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A much-discussed theme in international relations is how emerging powers will engage with the declining liberal world order and its various governance regimes. This article examines the engagement of emergent powers with the regime of “peacebuilding.” Empirically, it examines the interaction between India and China, with liberal peacebuilding projects in the peace processes of Nepal and Myanmar respectively. Departing from the theory that emergent powers either displace, or converge with, the liberal world order, this article argues that emergent powers have a “negotiated coexistence” with liberal peacebuilders. Despite competing motivations, this “coexistence” of liberal peacebuilders and emergent powers is negotiated, first, by the agency of conflict-affected states, who invoke plural forms of international engagement, to gain strategic advantage, and secondly, by limited interaction between the two, given the differences in their priorities and modalities of engagement. The differences ensure that emergent powers operate in parallel, yet distinctly, from peacebuilders, rarely crossing each other's path. This limited interaction not only prevents this coexistence from degenerating into instances of potential contestation but also inhibits cooperation. Yet, when emergent powers view their economic and strategic interests being threatened by norms and practices of liberal peacebuilding projects, few instances of contestation emerge.

Since the 1990s, the face of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping has changed drastically, with personnel contributions now coming predominantly from developing countries. Some of the most fragile stat...

Despite the noteworthy exertions aimed at the synthesis of numerous novel new polymers, the performance properties of such polymers when utilized in real-life applications can be well-thought-out to be average in many instances; thereby limiting their use in challenging areas of material science and engineering such as biomedical niche. The preparation of graphene along with the assessment of its excellent properties including excellent mechanical properties, extraordinary thermal conductivity, along with high electronic transport, have drawn the attention of industrial and academic researchers and consequently unwrapped a good outlook for the inclusion of graphene as a nano reinforcing fillers nanomaterial in polymer matrices to formulate multifunctional nanocomposites for advance application. The all-embracing research studies along with application on graphene and its polymer matrix-based composites targeted at applications in the biomedical field is the aim of this chapter. A summary of the polymer matrices utilized and the fabrication methods for graphene composites is also reported. To end with, the applications of graphene-polymer-based composites in the biomedical field such as wound healing, drug delivery, and sensors, etc. are conversed.

In fragile and conflict-affected States1(henceforth FCAS) in South Asia, two distinct forms of international engagement have worked simultaneously—the engagement of India, the regional hegemon, and that of Western states that promote liberal peacebuilding projects. From Norwegian engagement in Sri Lanka to European Union (EU) and United Nations (UN) engagement in Myanmar, to the UN-led international engagement in Nepal, liberal peacebuilding, despite its fault lines, has ubiquitous presence in South Asia, a region fraught with different forms of conflict and fragility. The norms, practices and modalities of engagement of India as well as of liberal peacebuilding projects have their distinct specificities in their normative foundations, practices and modalities of engagement. This article contends that the current interaction, though often unacknowledged, is marked by uncertainties, contrasts, instrumental use of norms, lack of coordination and even unexpected overlaps. This article primarily argues that in order for India to play a constructive role in the region, it needs to devise a policy on how it engages with liberal peacebuilding norms and its diffusion in practice through a variety of organisational and institutional networks.

India has significantly invested in Nepal’s development through economic assistance since 1952. Despite deploying aid to win the hearts and minds of the people of Nepal, India has not entirely succeeded in doing so. Paradoxically, an analysis of Indian aid and gaps in the planning, processes, modalities and perceptions of India’s motivation shows that it has possibly contributed to the fuelling of anti-India sentiments among the Nepalese population. Although Indian aid has not been refused, it has been resisted, and sceptical nationalist sentiments dominate perceptions of Indian aid in Nepal. Why is India not perceived as a major donor despite providing significant aid? Why do vested political and economic interests mar the public perception of Indian aid to Nepal? This article is an attempt to reconstruct the history of India’s developmental aid to Nepal, outline the trends, shifting priorities and modalities as well offering a critical analysis of the perceptions of Indian aid. The article is li...