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Human life is infused with different kinds of normativity (e.g. instrumental, epistemic, conventional, moral). Different theorists have proposed vastly differing views on how to conceptualize the different kinds of normativity. Whereas social domain theorists have asserted that moral, conventional, and personal kinds of normativity constitute distinct thematic domains and are viewed as such even by young children, other theorists have denied that moral and nonmoral kinds of normativity are thematically distinguishable. The current paper proposes a third approach that may show a way out of the controversy. Instead of viewing normative issues as belonging to one or more distinct thematic domains, it would be more accurate, both philosophically and psychologically speaking, to recognize that any given action may be grounded in multiple, non-exclusive reasons for action. Moral, conventional, and personal reasons for action may be defined in terms of what one believes one can respectively justify to all rational interlocutors, particular social partners, and oneself. The three kinds of reasons for action may accordingly be visualized as dimensions of normativity that together comprise a three-dimensional coordinate “space of reasons.” To illustrate the dimensions approach, 16 examples are given of actions whose values vary independently on each of the three dimensions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of this study was to investigate whether a potential moral cognitive impairment (failure in understanding moral rules) exists in patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) and to explore the effect of childhood trauma (CT) on moral cognition in a group of patients with SCZ. Methods: A total of 99 patients with SCZ and 102 healthy controls (HCs) were included in this study. The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire-Short Form (CTQ) was administered to assess childhood trauma experiences in both groups, while the Moral Identity Measure (MIM) and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) were applied for a comparative evaluation of moral cognition across the two groups. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) was administered to assess the psychopathology. Results: Patients with schizophrenia had significantly greater CTQ scores than HCs (42.77 ± 13.50 vs. 29.11 ± 4.25, t =9.697, p <0.001). The prevalence of childhood trauma (χ 2 = 58.452, p <0.001) and history of aggressive behaviors (χ 2 = 23.565, p =0.001) among patients with SCZ were greater than that among HCs. In addition, the scores of moral cognition (MIM: 61.82 ± 15.12 vs. 70.88 ± 8.87, p =0.001; MFQ: 87.24 ± 22.30 vs. 112.62 ± 23.42, p =0.045) in the SCZ group was lower than that in the HC group after controlling for the influence of CT covariates. The MFQ score was negatively correlated with the CTQ score, the emotional abuse (EA) score, the physical abuse (PA) score and the physical neglect (PN) score in SCZ patients. Among HCs, the MFQ score was positively correlated with the CTQ score, as well as with the dimensions of physical abuse (PA) and emotional Neglect (EN). Multiple linear regression analyses revealed that impaired moral cognition performance was significantly predicted by the CTQ score (beta =-0.235, p =0.034, 95% CI -0.743 to -0.031) in patients with SCZ but was significantly predicted by years of education (beta =-0.392, p <0.001, 95% CI -4.783 to -1.876), alcohol use (beta =0.210, p =0.023, 95% CI 2.191 to 29.399) and the CTQ score (beta =0.184, p =0.046, 95% CI 0.019 to 1.928) in HCs. CTQ moderated the effect of SCZ on MFQ (B = 0.516); Simple tests revealed that the group effect on the MFQ was B =12.306 at the lower level(-1SD) and B = 54.089 at the higher level(+1SD) of the CTQ scores. Conclusions: SCZ patients exhibit impaired moral cognition. The contribution of CT to the presence of moral cognitive impairments seems to be independent of psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Journal of Physical Education / Tiyu Xuekan is the property of Journal of Physical Education Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

The increasing involvement of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in moral decision situations raises the possibility of users attributing blame to AI-based systems for negative outcomes. In two experimental studies with a total of participants, we explored the attribution of blame and underlying moral reasoning. Participants had to classify mushrooms in pictures as edible or poisonous with support of an AI-based app. Afterwards, participants read a fictitious scenario in which a misclassification due to an erroneous AI recommendation led to the poisoning of a person. In the first study, increased system transparency through explainable AI techniques reduced blaming of AI. A follow-up study showed that attribution of blame to each actor in the scenario depends on their perceived obligation and capacity to prevent such an event. Thus, blaming AI is indirectly associated with mind attribution and blaming oneself is associated with the capability to recognize a wrong classification. We discuss implications for future research on moral cognition in the context of human–AI interaction. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Objective: The aim of this study was to investigate whether a potential moral cognitive impairment (failure in understanding moral rules) exists in patients with schizophrenia (SCZ) and to explore the effect of childhood trauma (CT) on moral cognition in a group of patients with SCZ. Methods: A total of 99 patients with SCZ and 102 healthy controls (HCs) were included in this study. The Childhood Trauma Questionnaire-Short Form (CTQ) was administered to assess childhood trauma experiences in both groups, while the Moral Identity Measure (MIM) and the Moral Foundations Questionnaire (MFQ) were applied for a comparative evaluation of moral cognition across the two groups. The Positive and Negative Syndrome Scale (PANSS) was administered to assess the psychopathology. Results: Patients with schizophrenia had significantly greater CTQ scores than HCs (42.77 ± 13.50 vs. 29.11 ± 4.25, t=9.697, p<0.001). The prevalence of childhood trauma (χ2 = 58.452, p<0.001) and history of aggressive behaviors (χ2 = 23.565, p=0.001) among patients with SCZ were greater than that among HCs. In addition, the scores of moral cognition (MIM: 61.82 ± 15.12 vs. 70.88 ± 8.87, p=0.001; MFQ: 87.24 ± 22.30 vs. 112.62 ± 23.42, p=0.045) in the SCZ group was lower than that in the HC group after controlling for the influence of CT covariates. The MFQ score was negatively correlated with the CTQ score, the emotional abuse (EA) score, the physical abuse (PA) score and the physical neglect (PN) score in SCZ patients. Among HCs, the MFQ score was positively correlated with the CTQ score, as well as with the dimensions of physical abuse (PA) and emotional Neglect (EN). Multiple linear regression analyses revealed that impaired moral cognition performance was significantly predicted by the CTQ score (beta=-0.235, p=0.034, 95% CI -0.743 to -0.031) in patients with SCZ but was significantly predicted by years of education (beta=-0.392, p<0.001, 95% CI -4.783 to -1.876), alcohol use (beta=0.210, p=0.023, 95% CI 2.191 to 29.399) and the CTQ score (beta=0.184, p=0.046, 95% CI 0.019 to 1.928) in HCs. CTQ moderated the effect of SCZ on MFQ (B = 0.516); Simple tests revealed that the group effect on the MFQ was B=12.306 at the lower level(-1SD) and B = 54.089 at the higher level(+1SD) of the CTQ scores. Conclusions: SCZ patients exhibit impaired moral cognition. The contribution of CT to the presence of moral cognitive impairments seems to be independent of psychopathology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral cognition has largely been studied via dilemmas in which making a utilitarian choice causes instrumental harm (negative dimension). Studies of utilitarianism link this behavior with socioemotional unresponsiveness. However, there is a positive dimension of utilitarianism in which one sacrifices the good of oneself or close others for the overall welfare. We measured utilitarian choices multidimensionally in a patient with behavioral variant frontotemporal dementia (bvFTD), incorporating dilemmas accounting for negative and positive dimensions. Despite socioemotional deficits our patient was highly utilitarian in the positive, dimension of utilitarianism. This case study challenges the tendency to automatically associate bvFTD with antisocial tendencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Power and status are two critical elements of social hierarchy. However, whether power and status have similar effects on unethical behavior has received inconsistent results. We constructed a theoretical model of power, status, and unethical behavior to address this issue by integrating the approach-inhibition theory and expectation states theory. We verified this model based on 132 samples reported in 95 articles. Our meta-analytic results show that power and status affect unethical behavior differently, such that power is positively related to unethical behavior. Contrastingly, status is negatively associated with unethical behavior. Furthermore, power and status have different indirect effects on unethical behavior through moral cognition. Compared with power, status has a stronger indirect inhibitory effect on unethical behavior through moral cognition. We also examined the moderating role of power distance in the indirect effects of power and status on unethical behavior. The results of the moderated mediation meta-analysis show that the indirect positive effect of power on unethical behavior through moral cognition and the indirect negative effect of status on unethical behavior through moral cognition are stronger when power distance is higher. These findings help scholars better understand how power and status may increase or inhibit unethical behavior and when this occurs. Furthermore, these findings provide more convincing and referential evidence for practitioners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the role of intuitive theories in the cultural evolution of moral cognition, integrating recent work across subfields of psychology and suggesting directions for future research. Focusing on intuitive theories in the moral domain concerning how people judge the moral value of actions and make inferences about moral character, we review evidence that the specific forms these theories take vary across individuals and can change via social learning. We propose that cultural selection can operate over the intuitive theories people apply in the moral domain, in which particular variants of intuitive moral theories can be more "successful" to the extent that they are cognitively efficient or provide reputational benefits. Finally, we explore some implications of considering moral cognition as a kind of cultural technology that can be innovated, considering whether intuitive moral theories help or hinder our ability to improve our collective moral norms or practices. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Laypeople often believe that God punishes transgressions; however, their inferences about God's punishment motives remain unclear. We addressed this topic by asking laypeople to indicate why God punishes. We also examined participants' inferences about why humans punish to contribute to scholarly conversations regarding the extent to which people may anthropomorphize God's mind. In Studies 1A to 1C, participants viewed God as less retributive than humans. In Study 2, participants expected God (vs. humans) to view humans' true selves more positively; this difference mediated participants' views of God as less retributive than humans. Study 3 manipulated agents' views of humans' true selves and examined how such information influenced each agent's perceived motives. Participants viewed a given agent as less retributive when that agent regarded the true self as good (versus bad). These findings extend scholarship on lay theories of punishment motives and highlight links between religious and moral cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p

The theory of moral disengagement has been useful in explaining disruptive social behavior in young people, showing differences between men and women. However, there are no studies regarding the association of psychological factors, as impulsivity, self-esteem, anxiety, and moral disengagement. Therefore, we analyzed gender differences and psychological predictors of moral disengagement mechanisms in young people. This was a quantitative, cross-sectional, comparative, and correlational study. Participants were 1,419 young people aged 16 to 30 years (M = 20.6, SD = 3.32) who answered the Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement Scale (mmds), the Barratt Impulsivity scale (bis-11), the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale (rses) and the Beck Anxiety Inventory (bai). A Student's t-test showed that men had higher scores on moral disengagement mechanisms and self-esteem, and women had higher scores on anxiety. Moral disengagement mechanisms were found to be inversely correlated with self-esteem, but directly correlated with impulsivity and anxiety. Multiple linear regression analysis showed that self-contempt, impulsivity, anxiety, and gender had the strongest effects on predicting moral disengagement and mechanisms. These effects were similar for men and women. This study provides important information about the influence of psychological factors not explored in previous studies on the understanding of moral agency in young people. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: Few studies have focused on social cognition in dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB), even though some brain structures being well known as underlying social cognitive processes are directly impacted in this disease. Furthermore, social cognition processes have been mostly studied independently using evaluations with poor ecological validity. We aimed at studying the ability of a new naturalistic and multidimensional social cognition task to reveal impairments in DLB patients. We chose to compare the profile of these patients with that of Alzheimer's disease (AD) patients, for which social cognition is better preserved. Method: Fifteen patients (DLB: n = 7; AD: n = 8) and 28 healthy controls underwent the REALSoCog task. They encountered several social situations (e.g. control versus transgressions) in a non-immersive virtual city environment allowing the assessment of moral cognition, cognitive and affective theory of mind (ToM), emotional empathy and behavioral intentions. Results: The main results showed (i) a lower ability to detect transgressions in DLB patients, particularly conventional ones, whereas moral cognition seemed better preserved in AD patients; (ii) a cognitive ToM impairment in both DLB and AD patients, while affective ToM is impaired only in DLB patients; (iii) a decreased emotional empathy specifically observed in DLB patients; (iv) more inappropriate behavioral intentions, mainly in DLB patients, but also in some AD patients. Conclusions: This study suggests the feasibility and potential interest of the REALSoCog task in revealing social cognition deficits, particularly for DLB patients by showing different social patterns as compared to AD patients. These results offer interesting clinical perspectives to develop more naturalistic tasks in such populations and for clinical differential diagnosis. Limitations and future perspectives are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study investigated the resource allocation of Chinese sixth-graders and the role of peer relationship in different resource conditions (N = 132, Mage = 11. 35 years, SD = 0.60). We designed the resource quantity as a between-group variable, with one group participating in a resource-limited experiment and another group in a resource-abundant experiment. Both groups of children allocated token resources to three types of peers relationships: good friends, disliked individuals, and strangers. Based on our experimental hypotheses, we presupposed three experimental outcomes: selfish allocation, equal allocation, and altruistic allocation. To analyze the data, we employed multivariate unordered regression analysis and performed two rounds of regression analyses using both selfish and altruistic allocations as reference categories to enhance the statistical power of regression model. Our results reveal that the resource quantity had a significant hindering effect on children's allocation behaviors, as the amount of available resources for allocation increased, so did their willingness to allocate selfishly. It was also found that an increase in resources led to a decrease in the proportion of children allocating equally. Nonetheless, the results still revealed generalized peer relationship preferences: children tended to allocate more resources to friends than to individuals they disliked. But when faced with disliked individuals, they were relatively more likely to allocate equally. Finally, we observed the proportion of equal allocation and discussed the similar impact of inequality aversion, different allocation contexts, and children's theory of mind on equitable allocation among sixth-graders. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Trends in moral psychology largely support the role that emotion plays in moral cognition with human lesion studies offering the most compelling evidence to date. Specifically, data from ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vmPFC) patients on moral judgment tasks has suggested the necessity of having intact emotion to behave in morally appropriate ways. However, patients with vmPFC damage also have deficits in a variety of complex judgment and decision-making tasks, regardless of whether emotion is involved. This paper argues that a basic information processing perspective of vmPFC functionality is a better interpretation of vmPFC patient deficits, specifically with the vmPFC being necessary for value assessment rather than being specific to emotion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Children recognise the praiseworthiness of others' moral actions from quite a young age. The work we propose here focuses on whether and how children's judgements of moral praiseworthiness may be affected by cost incurred by the agents. Recent work has revealed developmental changes in how children consider physical and psychological costs in their judgements of moral praiseworthiness. However, this question has only been examined among US children, and little is known about how much the findings can be generalised across cultures. In this article, we examine the consideration of different types of costs (psychological, physical) in moral evaluation by children in China, and compare to the US data. We choose to study children in China not only because it is a non‐WEIRD culture, but also because recent work has suggested that there are cultural differences between the US and China in terms of how children conceptualise desire inhibition and self‐control. This research will have implications for research on children's moral cognition across cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Prosocial values play a critical role in promoting care and concern for the well-being of others and prioritizing the common good of society. Evidence from population-based reports, cognitive neuroscience, and clinical studies suggests that these values depend on social cognition processes, such as empathy, deontological moral cognition, moral emotions, and social cooperation. Additionally, indirect evidence suggests that various forms of prosocial behaviors are associated with positive health outcomes at the behavioral, cardiovascular, immune, stress-related, and inflammatory pathways. However, it is unclear whether prosociality can positively influence brain health outcomes. In this perspective, we propose that prosocial values are not only influenced by brain conditions but could also potentially play a role in protecting brain health. We review studies from various fields that support this claim, including recent reports of prosociality-based interventions impacting brain health. We then explore potential multilevel mechanisms, based on the reduction of allostatic overload at behavioral, cardiovascular, immune, stress-related, and inflammatory levels. Finally, we propose potential prosociality-based interventions for improving brain health in at-risk populations, such as psychiatric and neurological patients, and individuals exposed to poverty or violence. Our perspective suggests that prosocial values may play a role in promoting and maintaining healthy brains.

The neurobiology of typical moral cognition involves the interaction of frontal, limbic, and temporoparietal networks. There is still much to be understood mechanistically about how moral processing is disrupted; such understanding is key to combating antisociality. Neuroscientific models suggest a key role for attention mechanisms in atypical moral processing. We hypothesized that attention-bias toward alcohol cues in alcohol use disorder (AUD) leads to a failure to properly engage with morally relevant stimuli, reducing moral processing. We recruited patients with AUD (n = 30) and controls (n = 30). During functional magnetic resonance imaging, participants viewed pairs of images consisting of a moral or neutral cue and an alcohol or neutral distractor. When viewing moral cues paired with alcohol distractors, individuals with AUD had lower medial prefrontal cortex engagement; this pattern was also seen for left amygdala in younger iAUDs. Across groups, individuals had less engagement of middle/superior temporal gyri. These findings provide initial support for AUD-related attention bias interference in sociomoral processing. If supported in future longitudinal and causal study designs, this finding carries potential societal and clinical benefits by suggesting a novel, leverageable mechanism and in providing a cognitive explanation that may help combat persistent stigma. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Introduction: How an event is framed impacts how people judge the morality of those involved, but prior knowledge can influence information processing about an event, which also can impact moral judgments. The current study explored how blame framing and self-reported prior knowledge of a historical act of racial violence, labeled as Riot, Massacre, or Event, impacted individual's cumulative moral judgments regarding the groups involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre (Black Tulsans, the Tulsa Police, and White Tulsans). Methods and results: This study was collected in two cohorts including undergraduates attending the University of Oklahoma and individuals living in the United Kingdom. Participants were randomly assigned to a blame framing condition, read a factual summary of what happened in Tulsa in 1921, and then responded to various moral judgment items about each group. Individuals without prior knowledge had higher average Likert ratings (more blame) toward Black Tulsans and lower average Likert ratings (less blame) toward White Tulsans and the Tulsa Police compared to participants with prior knowledge. This finding was largest when what participants read was framed as a Massacre rather than a Riot or Event. We also found participants with prior knowledge significantly differed in how they made moral judgments across target groups; those with prior knowledge had lower average Likert ratings (less blame) for Black Tulsans and higher average Likert ratings (more blame) for White Tulsans on items pertaining to causal responsibility, intentionality, and punishment compared to participants without prior knowledge. Discussion: Findings suggest that the effect of blame framing on moral judgments is dependent on prior knowledge. Implications for how people interpret both historical and new events involving harmful consequences are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People can be uncertain in their moral judgments. Philosophers have argued that such uncertainty can either refer to the underlying empirical facts (empirical uncertainty) or to the normative evaluation of these facts itself (normative uncertainty). Psychological investigations of this distinction, however, are rare. In this paper, we combined factor‐analytical and experimental approaches to show that empirical and normative uncertainty describe two related but different psychological states. In Study 1, we asked N = 265 participants to describe a case of moral uncertainty and to rate different aspects of their uncertainty about this case. Across this wide range of moral scenarios, our items loaded onto three reliable factors: lack of information, unclear consequences, and normative uncertainty. In Study 2, we confirmed this factor structure using predefined stimulus material. N = 402 participants each rated eight scenarios that systematically varied in their degree of uncertainty regarding the consequences of the described actions and in the value conflict that was inherent to them. The empirical uncertainty factors were mainly affected by the introduction of uncertainty regarding consequences, and the normative uncertainty factor was mainly affected by the introduction of value conflict. Our studies provide evidence that the distinction between empirical and normative uncertainty accurately describes a psychological reality. We discuss the relevance of our findings for research on moral judgments and decision‐making, and folk metaethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Psychological Science is the property of Psychological Science Editorial Office and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

We argue that there is significant evidence for reconsidering the possibility that moral judgment constitutes a distinctive category of judgment. We begin by reviewing evidence and arguments from neuroscience and philosophy that seem to indicate that a diversity of brain processes result in verdicts that we ordinarily consider "moral judgments". We argue that if these findings are correct, this is plausible reason for doubting that all moral judgments necessarily share common features: if diverse brain processes give rise to what we refer to as "moral judgments", then we have reason to suspect that these judgments may have different features. After advancing this argument, we show that giving up the unity of moral judgment seems to effectively dissolve the internalism/externalism debate concerning motivation within the field of metaethics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The aim of the study is to analyze the scientific literature and evidence on the mechanisms of functional connectivity involved in moral cognition processes in youth with psychopathy traits. Scientometric methods of citation networks based on graph theory were used. Bibliometrix, Sci2 Tool, and Gephi were used for the analysis. It was found that the dorsal and ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, hippocampus, angular gyrus, anterior cingulate and temporal cortex evidence functional alterations in young people with psychopathic traits. It was also reported that gray matter concentration in the left posterior and right anterior cingulate are possible endophenotypes of psychopathic traits. The theoretical, empirical, and legal implications of a moral neural perspective of psychopathy and antisocial behavior are discussed. The results demonstrated that psychopathic traits, which occasionally lead to criminal and violent behaviors, have a neurobiological basis related to moral cognition processes. However, a neuronal moral model has theoretical and practical limitations, as well as legal implications for free will and moral agency capacity.

IntroductionHow an event is framed impacts how people judge the morality of those involved, but prior knowledge can influence information processing about an event, which also can impact moral judgments. The current study explored how blame framing and self-reported prior knowledge of a historical act of racial violence, labeled as Riot, Massacre, or Event, impacted individual’s cumulative moral judgments regarding the groups involved in the Tulsa Race Massacre (Black Tulsans, the Tulsa Police, and White Tulsans).Methods and resultsThis study was collected in two cohorts including undergraduates attending the University of Oklahoma and individuals living in the United Kingdom. Participants were randomly assigned to a blame framing condition, read a factual summary of what happened in Tulsa in 1921, and then responded to various moral judgment items about each group. Individuals without prior knowledge had higher average Likert ratings (more blame) toward Black Tulsans and lower average Likert ratings (less blame) toward White Tulsans and the Tulsa Police compared to participants with prior knowledge. This finding was largest when what participants read was framed as a Massacre rather than a Riot or Event. We also found participants with prior knowledge significantly differed in how they made moral judgments across target groups; those with prior knowledge had lower average Likert ratings (less blame) for Black Tulsans and higher average Likert ratings (more blame) for White Tulsans on items pertaining to causal responsibility, intentionality, and punishment compared to participants without prior knowledge.DiscussionFindings suggest that the effect of blame framing on moral judgments is dependent on prior knowledge. Implications for how people interpret both historical and new events involving harmful consequences are discussed.

The aim of the study is to analyze the scientific literature and evidence on the mechanisms of functional connectivity involved in moral cognition processes in youth with psychopathy traits. Scientometric methods of citation networks based on graph theory were used. Bibliometrix, Sci2 Tool, and Gephi were used for the analysis. It was found that the dorsal and ventral regions of the prefrontal cortex, orbitofrontal cortex, amygdala, hippocampus, angular gyrus, anterior cingulate and temporal cortex evidence functional alterations in young people with psychopathic traits. It was also reported that gray matter concentration in the left posterior and right anterior cingulate are possible endophenotypes of psychopathic traits. The theoretical, empirical, and legal implications of a moral neural perspective of psychopathy and antisocial behavior are discussed. The results demonstrated that psychopathic traits, which occasionally lead to criminal and violent behaviors, have a neurobiological basis related to moral cognition processes. However, a neuronal moral model has theoretical and practical limitations, as well as legal implications for free will and moral agency capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral cognition is an emerging field investigating the cognitive underpinnings of moral judgement and moral decision-making. Of particular interest for Cognitive Translation and Interpreting Studies (CTIS) is the impact of the use of a foreign language on the cognitive processes associated with moral decision making, what has been labeled "Foreign Language Effect" (FLE). Using a second language has been reported to reduce decision-making biases, doing away with framing effects in risk aversion settings. At the same time, moral dilemmas posed in a second language prompt more utilitarian responses than when presented in the subjects' native tongues. These results beg the following question for the CTIS scholar: does language mediation training mitigate the FLE? This paper reports on an exploratory study investigating the impact of language mediation training on the FLE. Drawing from Costa et al. (2014), 1st and 4th year, bilingual students in a Translation and Interpreting degree are presented with the trolley dilemma both in their L1, L2, and L3. Initial results seem to indicate that language mediation training might have an impact on the FLE. However, the limitations of the study suggest the need for further exploration of the intersection between language mediation training and the FLE. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Artefactos: Revista de Estudios Sobre La Ciencia Y La Tecnologia is the property of Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this paper, we perform a text analysis of Adam Smith's two books, the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, to better characterize their highly disputed differences in terms of moral cognition. In particular, given that Smith's ideas are still very cited and influential in the current scholarly debate on moral cognition, we are interested in understanding whether a text analysis would unveil a semantic structure that is in line with a dual process theory interpretation or, alternatively, with a neuro-emergent cognition one. We find that, despite that the intellectual koine in which Smith's thought was originally embedded would be more in line with a dual process theory approach, the analysis reveals a better consonance with the neuro-emergent cognition approach. This opens new and interesting perspectives in future research on the moral cognition of market interactions in a Smithian tradition of thought. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do people think that someone living a morally bad life is less happy than someone living a good life? One possibility is that judging whether someone is happy involves not only attributing positive psychological states (i.e., lots of pleasant emotions, few unpleasant emotions, and satisfaction with life) but also forming an evaluative judgment. Another possibility is that moral considerations affect happiness attributions because they tacitly influence attributions of positive psychological states. In two studies, we found strong support for the second hypothesis. Moral considerations only appear to affect happiness attributions when they also affect attributions of positive psychological states. Additionally, both studies supported a hypothesis about why moral judgments have these effects. Specifically, we found that when people judge that someone is living a bad life, they infer that the person is not at peace with themselves. However, when this inference is blocked, moral considerations do not affect attributions of happiness or positive psychological states. In sum, although "happiness" appears to be a purely psychological concept, happiness judgments are sensitive to moral considerations because people often assume that immorality disrupts intrapersonal harmony. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We developed the Strong Ties Weak Ties Rationality Scale (STWTRS) to demonstrate the heuristic value of the ontological turn which attempts to do justice to the cultural insider's picture of what is real. To test empirically the hypothesis of the existence of two distinct ontological universes that fall along the divide between strong ties and weak ties ontological framings, we used STWTRS to conduct a cross-cultural study (n = 961) using four samples (i.e., Taiwanese, Yi Chinese, Asian American, and non-Asian American). The results support our claim that the ontological universe of the cultural insider is not a list of fragmentary, ever expanding list of attributes that proliferate in cross-cultural psychology, so much as a coherent wholeness. We argue that this concept is best articulated by Maturana and Varela's (1980) theory of autopoietic living systems. Potential contributions to the literature and future research directions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research shows an increasing interest in video game use for educational purposes. However, their use does not always give rise to positive learning, particularly when moral learning is analysed. This result can be explained since video games promote pragmatic goals aimed at success. Therefore, we believe that to facilitate moral learning, it is necessary to promote a moral cognition focus on epistemic goals oriented towards reflection on the actions and events that take place in the game. To identify if epistemic goals can promote moral cognition with a video game, we used Papers, Please. In this game, players take on the role of a customs officer who should face moral dilemmas related to allowing immigrants to cross the border into their country. We analysed the dialogues and decisions made by 12 pairs of students through a category system. The dialogue between players facilitated greater moral activation compared to studies that analysed spontaneous play. In addition, we identified that the game mechanics that promoted moral conflicts between players fostered more moral dialogue. Likewise, when the players empathised with the immigrants, the moral dialogue was more frequent. Therefore, we believe that these characteristics should be considered when designing educational practices using video games to promote moral cognition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In developing artificial intelligence (AI), researchers often benchmark against human performance as a measure of progress. Is this kind of comparison possible for moral cognition? Given that human moral judgment often hinges on intangible properties like "intention" which may have no natural analog in artificial agents, it may prove difficult to design a "like‐for‐like" comparison between the moral behavior of artificial and human agents. What would a measure of moral behavior for both humans and AI look like? We unravel the complexity of this question by discussing examples within reinforcement learning and generative AI, and we examine how the puzzle of evaluating artificial agents' moral cognition remains open for further investigation within cognitive science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

本研究旨在探討國小資優生的道德認知、在真實情境的新冠肺炎疫情下對疫情與病患的態度，以及疫情下情緒的現況與差異性，並分析其道德認知與對病患態度之相關及探究其預測情形。本研究以北區國小資優生515人與普通生372人共887人為研究對象，共使用「行為界 定問題測驗」、「對新冠肺炎疫情情緒量表」、「新冠肺炎病患態度量表」為研究工具，進行資料蒐集與分析處理。研究之結果如下：一、不同學生類別、不同年級與不同性別之學生在道德認知表現上資優生與普通生無明顯差異；二、不同學生類別、不同年級與不同性別之學生在情緒上的表現在疫情下，普通生「相信」、「害怕」、「驚訝」、「悲傷」高於資優生，中年級資優生「害怕」、「驚訝」、「悲傷」及「討厭」較高年級明顯，而普通班男生「悲傷」之情緒 高於女生；三、不同身分、年級與性別之資優生在疫情情境下，對疫情與病患之態度高於普通生，資優生態度高於普通生，高年級資優生與普通生比中年級有較佳的態度；四、新冠肺炎疫情與病患態度之預測及調節效果資優生的道德認知能預測態度，情緒在道德認知和病患 態度間不具有調節效果。 The aim of this study was to explore the effects of the moral cognition of gifted elementary schools students on their attitudes toward COVID-19. The study further investigated the changes in their emotions during the pandemic and the moderating effects of their emotions on the relationship between their moral cognition and attitudes toward patients with COVID-19. Various factors influence the moral cognition of children, such as age, sex, intelligence level, and personality. Moreover, their surrounding environments, particularly home and school environments, strongly affect their moral cognition. Therefore, various studies have explored relevant factors, such as education level, role replacement, peer relationship, family economic status, family structure, family emotion, religious belief, and sociocultural background. Nevertheless, the question regarding the attitudes of gifted children with outstanding potential toward moral issues should be explored. Lovecky (1997) indicated that gifted children are highly concerned about moral issues since childhood and that they have an excellent understanding of moral issues. Compared with their peers with a relatively low level of intelligence, gifted children have an improved understanding of fairness, justice, and responsibility toward he self and others (Gross, 1993), and this thus engenders high levels of moral sensitivity (Piechowski, 1991). Therefore, the question of whether the levels of these students’ moral perceptions vary depending on grade, sex, or sociocultural identity warrants exploration. Gifted students differ from others intellectually, socially, emotionally, and physically; however, their ability to cognitively understand moral issues is higher than their ability to emotionally adjust to such issues (Clark, 2002/2007). Accordingly, they need opportunities to discuss moral issues around them and promote their moral growth (Lovecky, 1997). Epidemics exert strong negative effects on the general public; this fact invoked curiosity in the research fraternity regarding the effects of epidemics on gifted students belonging to different grades, sexes, and sociocultural identities. Questions arose regarding the effects of emotions on the moral perceptions of gifted students and whether such effects further affect the students’ moral behaviors and attitudes. Studies on moral education in gifted students have not reported any major outcomes; this might be because of the lack of an association between moral cognition and moral practice (Liu, 2002). From an educational perspective, studies have explored the efforts of schools in educating children and constructing their moral cognition; gifted students perform better in making ethical choices than do other students. The COVID-19 may be the first real-life pandemic situation experienced by young students. Therefore, students must receive information related to health and epidemic prevention. The question of whether the attitudes of gifted and ordinary elementary school students vary depending on various factors (grade, sex, and sociocultural identity) in a real setting must be explored. Moreover, whether cognition and attitude are related remains to be determined. Whether the levels of students’ moral cognition can help predict their attitudes toward epidemics and diseases also warrants clarification. Accordingly, on the basis of the theory of moral cognition development in children, the present study investigated the current status of moral cognition levels, emotions, and attitudes toward epidemics and patients in gifted and ordinary students and compared the findings between the two cohorts. The study findings may serve as a reference for designing ethics courses for gifted students with special needs in order to cultivate their sense of social responsibility and civic awareness and cultivate the virtues of knowing, loving, and doing good. This study included a total of 887 elementary school students (gifted, 515; ordinary, 372). Three research tools — the Behavior Defining Questions Test, Epidemic and Patient Attitude Scale, and Emotion Scale — were used for data collection and analysis. The results revealed no significant differences between gifted and ordinary students in terms of moral cognitive performance. Regarding the epidemic-related emotions of students belonging to various grades and sexes, this study determined that the ordinary students expressed higher levels of belief, fear, surprise, and sadness than did the gifted students; middle- and higher-grade gifted students expressed fear, surprise, sadness, and disgust; and boys expressed higher levels of sadness than did girls. The levels of moral attitudes toward epidemics and patients were more prominent in the gifted students than in the ordinary students. Upper-grade students exhibited improved attitudes compared with middle-grade students. Furthermore, emotions exerted no moderating effects on the relationship between moral cognition and epidemic-related attitudes among the gifted elementary students. On the basis of the findings, this study proposes the following recommendations: 1. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, individuals may experience slight mood changes due to psychological adjustment to the new normal. In the present study, the students had different perspectives of COVID-19 and thus experienced different emotions. Future studies may investigate the suitable approach and time point for evaluating emotions. The relationship between moral attitudes and behaviors remains to be clarified in an actual classroom setting. Qualitative studies may be conducted to investigate this relationship. 2. In terms of moral cognition and attitudes toward the pandemic and patients, middle-grade gifted students appear to experience more negative emotions than do others; this may pose a considerable psychological burden on them. Thus, teachers must provide psychological support and counseling to gifted students with different needs and teach them to actively process and analyze situational information to help them devise strategies for stress relief. 3. Enhancing the belief and positive expectation of students regarding social issues may help improve their attitudes toward moral issues, thus improving their ethical behaviors.

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Interdisciplinary research has proposed a multifaceted view of human cognition and morality, establishing that inputs from multiple cognitive and affective processes guide moral decisions. However, extant work on moral cognition has largely overlooked the contributions of episodic representation. The ability to remember or imagine a specific moment in time plays a broadly influential role in cognition and behavior. Yet, existing research has only begun exploring the influence of episodic representation on moral cognition. Here, we evaluate the theoretical connections between episodic representation and moral cognition, review emerging empirical work revealing how episodic representation affects moral decision-making, and conclude by highlighting gaps in the literature and open questions. We argue that a comprehensive model of moral cognition will require including the episodic memory system, further delineating its direct influence on moral thought, and better understanding its interactions with other mental processes to fundamentally shape our sense of right and wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Humans face a fundamental challenge of how to balance selfish interests against moral considerations. Such trade-offs are implicit in moral decisions about what to do; judgments of whether an action is morally right or wrong; and inferences about the moral character of others. To date, these three dimensions of moral cognition-decision-making, judgment, and inference-have been studied largely independently, using very different experimental paradigms. However, important aspects of moral cognition occur at the intersection of multiple dimensions; for instance, moral hypocrisy can be conceived as a disconnect between moral decisions and moral judgments. Here we describe the advantages of investigating these three dimensions of moral cognition within a single computational framework. A core component of this framework is harm aversion, a moral sentiment defined as a distaste for harming others. The framework integrates economic utility models of harm aversion with Bayesian reinforcement learning models describing beliefs about others' harm aversion. We show how this framework can provide novel insights into the mechanisms of moral decision-making, judgment, and inference.

One influential framework for examining human moral cognition has been a dual process model, in which utilitarian judgment (e.g., infliction of harm for the greater good) is associated with cognitive control processes, while non-utilitarian judgment (e.g., avoiding such harms) is associated with emotional, automatic processes. Another framework of moral cognition, the two-dimensional model of utilitarian psychology, posits that utilitarian choices may reflect either instrumental harm, i.e., inflicting harm on an individual for the greater good; or impartial beneficence, i.e., impartially and altruistically acting for the benefit of the overall welfare. We evaluated preregistered hypotheses (https://osf.io/m425d) derived from these models of moral cognition in a sample of 275 neurologically healthy older adults. Our results suggest that both the dual process and two-dimensional models provided insights regarding utilitarian reasoning, including three cardinal domains of conflict between utilitarianism and common-sense morality: agent-centered permissions, special obligations, and personal rights. One prediction of the dual process-based model was supported by our findings, with higher emotionality associated with decreased endorsement of utilitarian judgments (b = - 0.12, p

Emerging evidence suggests that children may think of robots—and artificial intelligence, more generally—as having moral standing. In this paper, we trace the developmental trajectory of this belief. Over three developmental studies (combined N = 415) and one adult study (N = 156), we compared participants' judgments (Experiments 1–3) and donation choices (Experiment 4) towards a human boy, a humanoid robot, and control targets. We observed that, on the whole, children endorsed robots as having moral standing and mental life. With age, however, they tended to deny experiential mental life to robots, which aligned with diminished ascription of moral standing. Older children's judgments more closely mirrored those of adult participants, who overwhelmingly denied these attributes to robots. This sheds new light on children's moral cognitive development and their relationship to emerging technologies. • Young children tend to think of robots as mentally and morally similar to humans. • As children age, they come to see robots as less psychologically and morally human-like. • Adults often deny experiential mental life and moral value to robots. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To understand how we evaluate harm to others, it is crucial to consider the offender's intent and the victim's suffering. Previous research investigating event-related potentials (ERPs) during moral evaluation has been limited by small sample sizes and a priori selection of electrodes and time windows that may bias the results. To overcome these limitations, we examined ERPs in 66 healthy human adults using a data-driven analytic approach involving cluster-based permutation tests. Participants performed an implicit moral evaluation task requiring to observe scenarios depicting intentional harm (IHS), accidental harm (AHS), and neutral actions (NAS) while judging whether each scenario was set indoors or outdoors. Our results revealed two distinct clusters, peaking at ∼170 and ∼250 ms, showing differences between harm scenarios (IHS and AHS) and NAS, suggesting rapid processing of the victim's physical outcome. The difference between IHS and AHS scenarios emerged later, at ∼400 ms, potentially reflecting subsequent evaluation of the agent's intentions. Source analysis showed that brain regions associated with empathy for pain were associated with the earlier peaks at ∼170 and ∼250 ms, while the modulation of the activity of the mentalizing network was presented at ∼250 and ∼400 ms. These findings advance our understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying implicit moral evaluation. Notably, they provide electrocortical new insights for models of implicit moral evaluation, suggesting an early neural response linked to empathy for pain, with subsequent integration of empathy response with mentalizing processes, followed by later cognitive evaluations, likely reflecting the assessment of the agent's moral responsibility. • Data-driven EEG reveals temporal dynamics of implicit moral evaluation. • Early ERPs (∼170–250ms) distinguish harmful from neutral action scenarios. •Later ERPs (∼400ms) differentiate intentional vs. accidental harmful scenarios. •Neural shift from experience-sharing to mentalizing in moral processing. •EEG tracks implicit moral evaluation from outcome perception to intent inference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scientific norms value skepticism; many religious traditionsvalue faith. We test the hypothesis that these differentattitudes towards inquiry and belief result in differentinferences from epistemic behavior: Whereas the pursuit ofevidence or explanations is taken as a signal of commitmentto science, forgoing further evidence and explanation is takenas a signal of commitment to religion. Two studies (N = 401)support these predictions. We also find that deciding topursue inquiry is judged more moral and trustworthy, withmoderating effects of participant religiosity and scientism.These findings suggest that epistemic behavior can be a socialsignal and shed light on the epistemic and social functions ofscientific vs. religious belief.

Sometimes we incur a high psychological cost (for example,forgo something we really like) in order to fulfill social ormoral obligations. How would the information of incurringpsychological costs influence children’s social evaluations?Prior work suggests that children do not recognize the virtueof resolving inner conflicts until age 8. In two studies, we de-confounded costs from inner conflicts and found that whenthe difficulty was not explicitly stated as having conflictingdesires (a self-interested desire and a moral desire) at once,most 8- to 9-year-olds and some 6 to 7-year-olds gave adult-like favorable evaluations of the character who overcamepsychological or physical difficulty to act morally. Moreover,neither adults nor children inferred conflicting moral andpersonal desires spontaneously. These together suggest thatchildren’s evaluation of moral virtue depends onunderstanding of cost rather than conflict: Physical cost isincorporated early in development, and psychological costlater.

Moral Foundations Theory (MFT) posits that the human mind contains modules (or "foundations") that are functionally specialized to moralize unique dimensions of the social world: Authority, Loyalty, Purity, Harm, Fairness, and Liberty. Despite this strong claim about cognitive architecture, it is unclear whether neural activity during moral reasoning exhibits this modular structure. Here, we use spatiotemporal partial least squares correlation (PLSC) analyses of fMRI data collected during judgments of foundation-specific violations to investigate whether MFT's cognitive modularity claim extends to the neural level. A mean-centered PLSC analysis returned two latent variables that differentiated between social norm and moral foundation violations, functionally segregated Purity, Loyalty, Physical Harm, and Fairness from the other foundations, and suggested that Authority has a different neural basis than other binding foundations. Non-rotated PLSC analyses confirmed that neural activity distinguished social norm from moral foundation violations, and distinguished individualizing and binding moral foundations if Authority is dropped from the binding foundations. Purity violations were persistently associated with amygdala activity, whereas moral foundation violations more broadly tended to engage the default network. Our results constitute partial evidence for neural modularity and motivate further research on the novel groupings identified by the PLSC analyses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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