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A prevalent assumption in metaethics is that people believe in moral objectivity. If this assumption were true then people should believe in the possibility of objective moral progress, objective moral knowledge, and objective moral error. We developed surveys to investigate whether these predictions hold. Our results suggest that, neither abstractly nor concretely, people dominantly believe in the possibility of objective moral progress, knowledge and error. They attribute less objectivity to these phenomena than in the case of science and no more, or only slightly more, than in the cases of social conventions and personal preferences. This finding was obtained for a regular sample as well as for a sample of people who are particularly likely to be reflective and informed (philosophers and philosophy students). Our paper hence contributes to recent empirical challenges to the thesis that people believe in moral objectivity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study raises the question whether it is possible, in Xunzi's 荀子 view, for someone who has gone through moral transformation to backslide. I consider three possible interpretations. On the first interpretation, one's dispositions are transformed by environmental forces. Backsliding is possible and likely. I rule out this interpretation because it is inconsistent with other aspects of Xunzi's thought. On the second interpretation, one's kind-determining constitution is transformed from a neutral constitution to a moral constitution. Backsliding is not possible because one has acquired a moral constitution that is insusceptible to bad environmental influences. On the third interpretation, to be transformed is to have accumulated significantly more moral knowledge than ordinary untransformed people. Backsliding is possible but unlikely. I will then explain why it is difficult to adjudicate between the second and third interpretations and suggest further issues in Xunzi's thought that need to be investigated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One of standpoint theory's main claims is the thesis of epistemic advantage, which holds that marginalized agents have epistemic advantages due to their social disadvantage as marginalized. The epistemic advantage thesis has been argued to be true with respect to knowledge about particular dominant ideologies like classism and sexism, as well as knowledge within fields as diverse as sociology and economics. However, it has yet to be analyzed with respect to ethics. This paper sets out to complete this task. Here, I argue that we have good reason to believe that the marginalized are epistemically advantaged with respect to moral knowledge overall, including moral facts other than those about the morally problematic features of systems of domination. To do so, I first articulate the connection between marginalization and the moral domain, drawing on the rich history of feminist and non-ideal ethics. Then, I argue that the marginalized are more likely to have several particular epistemic skills that are necessary to come to have moral knowledge. Utilizing real-world cases where moral knowledge is at stake, I show how marginalized agents have better access to evidence (broadly), as well as advantages distinguishing between considerations that are morally relevant and those that aren't (sorting), determining the weight a certain piece of evidence has with respect to determining a moral matter (significance), and using concepts which bear on moral questions (conceptual competency). I close by considering the upshots my analysis here has for other areas of moral epistemology like moral testimony and expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the concept of moral expertise in the contemporary philosophical debate, with a focus on three accounts discussed across moral epistemology, bioethics, and virtue ethics: an epistemic authority account, a skilled agent account, and a hybrid model sharing key features of the two. It is argued that there are no convincing reasons to defend a monistic approach that reduces moral expertise to only one of these models. A pluralist view is outlined in the attempt to reorient the discussion about moral expertise. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Annals of Philosophy / Roczniki Filozoficzne is the property of John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Faculty of Philosophy and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Although initially plausible, the view that moral education should aim at the transmission of moral knowledge has been subject to severe criticism. In this context, one particularly prominent line of argumentation rests on the empirical observation that moral questions are subject to widespread and robust disagreement. In this paper, I would like to discuss the implications of moral disagreement for the goals of moral education in more detail. I will start by laying out the empirical and philosophical assumptions behind the idea that widespread and robust moral disagreement undermines the prospects of transmitting moral knowledge in educational settings. Having thus provided a specific interpretation of the epistemic dynamics behind this so-called 'challenge of disagreement', I will proceed by discussing its didactical implications. More specifically, I will defend two claims: first, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not an effective challenge, because it undermines the possibility of knowledge transfer only with respect to a limited set of moral propositions. Second, I will argue that the challenge of disagreement is not a specific challenge, because the epistemically destructive effects of moral disagreement also pose a challenge for other prominent accounts of moral education that were originally proposed as promising alternatives to knowledge transmission accounts. If convincing, my arguments show that knowledge transmission accounts of moral education are in a much better position than is usually expected to incorporate the fact that moral questions are notoriously controversial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Textbooks stand out as materials that fulfill the objectives of the subject area and curriculum goals in education and religious education. However, the fact that textbooks can provide the desired effect in education makes it necessary for them to carry some qualifications. The content is one of the three essential variables of written materials, together with readability and design. It has the power to present educational objectives and outcomes concretely, systematically, and efficiently, making it a distinct and crucial aspect of textbooks. Its effects on the material make the content significant in textbooks. As a basis for other fields and the fact that it is one of the main problems related to religion for individuals or societies, faith issues hold a distinct position in the instruction of religious culture and moral knowledge and curriculum. This and other unique features of the field of faith must be taken more into account the issues related to field knowledge and field education. This includes acting from basic sources when teaching the subject, arranging suitable content for the target audience, and correctly transferring abstract meanings to the concrete learning and teaching environment. This study selected faith-related units from secondary school textbooks on religious culture and moral knowledge as sample exemplars. The chosen units were specifically selected based on the developmental stage of the target audience, where learning about faith issues crystallizes and takes shape. The content was analyzed within this context to confirm adherence to scientific principles and curriculum standards. This study was planned as qualitative research. The study's qualitative data was gathered using the content analysis method and the textbook content evaluation tool prepared for this purpose. The acquired data were evaluated using a suitability scale, which compared the highest total score that can be obtained from the textbook content evaluation tool items with the total score obtained and organized based on the skill rate between 0 and 10. At the end of the study, the assessments showed that all the textbooks examined in the sample of faith-based units had high overall scores for content features, with suitability levels rated as 'quite adequate'. However, the positive outcomes did not persist in the assessments relating to the items. It was concluded that the competence outlined in the curriculum had not been attained whilst meeting the objectives, accomplishments, and criteria for creating instructional materials. Regarding the main problem of the study, this issue revealed that the alignment between the curriculum and the textbooks could not be achieved at the desired level in secondary school religious culture and moral knowledge textbooks, specifically in the sample of faith units. The same situation has been experienced in complying with scientific principles. Although the desired characteristics are generally present, ensuring logical consistency in sentences, paragraphs, titles and units within texts has emerged as a recurring challenge in all of the textbooks. Sufficient verses and hadith translations related to the subjects were incorporated. In the same manner, it was noted that students were not sufficiently encouraged to engage in critical thinking and research. The study has found that in order to maintain the positive developments noted in textbooks in recent years and to enable them to achieve the desired qualities as material at the utmost level, collaborative research by subject specialists and educationalists is essential for supporting content creation and editing efforts. Comparisons of the relevant units within textbooks between classes and between books have revealed the importance of addressing abstract and controversial topics like belief in angels and the afterlife, and the belief in destiny, through interdisciplinary studies in a more concrete manner. The finding that the assessed content of the textbook unit is mostly proficient and possesses the desired attributes, despite some problematic areas, leads to the conclusion that teachers who convey this content in the learning-teaching process and advice on the use of textbooks as materials should be evaluated with regard to their subjectspecific competencies. Teachers and their competencies have suggested that it is necessary to discuss the pre-service training programs that are designed to train the relevant personnel in religious education thus higher religious educational institutions. Then, the focus should be on in-service educational studies that provide teachers with effective strategies for learning by understanding the process of program development processes and textbooks that are part of it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Since the early 20th century, two new disciplines emerged in the tradition of analytic philosophy: meta-ethics and political epistemology. Nevertheless, debates on such questions go back to the ancient Greeks and, in particular, to the debates between Plato and Protagoras. This article elucidates the controversy between Plato and the influential sophist Protagoras from the perspective of contemporary meta-ethics and political epistemology. It argues that the main motivation of Plato's philosophical endeavors is to overcome Protagoras's skeptical claims that no moral facts and no moral knowledge applicable to political issues exist. The paper defends the thesis that there exists a deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato on the existence of moral facts and moral knowledge. A deep disagreement is a disagreement that cannot be resolved through the use of reasons and arguments. Applying the foundationalist approach Robert J. Fogelin proposes in his seminal paper "The Logic of Deep Disagreements", this article argues that the deep disagreement between Protagoras and Plato exists because their political thought is based on "underlying principles" that clash. While Plato's political philosophy rests on his religious and theological convictions, the political thought of Protagoras is based on his skepticism, relativism, and agnosticism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Although owing to proper basicality, phenomenal conservatism, and deliberative indispensability our axiomatic moral judgments seem to be prima facie justified, the question of potential undercutting defeaters can pose a challenge to moral knowledge. Evolutionary debunking arguments of various stripes are one of the more recent widely discussed contenders for such a defeater. Because of the likes of Michael Ruse, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street, such arguments have attracted much attention. Their general structure features an empirical premise according to which the process of evolution has had a significant impact on the stock of even our axiomatic moral judgments. The epistemic premise has it that if the empirical premise holds, then our moral knowledge is severely challenged if not debunked altogether, and perhaps even moral realism itself, since if our epistemic faculties can’t reliably put us in touch with objective moral truths, those truths are out of a job in our ontology. Since the most outspoken evolutionary debunkers are secularists, they somewhat understandably tend to smuggle something of a naturalistic origins thesis into their conception of evolution, thus precluding a divine guidance of the evolutionary process, which renders it a formidable challenge for them to evade the force of the debunking challenge. Unsurprisingly Ruse, Joyce, and Street all end up abandoning moral realism and any moral knowledge predicated on it. Theism, however, potentially provides a defeater-defeater against the evolutionary debunking argument(s) (if not a defeater-deflector), by rejecting the naturalistic origins thesis as a gratuitous theological add-on to which evolution need not be attached, carving out room for evolution to be a divinely guided process that may well ensure a correspondence between moral truth and at least our most nonnegotiable moral convictions.

This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism. While critics, like Shafer-Landau, Tropman, Oliveira and Perrine, reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is, I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism. What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science. While ethics is normative in nature, that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive. I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge. By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge, I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology, the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap. Indeed, many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions. I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp. I argue that Copp's naturalism is very similar to Huemer's intuitionism. Copp's argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to many, human autonomy is necessary for moral action and yet incompatible with being morally accountable to God's divine commands. By issuing commands that ground normative facts, God demands our accountability without understanding our normative reasons for moral action, which crushes human autonomy. Call this the Autonomy Objection to Theism (AOT). There is an unexplored connection between models of normative reason and AOT. I argue that any plausible AOT must be stated in terms of an adequate model of normative reason. There are two broad metaethical categories for models of normative reason: anti-realist or realist views. I defend the thesis that both anti-realism and realism about normative reasons fail to support AOT by means of a dilemma. If the AOT defender adopts anti-realism about normative reasons (subjectivism and constructivism), AOT loses its force. However, if the AOT defender adopts moral realism, they face the same problem as the theist, as normative fact constrains autonomy. Consequently, AOT is a problem for all moral realists, including non-theists, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent within the procedure of reflective equilibrium by adding a disposition for identifying reasonable beliefs. This can be seen as the starting point of the method, and would safeguard against the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. In order to do this, I will begin by analyzing the core characteristics of the method and its main weaknesses. I will then investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition for identifying an adequate means for achieving a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure which is carried out by an agent who deliberates well and can identify reasonable moral beliefs. These beliefs must be justified according to their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be interpreted as a kind of moral knowledge.

Knowledge about human wellbeing is a central part of ethical knowledge. But it is a neglected topic not only in ethics in general, but also in wellbeing theorizing, which has focused on enumerating the basic elements of wellbeing rather than on how to gauge, foster and maintain wellbeing in actual human lives. I consider the prospects for a procedural approach to wellbeing that sees it as depending on a process of continual adjustment between values, preferences, actions and emotions. The value-fulfilment theory of Valerie Tiberius provides a model for such an approach, but needs to be corrected and supplemented in certain respects. I propose a version of the approach that is only partly, but still significantly procedural, and which does not privilege higher-order mental states. Considering the relevance of such an approach for ethics, I finally suggest that (certain forms of) moral agency may be best analyzed as an intersubjective process of adjustment and fulfilment of values and desires (etc.), and as a process of acquiring and exercising collective moral knowing how. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Trans/Form/Ação is the property of Trans/Form/Acao and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The main aim of this paper is to propose the inclusion of the expertise of a prudent agent within the procedure of reflective equilibrium by adding a disposition for identifying reasonable beliefs. This can be seen as the starting point of the method, and would safeguard against the criticism of conservatism and subjectivism. In order to do this, I will begin by analyzing the core characteristics of the method and its main weaknesses. I will then investigate the characteristics of prudence as a disposition for identifying an adequate means for achieving a good end. With this in mind, I will apply prudence to the procedure which is carried out by an agent who deliberates well and can identify reasonable moral beliefs. These beliefs must be justified according to their consistency with ethical principles and with the factual beliefs of relevant scientific theories. Finally, I will argue that this deliberative process is consistent with ethical pluralism and democracy, and can be interpreted as a kind of moral knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper analyses the justification of personal integrity in ethical theories in contemporary moral epistemology. In the first chapter we present a theological consideration of the fundamental option that illustrates the complexity of agency of moral knowledge in the epistemic evaluation of a moral act as a specifically human conduct. Then, in the second chapter we briefly describe the inference and the structure of moral knowledge in ethical theories. In the last chapter, we argue why our personal integrity, our own understanding of it in self-estimation is related to the possibility of moral knowledge. We claim that moral knowledge is crucial in development of moral integrity of a person. The speculations on the possibility of their inference and cognitive capacity reflect on the epistemic disposition of the human being as a moral agent. Although ethical theories have offered a scientifically and methodologically precise frame to justify the truthfulness of moral knowledge and judgments, they have not anticipated the important fact of integrity between the intention, free will and practical reason.

According to many, human autonomy is necessary for moral action and yet incompatible with being morally accountable to God’s divine commands. By issuing commands that ground normative facts, God demands our accountability without understanding our normative reasons for moral action, which crushes human autonomy. Call this the Autonomy Objection to Theism (AOT). There is an unexplored connection between models of normative reason and AOT. I argue that any plausible AOT must be stated in terms of an adequate model of normative reason. There are two broad metaethical categories for models of normative reason: anti-realist or realist views. I defend the thesis that both anti-realism and realism about normative reasons fail to support AOT by means of a dilemma. If the AOT defender adopts anti-realism about normative reasons (subjectivism and constructivism), AOT loses its force. However, if the AOT defender adopts moral realism, they face the same problem as the theist, as normative fact constrains autonomy. Consequently, AOT is a problem for all moral realists, including non-theists, such as Russ Shafer-Landau, David Enoch, and Erik Wielenberg, among others.

Most people believe some moral propositions are true. Most people would say that they know that rape is wrong, torturing people is wrong, and so on. But despite decades of intense epistemological study, philosophers cannot even provide a rudimentary sketch of moral knowledge. In my view, the fact that we have very strong epistemic confidence in some fundamental moral propositions and the fact that it is extremely difficult for us to provide even the basics of an account of moral knowledge gives us an important clue. Both of these facts stem from the very nature of moral knowledge. In this paper I provide an intuitionist account of moral knowledge. I try to remove misunderstanding and add to our understanding of the contemporary account of self-evident moral propositions. For a theory of moral knowledge to be acceptable it must explain both the moral knowledge we have and why it is so very difficult for us to explain. My theory meets both requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper the author focuses on the concept and nature of moral knowledge as understood and presented by Servais Pinckaers, one of the most renowned and acknowledged contemporary authority on the moral teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas who rightfully occupies a prominent place within the Christian moral-theological tradition. In the introduction our attention is drawn to the immediate object of moral knowledge in all its breadth: human activity which ensues from human free will. It should, in no regard, be narrowed down neither to those human acts falling under any form of legal obligation or imperative, nor limited to any human activity which can be subjected to observation and analysis by the positive sciences. The introductory exposition is followed by two more parts. The first part points out the special nature of moral knowledge, its richness, inexhaustibility and strength, as well as its inseparability from the deepest dimension of human existence which man encounters within his inner self, his consciousness, conscience, and free will. The second and central part of the paper brings an overview of various forms of moral knowledge and underlines their internal, dynamic, constant and necessary connectedness stemming from concrete personal moral experience wherein lies the source, purpose and sole approach to moral knowledge. The concluding part presents a summary of the entire paper and highlights the special contribution contained in Pinckaers’ description of moral knowledge. The Belgian theologian strongly emphasizes that moral knowledge emerges and is shaped, first and foremost, by human activity, that it is developed through moral reflection and is confirmed and fulfilled similarly by concrete human activity. Furthermore, Pinckaers’ description of moral knowledge points out, not only the necessity for the personal and active commitment of the moral subject, but also gives a better and more appropriate insight into the irreplaceable role of practical reason strengthened by personal and concrete knowledge of a wide range of virtues.

Various interpretations were proffered for Nebuchadnezzar's dream of Daniel 2. The discussion has revolved around the possible historical kingdoms and their succession, but not enough attention has been paid to the statue itself and its unusual composition of metals. In this interdisciplinary article, I propose that the statue of Daniel 2 reflects a philosophy of history, revealing the moral degradation of humanity. Using some philosophical reflections of Emmanuel Levinas as a springboard, I focus on three aspects of the text. First, I explore the literary features and the key ideas of Daniel 2. Second, I underline the unusual choice of metals of the image as well as their obvious decline, indicative of the moral degradation of humanity in history. Finally, I analyze the motif of hubris and the anthropological vocabulary, pointing to the precise development of degradation in the remainder of the Book of Daniel.

The topic of goodness and badness in Avicenna’s view has been studied recently in the articles of the researchers of Moral Philosophy. The major approach in these articles is the affirmation of “moral realism” in Avicenna philosophy and rejecting “moral non-realism” from his views. In other words, in these articles, goodness and badness in his thoughts have been studied from an ontological point of view, and the relation of Avicenna’s view with “intrinsic goodness and badness” has been investigated. However, an epistemological study has not been carried out in this case. According to the popular view about the epistemology of goodness and badness, the theory of “religious goodness and badness” is related to Ash‘ari scholars, and the theory of “rational goodness and badness” is related to the Mu'tazila and Shi‘i scholars. Rational goodness and badness are also attributed to the Islamic philosophers. But there are ideas against this view in Avicenna’s works. Because although Avicenna, similar to the Mu‘tazilites, considers moral knowledge, a rational and demonstrable knowledge, on the other hand, alike the Ash‘arites, he accounts the religious law and the religious teachings, as the source of certain knowledge in practical philosophy and ethics. There are several pieces of evidence which show that Avicenna’s ethical theory is actually a combined theory, regarding an epistemological viewpoint.

My aim in this paper is to argue against what I call "epistemic" pessimism about moral testimony. Epistemic pessimists argue that moral testimony fails to transmit epistemic warrant as non-moral testimony does. I reject epistemic pessimism by defending the No Difference Thesis, that there is no in principle difference between the transmission of epistemic warrant by moral and non-moral testimony. The main thrust of my argument is that there is a good prima facie case to be made for the thesis, namely, that it is supported by all of the major current epistemological views of testimonial warrant, both reductionist and non-reductionist. After making this case, I consider five pessimist attempts to undermine the No Difference Thesis, and argue that none of these attempts succeeds. So, in the absence of any other compelling criticisms, we are justified in rejecting epistemic pessimism and accepting the No Difference Thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The paper explores the interplay among moral progress, evolution and moral realism. Although it is nearly uncontroversial to note that morality makes progress of one sort or another, it is far from uncontroversial to define what constitutes moral progress. In a minimal sense, moral progress occurs when a subsequent state of affairs is better than a preceding one. Moral realists conceive "it is better than" as something like "it more adequately reflects moral facts"; therefore, on a realist view, moral progress can be associated with accumulations of moral knowledge. From an evolutionary perspective, on the contrary, since there cannot be something like moral knowledge, one might conclude there cannot even be such a thing as moral progress. More precisely, evolutionism urges us to ask whether we can acknowledge the existence of moral progress without being committed to moral realism. A promising strategy, I will argue, is to develop an account of moral progress based on moral understanding rather than moral knowledge. On this view, moral progress follows increases in moral understanding rather than accumulations of moral knowledge. Whether an understanding-based account of moral progress is feasible and what its implications for the notion itself of moral progress are, will be discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Among Muslim scholars, Abu Hamed Muhammad Ghazali, emphasis on self-knowledge and introspection in recognizing the factors and obstacles in the realization of moral acts has special prominence. His view about why man's moral knowledge does not necessarily lead to corresponding moral acts is close to Aristotle's view which considers overcoming weak will as well as the existence of knowledge to be necessary in this regard. Ghazali provides six stages for the formation of moral acts which, in order to be traversed requires not only that the factors of realization of moral acts are available but also that any present obstacles be removed. Five obstacles can be extracted from Ghazali's sayings in Ihya e Ulumid Deen, (Revival of the Religious Sciences). By analyzing Ghazali's views about each of these obstacles - especially Satan - and his theory regarding good and bad thoughts in man, one can assume that he regards the origin of all of these obstacles to be internal, and not the presence of an independent and external factor which finds its way into man. If such a view is accepted, it will have important influences on accepting, knowing and defining moral factors and obstacles, as well as on man's moral training and it can also be proposed as a comprehensive view, even beyond the boundaries of a particular religion and denomination.

Purpose: The present study explored the influence mechanism of the organic part of moral quality by validating if moral knowledge mediates the relation between moral awareness and moral behavior. Design: The present study used randomly stratified sampling method to sample 1,140 Chinese sports practitioners in southwest China and administrated the self-composed sports practitioner moral quality (SPMQ) questionnaire to the subjects for data collection. In addition, the present study applied regression analysis and structural equation modeling (SEM) techniques to explore the relationships among moral awareness, moral knowledge, and moral behavior. Findings: The present study showed two major findings. First, the SPMQ questionnaire showed good internal consistency since the overall Cronbach's a coefficient is 0.85 and the corresponding values of three sub-dimension were over 0.60. Also, it showed that the instrument had good construct validity because all factor loadings were higher than 0.70, all average extracted variances were higher than 0.60, and all composite reliability coefficients were higher than 0.80. Second, the results showed that moral knowledge played intermediate role between moral awareness and moral behavior in the relationships among moral awareness, moral knowledge, and moral behavior. Practical implications: The study is one of the very few research that discuss the mechanism of moral quality from the perspective of the mediation, especially explore the potential mediation effect of moral knowledge in conjunction with the relevant theories and practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, I introduce a puzzle about moral assertion and defend a solution that centrally features the claim that the normativity of moral assertion centrally features moral understanding. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A familiar claim, meant as a challenge to moral knowledge, is that we can credibly accept putative moral facts just in case they explain natural facts. This article critically addresses Elizabeth Tropman's response to a version of that claim. Her response has interest partly because it falls within, and extends, an influential philosophical tradition – that of trying to expose (some) sceptical challenges as spurious or ill‐conceived. Also, Tropman's target is not just any version of the claim just mentioned. It is Gilbert Harman's classic version, according to which putative moral facts must earn credibility by explaining the formation of moral beliefs. This version has wide influence, and variations of it are possible in many areas. Tropman's response is thus well worth attention. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Pessimism about moral testimony, it is objectionable to form moral beliefs by deferring to another. This paper motivates Pessimism about another source of moral knowledge: propositional memory. Drawing on a discussion of Gilbert Ryle's on forgetting the difference between right and wrong, it argues that Internalism about moral motivation offers a satisfying explanation of Pessimism about memory. A central claim of the paper is that Pessimism about memory (and by extension, testimony) is an issue in moral psychology rather than moral epistemology. That is because it is best explained by appeal to claims about the constitution of moral knowledge as a state of mind, rather than requirements on belief formation. The paper also provides reason to suspect that the focus on testimony is something of a red herring. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It is has been argued that there is a problem with moral testimony: testimony is deferential, and basing judgments and actions on deferentially acquired knowledge prevents them from having moral worth. What morality perhaps requires of us, then, is that we understand why a proposition is true, but this is something that cannot be acquired through testimony. I argue here that testimony can be both deferential as well as cooperative, and that one can acquire moral understanding through cooperative testimony. The problem of moral testimony is thus not a problem with testimony generally, but a problem of deferential testimony specifically. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Scientific Annals of the "Stefan cel Mare" Academy of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova / Revista Stiintifica a Academiei Stefan cel Mare is the property of Stefan cel Mare University, Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republic of Moldova / Ministerul Afe and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)