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La Pregunta Compleja (PC) o Múltiple usualmente ilustrada por medio de preguntas semejantes a ‘¿Has dejado de hacer trampa en el examen?’, ha sido tradicionalmente incluida en los distintos catálogos de falacias. Sin embargo, no hay una teoría unificada del concepto de falacia y en consecuencia, resulta problemático determinar si este tipo de preguntas pueden ser consideradas como falacias. Para resolver esta cuestión, se llevará a cabo una revisión bibliográfica que apunta a reconstruir tres conceptos de falacia bastante representativos dentro de la literatura reciente, a saber, la Definición Estándar de Falacia (SDF) modificada por Hans Hansen y acá denominada Real Definición Estándar de Falacia (RDEF), la propuesta de Douglas Walton y aquella emanada desde la Pragma-Dialéctica (PD), para así contrastar dichas definiciones con los elementos característicos de la PC. Así las cosas, se llegará a que la PC no se puede concebir como falacia bajo la RDEF, pero sí bajo los otros dos enfoques. Sin embargo, se mostrará que esto se da de distintas formas y que además la PC no es per se falaz. Finalmente, se sinterizarán estos resultados en aras de subsanar algunas problemáticas que suscitan los enfoques de Walton y la PD., The Complex or Multiple Question (PC), usually illustrated by questions such as "Have you stopped cheating on the exam?", has traditionally been included in different catalogs of fallacies. However, there is no unified theory of the concept of fallacy; consequently, it is problematic to determine whether these types of questions can be considered as fallacies. To solve this matter, a bibliographic review will be carried out that aims to reconstruct three concepts of fallacy quite representative within the recent literature, namely, the Standard Definition of Fallacy (SDF) modified by Hans Hansen and here called the Real Standard Definition of Fallacy (RDEF), the proposal of Douglas Walton, and that emanated from the Pragma-Dialectic (PD), to contrast these definitions with the characteristic elements of the PC. Thus, it will be concluded that the PC cannot be conceived as a fallacy under the RDEF, but it can be, under the other two approaches. Nevertheless, it will be shown that this occurs in different ways, and that the PC is not per se fallacious. Finally, these results will be synthesized with the aim of correcting some problems raised by the Walton and PD approaches., Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes), Máster en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia

In this paper I aim to give a semantic account of moral relativism, that roughly advocates the idea that the truth or falsity of moral judgements is not absolute but only relative to the moral standards of different cultures or communities. I will first examine Kölbel’s relativism regarding predicates of personal taste in order to assess its capacity to account for faultless disagreement in culinary or aesthetic matters. The idea of disagreement without fault is, in fact, very intuitive in these areas, and conveys the idea that when each of two different speakers utter, respectively, a pair of mutually negated sentences ‐or, in other words, contradictory statements‐ neither of them must be at fault. In order to understand Kölbel’s proposal of semantic relativism I will first briefly review the core concepts of Kaplan’s two‐dimensional semantics, which will provide me with a very necessary set of semantic tools to assess the truth‐value of non‐objective propositions ‐may these be of aesthetic, culinary or moral nature‐. Once the relativist semantic discourse and its core concepts are clarified, I intend to apply it to the moral sphere, in order to evaluate whether the intuition of faultless disagreement should be preserved in matters regarding morality. In these ponderations, I will adduce some of the premises of moral realism, the metaethical opponent of moral relativism, which will help me gain a better understanding of the latter’s metaethical implications. Lastly, I want to conclude that Kölbel’s semantic relativism and its preservation of disagreement without fault is legitimately applicable to moral claims, Departamento de Filosofía (Filosofía, Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia, Teoría e Historia de la Educación, Filosofía Moral, Estética y Teoría de las Artes), Máster en Lógica y Filosofía de la Ciencia