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This paper proposes a service-oriented manufacturing strategy in a two-echelon supply chain with random demand. When there is no inventory for the retailer to meet demand, customers can choose to order products through the retailer and products will be delivered to them by the manufacturer directly in the promised time, and we call this delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing. We employ a Stackelberg game-theoretic model to analyse the procurement quantity and delivery time decisions by the manufacturer as the leader and the retailer as the follower. Using the performance of the pure-manufacturing strategy as a benchmark, our main results follow. First, the equilibrium strategies of the two players are obtained. Clear decision rules are also given. Second, delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing can be an effective way to reduce the holding cost of the retailer. Third, we describe the customer loss caused by waiting and find how the manufacturer influences procurement quantity of the retailer through the decision of delivery time. Finally, delivery service in service-oriented manufacturing cannot always improve the profit of the manufacturer and the retailer. We give guidance for managers to provide it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Behaviour-based pricing (BBP) is commonly observed in the information goods industry. Information goods providers typically sell multi-version products and have implemented different BBP strategies for their products. However, previous research on BBP is mostly limited to single-version products, which may not effectively guide practical decision-making regarding multi-version products. This gap sparks interest in how BBP can be applied to multi-version information goods. We show that the equilibrium pricing strategy depends on the quality gap between the products and how much consumers and the firm value future benefits. The firm should implement BBP for both high- and low-quality products if it values future benefits more than consumers do. If consumers value future benefits more than the firm, the firm should not implement BBP for either product. Moreover, when the firm and consumers value future benefits equally, the firm should only practice BBP for the low-quality product. Our calculations of consumer surplus and social welfare reveal that the absence of BBP doesn't always lead to the maximum benefits for consumers and society. Interestingly, if the firm values future benefits more than its consumers do, applying BBP only to high-quality products or both products may lead to higher consumer surplus and social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The emergence of blockchain creates a new possibility to solve the fraudulent problem of financial supply chain. We construct a game model to verify the strategic choice of the financial supply chain in an uncertain environment. We derive the equilibrium results and investigate the strategic choice of blockchain service for the financial supply chain. We also study the product price, product quantity, financing interest rate, and supply chain risk transmission, respectively. Specifically, when the blockchain is not considered, the financial model of supply chain led by core enterprises depends on firms' reputation. The retail and wholesale prices increase when fraud occurs or consideration payment increases. Besides, the market stability reduces price performance. In the blockchain environment, the strategic choices are divided into two cases: when choosing the core enterprise model and the third-party service model, the third-party service model is the equilibrium strategy; when choosing the third-party service model and the platform model, the platform model is the equilibrium strategy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The circular economy has become a promising solution to electronic product reuse. The advanced technology of Industry 4.0 drives the recycling platform (RP) to carry out a variety of new business modes, which are important ways to realise a circular economy. In this article, we consider a monopolistic RP under trade-in for new mode, leasing mode, or their mixed mode, respectively. We develop a discrete-time game with infinite periods and use the Markov decision and Bellman equation to obtain the consumer's perfect equilibria consumption strategies. By comparing different modes under RP's profits, consumer surplus, and environment impact perspectives, we find that when the durability of leased refurbished product exceeds that of the resold refurbished ones, the mixed mode is better than the trade-in for new mode, which can achieve more platform profits, more consumer surplus, and less environment impact. By considering the three perspectives together, the mixed mode is not always better than the other two modes. The mixed mode is optimal only when the durability of leased refurbished one is relatively high. We also conduct extensive numerical research, show optimal service mode under three perspectives, and extend the effects of different qualities of recycled used products on optimal mode. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We prove that the PoA of First Price Auctions is 1 -- 1/e² ≈ 0.8647, closing the gap between the best known bounds [0.7430, 0.8689]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a (non) zero-sum differential game between two insurers and determine a robust reinsurance contract from joint interests of the insurers and the reinsurer under the framework of Stackelberg differential game, that is, a hybrid stochastic differential game framework is introduced in this article. We assume that each party can invest in a financial market consisting of a risk-free asset and a risky asset whose price evolution follows a stochastic volatility model, and the reinsurer charges the premium according to both the expected value premium principle and the variance premium principle. Since the performance-related capital inflow or outflow feature is introduced, the insurers and reinsurer all aim to maximize their own time-inconsistent mean-variance criterion with delay. Using the dynamic programming approach, we derive the equilibrium investment strategy, the robust equilibrium reinsurance contract, and the corresponding equilibrium value functions under two premium principles with certain conditions, respectively. Some interesting properties of the equilibrium investment strategy are proved explicitly, and several numerical examples and sensitivity analysis are presented to demonstrate the effects of model parameters on the equilibrium reinsurance contract. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to describe reproductive ecology based on morphological aspects of Peckoltia oligospila in stream rapids, eastern Amazon. A total of 186 fish (75 males and 111 females) were collected. The sex and gonadal maturity stage of these specimens were obtained based on histological characteristics of the gonads. The sex ratio, gonado‐somatic index (GSI), relative frequency of the different maturity stages, size at first sexual maturation, condition factor of the population, and fluviometry were evaluated during the study. There was a significant female frequency during the study. The population exhibited positive allometric growth without differences between sexes. GSI and relative frequency showing a reproductive period synchronized in February, and the species exhibited parcelated spawning. L50 was estimated at 5.85 and 7.39 cm for females and males, respectively. There were significant differences in the condition factor only in females that showed a highest value in August. Thus, based on the results P. oligospila has an intermediate strategy between the opportunistic and equilibrium strategies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce a new solution concept for n -person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders' truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions. • A novel ascending auction provides flexible reporting requirements for bidders. • Balance between privacy preservation and speed of the ascending auction. • Simulations compare our auction with other ascending auctions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the short term after an emergency, the relief resources require some workers to distribute to various delivery sites through a self-organized cooperation. How to achieve a stable cooperation is an important issue of the self-organized resource distribution in emergency. This paper proposes a potential game theoretic formulation for the stable cooperation during resource distribution in Self-organized Emergency Management System (SEMS). In the potential game distribution model, the private utility function of each worker is defined based on the Aumann-Drèze value, which makes sure of the existence of Nash equilibrium and permutable equilibrium solutions in resource distribution. Then, we prove the non-decreasing and submodularity of the social utility function, ensuring that any Nash equilibrium is guaranteed at least 50% of suboptimality, and the best Nash equilibrium is the optimal solution. In this way, the optimal distribution scheme is transformed into the solution of Nash equilibrium, and the consistent control of individual rationality (maximizing the private utility) and system objective (maximizing the social utility) is realized. We take the COVID-19 epidemic in Changchun of China as a simulation of SEMS. It verifies that potential game is an efficient approach to obtain stable cooperation during self-organized resource distribution. Moreover, the number of workers and the possibility of workers choosing suboptimal decisions are key factors for forming stable cooperation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article captures the effects of technology diffusion on innovation under duopoly competition. With the game theory approach, some interesting results are achieved. First, technology diffusion stimulates innovation and firms launch innovation to share more market size. Second, firms under unilateral innovation launch less innovation than that under bilateral innovation. Finally, neither firms' innovation constitutes a Nash equilibrium and subsidy may transfer this equilibrium to a new equilibrium that both firms innovate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The connection between Average Daily Rate (ADR) and hotel room standard in both suburban and resort settings during high and low seasons remains an ongoing challenge. The purpose of this study is to craft practical cues for hotel managers to lean towards specific guiding cues for their effective decision-making of room rates. A study conducted on ADRs and guest comments from suburban and resort hotels across the United States from 2018 to 2023 utilized data from Smith Travel Research and TripAdvisor. Employing a vector error correction model and incorporating game theory, the research revealed that room standards are optimized in both types of accommodations when ADRs increase in resorts and decrease in suburban areas during peak seasons. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Security challenges in complex information technologies continue to grow and diversify. To improve network security, many researchers have explored the game theoretic approach as a hopeful modeling tool. Knowing that the attacker can take advantage of vulnerabilities and explore existing weaknesses in the network configuration to gain access to the system for a successful attack, our objective is to benefit from virtual machines' migration as a moving target defense technique and honeypot as a deceiving technique to increase the attack surface's dynamicity. This paper presents a game-theoretic framework for modeling attack-defense interaction. A model based on incomplete information game and attack graph is developed. Our main findings reveal in which case migration of virtual machines should be established in a architecture where a honeypot is deployed and identify the potential attack paths based on system security parameters. This provides network administrators with the ability to find unsecure nodes, avoid negative externality and more precisely inefficient migrations which impact the quality of service. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of the study is to evaluate the impact of social preferences, trust and behavioural norms on strategic choices made by economic agents using the framework of a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma (PD) game. The standard neoclassical economics model predicts that all players will choose a strategy of non-cooperation, establishing it as the Nash equilibrium. We examine how social preferences and behavioural norms influence the player's expectations from others and their own choices, by experimentally testing for the same using a 2 × 2 factorial design with the following three levels of partner selection arrangements: (i) game playing with stranger, (ii) face-to-face game playing with peer, and (iii) game playing with friend. The experimental results reveal significant deviations from the standard predictions of the one-shot PD game. The experimental data revealed that (i) players while interacting with a peer cooperated significantly more than playing with a stranger and (ii) players playing with a friend cooperated significantly more than playing with a peer. These changes in the social preferences of the players were further investigated in terms of trust/distrust and four behavioural norms—positive reciprocity, negative reciprocity, exploitation and altruism, and how these factors interact in influencing decision-making with respect to cooperation. JEL Classifications : C72, C91, D01, D91 [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study introduces a novel game-theoretic methodology to enhancing the optimization of Anti-Epileptic Drug (AED) selection for patients diagnosed with Juvenile Myoclonic Epilepsy (JME). The primary motivation is the need to enhance the treatment of JME by leveraging game theory principles to make informed decisions about AEDs. Within this framework, a novel cooperative Nash-based game model is proposed within the medical domain. It focuses on patients utilizing two distinct types of ADEs: Valproate (VPA) and Lamotrigine (LTG) to manage seizures while minimizing overall medical and non-medical expenses. The innovation lies in formulating a dynamic decision-making framework that integrates the patient's medical treatment selection, offering a unique Nash equilibrium decision under certain conditions. This work presents a patient-centered decision-making model to balance the trade-off between cost-based and drug-based contributions in epilepsy management. By linking medical decision-making through the equilibrium strategy, the study paves the way for personalized epilepsy treatment in JME management. Our model's application demonstrates that, under the equilibrium condition, the probability of selecting either VPA or LTG is 50%, indicating an equal preference for both drugs in managing JME. Sensitivity analyses on VPA and LTG parameters confirm the stability and reliability of this Nash equilibrium decision, reinforcing the model's applicability in clinical decision-making as well as assessing the stability and reliability of the Nash equilibrium decision in the treatment of JME. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the effect of product substitutability on subgame perfect Nash equilibrium pricing structures (Uniform vs. Two-part Pricing) in a duopoly where each firm chooses its pricing policy first and then decides the level of the strategic variables (unit price and fixed fee) associated with the chosen pricing policy to maximize its own profit. Previous studies on two-part pricing in a monopoly situation showed that two-part pricing yields higher profits than uniform pricing, and we show that two-part pricing is also a subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium at all degrees of product substitutability even in a duopoly situation. However, this paper shows that if the degree of substitutability is quite high, uniform pricing can also become a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy, although both firms can afford higher profits if both firms adopt two-part pricing. This paper also shows how the equilibrium unit price and fixed fee change as the product substitutability increases in each pricing structure and how the consumers in the market behave for these prices (purchase none, one of the products, or both). When both firms choose the two-part pricing policy, unit price and fixed fee show distinctive forms of U-shape and inverted U-shape as the substitutability increases, for which we explore the rationale. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper studies the endogenous formation of free trade agreements. There are four countries belonging to two types according to market demand and production technology. A unique strong Nash equilibrium exists for the coalition formation game. In equilibrium, two coalition structures may emerge: global free trade, wherein a single coalition encompassing all countries is established, or polarization, characterized by the formation of two symmetric agreements between the same type countries. The specific coalition structure that emerges in equilibrium depends on both the disparity in demand and the gap in unit cost of production between the two types of countries. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The security of wireless sensor networks is a hot topic in current research. Game theory can provide the optimal selection strategy for attackers and defenders in the attack-defense confrontation. Aiming at the problem of poor generality of previous game models, we propose a generalized Bayesian game model to analyze the intrusion detection of nodes in wireless sensor networks. Because it is difficult to solve the Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game by the traditional method, a parallel particle swarm optimization is proposed to solve the Nash equilibrium of the Bayesian game and analyze the optimal action of the defender. The simulation results show the superiority of the parallel particle swarm optimization compared with other heuristic algorithms. This algorithm is proved to be effective in finding optimal defense strategy. The influence of the detection rate and false alarm rate of nodes on the profit of defender is analyzed by simulation experiments. Simulation experiments show that the profit of defender decreases as false alarm rate increases and decreases as detection rate decreases. Using heuristic algorithm to solve Nash equilibrium of Bayesian game provides a new method for the research of attack-defense confrontation. Predicting the actions of attacker and defender through the game model can provide ideas for the defender to take active defense. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACT This article explores a decision‐making problem with partial information in a multi‐coalition game that involves both cooperation and competition. Considering heterogeneous players with general linear systems, we propose a distributed algorithm that employs average consensus mechanisms to estimate the gradient of the coalition function among players within each coalition and utilizes leader‐following protocols to estimate the actions of all players across multiple coalitions. Furthermore, to reduce communication costs, a dynamic event‐triggered mechanism (ETM) is introduced into the average consensus and leader‐following protocols. The ETM is asynchronous, eliminating the requirement for a global clock and allowing players to transmit information only when the triggering condition is satisfied. By the Lyapunov analysis, all actions asymptotically converge to the Nash equilibrium by the proposed algorithms. Moreover, the unmanned surface vehicle (USV) swarm confrontation is formulated as a coalition game. In the scenario of safeguarding territorial integrity, we devise specific tasks for both the invading and defending USVs, encompassing elements such as formation, intrusion, defense, and so forth. The effectiveness of the proposed algorithms is validated through comprehensive simulations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

AbstractWe examine a manufacturer’s strategic decision to its supplier’s potential technology infringement behavior within a co-opetitive supply chain, where the supplier serves as both the manufacturer’s production partner and market competitor. Our study investigates four potential reactions for the manufacturer when faced with the supplier’s possible infringement: no response, initiating patent litigation, entering a cross-licensing contract, or establishing a pure licensing agreement with the supplier. The supplier possesses the choice to decide whether to infringe on the manufacturer’s technology. By comparing equilibria among these models, we find that when the lawsuit winning rate is high, a lawsuit can demonstrate effectiveness, and a pure licensing contract can further fortify the positions of both parties. Surprisingly, a cross-licensing contract does not yield a similar effect and is absent from the equilibrium strategy in this scenario. Conversely, in cases where the lawsuit winning rate is low, litigation may not reach equilibrium. Instead, both parties could opt for either a pure licensing contract or a cross-licensing contract. Interestingly, while both types of licensing agreements significantly enhance outcomes for both parties in most instances, the no response model can still represent the equilibrium strategy under specific circumstances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hydrogen production through renewable energy-powered electrolysis is pivotal for fostering a sustainable future hydrogen market. In the electricity sector, hydrogen production bears an additional demand that affects electricity price, and mathematical models are needed for the joint simulation, analysis, and planning of electricity and hydrogen sectors. This study develops a Cournot and a perfect competition model to analyze the links of the electricity and hydrogen sectors. In contrast to other solving methods approaches, the Cournot model is solved by convex reformulation techniques, substantially easing the resolution. The case studies, focusing on the Iberian Peninsula, demonstrate the region's potential for competitive hydrogen production, and the advantages of perfect competition to maximize the use of renewable energies, in contrast to Cournot's oligopoly, where the exercise of market power raises electricity prices. Sensitivity analyses highlight the importance of strategic decision-making in mitigating market inefficiencies, with valuable insights for stakeholders and policymakers. • A Cournot and perfect competition models to analyze the electricity and hydrogen markets are proposed. • Convex reformulation techniques are used for efficient model resolution. • Renewable energy is maximized under perfect competition, while market power exercised under Cournot leads to higher prices. • Case studies on the Iberian Peninsula demonstrate the region's potential for competitive hydrogen production. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Internet finance is a new type of financial industry that is different from traditional finance.This study constructs an evolutionary game model between financial regulators and Internet financial institutions and discusses the strategy choices of the two participants under different circumstances. When analyzing the stable equilibrium strategy, the results show that when there are stable points in the game, Internet financial institutions tend to ‘excessive innovation’, while regulators’ strategies are affected by costs and benefits. When there is no stable point in the game, financial regulators and Internet financial institutions are in a continuous game of ‘moderate innovation – maintenance regulation – excessive innovation – strengthen regulation – moderate innovation.’ The study also provides policy recommendations to balance Internet financial innovation and regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, an H∞$$ {H}_{\infty } $$ optimal preview repetitive control (OPRC) scheme is proposed to deal with the disturbance attenuation problem for continuous‐time linear systems with external unknown disturbance and input delay. A general bounded L2$$ {L}_2 $$ gain is applied to the H∞$$ {H}_{\infty } $$ OPRC tracking control problem by introducing a function with discounted performance. First, an augmented system containing system state equation, tracking error dynamics, and modified repetitive control output equation is constructed, which is then transformed into a non‐delayed one by state transformation. Next, the OPRC controller is given and the game algebraic Riccati equation (GARE) is derived by transforming the H∞$$ {H}_{\infty } $$ tracking problem into a 2‐player zero‐sum game problem to give a Nash equilibrium solution of the associated min–max optimization problem. Besides, a value iteration (VI) algorithm is introduced to optimize the solution of continuous time GARE and ensure its convergence. Furthermore, the bounded‐input bounded‐output stability of the closed‐loop system is obtained by giving an upper bound on the discount factor. Finally, the numerical simulation example is provided to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed method. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers a non-zero-sum game for linear discrete-time systems involving two players. Based on a quadratic value function, we derive coupled algebraic Riccati equations. Then, we propose both on-policy and off-policy Q-learning algorithms, which operate without prior knowledge of the system dynamics, to achieve Nash equilibrium. These algorithms necessitate the inclusion of probing noise to ensure the persistence of excitation. We show that the on-policy Q-learning algorithm may introduce bias to the Nash equilibrium due to the probing noise, while the off-policy Q-learning algorithm maintains an unbiased property. Finally, we offer a numerical example to validate the effectiveness of the presented on-policy and off-policy Q-learning algorithms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Influence spread analysis, a critical component of social network studies, focuses on the patterns and effects of information dissemination among interconnected entities. The core of influence spread analysis is to identify influential nodes that involve two distinct aspects: influence maximization (IM) and influence blocking maximization (IBM). However, when IM and IBM occur simultaneously, identifying influential nodes becomes an intricate decision-making challenge. This study addresses identifying influential nodes in social networks through an attack–defense game perspective, where an attacker maximizes influence and a defender minimizes it. We first develop a two-player static zero-sum game model considering resource constraints. Based on the equilibrium strategy of this game, we redefine the concept of influential nodes from various viewpoints. Extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world networks show that, in most cases, the defender preferentially defends critical nodes, while the attacker adopts the decentralized strategy. Only when resources are unevenly matched do both players tend to adopt centralized strategies. This study expands the connotation of influential nodes and provides a novel paradigm for the social network analysis with significant potential applications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We study Asynchronous Dynamic games and show that in games with a finite state space and finite action sets, one can obtain the pure strategy Markov perfect equilibrium by using a simple backward induction method when the time period for the game is finite. The equilibrium strategies for games with an infinite horizon are then obtained as the point-wise limit of the equilibrium strategies of a sequence of finite horizon games, where the finite horizon games are truncated versions of the original game with successively longer time periods. We also show that if the game has a fixed K-period cycle, then there is a stationary Markov equilibrium. Using these results, we derive an algorithm to compute the equilibrium strategies. We test the algorithm in three experiments. The first is a two-player asynchronous game with three states and three actions. In the second experiment, we compute the equilibrium of a cybersecurity game in which there are two players, an attacker and a defender. In the third experiment, we compute the stationary equilibrium of a duopoly game with two firms that choose an output in alternate periods. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Uncertainty, time delays, and jumps often coexist in dynamic game problems due to the complexity of the environment. To address such issues, we can utilize uncertain delay differential equations with jumps to depict the dynamic changes in differential game problems that involve uncertain noise, delays, and jumps. In this paper, we first examine a linear quadratic differential game optimistic value problem within an uncertain environment characterized by jumps and delays. By applying the Z (x , y) transform, we convert the infinite-dimensional problem into a finite-dimensional one. We then demonstrate that the condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium strategy is equivalent to the existence of solutions to two cross-coupled matrix Riccati equations. Furthermore, we explore the saddle point equilibrium strategy of the linear quadratic differential game optimistic value model and derive the corresponding saddle point equilibrium solution. Finally, we apply our results to solve a carbon emission reduction game problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The cognitive reflection test or CRT (Frederick, 2005) has been found to be a reliable predictor of the degree of strategic sophistication of subjects in a variety of laboratory experiments. These studies have found that subjects who score higher in the CRT make choices that are closer to Nash equilibrium (i.e., Brañas-Garza et al., 2012). In an extended level- k model with free subjective beliefs, we theoretically decompose the closeness to equilibrium for the class of anchored guessing games introduced in Ballester et al. (2023) into two effects: subjects with a smaller distance to equilibrium must possess a higher reasoning level in the level- k hierarchy or their level- k iteration process must begin from a starting point (called "seed") that is inherently more advantageously positioned, which translates into the concept of "seed distance" (or both). Our main experimental finding is that subjects with a higher CRT score play closer to equilibrium due to the fact that they iterate more often in their reasoning process (as in Brañas-Garza et al., 2012), yet we find no clear evidence that they have a smaller seed distance. We also find evidence of a learning or adaptation process, which can be characterized by a warm-up phase (in which subjects reduce their seed distance), followed by a learning phase (in which they increase their reasoning level, at a faster rate in subjects with higher CRT) and then a saturation phase in which no further improvements are made. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Keeping an intelligent agent under surveillance with an autonomous robot as it travels in the environment is one of the essential tasks in robotics. This work addresses a pursuit-evasion surveillance problem between two Differential Drive Robots moving on a plane without obstacles. One of them, the pursuer, is equipped with a limited field-of-view sensor and aims to maintain the other robot (evader) inside its detection region for as much time as possible. On the contrary, the evader wants to escape as soon as possible. Unlike prior studies that address the same problem, based on heuristic approaches, we frame it as a zero-sum differential game, and we use differential game theory to find a solution with theoretical guarantees. In particular, we compute the players' time-optimal motion strategies to achieve their goals near the end of the game and provide analytical expressions describing them. These strategies are in Nash equilibrium, meaning that any unilateral deviation by a player from these strategies does not provide such player benefit toward its goal. Our analysis exhibits the existence of a Transition Surface in which the evader switches its controls. We also determine the game's winner based on the players' initial configurations and velocities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, we study the M/M/1 queueing systems with negative customers and unreliable repairers. The arrival of a negative customer causes the failure of the server, and the server is repaired immediately. The repairers may successfully repair the server with probability p, and the server continues to serve customers in the system. Otherwise, once the repair fails, the system will be cleared and all customers are forced to leave the system. By analyzing the quasi-birth-and-death process and using the probability generating function method, we obtain the steady-state probability and some performance measures of the system. Then, based on the reward-cost structure, we discuss the strategic behavior of customers and consider the equilibrium strategy. Finally, the effects of system parameters on the performance measures, individual benefit, and social benefit are analyzed by numerical examples. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Global Nash equilibrium is an optimal solution for each player in a graphical game. This paper proposes an iterative adaptive dynamic programming-based algorithm to solve the global Nash equilibrium solution for optimal containment control problem with robustness analysis to the iterative error. The containment control problem is transferred into the graphical game formulation. Sufficient conditions are given to decouple the Hamilton–Jacobi equations, which guarantee the solvability of the global Nash equilibrium solution. The iterative algorithm is designed to obtain the solution without any knowledge of system dynamics. Conditions of iterative error for global stability are given with rigorous proof. Compared with existing works, the design procedures of control gain and coupling strength are separated, which avoids trivial cases in the design procedure. The robustness analysis exactly quantifies the effect of the iterative error caused by various sources in engineering practice. The theoretical results are validated by two numerical examples with marginally stable and unstable dynamics of the leader. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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A kind of wireless communication called cognitive radio (CR) uses transceivers to identify the communication channels they are using. To avoid interference, it moves traffic to unoccupied channels as soon as possible, avoiding occupied channels. Research on cognitive wireless networks has focused heavily on spectrum assignment, which is a crucial problem for increasing spectrum efficiency. This article discusses the problem of spectrum sharing, in which several secondary users (SUs) might rent spectrum from a primary user (PU) in order to share frequencies. The spectrum is distributed and optimized using the Multi-Antenna Spectrum Sharing (NE-MASS) model, which is based on Nash Equilibrium. The study offers a mathematical approach that maximizes overall bandwidth while reducing total cost and idle spectrum assignment when selecting different network selection goals. This model analyzes the complexity of the problem in the user domain, taking into consideration the variations in spectral resource characteristics of primary networks across domains and the variety of secondary requirements of users. Both primary and secondary users may access available spectrum efficiently with this strategy. Comprehensive simulations were used to assess the performance of the NE-MASS algorithm, which showed better channel allocation performance than previous methods reported in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We consider a supplier selling substituted products to an e‐retailer through wholesale selling mode or mixed use of wholesale and agency selling mode (hybrid contracts). This paper explains the curious failure of the agency model and investigates the contract selection problem. We build the stylized models that consider consumer formats preferences and distribution sequence. We find that an excessively high agency fee can lead to failure but this is on the condition of substituted products simultaneously distributed. However, we find no failure phenomenon in sequential distribution scenarios. Because it is optimal to mark down the price of the delayed product that prevents inefficiency with a lower price in the agency model than in the wholesale model. Furthermore, in the e‐books industry, when consumers prefer digital (traditional) formats, the equilibrium strategy is that the e‐retailer claims a low agency fee, and the supplier chooses simultaneous (sequential) distribution through hybrid contracts. Besides, the equilibrium is robust. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We characterize Nash equilibrium by postulating coherent behavior across varying games. Nash equilibrium is the only solution concept that satisfies the following axioms: (i) strictly dominant actions are played with positive probability, (ii) if a strategy profile is played in two games, it is also played in every convex combination of these games, and (iii) players can shift probability arbitrarily between two indistinguishable actions, and deleting one of these actions has no effect. Our theorem implies that every equilibrium refinement violates at least one of these axioms. Moreover, every solution concept that approximately satisfies these axioms returns approximate Nash equilibria, even in natural subclasses of games, such as two‐player zero‐sum games, potential games, and graphical games. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Zhejiang Electric Power is the property of Zhejiang Electric Power Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we first introduced systems of generalized vector quasi-variational equilibrium problems as well as systems of vector quasi-variational equilibrium problems as their special cases in abstract convex spaces. Next, we established some existence theorems of solutions for systems of generalized vector quasi-variational equilibrium problems and systems of vector quasi-variational equilibrium problems in non-compact abstract convex spaces. Furthermore, we applied the obtained existence theorem of solutions for systems of vector quasi-variational equilibrium problems to solve the existence problem of Nash equilibria for noncooperative games. Then, as applications of the existence result of Nash equilibria for noncooperative games, we studied the existence of weighted Nash equilibria and Pareto Nash equilibria for multi-objective games. The results derived in this paper extended and unified the primary findings presented by some authors in the literature. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Hotelling's model—which is commonly referred to as the "linear city" model—is perhaps the most widely-used model of competition in differentiated products. However, pure-strategy Nash equilibria in prices do not exist unless the firms are located either sufficiently far apart from each other or at the same place. In fact, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium prices exist in only about 15 percent of all possible locations of firms in the linear city. This paper applies the undercut-proof equilibrium concept to solve for equilibrium prices for all possible locations of firms in the linear city. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the rapid development of autonomous driving technology, the advent of the autonomous driving era has become inevitable. An in-depth study of consumers' willingness to purchase autonomous vehicles is critical to accelerating the adoption and commercialization of autonomous vehicles. By constructing a tripartite evolutionary game model of governments, automobile manufacturers, and consumers, we analyze the stable choice of unilateral strategy and equilibrium strategy of autonomous vehicle purchase intention. The MATLAB2022b tool was used for data simulation analysis to verify the validity of the conclusion and the influence of related factors on the purchase intention toward autonomous vehicles. The results show the following: (1) The combination of government support, active R&D, and consumer purchasing is the evolutionary stability strategy (ESS) of the model. (2) With an increase in government support, the probability of automobile enterprises taking the initiative to participate in R&D also increases. However, the negative impact of risk can significantly reduce the incentive for firms to conduct R&D and reduce the effectiveness of government support. (3) Government subsidies to consumers and purchase incentives offered by automotive companies can significantly increase the likelihood that consumers will purchase an autonomous vehicle. Based on these findings, recommendations are made to strengthen government support, establish risk mitigation mechanisms, and strengthen market promotion efforts to promote the commercialization of autonomous vehicles. The study provides a new perspective for understanding multi-party interactions in the rollout of autonomous vehicles and provides valuable insights for policymakers and industry stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article considers a quantity‐setting duopoly (Cournot rivalry) in which firms adopt an abatement technology as a device to improve the quality of products. Consumer preferences capture vertical product differentiation (quality) towards "green" products. This introduces a trade‐off on the production side, as firms that do not abate, in turn, do not sustain any abatement cost but the demand for their product is low. On the contrary, firms that choose to abate incur abatement costs, but the demand for their product is high. The article aims to study and understand whether this kind of preference may lead firms to strategically invest in green technology and introduces a new, private‐based (that contrasts the well‐known public‐based) mechanism through which pollution abatement can emerge as a sub‐game perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of a non‐cooperative abatement decision game with product quality and complete information. The model is developed in a parsimonious way to pinpoint the main determinants of the endogenous market outcomes ranging from an anti‐prisoner's dilemma in which self‐interest and mutual benefit of non‐abatement do not conflict to an anti‐prisoner's dilemma in which self‐interest and mutual benefit of abatement do not conflict, passing through to an anti‐coordination scenario. Additionally, the welfare analysis reveals the existence of a win‐win solution from a societal perspective. The article shows that the results obtained in the Cournot setting also hold considering a Bertrand duopoly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces mix‐zero‐sum differential (MZSD) game theory to address multi‐player tracking systems, offering a better understanding of the coexistence of cooperation and competition among players. Within this framework, we present an optimal safety tracking control (OSTC) method, which incorporates a control barrier function (CBF) into the value function to ensure that the tracking error remains within a specified range, thus guaranteeing safety while achieving optimization. Simultaneously, to eliminate the need for system dynamics, we propose a novel approach leveraging off‐policy integral reinforcement learning (IRL) technology to obtain the Nash equilibrium solution of the MZSD games. We establish a unique critics–actors neural network (NN) structure that updates concurrently. Furthermore, we analyze stability and convergence using the Lyapunov method. We conduct two simulations to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed algorithm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

State-owned forest farms are key players in managing forestry resources worldwide, playing a pivotal role in advancing the development of the non-timber forest product industry. This paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model involving "government–state-owned forest farms–farmer households" to delve into how state-owned forest farms collaborate with governments and farmer households to propel the growth of the non-timber forest product industry. Additionally, it explores the interactive relationships among multiple stakeholders and their asymptotic stability. The findings reveal that (1) under certain conditions, the game model can achieve four stable equilibrium strategies: (0,0,0), (0,1,0), (0,1,1), and (1,1,1). (2) Key factors influencing the tripartite game include the political performance and administrative costs of local governments involved in the industry's development, assessment performance and reduced management and protection expenses of state-owned forest farms, and sales revenue and planting costs of farmers' under-forest products. (3) The market development costs shared by state-owned forest farms and government subsidies for under-forest planting should be within a reasonable range. This ensures effective promotion of farmers' participation in under-forest planting while maintaining the willingness of state-owned forest farms and governments to actively engage. These findings provide concrete guidelines that policymakers can use to spur sustainable growth in the NTFP sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forests are complex ecosystems that require integrated management to balance economic, social, and environmental dimensions. Conflicting objectives among stakeholders make optimal decision-making particularly challenging. This study seeks to balance the economic gains of forest harvesting with the goals of environmental conservation, with a focus on the Shafarood forest in Northern Iran. We applied multi-objective optimization and game theory to maximize the net present value (NPV) of forest harvesting while enhancing carbon sequestration. The research utilized data on stumpage prices, harvesting costs, tree density, volume per ha, growth rates, interest rates, carbon sequestration, and labour costs. Applying the epsilon-constraint method, we derived Pareto optimal solutions for a bi-objective model, and game theory was applied to negotiate between economic and environmental stakeholders. In the fifth round of bargaining, a Nash equilibrium was achieved between the two players. At this equilibrium point, the economic player achieved NPV from forest harvesting of 9001.884 (IRR 10,000/ha) and amount of carbon sequestration of 159.9383 tons/ha. Meanwhile, the environmental player achieved NPV from forest harvesting of 7861.248 (IRR 10,000/ha), along with a carbon sequestration of 159.9731 tons/ha. Results indicate significant trade-offs but reveal potential gains for both economic and environmental goals. These findings provide a robust framework for sustainable forest management and offer practical tools to support informed decision-making for diverse stakeholders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To stay competitive, firms regularly invest in innovation by supporting internal capital projects (funded and executed in-house) that explore new products and operational improvements. Each year, in a highly competitive process, managers from different functional units of the firm submit proposals (that include estimated costs and benefits) for such projects. Managers, because of their domain knowledge and expertise, are naturally better informed about the costs and benefits of their respective projects and can use this information strategically to secure funding. An example of such behavior is the under-reporting of the cost estimate of a project and subsequently requesting additional funding during the execution phase. Such strategic behavior not only affects the firm's ability to fund the best projects but is also costly. Motivated by this challenge of deciding the funding of such projects at a global agribusiness firm, we seek a mechanism that is both provably near-optimal for the firm and guarantees truthful reporting from managers. Our setting consists of a principal and multiple agents. In each time period, over an infinite horizon, each agent requests funding for a potential project from the principal. Before submitting his proposal, each agent privately estimates the project's cost and its benefit. If funded, each project is executed in one period. The principal's funding decisions are binary; that is, each project is either funded in full or not funded. The actual cost (benefit) of a funded project is realized on its completion and incurred (earned) by the principal. The agents earn utility from the experience and reputation gained in completing projects. In each period, the principal desires to keep the total spend below a budget but can borrow external money at a cost. Our main contribution is a practically appealing dynamic nonmonetary mechanism for internal capital allocation under which, for any ϵ>0 , (a) truth-telling forms an ϵ-Bayesian Nash equilibrium and (b) the principal's expected utility is within ϵ of the expected utility in the first-best setting. This paper was accepted by Karan Girotra, operations management. Supplemental Material: The online appendices and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.01121. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quantum game theory merges principles from quantum mechanics with game theory, exploring how quantum phenomena such as superposition and entanglement can influence strategic decision making. It offers a novel approach to analyzing and optimizing complex systems where traditional game theory may fall short. Congestion of passengers, if considered as a network, may fall into the categories of optimization cases of quantum games. This paper explores the application of quantum potential games to minimize congestion in common areas at airports. The players/passengers of the airport have identical interests and they share the same utility function. A metric is introduced that considers a passenger's visit to a common area by setting their preferences, in order to avoid congestion. Passengers can decide whether to visit a specific common area or choose an alternative. This study demonstrates that the proposed game is a quantum potential game for tackling congestion, with identical interests, ensuring the existence of a Nash equilibrium. We consider passengers to be players that want to ensure their interests. Quantum entanglement is utilized to validate the concept, and the results highlight the effectiveness of this approach. The objective is to ensure that not all passengers select the same common place of the airport to reduce getting crowded; hence, the airborne disease infection probability increases due to overcrowding. Our findings provide a promising framework for optimizing passenger flow and reducing congestion in airport common areas through quantum game theory. We showed that the proposed system is stable by encapsulating the Lyapunov stability. We compared it to a simulated annealing approach to show the efficacy of the quantum game approach. We acknowledge that this framework can be utilized in other disciplines as well. For our future work, we will research different strategies than binary ones to investigate the efficacy of the approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Purpose: This paper aims to study how the timing of these decisions affects the total profit and the individual profits of the two agents. Design/methodology/approach: This paper study a supply chain for a network good where there is a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer determines its wholesale price and its share in the retailer's advertising cost while the retailer decides the retail price and the advertising cost. Findings: This paper finds that a stronger network externality leads to higher prices and higher advertising efforts. This increases the profits of both manufacturer and retailer, but the manufacturer's share of advertising costs depends on the order in which the supply chain enterprise make their decisions, the strength of network externality and the effect of advertising determines which decision timeline results in a higher price and greater advertising effort. The manufacturer prefers the price decision to be made before the advertising decision, while the retailer prefers these decisions to be made simultaneously. Research limitations/implications: Although this paper studies the price and advertising decision-making order preferences of channel members based on network externalities, this research can also be expanded from the following aspects based on network effects. First, network externality affects advertising cooperation between both parties in the situation such that the pricing power of retail prices is transferred from the retailer to the manufacturer and the retailer relies on revenue sharing (revenue sharing contract, nonwholesale price contract. Second, the manufacturer dominates the issues in the supply chain, but in reality, a retailer can also be the dominator or there are no dominators (Nash equilibrium). Finally, it is possible to consider pricing and advertising decisions in situations where two manufacturers or retailers compete. Practical implications: When the price is reasonable, advertising investment is the main determinant of product sales. The greater the intensity of network externalities the more retailers will be willing to invest in advertising. An increase in the intensity of network externalities may not necessarily enhance manufacturers' motivation or cooperative advertising, but it depends on the decision-making sequence. The strength of network externalities determines the decision-making sequence preferences of supply chain channel members whose preferences vary leading to conflicts of interest. Originality/value: The impact of cooperative advertising or decision sequence on corporate decision-making has not been considered. To fill this gap, the paper integrates network externality and supply chain cooperative advertising models, focusing on the impact of network externality on pricing and advertising decisions, as well as on the sequence of decisions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]