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This book offers a concise and accessible introduction to debates about expertise, policy-making and democracy. It uniquely combines an overview of recent research on the policy role of experts with discussions in political philosophy and the philosophy of expertise. Starting with the fact that well-functioning democracies require experts and expert knowledge, the book examines two types of objections against granting experts a larger role in policy-making: concerns that focus on the nature and limits of expert knowledge, and those that concentrate on tensions between expertization and democracy. With this, the book discusses how expert arrangements can be organized to ensure the epistemic qualities of policies and democratic credentials, at the same time.The book will be of interest to scholars and students of political theory and democracy, public policy and administration, and to anyone interested in the role of expertise in society.

The focus of the chapter will be on this epistemic worry. We show that the substantive involvement of economic experts in policy-making raises some real epistemic concerns. However, we move beyond the uneasiness that many critics articulate, and present a list of ten discrete claims: (1) that we cannot know who the “real” or “best” economic experts are; (2) that all political decisions, including those on economic policy, have moral dimensions and that there is no moral expertise; (3) that proper economic expertise is only possible under conditions of “normal science” and political “well orderedness”; (4) that economists, like laypeople, make cognitive errors; (5) that economists, representing a particular disciplinary perspective and epistemic cultures, are one-eyed, overstretch their competence and fail to see their own perspective as one of many relevant perspectives; (6) that economists may be influenced by self-interest, or (7) have ideological commitments that bias their judgements; (8) that we cannot be sure that economic experts speak truth to power; (9) that economists often lack the competence (or willingness) to translate their expert knowledge to make it understandable for policy-makers and concerned citizens; and, finally, (10) that economic experts do not understand the logic of politics and lack good political judgement.

So-called activation policies aiming at bringing jobless people into work have been a central component of welfare reforms across OECD countries during the last decades. Such policies combine restrictive and enabling programs, but their characteristic feature is that also enabling programs are mandatory, and non-compliers are sanctioned. There are four main arguments that can be used to defend mandatory activation of benefit recipients. We label them efficiency, sustainability, paternalism, and justice. Each argument is analyzed in turn and according to a strict scheme. First we clarify which standards it invokes. Thereafter we evaluate each argument according to its own standards Finally we introduce competing normative concerns that have to be taken into account. In the conclusion we discuss possible constellations of arguments that make up the normative space for activation policies.

Article 19 of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights states that “Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.” Article 19 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights are approximately the same. Regarded as a human right, freedom of expression is a moral claim on any political order. To be legitimate, a political order has to guarantee this right. In constitutional democracies, freedom of expression is transformed into positive law and has the status of a constitutional right. Generally, a right is a relation between the holder (a), the addressees (b), and the object (R) of the right. If we speak of a constitutional right, (b) is a polity and (a) every citizen. That (a) has a right to (R) means, conversely, that (b) is obliged to guarantee (R) to (a). Any constitutional right gives rise to questions about how (c) is to be understood: What is the right a right to, i.e. what does it entitle citizens to do (or not to do) and what does it oblige the polity to do (or not to do)? These questions concerning rights as legal positions and relations can be distinguished from questions concerning the justification of rights, on the one hand, and the application and implementation of entrenched rights, on the other (Alexy 1991: 164-168). The reasons for rights answer the question “what entitles (a) to (R)” or “in virtue of what does (a) have the right to (R)”. Of course, questions on the three levels are interrelated. How we answer questions of justification has implications for how we answer questions of legal positions and relations as well as questions of application and implementation, and vice versa. In the present article, we will focus on the justificatory level, more specifically on the view developed by the Norwegian Governmental Commission on Freedom of Expression (1996-1999). On the basis of its justificatory considerations, the Commission proposed a new Article 100 in the Norwegian Constitution 1. The Commission’s amendment reflected its considerations quite literally. The Commission presented three reasons for why freedom of expression should be protected. All three were incorporated in the proposed amendment: “No person may be held liable in law for having imparted or received information, ideas or messages unless such liability can be justified in relation to the grounds for freedom of expression, which are the seeking of truth, the promotion of democracy and the individual’s freedom to form opinions.”2 Today, this passage is part of Article 100 of the Norwegian Constitution. The Commission’s view strongly relies on the Norwegian philosopher Gunnar Skirbekk’s attempt to clarify the normative foundation of freedom of expression as a constitutional right.3 Skirbekk was himself a member of the Commission. Moreover, the Commission itself very explicitly states in its report – in the chapter on justification (“Why freedom of expression?”) – that it follows Skirbekk’s explication of the three reasons for freedom of expression (19, n. 7).4 The three reasons are referred to as the principle of truth, the principle of democracy and the principle of autonomy. Together, the Commission says, these principles give a robust and potentially universal justification of the freedom of expression (25). 5 We start out by presenting the Commission’s argument for freedom of expression and Skirbekk’s philosophical elaboration of it. In the following paragraphs, we clarify and discuss the argument more thoroughly, and argue that the Commission and its philosopher have chosen a questionable justificatory strategy.