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In this letter, we study a Networked Control System (NCS) with multiplexed communication and Bernoulli packet drops. Multiplexed communication refers to the constraint that transmission of a control signal and an observation signal cannot occur simultaneously due to the limited bandwidth. First, we propose an epsilon-greedy algorithm for the selection of the communication sequence that also ensures Mean Square Stability (MSS). We formulate the system as a Markovian Jump Linear System (MJLS) and provide the necessary conditions for MSS in terms of Linear Matrix Inequalities (LMIs) that need to be satisfied for three corner cases. We prove that the system is MSS for any convex combination of these three corner cases. Furthermore, we propose to use the epsilon-greedy algorithm with the epsilon that satisfies MSS conditions for training a Deep Q Network (DQN). The DQN is used to obtain an optimal communication sequence that minimizes a quadratic cost. We validate our approach with a numerical example that shows the efficacy of our method in comparison to the round-robin and a random scheme., Comment: A preliminary version of this article has been submitted to IEEE Control Systems articles

In this paper, we introduce a static game that allows one to numerically assess the loss of efficiency induced by decentralized control or management of a global epidemic. Each player represents a region which is assumed to choose its control to implement a tradeoff between socio-economic aspects and health aspects; the control comprises both epidemic control physical measures and influence actions on the region opinion. The Generalized Nash equilibrium $(\mathrm{GNE})$ analysis of the proposed game model is conducted. The direct analysis of this game of practical interest is non-trivial but it turns out that one can construct an auxiliary game which allows one: to prove existence and uniqueness; to compute the GNE and the optimal centralized solution (sum-cost) of the game. These results allow us to assess numerically the loss (measured in terms of Price of Anarchy ($\mathrm{PoA}$)) induced by decentralization with or without taking into account the opinion dynamics.

We consider a set of consumers in a city or town (who thus generate pollution) whose opinion is governed by a continuous opinion and discrete action (CODA) dynamics model. This dynamics is coupled with an observation signal dynamics, which defines the information the consumers have access to regarding the common pollution. We show that the external observation signal has a significant impact on the asymptotic behavior of the CODA model. When the coupling is strong, it induces either a chaotic behavior or convergence towards a limit cycle. When the coupling is weak, a more classical behavior characterized by local agreements in polarized clusters is observed. In both cases, conditions under which clusters of consumers don't change their actions are provided.Numerical examples are provided to illustrate the derived analytical results., Comment: ECC conference 2024

A Stackelberg duopoly model in which two firms compete to maximize their market share is considered. The firms offer a service/product to customers that are spread over several geographical regions (e.g., countries, provinces, or states). Each region has its own characteristics (spreading and recovery rates) of each service propagation. We consider that the spreading rate can be controlled by each firm and is subject to some investment that the firm does in each region. One of the main objectives of this work is to characterize the advertising budget allocation strategy for each firm across regions to maximize its market share when competing. To achieve this goal we propose a Stackelberg game model that is relatively simple while capturing the main effects of the competition for market share. {By characterizing the strong/weak Stackelberg equilibria of the game, we provide the associated budget allocation strategy.} In this setting, it is established under which conditions the solution of the game is the so-called ``winner takes all". Numerical results expand upon our theoretical findings and we provide the equilibrium characterization for an example., Comment: This paper appears in: IEEE Control Systems Letters

The study proposes new results on the set input-to-state stability (ISS) subject to a small input time delay for compact, invariant sets that contains the origin. First, using the nonlinear small-gain theory, we prove a Razumikhin-type theorem that ensures ISS for sets in the setup of functional differential equations (FDEs) with disturbances. Next we show how this theorem can be used to ensure set ISS for nonlinear systems with input delays and disturbances. In comparison to the existing research on set ISS robustness with respect to small time delays at the input, our results are rather broad, retaining the ISS gain and without any constraints on time delayed states. The effectiveness of the method is illustrated through two case-studies addressing set stability for classes of nonlinear oscillators of practical interest., Comment: 11 pages

We present a controller and transmission policy design procedure for nonlinear wireless networked control systems. Our objective is to ensure the stability of the closed-loop system, in a stochastic sense, together with given control performance, while minimizing the average power used for communications. The controller is designed by emulation, i.e., ignoring the network, and the transmission power is given by threshold policies. These policies involve waiting a given amount of time since the last successful transmission instant, as well as requiring that the measured wireless channel gain is above a given threshold, before attempting a new transmission. Two power control laws are investigated: i) a constant power and ii) a power level inversely proportional to the channel gain. We explain how to select the waiting time, the channel threshold and the power level to minimize the induced average communication power, while ensuring the desired control objectives.

In this paper, we introduce a game that allows one to assess the potential loss of efficiency induced by a decentralized control or local management of a global epidemic. Each player typically represents a region or a country which is assumed to choose its control action to implement a tradeoff between socioeconomic aspects and the health aspect. We conduct the Nash equilibrium analysis of this game. Since the analysis is not trivial in general, sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness are provided. Then we quantify through numerical results the loss induced by decentralization, measured in terms of price of anarchy (PoA) and price of connectedness (PoC). These results allow one to clearly identify scenarios where decentralization is acceptable or not regarding to the retained global efficiency measures., Comment: Accepted for publication in LCSS

Various measures have been taken in different countries to mitigate the Covid-19 epidemic. But, throughout the world, many citizens don't understand well how these measures are taken and even question the decisions taken by their government. Should the measures be more (or less) restrictive? Are they taken for a too long (or too short) period of time? To provide some quantitative elements of response to these questions, we consider the well-known SEIR model for the Covid-19 epidemic propagation and propose a pragmatic model of the government decision-making operation. Although simple and obviously improvable, the proposed model allows us to study the tradeoff between health and economic aspects in a pragmatic and insightful way. Assuming a given number of phases for the epidemic and a desired tradeoff between health and economic aspects, it is then possible to determine the optimal duration of each phase and the optimal severity level for each of them. The numerical analysis is performed for the case of France but the adopted approach can be applied to any country. One of the takeaway messages of this analysis is that being able to implement the optimal 4-phase epidemic management strategy in France would have led to 1.05 million infected people and a GDP loss of 231 billion euro instead of 6.88 million of infected and a loss of 241 billion euro. This indicates that, seen from the proposed model perspective, the effectively implemented epidemic management strategy is good economically, whereas substantial improvements might have been obtained in terms of health impact. Our analysis indicates that the lockdown/severe phase should have been more severe but shorter, and the adjustment phase occurred earlier. Due to the natural tendency of people to deviate from the official rules, updating measures every month over the whole epidemic episode seems to be more appropriate.

In this paper, we consider a network of consumers who are under the combined influence of their neighbors and external influencing entities (the marketers). The consumers' opinion follows a hybrid dynamics whose opinion jumps are due to the marketing campaigns. By using the relevant static game model proposed recently in [1], we prove that although the marketers are in competition and therefore create tension in the network, the network reaches a consensus. Exploiting this key result, we propose a coopetition marketing strategy which combines the one-shot Nash equilibrium actions and a policy of no advertising. Under reasonable sufficient conditions, it is proved that the proposed coopetition strategy profile Pareto-dominates the one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy. This is a very encouraging result to tackle the much more challenging problem of designing Pareto-optimal and equilibrium strategies for the considered dynamical marketing game., Comment: IEEE Control Systems Letters Vol. 5, No. 6, pp. 3224-3229, April 2019

One of the key features of this paper is that the agents' opinion of a social network is assumed to be not only influenced by the other agents but also by two marketers in competition. One of our contributions is to propose a pragmatic game-theoretical formulation of the problem and to conduct the complete corresponding equilibrium analysis (existence, uniqueness, dynamic characterization, and determination). Our analysis provides practical insights to know how a marketer should exploit its knowledge about the social network to allocate its marketing or advertising budget among the agents (who are the consumers). By providing relevant definitions for the agent influence power (AIP) and the gain of targeting (GoT), the benefit of using a smart budget allocation policy instead of a uniform one is assessed and operating conditions under which it is potentially high are identified., Comment: IEEE Control Systems Letters (L-CSS), Vol. 2, No. 4, pp. 593-598, June 2018

Motivated by a real problem in steel production, we introduce and analyze a general class of singularly perturbed linear hybrid systems with both switches and impulses, in which the slow or fast nature of the variables can be mode-dependent. This means that, at switching instants, some of the slow variables can become fast and vice-versa. Firstly, we show that using a mode-dependent variable reordering we can rewrite this class of systems in a form in which the variables preserve their nature over time. Secondly, we establish, through singular perturbation techniques, an upper bound on the minimum dwell-time ensuring the overall system's stability. Remarkably, this bound is the sum of two terms. The first term corresponds to an upper bound on the minimum dwell-time ensuring the stability of the reduced order linear hybrid system describing the slow dynamics. The order of magnitude of the second term is determined by that of the parameter defining the ratio between the two time-scales of the singularly perturbed system. We show that the proposed framework can also take into account the change of dimension of the state vector at switching instants. Numerical illustrations complete our study.

The paper considers the consensus problem in large networks represented by time-varying directed graphs. A practical way of dealing with large-scale networks is to reduce their dimension by collapsing the states of nodes belonging to densely and intensively connected clusters into aggregate variables. It will be shown that under suitable conditions, the states of the agents in each cluster converge fast toward a local agreement. Local agreements correspond to aggregate variables which slowly converge to consensus. Existing results concerning the time-scale separation in large networks focus on fixed and undirected graphs. The aim of this work is to extend these results to the more general case of time-varying directed topologies. It is noteworthy that in the fixed and undirected graph case the average of the states in each cluster is time-invariant when neglecting the interactions between clusters. Therefore, they are good candidates for the aggregate variables. This is no longer possible here. Instead, we find suitable time-varying weights to compute the aggregate variables as time-invariant weighted averages of the states in each cluster. This allows to deal with the more challenging time-varying directed graph case. We end up with a singularly perturbed system which is analyzed by using the tools of two time-scales averaging which seem appropriate to this system.

We introduce a distributed control architecture for a class of heterogeneous, nonlinear dynamical agents moving in the "string" formation, while guaranteeing trajectory tracking, collision avoidance and the preservation of the formation's topology. Each autonomous agent uses information and relative measurements only with respect to its predecessor in the string. The performance of the scheme is independent of the number of agents in the network and also on the agent's relative position in the network. The scalability is a consequence of the "decoupling" of a certain bounded approximation of the closed--loop equations, which allows the regulation and controller design (at each agent) to be done individually, in a completely decentralized manner. A practical method for compensating communication induced delays is also presented. Numerical examples illustrate the effectiveness and the main features of the proposed approach., Comment: 14 pages, 7 figures, extended and revised version

We study a class of discrete-time multi-agent systems modelling opinion dynamics with decaying confidence. We consider a network of agents where each agent has an opinion. At each time step, the agents exchange their opinion with their neighbors and update it by taking into account only the opinions that differ from their own less than some confidence bound. This confidence bound is decaying: an agent gives repetitively confidence only to its neighbors that approach sufficiently fast its opinion. Essentially, the agents try to reach an agreement with the constraint that it has to be approached no slower than a prescribed convergence rate. Under that constraint, global consensus may not be achieved and only local agreements may be reached. The agents reaching a local agreement form communities inside the network. In this paper, we analyze this opinion dynamics model: we show that communities correspond to asymptotically connected component of the network and give an algebraic characterization of communities in terms of eigenvalues of the matrix defining the collective dynamics. Finally, we apply our opinion dynamics model to address the problem of community detection in graphs. We propose a new formulation of the community detection problem based on eigenvalues of normalized Laplacian matrix of graphs and show that this problem can be solved using our opinion dynamics model. We consider three examples of networks, and compare the communities we detect with those obtained by existing algorithms based on modularity optimization. We show that our opinion dynamics model not only provides an appealing approach to community detection but that it is also effective.