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Purpose The relationship between military expenditure and economic growth is complex. The purpose of this paper is to examine this relationship in India. Design/methodology/approach The design of this study is descriptive in the theoretical part, and quantitative in the applied one. The study uses time series approach, and Hendry General-to-Specific (GTS) modeling methodology, to examine and analyze the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in India, during the period 1980-2016. Findings The study shows the following: Absence of causal relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in India, during indicated period. The continuous regional tensions facing India represent the main factor for adopting Indian military strategy and emphasizing military capabilities. India has been able to build and develop links between civilian and military sectors. The Indian military scientific and manufacturing policies have achieved self-sufficiency in some of its military needs, a strong military industrial base and high levels of military exports. India participated with developed countries in military strategic industries. Such participation contributed to the integration of civilian and military sectors. India gave rights to private sector and foreign direct investment (FDI) for manufacturing in military industries, giving full marketing rights to the Indian government. These new policies considered a great move toward deep changes for Indian military manufacturing policy. Social implications The findings shed light on the importance of stimulating links between civilian and military sectors, particularly in the industrial sectors and scientific activities. Originality/value This study has a contribution to literature of military expenditures' economic effects. Theoretically, this study tries to fill the research gap regarding the impact of military expenditure in Indian case. Furthermore, to the best of the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that examines the relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in India using Hendry general-to-specific (GTS) modeling methodology and time series approach.

У статті розглянуто проблемні питання посилення економічного потенціалу України шляхом реформування та розвитку підприємств оборонної галузі, висвітлено організаційно-правові та економічні чинники, які стримують розвиток оборонно-промислового комплексу, причини недостатньо ефективного військово-технічного співробітництва України з іноземними державами. У рамках Державної цільової програми реформування та розвитку оборонно-промислового комплексу до2021року запропоновано в основу реформування та розвитку підприємств оборонної галузі України покласти заходи, спрямовані на реструктуризацію, реорганізацію та корпоратизацію підприємств, забезпечення фінансового оздоровлення підприємств, імпортозаміщення, інтеграцію науки та виробництва, вдосконалення системи стандартизації, уніфікації та управління якістю продукції, кадрове забезпечення підприємств оборонно-промислового комплексу., The article deals with the issues of strengthening of the economic potential of Ukraine through reformation and development of defence industry enterprises. Organizational, legal and economic factors that restrain the development of the defence-industrial complex, as well as the reasons for the lack of effective military-technical cooperation between Ukraine and foreign countries are highlighted. Within the framework of the State Target Program for the Reform and Development of the Defence Industry Complex by the year 2021, as the basis for the reform and development of enterprises of the defence industry of Ukraine some measures are proposed that aimed at restructuring, reorganization and corporatization of enterprises, provision of financial rehabilitation of enterprises, import substitution, integration of science and production, improvement of the standardization, unification and quality control system, staffing of enterprises of the defence industry complex.

What connects the rise of the extreme Right in the 1930s with today is the inability of the political Left to benefit from crises of capitalism. The Great Depression was the deepest crisis of the era, but the Left (both moderate and radical) was unable to mobilize for position, creating an opening for military Keynesianism of the radical Right to gain popularity by providing an illusionary solution to economic concerns. The neoliberalization of the Left in the 1980s again created an opening for crisis (after 2008) and discredited the Left itself. The resultant inequalities and loss of security provided fuel not for the shunned Left, but for the nationalistic demagogy of the radical Right. Using the rise of Viktor Orban in Hungarian politics as a case study, I examine how the Left has failed to popularize its own reading of capitalism, thereby giving way to the rise of the Right.

Este trabajo de investigación pretende comprobar cómo el gasto militar promueve el crecimiento económico y la productividad industrial, como sugiere el postulado militar keynesiano. El método NARDL se emplea para lograr el objetivo anterior en los datos de panel de India, China y Pakistán que cubren el período 1990-2018. El estudio encuentra que el impacto positivo y negativo del gasto militar tiene un efecto positivo y negativo significativo en el crecimiento económico a largo plazo para China e India; sin embargo, en el corto plazo, solo los impactos positivos afectan el crecimiento económico. Por lo tanto, existe un efecto simétrico en el corto plazo y un impacto asimétrico en el largo plazo. Este resultado asimétrico respalda el trabajo del keynesianismo militar, que ayuda a los legisladores a diseñar políticas macroeconómicas adecuadas. This research work aims to verify how military expenditure promotes economic growth and industrial productivity, as suggested by the Military Keynesianism postulate. The NARDL method is employed to achieve the above objective on the panel data of India, China, and Pakistan, covering the period between 1990 and 2018. The study finds that the positive and negative impact of military expenditure has a significant positive and negative effect on economic growth in the long run for China and India; however, in the short-run, only positive impact favors economic growth. Thus, there is a symmetric effect in the short-run and an asymmetric impact in the long-run. This asymmetric result supports the work of Military Keynesianism, helping policymakers in devising appropriate macro-economic policies.

This chapter is a contribution to the intellectual history of the anxiety that full employment in the modern United States depended somehow on military spending. This discourse (conveniently abbreviated as “military Keynesianism”) is vaguely familiar, but its contours and transit still await a full study. The chapter shows the origins of the idea in the left-Keynesian milieu centered around Harvard’s Alvin Hansen in the late 1930s, with a particular focus on the diverse group that cowrote the 1938 stagnationist manifesto An Economic Program for American Democracy. After a discussion of how these young economists participated in the World War II mobilization, the chapter considers how questions of stagnation and military stimulus were marginalized during the years of the high Cold War, only to be revived by younger radicals. At the same time, it demonstrates the existence of a community of discourse that directly links the Old Left of the 1930s and 1940s with the New Left of the 1960s and 1970s, and cuts across the division between left-wing social critique and liberal statecraft.

The question of the military-industrial complex provides an interesting case in the sociology of knowledge. During the 1960s and 1970s, scholars directed considerable attention toward the phenomenon of military-industrial linkages, and numerous titles contained the phrase 'military-industrial complex'. This chapter analyses the military-industrial complex perspective. The economic importance of the military-industrial complex has been widely debated. Paul Baran and Paul Sweezy argue that defense spending constitutes a kind of 'military keynesianism', and that military expenditures stimulate the whole macroeconomy. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan is an excellent case study in the context of the discussion for the simple reason that it was a decisively important event in the history of the cold war. It is generally agreed that it was Afghanistan, more than any other single factor, that ended the policies of detente between the United States and the USSR.

Kalecki’s analysis of military Keynesianism highlights the difficulties of managing aggregate demand in one country, without coordination with trading partners. Military Keynesianism is effective as a means of reflation because, unlike civilian public works, it induces similar expenditure by political rivals. In this way it overcomes some of the trade difficulties that arise if aggregate demand expands in only one country.

From after World War II until late 1971, the U.S. economy demonstrated new capacities in terms of macroeconomic stability during the so-called Golden Age: recessions were brief and shallow while growth was strong, generating shared returns for the working class, a burgeoning middle class, as well as for capital-owners. Neither then nor up to now has there been sufficient recognition of the key role played by military expenditures in this dynamic process. These enormous outlays at times accounted for as much as 25 percent of gross domestic product—including their induced multiplier effects. This article examines the origins of what has been termed “military Keynesianism” during the Golden Age, emphasizing the little-known leading role played by Leon Keyserling. Keyserling exercised behind-the-scenes power in order to convert Keynesian theory into a macroeconomic policy that would be both consistent with the U.S. institutional context and sufficiently large to promote long-term conditions for full e...

ResumenLa economía estadounidense durante la llamada “Era Dorada” después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial y hasta fines del año 1971, mostró sus capacidades en cuanto a la estabilidad macroeconómico —recesiones breves y poco profundas— y crecimiento fuerte, con retornos compartidos entre la clase trabajadora, una creciente clase media y los dueños de capital. Ni en aquel entonces ni en la actualidad ha sido tomado en gran medida el papel clave de los gastos militares en esta dinámica que alcanzaron —inclusive con los efectos multiplicadores inducidos— a veces alrededor de veinticinco % del PIB. En este trabajo analizamos los orígenes del llamado “Keynesianismo militar” durante la época dorada, destacando el papel protagonista de Leon Keyserling, un postkeynesiano poco reconocido, que fue una fuerza detrás de la cortina para convertir la teoría Keynesiana en una política macroeconómica consistente con el matriz institucional norteamericana con alcance suficiente para promover condiciones seculares del pleno empleo. Con cierta audacia, en un momento dado la resonancia socioeconómica del documento fundacional conocido como “NSC-68” promulgado por “Estado de Seguridad Nacional” —el Estado dentro del Estado— Keyserling desafió, exitosamente, la supuesta “ley” neoclásico de cañones o mantequilla.AbstractAfter the Second World War, during the so-called “Golden Age” the U.S. economy, until late 1971, demonstrated new capacities in terms of macroeconomic stability: recessions were brief and shallow while growth was strong, generating shared returns for the working class, a burgeoning middle class and for capital-owners. Neither then or since, up to the moment, has there been sufficient recognition of the key role played by military expenditures in this dynamic process accounting for at times —including induced multiplier effects— as much as twenty-five percent of the GDP. In this article we examine the origins of what has been termed “Military Keynesianism” during the Golden age, emphasizing the little-known leading role played by Leon Keyserling, who exercised behind-the-scenes power in order to convert Keynesian theory into a macroeconomic policy consistent with the U.S. institutional context that would be sufficiently large to promote long-term conditions of full employment. With a degree of audacity, at an historically opportune moment given the socioeconomic resonance of the foundational document known as “NSC-68” promulgated by the “State within the State” —the National Security State— Keyserling successfully challenged the fallacious neoclassical “law” of guns or butter.

Kalecki’s analysis of military Keynesianism highlights the difficulties of managing aggregate demand in one country, without coordination with trading partners. Military Keynesianism is effective as a means of reflation because, unlike civilian public works, it induces similar expenditure by political rivals. In this way it overcomes some of the trade difficulties that arise if aggregate demand expands in only one country. However, military technology is not immediately transferable to civilian production, and therefore tends to reinforce technological backwardness.

1930’lar Almanya’sı ile 1980’ler ve 2000’ler Amerika Birleşik Devletleri (ABD)’nde yürütülen hükümet politikalarında dile getirilen Askeri Keynesçilik, en çok yankı bulan kavramlar arasındadır. Askeri Keynesçilik; hükümetlerin, ekonomik büyümeyi yükseltmek amacıyla orduya büyük miktarlarda harcama yaptığı bir tür ekonomik politikadır. Bu kavram İngiliz ekonomist John Maynard Keynes tarafından geliştirilmiş olan Keynesyen Ekonomi’nin çok özgül bir çeşitlemesidir. Askeri Keynesçilik destekçilerine göre bu tür politikalar arz ve talep yönünden değişik etkiler yapar. Talep tarafından bakıldığında, askeri kurumun artan mal ve hizmet talepleri direkt olarak hükümet harcamaları yoluyla karşılanır. Diğer yandan bu doğrudan harcama, genel tüketici harcamalarında çarpan etkisine yol açar. Arz tarafından bakıldığında ise, ayakta duran bir ordunun devamlılığı, sivil işgücü içinde yer alan pek çok çalışanın yerini değiştirmektedir. Asker alımı, eğitim veya ustalık gibi konularda doğrudan fırsatlar sunularak yapılmaktadır. Arz kanadında ayrıca; araştırma-geliştirme (Ar-Ge) yönündeki askeri harcamaların sivil sektörlerdeki verimliliği yeni ileri-sistemler ve gelişmiş teknoloji üretme yoluyla arttırdığı sık sık tartışılmaktadır. Çalışmada ayrıca klasiklerden başlamak üzere “devlet” faktörü üzerinde durularak, devletin piyasaya bu türlü müdahalelerinin ekonomistler tarafından bir değerlendirmesi ortaya konulmuştur. Ayrıca tarih boyu Askeri Keynesçilik politikalarının, örnek gösterilen Almanya ve ABD üzerindeki etkileri tartışılmıştır., In this study, the notion Military Keynesianism which was expressed in the policies implemented at the Germany of 1930’s and US of 1980’s and 2000’s is related. Military Keynesianism is an economic policy on which the goverment spends great amounts on the military in order to increase the economic growth. This is a very specific variation of Keynesian Economics, developed by the English Economist John Maynard Keynes. The supporters of Military Keynesianism say that this kind of policies affect differently on the side of supply and demand. On the demand side, increased military demand for goods and services are devoted directly by the goverment. On the other side, this direct spending causes a multiplier effect on the general consumer spending. On the supply side; the duration of a standing army replaces many workers in the civilian workforce. The soldier charge is implemented by serving direct oppurtunites on some subjects like education and expertise. Also on the supply side, it’s often discussed that whether the military spending on the research and development (R&D) increases the efficiency of the civilian sectors by the new advanced-systems and producing advanced tecnology. Also on the study, the “state” notion is expressed considering first the classics; the interpretation of this kind of interference of the goverment on the market by the economists is expressed. Also, the effects of Military Keynesianism on the examples of Germany and US throughout the history is discussed.

Using growth curve modeling techniques, this research investigates whether military spending improved or worsened the economic well-being of citizens within the American states during the post-Vietnam War period. We empirically test the military Keynesianism claim that military spending improves the economic conditions of citizens through its use by politicians as a countercyclical tool to reduce the negative effects of economic downturns. However, due to deindustrialization and the emergence of the "new military," there are reasons to believe that military spending will not effectively improve economic well-being during the post-Vietnam War era. Using longitudinal data we find that states with high levels of military spending are better equipped to stave off the deleterious effects of economic recession than are states with lower levels of military spending.

The world economy today is facing the juncture of two simultaneous crises: the deepest recession since the end of World War Two and an unprecedented world ecological crisis. Does Keynesianism offer viable ideas to face this combined crisis, alternative to the neoliberal policymaking that has prevailed during the last thirty years? Historically, if viewed from a longer-term perspective, the form of Keynesianism that has predominated, is military Keynesianism, defined as macro-economic policymaking by capitalist governments aimed at stimulating aggregate demand for goods. Thus deficit spending was already applied by the British government when it competed with other European states to gain world hegemony, in the late 17th and the 18th century. Again, whereas for a limited period of time after World War Two, a civilian type of Keynesianism has 'coexisted' with military Keynesianism, especially in Western Europe, – the military form of Keynesianism has clearly prevailed in the era of globalization, especially...

The term 'military Keynesianism' refers to economic policies in which the government devotes large amounts of spending to the military in order to foster economic growth. In this article, a number of crucial distinctions are made between different forms of military Keynesian policy, providing a more sophisticated picture of the practices of US and EU governments. It is argued that a form of military Keynesianism can be said to be operating even where it is not the primary means for regulating the business cycle. And the particular effects of externalised military Keynesianism, in which the state encourages other countries to purchase arms from domestic manufacturers, are considered. As Keynes s ideas are revived in response to the financial crisis, this article concludes by asking what a genuinely ecological alternative to military Keynesianism would look like.

Classical sociology is generally equated with analyses of late nineteenth-and early twentieth-century thinkers whose writings ranged seamlessly across what, subsequently, would become differentiated fields of inquiry. One twentieth-century analyst whose texts replicate aspects of the works of the classical sociologists is J.K. Galbraith, a figure whose disciplinary home is conventionally considered to be economics, but whose writings transcend disciplinary boundaries to explore the articulation of economic, social and political phenomena. Galbraith's studies, addressing such matters as increasing inequality and growing economic insecurity; the cultivation and management of consumer demand; the imbalance between private consumption and public provision; and the growth in military and defence expenditure, continue to be of contemporary relevance and warrant a prominent place within sociology.

J.K. Galbraith’s short book, How to Control the Military, boldly championed political and institutional reforms to curb “the military power.” Galbraith stood out among economists for his advocacy of arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union. He rejected the hypothesis that the Soviet Union nurtured an aggressive expansionary military policy. At the same time, he maintained that the tenor of national policy and the shaping of national priorities emanated from the Pentagon. Galbraith’s assertion that the military was the dominant force within the “military-industrial complex” was never empirically demonstrated. Nor did he adequately address the crucial role that military outlays played in advancing major technological innovations which underwrote the accumulation process. Veblen offered a more comprehensive analysis of the role of military expenditures, correctly showing that forms of “waste” are highly functional to the institutional and ideological structure of the U.S. economy. Military ...

This research is examines the nuclear arms race that dominated the 20th century, during which the United States manufactured and stockpiled a large number of strategic weapons. Using moral panic theory, the roles of the President of the United States and the media are examined in facilitating public interest in the manufacture of these weapons from 1955-1990. The project uses both time series and historical analyses to determine the extent to which the strategic nuclear weapons crisis was a moral panic created to insure public acceptance of such this massive defense sector expenditure. The time series analysis reveals that the President does have the ability to influence the public via the State of the Union Address, but that influence does not extend strongly to the media. However, what influence the President does have appears to be correlated to the use of substantive rhetoric, and the percentage of the speech dedicated to the issue. Finally, the historical analysis demonstrates that the moral panic moves through three phases. The first phase is characterized by grassroots concern over the technical gap represented by Sputnik 1's launch was utilized by interested actors to accomplish their goals. During the second phase, this concern transformed into an institutional technique utilized for deflecting institutional challenges when the moral panic moved into an interest group model. The final phase occurs during the rise of the "security state", when elites begin using the moral panic to achieve their own ends. Ph. D.

Building professional soldiers into the wishes and commitments of many countries, this is due to the strengthening of threats that are not only traditional threats, but also non-traditional threats. This situation confirms that the presence of professional soldiers will ensure the sovereignty of the state, because the military institution can focus on its duties and functions on the defense of the country. In this context, the Indonesian Armed Forces (Tentara Nasional Indonesia—TNI) is also faced with situations that place TNI institutions to become professionals, relying on democratic civilian government through the defense ministry with an emphasis on improving the welfare of soldiers simultaneously with efforts to modernize Indonesia's defense system. Because the Military-Keynesianism approach believes that improving the welfare of the army is part of the consequences of increasing defense budgets. The paper argues that the increase in defense budget will be correlated with the welfare of the army, although the policy is not directly for the welfare of the army. The article also argues that the increase in the defense budget should improve the TNI foundation as an ideal institution by emphasizing the welfare of soldiers.

American criminal justice system today focuses to an unprecedented degree on incarceration as a means to punish transgressors. As we will see, this practice deviates substantially from practices of other Western nations, and, indeed, from Western justice tradition. Incarceration is expensive, which has led to attempts to reduce costs by relying on the discipline of the marketplace through "privatization" of prisons and, more importantly, by putting prisoners to work for private firms. These largely complementary movements are generating what might be termed a "prison-industrial complex," or a form of "penal Keynesianism." In this article, it will be argued that while penal Keynesianism does replicate some of the features of military Keynesianism, it is not likely to generate as many supply

The recent recession has seen something of a resurgence in the debate over military Keynesianism. Recent commentators, who should know better, have claimed that it would make sense to stimulate the U.S. economy through increases in military spending, as though this has not been a commonly contested view over the last 40 years. A large, literature has debated the economic effects of military spending, and while it has reached no consensus, there is also little support for any belief that military spending is a good way of stimulating the economy. This paper makes a contribution to the debate by assessing the theoretical perspectives and the empirical approaches used. It then undertakes an analysis of the United States using a number of approaches, and the results suggest that the simple military Keynesian arguments still lack empirical support.

This paper explains the origins of the permanent war economy in the United States. We emphasize the combined efforts of three key interest groups (military, labor unions, and industry) that arose in the context of the dual crises of the Great Depression and World War II. During the depression and the war that followed, there arose a partnership between industry, the military, and politicians. These crises, combined with the State’s monopoly over the military, created the opportunity for these interests to influence the trajectory of economic activity in a self-serving, and lasting, manner.

This study examines geostrategic interests in the preservation and reinforcement of the hegemonic position of the United States, which underlie nato's expansion towards Eastern Europe, to analyze the strictly economic aspects of This study examines geostrategic interests in the preservation and reinforcement of the hegemonic position of the United States, which underlie nato's expansion towards Eastern Europe, to analyze the strictly economic aspects of the process, particularly as regards the link between financing the expans ion of NATO and the us military industry. The study concludes that, despite the vagueness and disparities between the estimates of the "costs of expansion", both the aim of the project and us government subsidies which are already at stake mean that NATO's expansion will be one of the main factors in the reactivation of defense spending currently underway, described here as military Keynesianism.

This paper empirically tests the Keynesian hypothesis that government defence spending positively impacts on aggregate output, by using a long-run equilibrium model for the US and the UK. Our contribution, with respect to previous works, is twofold. First, our inferences are adjusted for structural breaks exhibited by the data concerning fiscal and monetary variables. Second, we take into account different dynamics between defence spending on aggregate output, showing that the results are sensitive to sub-sample choices. Though the estimated elasticities in both countries show a lack of significance in the more recent years of the sample, defence-spending priorities addressed to international security may revitalize pro-cyclical effects in the UK, by an industrial policy of defence shared with the EU members. © 2008 Society for Policy Modeling.