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This article reexamines the rise and fall of Operation PBFORTUNE by restoring the contributions of its Latin American participants. In 1952, a loose network of Caribbean Basin regimes sought to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz's democratically-elected government in Guatemala. At the same time, the U.S. government's State Department and CIA held the same goal. Lobbied by Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza on behalf of Guatemalan counterrevolutionary Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas, the Truman Administration inadvertently approved what Caribbean Basin officials interpreted as their own scheme. Although the CIA would be regularly notified of meetings among Latin American actors, Assistant Secretary of State Edward Miller grew increasingly frustrated as Caribbean Basin officials contacted State Department officials whom Miller intended to keep unaware. When the State Department ended the program, U.S. officials blamed their Latin American counterparts in order to maintain plausible deniability and circumvent any discussions about their respective department's role in Operation PBFORTUNE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reveals how Dominican dictator Rafael Trujillo intervened in Costa Rica's military conflicts in 1948. Previous works have centered upon Central American actors like Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza and Guatemalan president Juan Jos' Ar'valo who sought to influence the direction of Costa Rica's Civil War or the end-of-year invasion into the country. This work applies an international perspective that recognizes the activities of actors throughout the Caribbean Basin. Recently declassified Cuban, Dominican, and Guatemalan sources demonstrate that Somoza and prominent Costa Rican figures, including ex-president Rafael Ángel Calderón Guardia, lobbied Trujillo to support their efforts against an alleged network of communist enemies throughout the region, and expose Somoza's role as a middleman for armaments and funds for the end-of-year invasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Whether in podcasts, online articles, TED videos, or its I Wikipedia i page, the UFCO still casts its shadow over Operations PBFORTUNE and PBSUCCESS, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)'s 1952 and 1953-1954 covert attempts to overthrow Jacobo Arbenz's democratically elected Guatemalan government.[4] Consistently, the overwhelming question driving this media is whether and how the UFCO contributed to the U.S. government's decision. After a few years working for the United Fruit Company (UFCO), lawyer Thomas Corcoran took a moment to gloat. "You know and I know that Communism and not the United Fruit Company is the problem", one UFCO official warned Zemurray, "but unless [the UFCO] can be taken out of the picture and promptly, I think the issue is likely to be confused in the minds" of many observers.[148] Again, the U.S. government and the UFCO's goals overlapped. Internal reports claimed the corporation was pushing against the grain, a lone voice warning U.S. officials about Guatemalan communism.[45] Actually, the State Department repeatedly intervened to prevent any discrimination against U.S.-based corporations.[46] Some lower-level U.S. officials in Guatemala opposed the idea of the U.S. government constantly protecting U.S. companies' interests abroad, but their superiors insisted, "It would be to invite wholesale expropriation of U.S. interests elsewhere in the continent, if the U.S. did not protest" the alleged persecution of the UFCO.[47] Nevertheless, the UFCO felt this was insufficient, for any challenge against its authority was unforgivable. [Extracted from the article]

This article offers a brief historiographical overview of how the Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (ACMINREX) in Havana has expanded the scholarship of Cuban foreign relations during the Cold War. Beginning with foundational works from John Kirk and Piero Gleijeses, ACMINREX materials were incorporated into multiarchival methodologies exploring Cuban-Canadian and Cuban-African interactions before illuminating inter-American relations in the 1940s and 1950s. Now, the archive's collections appear in multiple works in global Cold War studies examining Cuba's impact. This article concludes with suggestions on the ACMINREX's value for scholars considering further research into Cuban and inter-American foreign relations. Este artículo proviene una breve reseña historiográfica sobre cómo el Archivo Central del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores (ACMINREX) en la Habana ha ampliado la literatura sobre las relaciones cubanas durante la guerra fría. Empezar con las obras fundamentales de John Kirk y Piero Gleijeses, se incorporaron los materiales del ACMINREX con las metodologías multiarchivas sobre las interacciones cubano-canadienses y cubano-africanos antes de iluminar las relaciones interamericanas de los 1940s y 1950s. En este momento, los colecciones del ACMINREX están fortaleciendo varios trabajos de los estudios de la guerra fría global sobre el impacto cubano. El artículo entonces les ofrece sugerencias sobre el valor del ACMINREX a los interesados en investigar las relaciones exteriores cubanas e interamericanas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]