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In my dissertation, I defend anti-realism about fictional objects such as characters. I begin by defending realism about fictional objects against the charge that it is committed to metaphysically problematic objects, arguing that the realist can avoid said commitment by distinguishing the properties the character has in the fiction and the identity relations the character bears to other characters in the fiction from those it actually has or bears. I call these moves ‘contextualism’ and ‘externalism’, respectively. I then criticize the revised version of realism on the grounds that contextualism and externalism leave the realist with an unsatisfactory account of reference to fictional objects and arbitrariness in the counting of said objects. I also argue that the fictional objects to which the realist is committed lack properties essential to characters. In contrast, anti-realists do not face these worries, in large part due to the fact that they are never forced to make the contextualist or externalist move.