Search

In The End of Grand Strategy, Simon Reich and Peter Dombrowski challenge the common view of grand strategy as unitary. They eschew prescription of any one specific approach, chosen from a spectrum that stretches from global primacy to restraint and isolationism, in favor of describing what America's military actually does, day to day. They argue that a series of fundamental recent changes in the global system, the inevitable jostling of bureaucratic politics, and the practical limitations of field operations combine to ensure that each presidential administration inevitably resorts to a variety of strategies. Proponents of different American grand strategies have historically focused on the pivotal role of the Navy. In response, Reich and Dombrowski examine six major maritime operations, each of which reflects one major strategy. One size does not fit all, say the authors—the attempt to impose a single overarching blueprint is no longer feasible. Reich and Dombrowski declare that grand strategy, as we know it, is dead. The End of Grand Strategy is essential reading for policymakers, military strategists, and analysts and critics at advocacy groups and think tanks.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld arrived at the Pentagon in 2001 with an agenda that included the transformation of the American armed forces. His intent was to modernize the existing force while simultaneously developing high-tech innovations to revolutionize the military of the future.The primary architect of transformation, Arthur Cebrowski, conceived what is known as network-centric warfare—a concept to leverage advances in military technology that will influence the U.S. Armed Forces for many decades to come.The basis of this work was Arthur Cebrowski's autobiographical history of the development of network-centric warfare. He passed away, however, before he could complete his account. Blaker has used much of the material gathered by Cebrowski to craft a history based on the former naval officer's own writings, testimony, and interviews of Cebrowski conducted by a variety of individuals in the media and military during his time in Washington, D.C. Transforming Military Force is also an examination of the successes and failures of this new form of warfare, analyzing what has been done in the past and offering suggestions on the future direction of this form of conflict.

This book recounts the successes and failures of the US Army's Army Transformation program in the larger context of the Department of Defense's overall military transformation effort.Spurred by the belief that RMA represented the future, the Department of Defense (DoD) set out to transform the U.S. armed forces by adopting RMA concepts. Led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the DoD spent billions in an attempt to make the hypothetical capabilities real, changing the entire structure of the armed forces as a result. The services, the media, Congress, and the military industry each had its own agenda, all of which continue to come into play in the development of RMA strategies. The interplay of politics, technology, and military reality offers a fascinating narrative.Sure to be found controversial by some, compelling by all, this is the only available book-length examination of the way the U.S. Army and Department of Defense have tried to create the capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs. Of more immediate concern, it is also the only in-depth account of the effect RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan, author Thomas K. Adams argues, arose from the DoD's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts—whether they were appropriate or not. What we need to do, he maintains, is to fight the war we have, not the war we want.