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Related Articles This article examines the effect of leader longevity in power on world happiness. To make the assessment, a sample composed of 135 countries observed over the period 2006 to 2018 was constituted. The results obtained from OLS estimates show that longevity in power reduces individual happiness. Furthermore, the negative effect is more amplified in democratic countries. Quantile regression reveals variability in the effect over the different intervals. These results are robust to the use of alternative estimation techniques. We also identify the quality of institutions and public spending as two potential transmission channels through which longevity in power influences well‐being. These results invite political authorities to respect constitutional limits or implement constitutional reforms with the aim of limiting the duration of the mandate of the executive in order to reduce the harmful effect of an extension of the latter on individuals' well‐being.Flavin, Patrick, Alexander C. Pacek, and Benjamin Radcliff. 2011. “State Intervention and Subjective Well‐Being in Advanced Industrial Democracies.” Politics & Policy 39(2): 251–69. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747‐1346.2011.00290.x.Jakubow, Alexander. 2014. “State Intervention and Life Satisfaction Reconsidered: The Role of Governance Quality and Resource Misallocation.” Politics & Policy 42(1): 3–36. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12057.Kim, Hae S. 2017. “Patterns of Economic Development: Correlations Affecting Economic Growth and Quality of Life in 222 Countries.” Politics & Policy 45(1): 83–104. https://doi.org/10.1111/polp.12190. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper focuses on analysing the effects of sector orientation and the origin of FDI on the types of corruption. The GMM technique and the IV-2SLS on a panel of Sub-Saharan African countries were used. Globally, we find that FDI increases political corruption in SSA. Moreover, the study shows that sector orientation and the origin of FDI have significant effects on each type of corruption. Primary sector FDI enhances public sector corruption and reduces judicial corruption. Secondary sector FDI increases executive, public, and judicial corruption. In the tertiary sector, executive and public corruption are enhanced while judiciary corruption is reduced. Regarding the origin, FDI from France increases public sector corruption whereas FDI from China and the USA reduces it. Executive corruption is reduced by FDI, regardless of its origin. FDI from France and the USA discourages judiciary corruption while FDI from China increases it. FDI from China reduces legislative corruption, while FDI from the USA tends to increase it. Furthermore, the analysis of the transmission channels shows education and development levels as important channels through which FDI could reduce corruption in SSA. Relevant policy implications derived from this study include the necessity for policy-makers to combat all types of corruption and mostly public corruption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]