well the 'process' has performed this year. It appears that American decision-makers in 1999 were primarily influenced by events and by our Australian ally. It is less clear that Washington overtly considered all U.S. interests. A more U.S.-centered approach may well have come to a very similar outcome regarding East Timor. Still, in general, the U.S. best supports its interests by engaging in a more structured strategic analysis and a longer-term view.

In 1992, presidential hopeful William Jefferson Clinton, in what Warren Christopher called the toughest foreign policy rhetoric of the campaign, criticized then President Bush for failing to tie China's Most Favored Nation (MFN) status to its human rights record. In 1994, despite its poor progress in human rights issues, President Clinton announced his intention to support continuation of China's MFN status. This paper examines this sea change in the Clinton presidency. It studies why this potential superpower rival was awarded MFN status despite legitimate concerns and President Clinton's best intentions to the contrary. It also critiques the Governmental Politics model with respect to this decision and finally, proposes a new decision process model to evaluate economic, political and contextual influences on government decisions.

Not only has Saddam denied the West a complete victory, he has emerged as one of the strongest of the post-war leaders. Since the 1991 Desert Storm, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, King Hussein of Jordan, and Sheik Isa bin Sulman al Khalifa of Bahrain have passed away. George Bush, Yitzhak Shamir, and Maggie Thatcher were defeated in reelection bids, and Sheik Khalifa bin Hamad al Thani of Qatar was deposed by his son. Nearly every nation of the United Nations authorized, American-led coalition has witnessed a change in leadership. Yet in October 1999 Saddam Hussein remains firmly ensconced in power in Baghdad directing challenges against the Gulf War cease-fire accords. Iraq's strategy has effectively reduced the UN Weapons Monitoring system to shambles, ebbed world disdain for the Iraqi regime, and eroded fears about its WMD schemes. In this decade-long conflict against the West, of which the Gulf War was merely a phase, Saddam is emerging as the real winner.

Few public policy decisions rival the degree of angst created by military base closures. Among advocates and critics alike, the mere mention of the acronym "BRAC" evokes vehement reactions on Capitol Hill, just as it does in the White House, the Pentagon and civilian locales near military installations. This paper will examine the unique evolution of the controversial, but essential, decision process behind military base closures. In the book, Essence of Decision, Graham Allison proposes three models for analyzing the decision-making process: the rational actor, organizational behavior and government-bureaucratic politics. A fourth model, that of psychology, is also instructive in that it considers the influence of uncertainty, ambition and values in decision-making dynamics. The evolution of the base realignment and closure (BRAC) process is a paragon of how rational, organizational, political and psychological factors are deeply embedded within public policy decisions. Precisely because sizing and shaping of military force structure and infrastructure have profound implications for myriad stakeholders, what should be a rational decision in the context of broad national security interests is anything but.

Developing, executing and supervising national security strategy and policy requires coherence, consistency, and synchronization. Constitutional checks and balances make the effort to achieve these standards a complex task. The National Security Council (NSC), as outlined in Presidential Decision Directive 2 dated 20 January 1993, does a very good job gathering proponents for key elements of national power and setting general guidelines for their interaction in pursuit of effective policy within Constitutional strictures. Very good may be the best for which one can hope in a system created to diffuse power, but protection and furtherance of national interests in an increasingly small, interconnected world demands we try to do better. Practical theory for executive branch decision-making that increases rigor and synchronization within the restrictions imposed by intergovernmental separation of powers is absolutely vital. To be durable as well as practical, theory must have the flexibility to account for varied presidential managerial style. Combined with formal training of both political appointees and government employees in national security matters and procedures, practical theory will result in better and more coherent national security strategy and policies.

This report examines the historical events, along with actions and decisions of key players in the U.S. government that led to American involvement in the Persian Gulf War. It uses a modified version of A Practitioner's Framework for Decision Making to discuss the roles played by the key participants in the national security decisions during the time period leading up to the beginning of the war. The American Government goes to war reluctantly and only after a comprehensive consideration of the consequences. The decision to fight was a logical result of an institutionalized process that involved the executive and legislative branches of the U.S. Government.

The U.S. seems to have developed a pattern of intervention since the end of the Cold War--actually adopting a new way of war. Absent a peer competitor, America has the ability and desire to intervene in conflicts that have little to do with vital national interests. Consequently, the U.S. has chosen to wage war, pursuing results that are not critical to the nation's strategic goals. This essay will draw the connection from strategic decision making to the tactical execution of America's interests while highlight the cost of intervening and the impact of strategic decisions from the perspective of military commanders at the tactical level. Additionally, this article will show commanders differing opinions and assumptions when it comes to accepting risks and their impacts on mission accomplishment. Finally, I make recommendations for incorporating risk assumptions at all command levels in future combat operations ensuring assumptions are explicitly stated and received., The original document contains color images.

NATO's war against Serbia, officially dubbed Operation Allied Force, resulted in a clear and compelling victory. Serbian President Milosevic publicly conceded defeat and agreed to NATO demands for withdrawal of Serb forces from Kosovo, return of the refugees, and insertion of a NATO-led international peacekeeping force. Moreover, during the 78-day operation, substantial damage was inflicted on Serb military capability, industry, and infrastructure, with some casualty estimates exceeding 5,000 Serb soldiers, while NATO maintained an astonishing record of zero combat casualties. In this first true combat engagement of NATO's existence, the Alliance displayed an extraordinary degree of political unity, coalition interoperability, and overall military effectiveness. Yet, despite this impressive performance, the war has sparked a firestorm of controversy among American national security strategists and has been the subject of widespread criticism from across the political spectrum. The operation has been characterized variously as a fiasco, a perfect failure, and a miscalculation that ranks with the Bay of Pigs and Vietnam. Even the few examples of more charitable commentary have levied severe judgments on the war's dark victory and ambiguous results and its noble effort left more than half undone. In stark contrast to the exuberant reaction of Secretary Hay and most other Americans to the Spanish-American war a century prior, Kosovo has engendered an almost consensus response of consternation if not outright condemnation.

Lieutenant General Sir Michael Rose, former commander of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia, reportedly coined the expression "crossing the Mogadishu line" while describing the key dilemma faced by UN troops in Bosnia: how do armed peacekeepers maintain the appearance of neutrality in the midst of civil war while achieving the political objectives for which they were sent? Indeed, when one considers the difficulties the United States has experienced in a long string of recent interventions, to include Lebanon, Somalia, Haiti, and the Balkan wars of Bosnia and Kosovo, the historical record suggests that the solution to this dilemma has yet to be identified.

It may seem odd to ask whether Clausewitzian strategy can explain the success of the rebellious colonies in the American Revolutionary War. After all, Clausewitz was almost entirely concerned with warfare on the European continent and, most particularly, with the changes brought about by Napoleon's military campaigns. On War barely mentions the American Revolutionary War. The question may seem even less appropriate if one narrows the focus, as I intend to do, to George Washington and his strategy. Washington is not best remembered as a military commander. His Revolutionary War record is often given scant attention or is criticized as lacking in major victories (except at Yorktown, with a great deal of French assistance). Sometimes, Washington is even taxed with military incompetence (as in the defeat and near capture of himself and his forces on Long Island and Manhattan). And yet, to focus on Washington the President or Washington the battlefield commander is to risk missing his significance as a strategist. On this level, Washington excelled -- and the particular way in which he did so shows how Clausewitz' theory of war can be used as a framework for evaluating conflicts quite different from those that were the focus of the Prussian theorist's attention.

"War is...a wonderful trinity, composed of the original violence of its elements, hatred and animosity, which may be looked upon as blind instinct; of the play of probabilities and chance, which make it a free activity of the soul; and of the subordinate nature of a political instrument, by which it belongs purely to the reason." Carl Von Clausewitz wrote this famous definition of the nature of "real war" in the early 1800's and the meaning and implications of this definition have been vigorously discussed by political and military strategists ever since. Continuing this tradition, I assert the contemporary validity of the Clausewitzian definition of the nature of war by highlighting its timelessness and broad applicability to all forms of human conflict. Secondly, I graphically present an alternative intellectual model of the trinity designed to increase the trinity's objective validity when examining the wider context of contemporary conflict in advance of war. Finally, I close by more generally applying the alternative Clausewitzian model to a validation of administration policy on International Public Information as documented in Presidential Decision Directive 68.

As of today, no definitive work on space power theory, comparable to the writings of Clausewitz, Mahan, Mitchell (and others in their respective fields), is recognized by military theorists. Though most preliminary space power writing in the United States has centered on space as a logical extension of air power theory (if for no other apparent reason than the organizational location of most space forces within the U.S. Air Force), such treatment is akin to early Army characterizations of aircraft as a tool of the artillery or signal corps, restricted to supporting ground operations. While space is certainly a unique operational setting that has yet to be fully exploited, it shares many characteristics with the sea as an arena for commerce, transport, observation and conflict. In fact, because of the distances involved, the importance of constantly safeguarding the free flow of global commerce (e.g. information) in both peace and war, and the more or less permanent basing of key civil and military assets in orbit, space power, missions and responsibilities have many analogs to the sea. Therefore, one would do well to consider first the earlier work of sea power theorists, specifically A.T. Mahan, when attempting to develop a theory of space power and to develop strategies for space control.

Space, as the newest theater of combat, is also the most rapidly developing. The nature and character of space warfare 50 years from now may be wholly unrecognizable to those of us alive today. It would be foolish to try to freeze the nature of space warfare today within the confines of any theory, let alone one a century old. Nevertheless, Julian Corbett's explication of the relationship between sea and land power does give us important insights into how space power relates to other military tools, at least for the coming years. Just as Corbett showed the potentials and limitations of naval power in what was to be a century dominated by great continental powers, his theory suggests both the contribution that space power can make to an overall military campaign and the new vulnerabilities it introduces in so doing. The task of space strategy will be to maximize the former while minimizing the latter.