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Using an integrative grounded theory design, this study investigated prospective teachers' moral perceptions, emotions, behavioral intentions, and reasons for their moral behavioral intentions concerning their future teaching to uncover whether prospective teachers' sense of moral agency would be explained within a multi-layered framework. The data were collected through semi-structured focus-group interviews with 40 conveniently sampled prospective teachers. The results revealed that prospective teachers' sense of moral agency encompassed perceptual (i.e. moral perceptions, emotions, behavioral intentions, and reasons for moral behavioral intentions), regulatory (i.e. prescriptive and proscriptive moral regulation systems), and contextual layers (i.e. personal, interpersonal, and social contexts). Theoretical and practical implications were also discussed in the study. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aims to investigate ethical tensions involved in mathematics teachers' instructional decisions. The research was designed as a multiple case study and three mathematics teachers were chosen as cases with criterion sampling strategy. Data were collected through a series of in-depth interviews via semi-structured questions and scenarios. Moral distress framework, first proposed in nursing research, was employed to analyse the data. Our analysis suggested that teacher decisions were shaped on the basis of scientific/technical as well as ethical considerations. Findings pointed to the operation of three different types of ethical tensions in the production of mathematics teachers' particular instructional decisions: moral distress, moral dilemma and moral uncertainty. We proposed that ability to perform desired actions and to provide rationalizations are among the key discriminants for different forms of tensions. We discussed the features of different types of ethical tensions and shared the implications about the development of moral agency as well as the consideration of ethics in mathematics teacher education. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An emerging strand of research claims that blame is justified on the basis of its instrumental role in serving to ‘cultivate’ or ‘scaffold’ moral agency in those to whom it is directed. On these instrumentalist accounts, our actual collective responsiveness to moral considerations is largely explained by the scaffolding or cultivating force of blame as directed at us. We believe that there is some reason to be sceptical of the instrumental role assigned to blame on these accounts. This is because there is evidence from the psychology literature on prosocial behaviour and moral development that blame may be directly ineffective; it may be ineffective in inculcating moral norms in the children and young adults to whom it is directed. We concede that blame may have this proximate instrumental role in scaffolding moral behaviour in adults, however we believe that such accounts overlook what we think is likely the more central instrumental role of blame. This is the role blame plays in the moral ecology: the models, narratives, scripts, and cultural frameworks that we internalize. The most central instrumental role of blame, we claim, is to indirectly foster moral considerations responsive agency in third parties through modelling behaviour observed in the moral ecology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exemption from blameworthiness is bound to implicit or explicit claims of diminished agency, or even non-agency. This poses a dilemma in navigating moral relationships affected by mental illness. While it is crucial for assessments of responsibility to be responsive to the significance of mental illness, must this responsiveness come at a cost to symmetrical moral relations? In this paper we argue, contra recent critiques, that Strawsonian accounts of responsibility are able to navigate this dilemma, and can accommodate significant exculpation on the basis of mental illness while maintaining symmetrical relations. We understand this to be part of the larger recognition that while we have certain fundamental entitlements within our moral relationships, it is also possible to be over-entitled, and to expect too much of others. Our account draws, in particular, on the moral significance of difficulty. Difficulty is inherently scalar, and in drawing on this explanatory framework we explicate a theory of both excuse and exemption by degree. We argue for a significant realm of excuse on the basis of mental illness that is fully compatible with symmetrical relations. However, we also acknowledge the limits of this accommodation on Strawsonian grounds, and argue that these limits are justified and appropriate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral distress is a well-documented phenomenon for health care providers (HCPs). Exploring HCPs' perceptions of participation in moral distress interventions using qualitative and quantitative methods enhances understanding of intervention effectiveness. The purpose of this study was to measure and describe the impact of a two-phased intervention on participants' moral distress. Using a cross-over design, the project aimed to determine if the intervention would decrease moral distress, enhance moral agency, and improve perceptions about the work environment. We used quantitative instruments and explored participants' perceptions of the intervention using semi-structured interviews. Participants were from inpatient settings, within three major hospitals of a large, urban healthcare system in the Midwest, United States. Participants included nurses (80.6%) and other clinical care providers. Using generalized linear mixed modeling we assessed the change in each of the outcome variables over time controlling for groups. Interviews were audiotaped and professionally transcribed. The written narratives were coded into themes. The change in scores on study instruments trended in the desired direction however did not meet statistical significance. Qualitative interviews revealed that intervention effectiveness was derived from a combination of learning benefits, psychological benefits, and building community that promoted moral agency. Findings demonstrate a clear link between moral distress and moral agency and suggest that Facilitated Ethics Conversations can enhance the work environment. Findings provide insight for developing evidenced-based approaches to address moral distress of hospital nurses. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Following the social conception of moral agency, this paper claims that many agents commonly exempted from moral responsibility, like young children, adults with late-stage dementia, and nonhuman animals, may nevertheless qualify as participants in moral responsibility practices. Blame and other moral responsibility responses are understood according to the communicative emotion account of the reactive attitudes. To blame someone means having an emotion episode that acts as a vehicle for conveying a particular moral content. Therefore, moral agency is argued to be manifested in communicative exchanges between a claimant and a defendant. While many human and nonhuman agents are justifiably exempted from ascriptions of moral responsibility, this does not necessarily exclude such agents from the community of moral agents altogether. Toddlers and dogs, for instance, seem capable of other-directed reactive attitudes, like resentment, and could, therefore, qualify as participants in moral responsibility practices with respect to the claimant position. Therefore, we may have reason to adopt a distinct claimant-directed participant stance to some beings, even if they fail to qualify as apt targets of blame. This expanded theoretical room for moral agency is argued to make explicit further normative considerations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study was to determine whether a turning point (change in substance use and substance-related problems) and a cognitive variable (a change in moral agency) interacted to predict recidivism and future offending. Participants were 7,117 (5,640 males, 1,477 females) low-to-moderate-risk justice-involved youth from the Florida Department of Juvenile Justice study and 1,354 (1,170 males and 184 females) high-risk justice-involved youth from the Pathways to Desistance study. The main effects for a change in moral agency and a change in substance use, as well as a change in their interaction, predicted a change in offending. A potentially important inter-study difference surfaced in which the interaction occurred at the promotion end of the bipolar continuum in the low-to-moderate-risk sample (moral agency and absence of substance use/problems), and at the risk end of the bipolar continuum in the high-risk sample (moral neutralization and more social consequences for substance use). It would appear that another way turning points contribute to desistance besides addition/mediation and reciprocity is by interacting with relevant cognitive factors like moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In today's China, countless parents embark on a journey of moral peril in search of treatment for their children with autism, navigating a bustling yet chaotic market of therapies. Based on 13 months of fieldwork in the Pearl River Delta, this study examines how the boom of China's autism therapy industry has plunged parents, who are relentlessly striving for their children's futures, into deeper vulnerability. I view the "ethics of trying" as parental enactment of their moral agency in seeking therapy and reveal how it serves as a moral engine for the industry's growth in the early 21st century, as well as how it leads to moral tragedies for parents as new norms of therapeutic choice emerge with government and professional guidance compelling them to make optimal therapeutic choices within a critical developmental window. Although parental efforts to avoid "agent-regret" can paradoxically lead to significant remorse, the moral tragedy they encounter can also prompt reflection and reevaluation of their approach to their child's condition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

People living in nursing homes have the right to self-determination, and difficulty in accommodating this right can create moral distress in staff. This study aimed to explore experiences of situations of moral distress and to identify nursing home staffs' needs to act with moral agency. Six group interviews were conducted with nursing home staff. Content analysis of the interview responses showed that moral distress can be rooted in both concrete situations with residents and factors related to the work environment and policy requirements. Personnel can address moral distress through both active and passive means. Staff acted to address moral distress mainly in situations with residents and sometimes in relation to co-workers, but they did not try to influence the policy level. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Intelligent machines – from automated robots to algorithmic systems – can create images and poetry, steer our preferences, aid decision making, and kill. Our perception of their capacities, relative autonomy, and moral status will profoundly affect not only how we interpret and address practical problems in world politics over the next 50 years but also how we prescribe and evaluate individual and state responses. In this article, I argue that we must analyse this emerging synthetic agency in order to effectively navigate – and theorise – the future of world politics. I begin by outlining the ways that agency has been under-theorised within the discipline of International Relations (IR) and suggest that artificial intelligence (AI) disrupts prevailing conceptions. I then examine how individual human beings and formal organisations – purposive actors with which IR is already familiar – qualify as moral agents, or bearers of duties, and explore what criteria intelligent machines would need to meet to also qualify. After demonstrating that synthetic agents currently lack the 'reflexive autonomy' required for moral agency, I turn to the context of war to illustrate how insights drawn from this comparative analysis counter our tendency to elide different manifestations of moral agency in ways that erode crucial notions of responsibility in world politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aim Design Data Sources Methods Results Conclusion Implications for the Profession Impact Reporting Method Patient or Public Contribution This study seeks to review how the use of digital technologies in clinical nursing affects nurses' professional identity and the relations of power within clinical environments.Literature review.PubMed and CINAHL databases were searched in April 2023.We screened 874 studies in English and German, of which 15 were included in our final synthesis reflecting the scientific discourse from 1992 until 2023.Our review revealed relevant effects of digital technologies on nurses' professional identity and power relations. Few studies cover outcomes relating to identity, such as moral agency or nurses' autonomy. Most studies describe negative impacts of technology on professional identity, for example, creating a barrier between nurses and patients leading to decreased empathetic interaction. Regarding power relations, technologically skilled nurses can yield power over colleagues and patients, while depending on technology. The investigation of these effects is underrepresented.Our review presents insights into the relation between technology and nurses' professional identity and prevalent power relations. For future studies, dedicated and critical investigations of digital technologies' impact on the formation of professional identity in nursing are required.Nurses' professional identity may be altered by digital technologies used in clinical care. Nurses, who are aware of the potential effects of digitized work environments, can reflect on the relationship of technology and the nursing profession.The use of digital technology might lead to a decrease in nurses' moral agency and competence to shape patient‐centred care. Digital technologies seem to become an essential measure for nurses to wield power over patients and colleagues, whilst being a control mechanism. Our work encourages nurses to actively shape digital care.We adhere to the JBI Manual for Evidence Synthesis where applicable. EQUATOR reporting guidelines were not applicable for this type of review.No patient or public contribution. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this study was to determine whether a change in school grades could serve as a turning point for delinquency, and whether it did so by forming a reciprocal relationship with a change in moral agency. Separate samples of 3,558 (2,829 males, 729 females) and 3,559 (2,811 males, 748 females) low-to-moderate risk justice-involved youth from the same data set served as participants in this study. Cross-lagging school grades and moral agency, while controlling for prior levels of all predictor and outcome variables, two four-variable pathways were tested (grades → moral agency → grades → recidivism; moral agency → grades → moral agency → recidivism). There were significant indirect effects in both pathways across samples, although none of the four direct effects were significant. These findings support the notion that small changes in behavior (grades) and cognition (moral agency) produce a chain reaction capable of predicting desistance from crime. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates the process of moral agency development as a community-supported process. Based on a multimethod qualitative inquiry, including diaries, focus groups, and documentary analysis, we analyze the experiences of middle managers in two Norwegian hospitals during the first year of the COVID-19 pandemic. We find that moral agency is developed through a community-embedded value inquiry, emerging in three partially overlapping steps. The first step is marked by moral reflex, an intuitive, value-driven, pre-reflective response to a crisis situation. In the second step, the managers involved the community in value calibration, a collective-ethical sensemaking. In the third step, they took active stances to translate values into actions, with an increased awareness of values and an ability to explain and justify their actions. We label the steps, respectively: value inquiry-in-action, value inquiry-on-action and reflective enactment of value. An analysis of the process reveals two aspects critical for moral agency development: it happens through confrontation with uncertainty, and it is relational, that is, embedded in a community. While uncertainty forces an intuitive moral response, dialogical reflection in the community develops value awareness and relationships of mutual care and support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Until recently, discussions on moral agency focused almost exclusively on the individual moral subject. Recognizing that social structures and cultures influence human subjects but do not have agency, this article argues that we must now recognize the moral agency of organized collectives. Invoking the work of philosophers and other theologians who already do, this article turns to theological ethicists writing on community organizing, racism, and social virtues, and, finally, to feminists engaging moral luck and intersectionality to illustrate the importance of collective moral agency. It concludes by describing qualifications for estimating the ethical agency of such collectives. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Artificial intelligences (AIs), although often perceived as mere tools, have increasingly advanced cognitive and social capacities. In response, psychologists are studying people's perceptions of AIs as moral agents (entities that can do right and wrong) and moral patients (entities that can be targets of right and wrong actions). This article reviews the extent to which people see AIs as moral agents and patients and how they feel about such AIs. We also examine how characteristics about ourselves and the AIs affect attributions of moral agency and patiency. We find multiple factors that contribute to attributions of moral agency and patiency in AIs, some of which overlap with attributions of morality to humans (e.g., mind perception) and some that are unique (e.g., sci-fi fan identity). We identify several future directions, including studying agency and patiency attributions to the latest generation of chatbots and to likely more advanced future AIs that are being rapidly developed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Xiao-filiality is the most fundamental concept in the Chinese intellectual-cultural tradition. It represents not only family values but also religious, political and ethical ideologies. The conception of xiao, which originally denoted the meanings of presenting offerings to deceased ancestors and inheriting their legacy in the Shang dynasty, went through two stages of evolution from the early Zhou dynasty to the Warring States period. In the first stage, xiao was extended to ethical domain with the humanistic turn from human-spirit relationship to human-human relationship. Xiao was not only expanded to the empirical exercise of serving living parents but also established as a ritual-ethical norm that defined people's familial, social, and hierarchical role duties and regulated their conducts of dealing with interpersonal relationships. As a result, the religious authority of paranormal ancestral spirits was transferred to the social-political authority who enforced the implement of the ritual-ethical norm of xiao. In the second stage, Confucius and his followers on the one hand recognized the importance of compliance with this prescribed ritual-ethical norm, and on the other internalized it to become the individual agent's moral emotion and free choice. Consequently, the social-political authority was further transferred to the internal authority of moral autonomy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article engages the considerations of imagination in Kierkegaard and Ricoeur to argue for a moral dimension of the imagination and its objects. Imaginary objects are taken to be mental representations in images and narratives of people or courses of action that are not real in the sense that they are not actual, or have not yet happened. Three claims are made in the article. First, by drawing on the category of possibility, a conceptual distinction is established between imagination and fantasy, (1) I claim that imagination has a moral dimension because it is engaged in considering real-life possibilities. Second, (2) drawing on Kierkegaard and Ricoeur, it is argued that mental representations of selfhood in imagination have a moral dimension because they essentially allow people to understand the development of agency in human selfhood by means of representations of would-be selves and narrative figurations of the self. Third, (3) mental representations of human selves have a moral dimension because they form important points of reference for moral orientations in the field of human praxis (moral pointers). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral imagination is a central component of moral agency and person‐centred care. Becoming moral agents who can sustain attention on patients and their families through their illness and suffering involves imagining the other, what moral possibilities are available, what choices to make, and how one wants to be. This relationship between moral agency, moral imagination, and personhood can be effaced by a focus on task‐driven technical rationality within the multifaceted challenges of contemporary healthcare. Similarly, facilitating students' moral agency can also be obscured by the task‐driven technical rationality of teaching. The development of moral agency requires deliberate attention across the trajectory of nursing education. To prepare nursing students for one practice challenge, workplace violence, we developed a multimodal education intervention which included a simulated learning experience (SLE). To enhance the realism and consistency of the educational experience, 11 nursing students were trained as simulated participants (SP). As part of a larger study to examine knowledge acquisition and practice confidence of learners who completed the SLE, we explored the experience of being the SP through interviews and a focus group with the SP students. The SP described how their multiple performances contributed to imagining the situation 'on both sides' prompting empathy, a reconsideration of their moral agency, and the potential to prevent violence in the workplace beyond technical rational techniques, such as verbal de‐escalation scripts. The empirical findings from the SP prompted a philosophical exploration into moral imagination. We summarise the multimodal educational intervention and relevant findings, and then, using Johnson's conception of moral imagination and relevant nursing literature, we discuss the significance of the SP embodied experiences and their professional formation. We suggest that SLEs offer a unique avenue to create pedagogical spaces which promote moral imagination, thereby teaching for moral agency and person‐centred care. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In recent years, the phenomenon of moral distress has been critically examined—and for a good reason. There have been a number of different definitions suggested, some that claimed to be consistent with the original definition but in fact referred to different epistemological states. In this paper, we re‐examine moral distress by exploring its relationship with moral agency. We critically examine three conceptions of moral agency and argue that two of these conceptions risk placing nurses' values at the center of moral action when it ought to be the patient's values that shape nurses' obligations. We propose that the conception of moral agency advanced by Aimee Milliken which re‐centers patient values, should be more broadly accepted within nursing. We utilize a case example to demonstrate a situation in which the values of a patient's parents (surrogates) justifiably constrained nurses' moral agency, creating moral distress. Through an examination of constraints on nurse agency in this case, we illustrate the problematic nature of 'narrow' moral distress and the value of re‐considering moral distress. Finally, we provide an action‐oriented proposal identifying mediating steps that we argue have utility for nurses (and other healthcare professionals) to mediate between experiences of narrow moral distress and the exercise of moral agency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents a review of the role of parents in the sociomoral development of children from different theoretical perspectives. Emphasis is placed on the role of parents as attachment figures and on the opportunities for parental scaffolding derived from the conflicts that are processed in the family context, opportunities that are related not only to the development of moral concepts, but also to the construction of a sense of moral agency. We conclude by presenting challenges for research in our contexts and for the strengthening of parental support processes and policies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral distress is an interior affliction associated with exterior conflicts between one's values, obligations, and actions. This article builds understanding of moral distress among nurses and the importance of reducing its harmful impact, particularly to novice nurses. Moral distress is defined along with ethical issues and concepts related to moral distress, its current impact, coping with moral distress and building moral reserve, and the significance of acting according to one's conscience. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores shame and moral agency in relationship to the climate catastrophe, and the moral situation of the world's relatively high‐consuming people who are implicated in greenhouse gas emissions that cause climate change. The author complexifies that situation in the conundrums of climate colonialism, climate racism, structural sin, and the moral ambiguities they raise, including such questions as: "What are the moral demands of climate sin grounded in historically rooted economic systems that one did not create but upon which the material conditions of one's life depend? To what extent, if any, is the individual morally accountable for the social structures of which one is a part and from which one benefits?" From there, the essay moves to its central question. It is whether shame theory might help to enable moral agency for what is desperately needed now by people of climate privilege and economic privilege in the North Atlantic world—wise and courageous action to address climate change and climate injustice. The article probes shame theory for clues to what disables moral agency and what catalyzes it. The author finds in shame theory pathways for transforming shame‐based moral inertia into moral agency. Those pathways suggest vital roles for the church. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Social robots are being groomed for human influence, including the implicit and explicit persuasion of humans. Humanlike characteristics are understood to enhance robots' persuasive impact; however, little is known of how perceptions of two key human capacities—mind and morality—function in robots' persuasive potential. This experiment tests the possibility that perceived robot mind and morality will correspond with greater persuasive impact, moderated by relational trustworthiness for a moral appeal and by capacity trustworthiness for a logical appeal. Via an online survey, a humanoid robot asks participants to help it learn to overcome CAPTCHA puzzles to access important online spaces—either on grounds that it is logical or moral to do so. Based on three performance indicators and one self-report indicator of compliance, analysis indicates that (a) seeing the robot as able to perceive and act on the world selectively improves compliance, and (b) perceiving agentic capacity diminishes compliance, though capacity trustworthiness can moderate that reduction. For logical appeals, social-moral mental capacities promote compliance, moderated by capacity trustworthiness. Findings suggest that, in this compliance scenario, the accessibility of schemas and scripts for engaging robots as social-moral actors may be central to whether/how perceived mind, morality, and trust function in machine persuasion. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores the intersection between neuroscience and philosophy, particularly in the areas of moral philosophy and philosophy of mind. While traditional philosophical questions, such as those relating to free will and moral motivation, have been subject to much debate, the rise of neuroscience has led to a reinterpretation of these questions considering empirical evidence. This has led to tensions between those who believe neuroscience can provide definitive answers to very complex philosophical questions and those who are skeptical about the scope of these studies. However, the paper argues that neuroscientists and philosophers can work together to generate major scientific and social advances. To contribute to bridge the gap, in this paper we expose the complexity of moral experience from a philosophical point of view and point to two great challenges and gaps to cover from neurosciences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In several contexts Nietzsche claims that he wants to free humanity of the affect of guilt. He also argues that we are not ultimately responsible for who we are or what we do because libertarian free will is a false belief invented for the purpose of legitimizing judgments of guilt. Combining these related threads of argument, we arrive at what would seem to be an uncontroversial conclusion: Nietzsche does not think guilt is an apt response to wrongdoing, and he therefore thinks we ought to dispense with the feeling of guilt altogether. I argue against this conclusion by offering a comparative analysis of two kinds of guilt Nietzsche discusses in his works, reactive guilt, which is a reaction to an act of wrongdoing, and proactive guilt, which is a drive or desire to make oneself feel guilty. Here I offer an account of Greek guilt as a species of reactive guilt, and I argue that Nietzsche only rejects proactive guilt, which is endemic to Judeo-Christianity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

One way to seek to reduce the risk of potential offenders engaging in certain types of crime in a public or semi-public area is to make it much more difficult, or even impossible, for them to gain access to the area in question and subject them to a sanction if they do enter the area. This paper considers whether preventive exclusion of this kind should be considered a pro tanto morally impermissible means of crime prevention because it violates the agency of those excluded. Several variants of this agency objection to preventive exclusion are identified and critically assessed. It is argued that none persuasively show preventive exclusion to be pro tanto morally wrong. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

ABSTRACTI argue that ascribing duties to the poor better realizes Deveaux’s methodological and normative commitments; address some of the concerns such ascription raises; and indicate how Deveaux’s rich description of collective and individual agency-building can contribute to theorizing moral agency in non-ideal circumstances more generally.

Although the Khmer Rouge regime was responsible for the deaths of roughly 2.2 million Cambodians—and the persecution and abuse of millions more—only a handful of survivors have been able to testify at the tribunal established to prosecute former leaders of the regime. Partly to address this gap, an NGO affiliated with the tribunal has been offering ‘Testimonial Therapy’ for the past decade as a form of reparation for survivors with symptoms of psychological distress. For 16 months, I followed survivors undergoing this therapy, during which they developed a testimonial narrative of their life story in collaboration with a local mental health worker. In this Position Piece, I consider Myers’ conception of ‘moral agency’ (2015) in relation to this process of personal narrative creation, and the critical importance of audience engagement. I then reflect on my own positionality as both ethnographer and active listener, tracing how this affective posture has been formed not only through fieldwork, but also through engagement with family narratives of loss in the context of war-torn Ukraine.

This Special Section explores questions of method and positionality attached to moral agency in mental healthcare, which give rise to novel methodological and theoretical approaches to everyday life in the clinical and non-clinical spaces where such ‘care’ occurs. Moral agency is the ability to be perceived as a ‘good enough’ person, which makes possible intimate relationships with others that are needed to thrive in many social contexts (Myers 2015). In this introduction, we draw on Mattingly’s (2014) notion of everyday moral laboratories: an exploratory attention to moral life as innovative method, episteme, and interpersonal collaboration. Exploring the everyday moral laboratories where people struggle to replenish or protect their moral agency and so create meaning and relationships in their lives is a key focus of this Special Section. For interdisciplinary ethnographers working in spaces intended for care, such experimentation yields opportunities to more creatively and proactively inform that care—the everyday, the ordinary, and the extraordinary—that centres on helping our interlocutors replenish moral agency and thrive.

This research article investigates moral agency in the spaces between the methadone clinic and the inpatient psychiatric ward by exploring the ways dually-diagnosed service users move though ever-more labyrinthine networks of care. I ask: how are patients’ own engagements with the ethical stakes of such care both made possible and delimited by virtue of their proximity to substances that are understood to affect their subjectivities, wills, and capacities for self-governance? Drawing on fieldwork in the community mental health network of Dublin, Ireland, and following my interlocutors’ own reflections, I analyse the moral dimensions of polypharmaceutical treatment for substance use disorder in the context of psychiatric dual diagnosis. I illustrate how various apparatuses of coercion and care apprehend and govern patients who are thought to be both addicted and mad, simultaneously enthralled by one form of the pharmakon and dangerously unreasonable when other medications are absent or neglected. In the space of such medicated subjectivities, a curious but ultimately revelatory claim to authority about the intended and unintended effects of polypharmaceutical treatment takes shape.

Anthropologists studying mental healthcare tend to do so through observational and analytic attention to how individuals experience specific clinical and cultural contexts. While narrating lived experience may serve to humanise conditions like mental illness, those of us observing from a White, colonist-descended position can overlook the structural and racialised forces that determine entrance into particular treatment spaces. In doing so, we inadvertently obscure structural racism. This Position Piece critiques my approach as a student-in-training in anthropology, who conducted an ethnography of outpatient, government-funded clozapine clinics in the United Kingdom and Australia. In documenting how these clinics unexpectedly became a central source of moral agency for its clients, I stopped short of examining the demographic dynamics that helped to cultivate moral agency. Focused on other questions of health disparity, I missed the role of race and racism in treatment access pathways, trustworthiness, and experiences of moral agency. Engaging now with disciplinary legacies that shaped my inattention, I reflect on my silencing of racism at an interpersonal, institutional and structural level in my early analysis. I encourage similarly positioned anthropologists studying psychiatric treatment spaces and moral experience to confront how racism can be filtered through the stories we tell.

This Research Article deploys the frameworks of moral injury and moral agency to explore the experiences of veteran men who completed group therapy for military sexual trauma (MST). The article analyses ethnographically how veteran men with MST experience psychological growth via a replenishment of their sense of moral agency, thereby blending psychological theory about moral injury with anthropological theory about moral agency. It highlights how broader cultural experience can intersect and contribute to shame around MST, then depicts the ways that veterans recovered from a life characterised by pervasive shame, isolation, and compromised identity—psychological signs of moral injury—and made gains toward a life characterised by greater self-acceptance, an ability to tell one’s own story, and intimacy with others—signs of moral agency. In so doing, the article highlights the social and moral dimensions that can constitute psychological injury, and the way that addressing these dimensions can promote moral agency and thus mental health recovery.

Ecological accounts of responsible agency claim that moral feedback is essential to the reasons-responsiveness of agents. In this paper, we discuss McGeer's scaffolded reasons-responsiveness account in the light of two concerns. The first is that some agents may be less attuned to feedback from their social environment but are nevertheless morally responsible agents – for example, autistic people. The second is that moral audiences can actually work to undermine reasons-responsiveness if they espouse the wrong values. We argue that McGeer's account can be modified to handle both problems. Once we understand the specific roles that moral feedback plays for recognizing and acting on moral reasons, we can see that autistics frequently do rely on such feedback, although it often needs to be more explicit. Furthermore, although McGeer is correct to highlight the importance of moral feedback, audience sensitivity is not all that matters to reasons-responsiveness; it needs to be tempered by a consistent application of moral rules. Agents also need to make sure that they choose their moral audiences carefully, paying special attention to receiving feedback from audiences which may be adversely affected by their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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I argue that ascribing duties to the poor better realizes Deveaux's methodological and normative commitments; address some of the concerns such ascription raises; and indicate how Deveaux's rich description of collective and individual agency-building can contribute to theorizing moral agency in non-ideal circumstances more generally. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This introductory article outlines how this special issue contributes to existing scholarship that calls for a rethinking and re-evaluation of common assumptions about early modern philosophy. One way of challenging existing narratives is by questioning what role systems or systematicity play during this period. Another way of rethinking early modern philosophy is by considering assumptions about the role of philosophy itself and how philosophy can effect change in those who form philosophical beliefs or engage in philosophical argumentation. A further way of advancing early modern scholarship is by examining the tight links between early modern views on metaphysics and epistemology, on the one hand, and moral, social, and political philosophy, on the other hand. Moreover, there are ongoing debates whether and how the traditional distinction between rationalism and empiricism, which has been questioned for several reasons, should be replaced. It has been proposed to replace it with a distinction between experimental and speculative philosophy, but this distinction cannot easily accommodate early modern debates concerning moral, social, and political philosophy. In addition to highlighting several ways how early modern philosophy has and can be rethought, we summarize how the papers in this special issue contribute to these ongoing efforts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]