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Moral injury has emerged as an important construct for understanding the distress experienced in the aftermath of a moral violation, initially among combat veterans and increasingly among other populations, such as healthcare workers and first responders. While numerous measures have been validated to assess for exposure to potentially morally injurious events and/or sequelae, additional tools are needed to facilitate nuanced discussion of the experience of moral injury in therapeutic encounters. The Moral Injury Experience Wheel (MIEW; Fleming, 2023) is an infographic instrument that is designed to elicit precise language and help differentiate feelings in an effort to process morally perplexing circumstances. This paper describes the contents and potential clinical applications of a newly developed manual to guide the use of the MIEW. The MIEW and manual are designed to be used independently or alongside existing moral injury interventions. A case study featuring the use of the MIEW and manual demonstrates how the tools can be used in a professional healthcare setting. Recommendations for moral injury care practitioners are provided. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We investigate how issue fields with increasing levels of contestation can develop into fields characterized by echo chambers. Studying the introduction of a controversial new approach to addiction services—harm reduction—we explain how proponents' and opponents' rhetorical arguments changed over time, transitioning the issue field through different configurations. Our findings reveal how field actors were initially differentiated by moral convictions, and as their expression of moral emotions became more intense, the two groups became increasingly divided and polarized in their views, leading to an issue field characterized by echo chambers. Through our analysis of archival materials and interview data, we explicate this process by identifying three phases of issue field transition: creating a moral emotional divide; intensifying antagonization; and insulating against the other side. We contribute to the literature by presenting a model of change explaining how emotional rhetoric, together with different types of triggering events, can fuel increasing levels of contestation and drive the field toward developing echo chambers. Second, by taking a discursive view of issue fields with particular attention to rhetorical arguments, we provide foundational work for an institutional perspective on echo chamber—that echo chambers result from ongoing social processes where people encapsulate themselves based on a sense of right and wrong, in contrast to the predominant view of becoming trapped in an enclosed space. Third, through our focus on the role of moral emotions and how they can escalate in situations of contestation, we advance knowledge regarding the importance of emotions in field dynamics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background: Moral outrage (MO) is an emotional experience that arises in situations where a moral standard is violated. Despite its relevance, there are few psychometric studies in the Latin American context, characterized by inequality and social problems. This highlights the need for specific assessment instruments for this construct. The purpose of this study was to analyze the psychometric properties of an MO scale in the Peruvian population. Methods: The sample consisted of 881 Peruvians (57.2% women, Mage = 24.5 years, SD = 9.07 years). The moral outrage scale was administered to participants. To analyze the data, two models were tested: a structural equation model (SEM) and an exploratory structural equation model (ESEM). Results: The CFA confirmed a two-factor model (emotional and cognitive), with satisfactory fit indices and standardized factor loadings greater than 0.70. The ESEM model also showed improved fit indices. Measurement invariance across sex was established, and convergent validity was demonstrated between the dimensions of MO and authoritarianism, as well as other sociodemographic variables such as sex, age, and socioeconomic level. Conclusions: The MO scale tested in this study is a reliable, valid, and invariant instrument, suitable for assessing moral outrage in both men and women within the Peruvian context. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study examined legal practitioners' emotion regulation strategies and subjective moral emotions related to legal cases they handle. Forty-two participants recalled a civil law case and the emotions they experienced while handling the case. They completed the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire to identify emotion regulation strategies they usually use. Results showed that attorneys often experienced anger and empathy and used strategies that tend to be adaptive across a wide range of contexts. There was a moderate positive correlation between Anger and Positive Refocusing, Contempt and Other-Blame, Guilt and Maladaptive emotion regulation strategies, and the Difference between parties’ agreeableness (understood as how sympathetic they seemed) and Anger. As the experience of negative emotions paired with maladaptive emotion regulation techniques might be associated with negative consequences both for the self and for the relationship with clients, the present study suggests that adding emotion regulation into legal curricula is crucial. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has revealed that including emotional content in ethics cases may improve students’ learning. However, there remain concerns as to whether the emotional content will also impact students’ moral reasoning. There is evidence that incorporating compassion-related emotional content into ethics cases through the implicit induction method increased the intensity of compassion without influencing the moral reasoning of participants. However, the impact of a higher intensity of compassion on moral reasoning remained unclear. Thus, in this experimental study, after using two (explicit expression and descriptions of severe consequences) methods of generating a higher intensity of compassion in ethics cases, we investigated whether this higher emotional intensity impacted the moral reasoning schemas activated in participants (N = 299). Our findings indicated that there was no evident impact. This research suggests there are now multiple strategies to integrate compassion into ethics cases at multiple levels of intensity without distorting moral reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Company activities are important contributors to climate change. Consumers take companies' actions toward environment into account when they decide to engage with these companies. We study under which conditions corporate misconduct with respect to climate change outrages consumers, eliciting negative moral emotions. Moreover, we explore the capacity of these negative moral emotions to energize consumer decisions and action tendencies to retaliate against “offending” companies. Testing two moderated mediation models on random samples of 152 adult citizens of the United States and 159 adult citizens of France, we show that negative moral emotions experienced by consumers that witness corporate malfeasance toward the climate determine negative attitudes toward the company and intentions to penalize it. Moreover, for both samples, empathy, collective self, and moral identity moderate the relationship between the perception of corporate irresponsibility and moral emotions, while the effect of political orientation is culturally specific. These findings help to uncover under which conditions consumer hostile responses toward corporate misconduct takes place. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Abstract Background Moral outrage (MO) is an emotional experience that arises in situations where a moral standard is violated. Despite its relevance, there are few psychometric studies in the Latin American context, characterized by inequality and social problems. This highlights the need for specific assessment instruments for this construct. The purpose of this study was to analyze the psychometric properties of an MO scale in the Peruvian population. Methods The sample consisted of 881 Peruvians (57.2% women, Mage = 24.5 years, SD = 9.07 years). The moral outrage scale was administered to participants. To analyze the data, two models were tested: a structural equation model (SEM) and an exploratory structural equation model (ESEM). Results The CFA confirmed a two-factor model (emotional and cognitive), with satisfactory fit indices and standardized factor loadings greater than 0.70. The ESEM model also showed improved fit indices. Measurement invariance across sex was established, and convergent validity was demonstrated between the dimensions of MO and authoritarianism, as well as other sociodemographic variables such as sex, age, and socioeconomic level. Conclusions The MO scale tested in this study is a reliable, valid, and invariant instrument, suitable for assessing moral outrage in both men and women within the Peruvian context.

The goal of this paper is to explore arguments about the moral (in)appropriateness of counter-contempt as a justified moral and pedagogical response to racist contempt. Drawing on debates for and against contempt in moral philosophy, the paper suggests a contextual approach to contempt that pays attention to both the specifics of the concrete situation that agents are in when they are experiencing racist contempt and the context of the agents themselves, understood as the conceptual and affective tools that are available to them in order to discern and challenge the meaning of racist contempt. The paper discusses the moral and pedagogical dilemmas entailed in efforts to cultivate in the classroom (and beyond) the right kind of contempt—both as a pedagogical stance and as a political message—which does not backfire but instead inspires a productive engagement with racism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unethical employee behavior (UEB), an important organizational phenomenon, is dynamic and multi-faceted. Recent renewed interest in the role of emotion in ethical decision-making (EDM) suggests that unethical behaviors are neither always rationally derived nor deliberately undertaken. This study explores how to integrate the conscious and nonconscious dimensions of unethical decision-making. By broadening the scope of inquiry, we explore how integral affect—the emotion tied to anticipated decision outcomes for the employee engaging in misconduct—can shed light on UEB. We review related literature on affect and EDM and propose a model in which we assert that at a decision point, an employee experiences multiple integral affects that are either persuasive or dissuasive toward UEB. We further posit that among these integral affects, a dominant integral affect (DIA) emerges, determining the nature and direction of unethical behavior. In addition, our model considers the role of affective residue and the influence of other factors, such as incidental affect, disposition, context, and retrospection, to derive propositions. Our DIA model can help managers gain a comprehensive understanding of how affect, characterized by its locus (self or other orientation) and valence (enhancing or harming), determines the characteristics of UEB. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

While social communication and interaction deficits are inherent in autism spectrum disorder (ASD), the evidence regarding difficulties in basic and moral emotion recognition remains inconclusive. Previous research has predominantly focused on the recognition of basic emotions, using stimuli that lack context and overlooking the influence of alexithymia and interoceptive awareness traits. This study sought to investigate the recognition of contextualized basic and moral emotions, as well as the subjective experience of the second ones in adults with ASD (n = 32) and neurotypical peers (n = 33). We also examined its relationship with alexithymia and interoceptive awareness traits. Basic emotion recognition was assessed using a task incorporating facial and body cues in congruent and incongruent contexts. In addition, we used a modified version of the Moral Sentiment Task to examine recognition and subjective experience of self-conscious (guilt and embarrassment) and other-oriented (pity and indignation) moral emotions. Self-report scales were used to collect data on alexithymia and interoceptive awareness traits. Adults with ASD exhibited lower performance in recognizing contextual basic and moral emotions compared to neurotypical individuals. However, neither alexithymia traits nor interoceptive awareness were associated with the recognition of contextual basic or moral emotions. These findings contribute to a better understanding of social deficits in ASD, highlighting the potential benefit of developing new diagnostic assessments and non-pharmacological intervention targets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that moral emotions interact with self-control and unstructured socializing in explaining rule-breaking behavior. High levels of moral emotions appear to weaken the effects of both self-control and unstructured socializing, in explaining rule-breaking behavior. The current study examined whether these interactions also affect rule-breaking behavior that is explicitly committed with friends. In addition, three operationalizations of moral emotions were distinguished. Data were collected from N = 169 adolescents (54% female; mean = 14.95 years; SD = 1.7) using a self-report questionnaire battery. Results indicate that high levels of anticipated emotions in moral conflicts (AEMC) attenuate the effect of low self-control on one's own rule-breaking behavior. In contrast, high levels of both guilt- and shame-proneness enhanced the effect of unstructured socializing on one's own and rule-breaking with friends. The limitations of the study, ideas for future research, and practical implications are also discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite being of undisputed importance, there is no consensus on what emotions are, with the majority of research that constructs ideas about them being colored by a particular worldview. This conceptual article examines the case for conducting an Islamic analysis of emotion. It might seem a peculiar area to examine; what would be the need to analyze such a universal psychological concept through the lens of a particular religion? Three points are used to argue for this endeavor. To begin with, this article highlights the relative instability of the term; there is yet no universally agreed upon definition of what emotions are, and which human processes they contribute to. As the concept is still being defined, there is merit in engaging with the discussion, particularly given the relative absence of metaphysics from the debate. Secondly, specificities relating to emotions and how they have conceptualized are considered. This section delves into the way in which variable factors, such as culture, language, and worldview, influence how emotions manifest. The overarching point argued for here is that how emotions are experienced, and even which emotions are experienced, are shaped by factors that are not consistent across time and space. Accordingly, different worldviews will formulate different "emotional palates" and "emotional ideologies"; different groups of people will understand and engage with emotions differently. Thirdly, a broader discussion ensues pertaining to the nature of science, psychology, and their relationship with secularity. This discussion includes critique of the idea that forces such as secularism and scientific materialism have been "discovered" and are therefore value-neutral. Accordingly, understandings of emotions to have emerged from the Academy, and contemporary psychology, are value-laden. This section also looks at the origins of science in order to determine whether it is inherently atheistic or areligious, and therefore antagonistic to a religious worldview. The section also challenges the apparent secularity of psychology and key psychologists. A range of other facets pertaining to how the emotions have been conceptualized, such as their relational core, their interaction with moral faculties, and their enmeshment with what is important to individuals and groups, are also considered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social emotions such as shame and guilt are critical to social-emotional development in any culture because they help children and adolescents learn to adhere to the social rules and norms of their culture. However, most instruments that currently measure these emotions were validated only in samples from Western countries. This study aimed to translate and validate the Brief Shame and Guilt Questionnaire for Children (BSGQ-C) in children and adolescents living in Iran. A total of 453 children and adolescents aged 8 to 16 years filled out the BSGQ-C, consisting of 2 scales (Guilt: 6 items; Shame: 6 items) and questionnaires for social anxiety and worry. Factorial validity was confirmed by the intended two-factor structure, with an adequate test-score reliability for the scales. Concurrent validity was also confirmed: as expected, shame but not guilt was related to symptoms of social anxiety and worry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper reports on the development and validation of a communication measure designed to assess how military veterans feel toward civilian communication. Specifically, we theorize that some veterans experience a mild negative moral emotion (i.e., contempt) toward civilians' communication habits. The emotion is likely a consequence of intense professional socialization and membership in a totalistic organization. Veterans who served in the military since September 11, 2001 (N = 215) responded to items, which were factor analyzed. Then, in a second study, the scale was validated using another sample of post-9/11 veterans (N = 466). Together, these studies contribute an original communication measure that could help identify whether a veteran will have difficulty reintegrating into civilian work life. The scale could be useful in developing interventions to aid veterans in successful reintegration. Ultimately, the measure holds the potential to promote workplace diversity through the successful inclusion of more veterans in the workforce. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Shame we are told is as intense as it is unrelenting. Shame we are told, further still, is as contagious as it is transmittable. By fastidiously attending to clinical reports and theoretical depictions of shame's totalizing character, I argue in this paper that we can notice something that has broadly gone unnoticed: shame assumes for itself absolute value. To bear this out, I contrast my view with that of the dominant one: that shame has an instrumental value. I show some limitations of the dominant view by reflecting on the role of shame in psychoanalytic training. The picture that emerges may seem quaintly commonsensical, and even commonplace, but it has, I think, vast clinical implications. I believe that it certainly has the potential to open some new horizons. The arguments for such a bold claim will occupy the concluding section of my paper. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Jordanian Educational Journal is the property of Association of Arab Universities and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

"A Conceptual and Semantic Analysis of the Qualitative Domains of Aesthetic and Moral Emotions" by Andrej Demuth and Slávka Demuthová explores the crucial intersection of aesthetic and moral emotions. Understanding these emotions is vital for grasping human psychology and social behaviour, as they shape personal experiences and influence societal norms and ethics. Scholars like Immanuel Kant and Martha Nussbaum have emphasised the role of aesthetics in moral judgement, highlighting how sensory experiences inform our sense of right and wrong. This book's exploration of the semantics and etymology of terms related to aesthetics and moral emotions enhances our understanding of how language shapes emotional experiences and provides historical insights into evolving perceptions of beauty and disgust. This study has significant implications for legal research, where morality, ethics, and justice are influenced by emotional and aesthetic judgements. By examining these judgements, legal scholars can better understand biases, interpret laws more fairly, and develop frameworks that resonate with the complexities of human psychology, enriching both legal theory and practice.

Munch-Jurisic’s account of perpetrator disgust raises important new questions concerning the complexity of emotions and their connection with moral actions. In this commentary, we discuss this account by applying some of the author’s ideas to the case of anger. We suggest that just as the relations between disgust and moral action are much more nuanced than previously thought, as Munch-Jurisic explains, analyses of anger can also profit from a more careful approach to such connections. Specifically, we propose that contextual factors can affect the moral character of anger reactions, which in turn can provide them with moral value. We also argue that the contextual view deployed to study disgust reactions can also support distinctions between core forms and socio-moral forms of the same emotion, which in turn raises interesting questions concerning different forms of anger. Lastly, we extend the contextual approach to problems of emotion individuation and theories in emotion science, showing how current scientific emotion theories can learn from a detailed examination of disgust, anger, and other context-sensitive emotions. We aim to highlight some important contributions of Munch-Jurisic’s work to broader discussions on emotions, morality, and how to theorize about emotions overall. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

As brand activism continues to move up the corporate agenda, a more comprehensive understanding of its effects is needed. This paper contributes to the evolving research by investigating moral emotions (i.e. other-praising and other-condemning emotions) as mediating factors and consumer-brand identification (CBI) as a moderator that shape consumer reactions to brand activism. Three scenario-based experiments on two divisive topics show that activist messages elicit moral emotions that determine how individuals respond to them, depending on whether or not they agree with the brand's stance. Moreover, this effect of (dis)agreeing with the brand's stance on brand attitude is moderated by CBI. In case of a strong identification, an activist message does not affect brand attitude as CBI attenuates the activation of moral emotions – both in the positive case of agreement and in the negative case of disagreement. Finally, brand activism may counter the brand's social goals, as it disproportionally motivates opponents of the brand's stand to advocate their own contrary views on the contentious issue. In sum, these findings underscore both the emotional nature of consumer reactions to brand activism and the high level of social responsibility of companies that position themselves as political actors. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We love people because of who they are, but can the idea of "who they are" be explained through a property that everyone has, such as agency? David Velleman believes this to be the case, and argues that love is an appraisal of a person's incomparable value, which disarms the lover's emotional defences. Modelling love on Kantian respect, Velleman claims that love is a response to a person's rational nature, indirectly perceived though her empirical persona--her observable traits and behaviours, which are imperfect representations of the value of rational nature. An important problem for Velleman's account is that it seems incompatible with two widely shared assumptions about love: that love is personal (so it cannot be analogous to impersonal respect) and that love is selective (so it cannot be based on a property shared by all individuals). Here, I propose a re-formulation of Velleman's view that avoids those objections while preserving the idea that love is an evaluation of the loved person's agency. Specifically, love is an evaluation of a person's inner narrator, which is also a person's capacity to act for reasons--to make actions intelligible to herself. The inner narrator is perceived through that person's observable narrative: her actions and interpretations in interaction, which are a product, and not an imperfect representation, of the inner narrator. In the re-formulated view, love is both personal and selective, but still an agential process that involves both the lover's and the loved person's capacities to make sense of the world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite being of undisputed importance, there is no consensus on what emotions are, with the majority of research that constructs ideas about them being colored by a particular worldview. This conceptual article examines the case for conducting an Islamic analysis of emotion. It might seem a peculiar area to examine; what would be the need to analyze such a universal psychological concept through the lens of a particular religion? Three points are used to argue for this endeavor. To begin with, this article highlights the relative instability of the term; there is yet no universally agreed upon definition of what emotions are, and which human processes they contribute to. As the concept is still being defined, there is merit in engaging with the discussion, particularly given the relative absence of metaphysics from the debate. Secondly, specificities relating to emotions and how they have conceptualized are considered. This section delves into the way in which variable factors, such as culture, language, and worldview, influence how emotions manifest. The overarching point argued for here is that how emotions are experienced, and even which emotions are experienced, are shaped by factors that are not consistent across time and space. Accordingly, different worldviews will formulate different “emotional palates” and “emotional ideologies”; different groups of people will understand and engage with emotions differently. Thirdly, a broader discussion ensues pertaining to the nature of science, psychology, and their relationship with secularity. This discussion includes critique of the idea that forces such as secularism and scientific materialism have been “discovered” and are therefore value-neutral. Accordingly, understandings of emotions to have emerged from the Academy, and contemporary psychology, are value-laden. This section also looks at the origins of science in order to determine whether it is inherently atheistic or areligious, and therefore antagonistic to a religious worldview. The section also challenges the apparent secularity of psychology and key psychologists. A range of other facets pertaining to how the emotions have been conceptualized, such as their relational core, their interaction with moral faculties, and their enmeshment with what is important to individuals and groups, are also considered.

Guilt and shame are often mentioned in the context of environmental problems. Exploring how such emotions affect individuals and their behavior is crucial to the effective promotion of more pro-environmental behavior and sustainable consumption. The aim of this article is to further the understanding of eco-guilt and eco-shame by studying these emotions among participants with differing levels of environmental concern (EC). Using a phenomenologically inspired approach, we conducted 18 in-depth interviews with Danish citizens. A clear connection between EC and the experienced emotions emerged, including how these emotions were triggered and how participants reacted to them. While individuals with high EC mainly experienced eco-guilt, individuals with low EC mainly experienced eco-shame and individuals with a medium level of EC experienced both emotions. Both eco-guilt and eco-shame can increase pro-environmental behaviors under certain conditions, but their effects are complex, and eco-shame in particular, risks leading to environmentally harmful behaviors. Therefore, harnessing these emotions to promote pro-environmental behavior introduces moral as well as practical considerations. The novelty of this study is that it questions the view that certain environmental emotions are inherently adaptive or maladaptive and underscores the importance of understanding the individual and social dynamics, which can affect how eco-guilt, eco-shame and their pro-environmental effects are experienced.

Policies toward undocumented immigrants have fueled political debates recently. Since policies are multidimensional, I proposed examining support for two types of policies: punishing or helping. The Theory of Dyadic Morality (Schein & Gray, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1177/1088868317698288), above other theoretical approaches, was the most fitting to analyze these divergent perspectives. Based on the typecast model, I hypothesized that agent typecast beliefs would predict punishing and patient (victim) beliefs would predict helping. Thus, I expected the agent effect to be mediated through disgust and anger and the victim effect to be mediated through empathy-related emotions. In Study 1 participants provided open-ended responses regarding their beliefs about undocumented immigrants, which were coded for agent and victim themes. Viewing undocumented immigrants as agents of harm was associated with support for punishing policies, and this link was mediated by elevated disgust/anger. Study 2 replicated these Study 1 findings and, in addition, found that perceiving undocumented immigrants as victims was associated with support for helping policies. This link was mediated by increased empathy-related emotions. Implications for ongoing policy debates were discussed.

Civilization is a symbol of culture, and only music education with the spirit of civilization has the core of culture. To meet the needs of the times and promote the reform of the educational system, this study analyzes the Eastern rites and music civilization, and Western ethical civilization. The similarities and differences between them were compared. It was found that both affirm the moral-emotional-aesthetic value of music, but they consider the internal and external nature of its role different. The philosophical foundations of the music education system in modern society are analyzed, and the current state of music education is reflected. Aiming at the problems of lack of subjectivity, lack of understanding and lack of musical identity in music education, the study proposes an innovative path for modern music education in the way of the return of the civilizations of oriental “rites and music” and western “ethics,” i.e., resetting the norms of the musical grammatical behavior, penetrating the humanistic connotations and defining the position of subjectivity.

Copyright of Revista Electrónica de Psicología Iztacala is the property of Facultad de Estudios Superiores Iztacala and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Moral emotions are critically important in understanding people's behavioral responses to justice events. There are conflicting predictions about positive and negative moral emotions' functions in activating retaliation and prosocial tendency from the broaden-and-build perspective and the asymmetric perspective, and few studies have elucidated how justice perception impacts moral emotions on the part of first-person party and third-person party. A sample of 275 undergraduates were recruited to voluntarily participate the experiment to test the mediation effect of moral emotions and the moderation effect of first- and third-person perspectives in the association between justice perception and retaliation, prosocial motivation. The results showed only negative other-focused moral emotions including anger, disgust, contempt, compassion mediated the effect of justice perception on retaliation and prosocial motivation, and first- and third-person perspectives mainly moderated the effect of justice perception on negative other-focused moral emotions. Compared to actors, observers experienced higher level of anger, disgust, contempt and compassion in injustice context. These findings support the asymmetric perspective of moral emotions, rather than the broaden-and-build perspective. They also well account for why people roar at the sight of injustice, and contribute the growing literature concerning behavioral decisions of the third-party observers. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral and self-conscious emotions like guilt and shame can function as internal negative experiences that punish or deter bad behaviour. Individual differences exist in people's tendency to experience guilt and shame. Being disposed to experience guilt and/or shame may predict students' expectations of their emotional reactions to engaging in immoral behaviour in the form of academic misconduct, and thus dissuade students from intending to engage in this behaviour. In this study, students' (n = 459) guilt and shame proneness, their expectations of feeling guilt and shame if they engaged in academic misconduct, and their intentions to engage in academic misconduct were measured. Three of the four facets of the guilt and shame proneness scale [GASP: Guilt–Negative-Behavior-Evaluation (NBE), Guilt-Repair, Shame–Negative-Self-Evaluation (NSE)] had significant negative correlations with academic misconduct intentions, and these relationships were mediated by anticipating shame and guilt related to engaging in academic misconduct. These results suggest that for some students expecting to experience negative moral emotions when engaging in academic misconduct may protect them from breaching ethical assessment rules. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Community characteristics can explain differences in bullying rates between schools. Underpinned by the social-ecological model, this study examined the relationships among community violence exposure (CVE), moral emotions (guilt and sympathy), and bullying in adolescents. We also explored the moderating role of gender in these relationships. The sample included 915 adolescents (48.6% female and 51.4% male) aged 11–16 (M age = 13.76, SD = 0.82). Students responded to the self-report measures. We used a latent variable structural equation modeling (SEM) approach to examine the relationships between variables. The SEM indicated that CVE was negatively associated with moral emotions (guilt and sympathy) and positively associated with bullying. In addition, CVE had a negative indirect association with bullying through their negative relationship with moral emotions. The structural model is equivalent for both genders, suggesting gender does not moderate these relationships. These findings indicate that CVE are associated with differences in school bullying rates. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research on moral judgment (MJ) has focused on understanding the cognitive processes and emotional factors that influence different types of moral judgment tasks, such as personal and impersonal dilemmas. However, few studies have distinguished between the emotions related to cognition and the complex emotions specifically caused by MJ tasks. This gap in knowledge is important to address to have a better understanding of how emotions influence moral judgment. The aim of this study was to investigate the influence of fear and the role of moral emotions on MJ. Data were collected from 145 participants through jsPsych and analyzed using mixed‐model analysis of variance (ANOVA) and correlation analysis. The study found that individuals who were triggered by the fear increased the number of utilitarian moral judgments in personal moral scenarios and lengthened the cognitive process, but not in impersonal moral dilemmas. Hence, we speculate that fear may play a cognitive role in personal moral dilemmas and an emotional role in impersonal moral dilemmas. Another finding is that the complex moral emotions arising from the moral decision‐making process may affect the effectiveness of fear and potentially influence moral judgments. However, this study adopts a cautious attitude toward these discoveries, and further verification of this hypothesis should be conducted in the future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In the investigation of moral judgments of autonomous vehicles (AVs), the paradigm of the sacrificial dilemma is a widespread and flexible experimental tool. In this context, the sacrifice of the AV's passenger typically occurs upon enactment of the utilitarian option, which differs from traditional sacrificial dilemmas, in which the moral agent's life is often jeopardized in the non-utilitarian counterpart. The present within-subject study (n = 183) is aimed at deepening the role of self-sacrifice framing, comparing autonomous- and human-driving text-based moral dilemmas in terms of moral judgment and intensity of four moral emotions (shame, guilt, anger, and disgust). A higher endorsement of utilitarian behavior was observed in human-driving dilemmas and for self-protective utilitarian behaviors. Interestingly, the utilitarian option was considered less moral, shameful, and blameworthy in the case of concurrent self-sacrifice. The present study collects novel information on how different levels of driving automation shape moral judgment and emotions, also providing new evidence on the role of self-sacrifice framing in moral dilemmas. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Rationale and Method: Three interrelated topics are examined in this paper. These are (1) the study of shame and the other moral emotions (guilt, regret, remorse) as it relates to clinical approaches in cross‐cultural psychiatry; (2) the examination of methodological problems and choices in researching and treating shame in persons who have experienced forced departure from their country of origin and immigration into ambivalent host countries, in which shame experienced as part of the power differentials between host and refugee is added to whatever shaming experiences the person endured within the violence of the country of origin; and (3) an examination of the suitability of evidence‐based psychiatry (EBP) and narrative psychiatry as vehicles for providing clinical assessment and care that is scientifically rigorous and also establishes a reciprocally respectful relationship between two humans working on a single task of developing and understanding the life story of the person who has experienced the stresses of life as a refugee. Discussion: The three topics outlined above (shame viewed at many levels; experience of entering and receiving hospitality from a host country fraught with political resentment and bureaucratic institutional procedures, yet holding the possibility of rebuilding a life with the support and assistance of the healthcare professions and other agencies; the limitations of EBP and suitability of Narrative Psychiatry are discussed at theoretical and practical levels as these domains interact in seeking, through a true partnership, the common ethical goals of providing the best course of action for this patient at this moment. Conclusions: We present two case vignettes as illustrations of how shame or respect arises and is responded to in the context of a psychiatry session. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research proposes that consumers vary in their response to company moral transgressions as a function of power distance belief (PDB), which is the extent that consumers accept inequality (a prominent moral principle). Specifically, consumers with lower PDB tend to feel more empathy for victims, which in turn heightens harm perceptions and negative moral emotions, leading to less favorable reactions toward the transgressing company. A series of nine studies and four supplementary experiments provides converging evidence for the PDB effect and underlying empathy-based process, while identifying victim salience and company crisis response strategy as theoretically and pragmatically relevant moderators. Specifically, the PDB effect emerges when victim salience is high (evoking greater empathy among lower-PDB consumers) but is attenuated when victim salience is low (and empathy is not evoked). Likewise, the PDB effect on company evaluations can be mitigated when the transgressing company offers both an apology and remedy, which together signal the company's empathy for victims and remedy for harm that are salient to low-PDB consumers. Together, these findings shed light on how consumer reactions to company moral transgressions vary by culture, transgression characteristics, and company response strategies, providing guidance to companies in crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Previous research has shown that moral emotions interact with self-control and unstructured socializing in explaining rule-breaking behavior. High levels of moral emotions appear to weaken the effects of both self-control and unstructured socializing, in explaining rule-breaking behavior. The current study examined whether these interactions also affect rule-breaking behavior that is explicitly committed with friends. In addition, three operationalizations of moral emotions were distinguished. Data were collected from N = 169 adolescents (54% female; mean = 14.95 years; SD = 1.7) using a self-report questionnaire battery. Results indicate that high levels of anticipated emotions in moral conflicts (AEMC) attenuate the effect of low self-control on one’s own rule-breaking behavior. In contrast, high levels of both guilt- and shame-proneness enhanced the effect of unstructured socializing on one’s own and rule-breaking with friends. The limitations of the study, ideas for future research, and practical implications are also discussed.

The present study focuses on the thematization of the new Romanian diaspora’s experiences through the spectacular mechanisms of the media and on the subsequent production of active moral feelings, which intensify critical expressions and justificatory demands within various audiences – designated by the concept of “news community”. Generically, the term “diasporapathy” is used to characterize putative members of a diaspora who do not respond to the appeals of “diasporactivists”. This study is based on an anti-essentialist methodology (S. Fish, R. Brubaker, B. Anderson) and on L. Boltanski, L. Thevenot and L. Chouliaraki’s model of analyzing “distant” moral interpellations and the transfer of moral causes into “news speech”. In speech interactions – in the sample drawn from internet discussion forums – we observe how this diasporic experience is used as a category of practice in order to articulate new claims and projects, apart from activating the “ideal diaspora” versus “diasporapathetic” behaviors in order to remake an ideal Romanianness within the new European area.

Existing empirical research on voters' responses to individual politicians' moral transgressions pays limited attention to moral emotions, although moral emotions are an integral part of voters' moral judgment. This study looks at U.S. voters' discrete moral emotional responses to politician's moral violations and examines how these discrete moral emotional responses are dependent on voters' own moral principles and the extent to which they identify with a political party. We report on a 5 × 3 between-subjects experiment where 2026 U.S. respondents reacted to politicians' violations of one of five moral foundations defined by Moral Foundations Theory. We randomly vary which moral foundation is violated and the partisanship of the politician. While voters' own moral principles somewhat condition moral emotional responses, we find that voters' moral emotional responses mostly depend on partisan identification. When voters share party identity with a politician committing a moral violation, they respond with less anger, contempt, disgust and shame than when they do not share party identity. The effect is greater among strong partisans. However, we find limited evidence that specific moral emotions are activated by violations of particular moral foundations, thereby challenging Moral Foundations Theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim: To explore the moral emotions that frontline nurses navigated in endeavouring to ensure a 'good death' for hospital patients and care home residents during the first wave of the COVID‐19 pandemic. Background: Under normal circumstances, frontline staff are focused on clinical ethics, which foreground what is best for individuals and families. Public health crises such as a pandemic require staff to adapt rapidly to focus on what benefits communities, at times compromising individual well‐being and autonomy. Visitor restrictions when people were dying provided vivid exemplars of this ethical shift and the moral emotions nurses encountered with the requirement to implement this change. Methods: Twenty‐nine interviews were conducted with nurses in direct clinical care roles. Data were analysed thematically informed by the theoretical concepts of a good death and moral emotions. Results: The data set highlighted that moral emotions such as sympathy, empathy, distress and guilt were integral to the decisions participants described in striving for a good palliative experience. Four themes were identified in the data analysis: nurses as gatekeepers; ethical tensions and rule bending; nurses as proxy family members; separation and sacrifice. Conclusions: Participants reflected on morally compromising situations and highlighted agency through emotionally satisfying workarounds and collegial deliberations that enabled them to believe that they were party to painful but morally justifiable decisions. Implications for the profession and patient care: Nurses are required to implement national policy changes that may disrupt notions of best practice and therefore be experienced as a moral wrong. In navigating the moral emotions accompanying this shift, nurses benefit from compassionate leadership and ethics education to support team cohesion enabling nurses to prevail. Public contribution: Twenty‐nine frontline registered nurses participated in the qualitative interviews that inform this study. Reporting method: The study adhered to the Consolidated Criteria for Reporting Qualitative Research checklist. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The gamer’s dilemma, initially proposed by Luck (Ethics and Information Technology 11(1):31–36, 2009) posits a moral comparison between in-game acts of murder and in-game acts of paedophilia within single-player videogames. Despite each activity lacking the obvious harms of their real-world equivalents, common intuitions suggest an important difference between them. Some responses to the dilemma suggest that intuitive responses to the two cases are based on important differences between the acts themselves or their social meaning. Others challenge the fundamental assumptions of the dilemma. In this paper, we identify and explore key imaginative and emotional differences in how certain types of in-game violence are experienced by players, consider how these differences factor into the moral lives of players, and use these insights to resolve the dilemma. The view we develop is that the key moral emotion in offensive video gameplay is self-repugnance. This is not repugnance of the act one directs a game character to perform in the game, nor repugnance of the character one plays. It is repugnance of oneself in playing the game. If self-repugnance is a fitting emotional response to playing a videogame, then this is prima facie grounds for thinking it is wrong to play the videogame. Our approach to the gamer’s dilemma is to distinguish the fittingness conditions of self-repugnance from the fittingness conditions of other moral emotions as they pertain to playing videogames. We argue that because of the virtual character of the actions performed in video games, self-repugnance is a fitting response to particular kinds of offensive gameplay. On the other hand, in-game murder is not invariably a fitting ground for self-repugnance. We argue that this difference is grounded in imaginative responses to the harm of death and the harms of profound suffering. Our task is to explain and justify this difference in fittingness conditions and use this to resolve the gamer’s dilemma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Despite the important social functions of moral emotions, they are understudied in the autism spectrum disorder (ASD) population. This three-wave longitudinal study is among the first to examine the development of moral emotions and their associations with theory of mind in 3- to 7-year-old children with ASD, using observational tasks. One hundred and forty-two children (52 with ASD) were followed over a period of 2 years. We found that while the expressions of shame and guilt remained stable in non-ASD children, they decreased with age in children with ASD. No group differences were found in the levels or the developmental trajectories of pride. Besides, better false-belief understanding was uniquely related to the expressions of pride in children with ASD. Our findings highlight the importance of enhancing understanding of moral emotion development and related factors in children with ASD. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic is a major heath crisis that continues to impact healthcare organizations worldwide. As infection rates surged, there was a global shortage of personal protective equipment, critical medications, ventilators, and hospital beds, meaning that healthcare professionals faced increasingly difficult workplace conditions. In this conceptual study, we argue these situations can lead to healthcare professionals experiencing moral emotions - defined as specific emotions which relate, or occur in response, to the interest or welfare of others - towards their organizations. This paper explores the three moral emotions of contempt, anger and disgust, and their potential influence on healthcare professionals' workplace commitment in the context of a pandemic. Drawing from the moral emotions and organizational commitment literature, we develop a process model to demonstrate how healthcare professionals' affective and continuous commitment are likely to decrease while, paradoxically, normative, and professional commitment may become amplified. The possible potential for positive outcomes from negative moral emotions is discussed, followed by theoretical and practical contributions of the model, and finally, directions for future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Do moral beliefs motivate action? To answer this question, extant arguments have considered hypothetical cases of association (dissociation) between agents' moral beliefs and actions. In this paper, I argue that this approach can be improved by studying people's actual moral beliefs and actions using empirical research methods. I present three new studies showing that, when the stakes are high, associations between participants' moral beliefs and actions are actually explained by co-occurring but independent moral emotions. These findings suggest that moral beliefs themselves have little or no motivational force, supporting the Humean picture of moral motivation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]