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Attention, the mechanism that prioritizes stimuli in the environment for further processing, plays an important role in behavioral choice. In the present study, we investigated the automatic orienting of attention to cues that signal reward. Such attentional capture occurs despite negative consequences, and we investigated whether this counterproductive and reflexive behavior would persist following outcome devaluation. Thirsty participants completed a visual search task in which the color of a distractor stimulus in the search display signaled whether participants would earn water or potato chips for making a rapid eye movement to a diamond target, but looking at the colored distractor was punished by omission of the signaled reward. Nevertheless, participants looked at the water-signaling distractor more frequently than the chip-signaling distractor. Half the participants then drank water ad libitum before continuing with the visual search task. Although the water was now significantly less desirable for half of the participants, there was no difference between groups in the tendency for the water-signaling distractor to capture attention. These findings suggest that once established, counterproductive attentional bias to signals of reward persists even when those outcomes are no longer valuable. This suggests a “habit-like” attentional mechanism that prioritizes reward stimuli in the environment for further action, regardless of whether those stimuli are aligned with current goals or currently desired.

Learning of cue-outcome relationships in associative learning experiments is often assessed by presenting cues without feedback about the outcome and informing participants to expect no outcomes to occur. The rationale is that this "no-feedback" testing procedure prevents new learning during testing that might contaminate the later test trials. We tested this assumption in 4 predictive learning experiments where participants were tasked with learning which foods (cues) were causing allergic reactions (the outcome) in a fictitious patient. We found that withholding feedback in a block of trials had no effect on causal ratings (Experiments 1 and 2), but it led to regression toward intermediate ratings when the missing feedback was embedded in the causal scenario and information about the outcome replaced by a "?" (Experiment 3). A factorial experiment manipulating cover story and feedback revealed that the regression-to-baseline effect was primarily driven by presentation of the "?" feedback (Experiment 4). We conclude that the procedure of testing without feedback, used widely in studies of human cognition, is an appropriate way of assessing learning, as long as the missing data are attributed to the experimenter and the absence of feedback is not highlighted in a way that induces uncertainty. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2022 APA, all rights reserved).

An attentional bias toward threat has been theorized to be a normative aspect of infants' threat and safety learning, and an indicator of risk for internalizing psychopathology in older populations. To date, only four studies have examined this bias using the dot-probe task in infancy and the findings are mixed. We extended the literature by examining patterns of attention to threat in a culturally and linguistically diverse sample of infants aged 5-11 months old (N = 151) using all measures previously employed in the infant dot-probe literature. Given that an attentional bias toward threat is associated with higher risk of developing anxiety disorders later in life, we also examined how negative affect-an early correlate of later anxiety disorders-is related to attentional bias toward threat in infancy. This study was the first to use a consistent measure of negative affect across the whole sample. An eye-tracking dot-probe task was used to examine attentional bias toward threat (i.e., angry faces) relative to positive (i.e., happy faces) stimuli. Results showed that an attention bias to threat was not characteristic of infants at this age, and negative affect did not moderate the putative relationship between attention and emotional faces (angry, happy). These findings therefore suggest that attention biases to socio-emotional threat may not have emerged by 11 months old.

Attention researchers have long debated the role that attentional control settings play in determining selection. In their article, Luck et al. (2021) have identified points of consensus among trad...

Existing research demonstrates different ways in which attentional prioritization of salient nontarget stimuli is shaped by prior experience: Reward learning renders signals of high-value outcomes more likely to capture attention than signals of low-value outcomes, whereas statistical learning can produce attentional suppression of the location in which salient distractor items are likely to appear. The current study combined manipulations of the value and location associated with salient distractors in visual search to investigate whether these different effects of selection history operate independently or interact to determine overall attentional prioritization of salient distractors. In Experiment 1, high-value and low-value distractors most frequently appeared in the same location; in Experiment 2, high-value and low-value distractors typically appeared in distinct locations. In both experiments, effects of distractor value and location were additive, suggesting that attention-promoting effects of value and attention-suppressing effects of statistical location-learning independently modulate overall attentional priority. Our findings are consistent with a view that sees attention as mediated by a common priority map that receives and integrates separate signals relating to physical salience and value, with signal suppression based on statistical learning determined by physical salience, but not incentive salience. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.3758/s13414-021-02426-7.

Preview benefit refers to faster search for a target when a subset of distractors is seen prior to the search display. We investigated whether reward modulates this effect. Participants identified ...

Background: To date, there has been little investigation on how motivational and cognitive mechanisms interact to influence problematic drinking behaviours. Towards this aim, the current study examined whether reward-related attentional capture is associated with reward, fear (relief), and habit drinking motives, and further, whether it interacts with these motives in relation to problematic drinking patterns. Methods: Ninety participants (mean age = 34.8 years, SD = 9.1, 54% male) who reported having consumed alcohol in the past month completed an online visual search task that measured reward-related attentional capture as well as the Habit Reward Fear Scale, a measure of drinking motives. Participants also completed measures of psychological distress, impulsivity, compulsive drinking, and consumption items of Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test. Regression analyses examined the associations between motives for alcohol consumption and reward-related attentional capture, as well as the associations between reward-related attentional capture, motives, and their interaction, with alcohol consumption and problems. Results: Greater reward-related attentional capture was associated with greater reward motives. Further, reward-related attentional capture also interacted with fear motives in relation to alcohol consumption. Follow-up analyses showed that this interaction was driven by greater fear motives being associated with heavier drinking among those with lower reward-related attentional capture (i.e., “goal-trackers”). Conclusion: These findings have implications for understanding how cognition may interact with motives in association with problematic drinking. Specifically, the findings highlight different potential pathways to problematic drinking according to an individual’s cognitive-motivational profile and may inform tailored interventions to target profile-specific mechanisms. Finally, these findings offer support for contemporary models of addiction that view excessive goal-directed behaviour under negative affect as a critical contributor to addictive behaviours.

Many factors affect figure–ground segregation, but the contributions of attention and reward history to this process is uncertain. We conducted two experiments to investigate whether reward learning influences figure assignment and whether this relationship was mediated by attention. Participants learned to associate certain shapes with a reward contingency: During a learning phase, they chose between two shapes on each trial, with subsets of shapes associated with high-probability win, low-probability win, high-probability loss, and low-probability loss. In a test phase, participants were given a figure–ground task, in which they indicated which of two regions that shared a contour they perceived as the figure (high-probability win and low-probability win shapes were pitted against each other, as were high-probability loss and low-probability loss shapes). The results revealed that participants had learned the reward contingencies and that, following learning, attention was reliably drawn to the optimal stimulus. Despite this, neither reward history nor the resulting attentional allocation influenced figure–ground organization.

From an associative perspective the acquisition of new goal-directed actions requires the encoding of specific action-outcome (AO) associations and, therefore, sensitivity to the validity of an action as a predictor of a specific outcome relative to other events. Although competitive architectures have been proposed within associative learning theory to achieve this kind of identity-based selection, whether and how these architectures are implemented by the brain is still a matter of conjecture. To investigate this issue, we trained human participants to encode various AO associations while undergoing functional neuroimaging (fMRI). We then degraded one AO contingency by increasing the probability of the outcome in the absence of its associated action while keeping other AO contingencies intact. We found that this treatment selectively reduced performance of the degraded action. Furthermore, when a signal predicted the unpaired outcome, performance of the action was restored, suggesting that the degradation effect reflects competition between the action and the context for prediction of the specific outcome. We used a Kalman filter to model the contribution of different causal variables to AO learning and found that activity in the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) tracked changes in the association of the action and context, respectively, with regard to the specific outcome. Furthermore, we found the mPFC participated in a network with the striatum and posterior parietal cortex to segregate the influence of the various competing predictors to establish specific AO associations.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTHumans and other animals learn the consequences of their actions, allowing them to control their environment in a goal-directed manner. Nevertheless, it is unknown how we parse environmental causes from the effects of our own actions to establish these specific action-outcome (AO) relationships. Here, we show that the brain learns the causal structure of the environment by segregating the unique influence of actions from other causes in the medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices and, through a network of structures, including the caudate nucleus and posterior parietal cortex, establishes the distinct causal relationships from which specific AO associations are formed.

Pairing a stimulus with large reward increases the likelihood that it will capture attention and eye-gaze, even when such capture has negative consequences. This suggests that a stimulus’s signalling relationship with reward (the co-occurrence of that stimulus and reward) has a powerful influence on attentional selection. In the present study, we demonstrate that a stimulus’s response relationship with reward (the reward-related consequences of attending to that stimulus) can also exert an independent, competing influence on selection. Participants completed a visual search task in which they made a saccade to a target shape to earn reward. The colour of a distractor signalled the magnitude of reward available on each trial. For one group of participants, there was a negative response relationship between making a saccade to the distractor and reward delivery: looking at the distractor caused the reward to be cancelled. For a second group, there was no negative response relationship, but an equivalent distractor–reward signalling relationship was maintained via a yoking procedure. Participants from both groups were more likely to have their gaze captured by the distractor that signalled high reward versus low reward, demonstrating an influence of the signalling relationship on attention. However, participants who experienced a negative response relationship showed a reduced influence of signal value on capture, and specifically less capture by the high-reward distractor. These findings demonstrate that reward can have a multifaceted influence on attentional selection through different, learned stimulus-reward relationships, and thus that the relationship between reward and attention is more complex than previously thought.

Salient-but-irrelevant distractors can automatically capture attention and eye-gaze in visual search. However, recent findings have suggested that attention to salient-but-irrelevant stimuli can be suppressed when observers use a specific target template to guide their search (i.e., feature search). A separate line of research has indicated that attentional selection is influenced by factors other than the physical salience of a stimulus and the observer's goals. For instance, pairing a stimulus with reward has been shown to increase the extent to which it captures attention and gaze (as though it has become more physically salient), even when such capture has negative consequences for the observer. Here we used eye-tracking with a rewarded visual search task to investigate whether capture by reward can be suppressed in the same way as capture by physical salience. When participants were encouraged to use feature search, attention to a distractor paired with relatively small reward was suppressed. However, under the same conditions attention was captured by a distractor paired with large reward, even when such capture resulted in reward omission. These findings suggest that reward-related stimuli are given special priority within the visual attention system over and above physically salient stimuli, and have implications for our understanding of real-world biases to reward-related stimuli, such as those seen in addiction. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Existing research indicates that learning about the Pavlovian 'signal value' of stimuli can induce attentional biases: findings suggest that our attentional system prioritises detection of stimuli that have previously signalled availability of high reward. These findings potentially provide a human analogue of sign-tracking behaviour previously reported in studies of non-human animals. Here we examine a visual search task that has been developed to demonstrate the Pavlovian influence of reward on attention, in which the critical reward-signalling stimuli are never explicit targets of search. This procedure has previously yielded robust effects of reward on attention; however it remains unclear whether this pattern reflects a persistent and automatic bias in attentional capture based on prior experience of stimulus-reward pairings, or whether it results from participants strategically attending to reward-signalling distractors because they provide useful information about reward magnitude. To investigate this issue, in the current study participants initially completed a rewarded visual search task, in which colours of distractor stimuli signalled availability of high or low reward. Participants then completed a test phase in which rewards were no longer available, such that distractor colours no longer provided useful information on reward availability. Performance during the initial rewarded phase was impaired by the presence of a distractor signalling availability of high relative to low reward. Crucially, the magnitude of this reward-related distraction effect did not reduce in the subsequent unrewarded test phase. This suggests that participants' experience of differences in reward value signalled by distractor stimuli in this task can induce persistent biases in the extent to which these stimuli involuntarily capture attention, even when they are entirely task-irrelevant.

Recent research has demonstrated a counterproductive attentional bias toward threat-related stimuli: under conditions in which fixating on a color distractor stimulus sometimes resulted in an immediate shock, participants were nevertheless more likely to look at this threat-related distractor than a neutral distractor matched for physical salience. However, participants in that prior research may not have realized that their own actions caused delivery of aversive outcomes, such that monitoring for the threat-related distractor may not have been counterproductive from participants' perspective. In Experiment 1 of the current study, we demonstrate that the attentional bias to the threat-related distractor persists (and indeed, becomes stronger) when participants are made explicitly aware that looking at this stimulus is the sole cause of aversive events, which are otherwise avoidable. In Experiment 2 we replicate the bias in informed participants under conditions in which there is additional (reward-driven) motivation to avoid attending to distractors. Taken together with prior findings, the observation of an attentional bias toward the threat-related distractor under these explicitly counterproductive conditions provides strong support for the idea that threat-related stimuli are automatically prioritized by our attentional system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Stimuli that signal large reward have an increased likelihood of capturing attention and gaze relative to stimuli that signal small or no reward, even when capture counterproductively prevents reward delivery. These findings suggest that a stimulus's signaling relationship with reward (the contingency between stimulus presentation and reward delivery) is a potent influence on selective attention. Recent studies have also implicated a stimulus's response relationship with reward (the contingency between orienting to a stimulus and reward delivery) in reducing capture by signals of reward. Here we show that this response pathway modulates capture by encouraging a reactive, goal-directed distractor suppression process. In a rewarded visual search task, participants demonstrated an oculomotor preference away from a distractor that had a negative response relationship with high reward (looking at the distractor caused reward omission) and toward a distractor that had no such negative response relationship, providing evidence for the role of the response relationship in suppressing capture by reward-related distractors. Analysis of the temporal dynamics of eye movements suggests that this distractor suppression process operates via a reactive mechanism of rapid disengagement (Experiment 1). Consistent with a goal-directed mechanism, the influence of the response relationship was eliminated when reward was unavailable (Experiment 2). These findings highlight the multifaceted role of stimulus-reward relationships in attentional selection. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

There is tentative evidence that infants can learn preferences through evaluative conditioning to socioemotional stimuli. However, the early development of evaluative conditioning and the factors that may explain infants' capacity to learn through evaluative conditioning are not well understood. Infants (N = 319; 50.2% boys) participated in a longitudinal study where an evaluative conditioning paradigm using socioemotional stimuli was conducted on two occasions (when infants were 7 and 14 months old, on average). We tested whether repeatedly pairing neutral stimuli (triangular and square shapes) with affective stimuli (angry and happy faces) affects infants' preferences for these shapes. At both timepoints, the majority of infants did not choose the shape that was paired with happy faces, indicating that, in general, learning through evaluative conditioning was not present. However, as expected, individual differences were evident such that infants who spent more time fixating on faces compared to shapes (face-preferrers) during the conditioning trials were significantly more likely than non-face-preferrers to choose the shape paired with happy faces, and this effect strengthened with increasing age.

We examine how bottom-up (or stimulus-driven) and top-down (or goal-driven) processes govern the distribution of attention in risky choice. In three experiments, participants chose between a certain payoff and the chance of receiving a payoff drawn randomly from an array of eight numbers. We tested the hypothesis that initial attention is driven by perceptual properties of the stimulus (e.g., font size of the numbers), but subsequent choice is goal-driven (e.g., win the best outcome). Two experiments in which task framing (goal driven) and font size (stimulus driven) were manipulated demonstrated that payoffs with the highest values and the largest font sizes had the greatest impact on choice. The third experiment added a number in large font to the array, which could not be an outcome of the gamble (i.e., a distractor). Eye movement and choice data indicated that although the distractor attracted attention, it had no influence on option selection. Together with computational modeling analyses, the results suggest that perceptual salience can induce bottom-up effects of overt selection but that the perceived value of information is the crucial arbiter of intentional control over risky choice.

Background.Compulsivity can be seen across various mental health conditions and refers to a tendency toward repetitive habitual acts that are persistent and functionally impairing. Compulsivity involves dysfunctional reward-related circuitry and is thought to be significantly heritable. Despite this, its measurement from a transdiagnostic perspective has received only scant research attention. Here we examine both the psychometric properties of a recently developed compulsivity scale, as well as its relationship with compulsive symptoms, familial risk, and reward-related attentional capture.Methods. Two-hundred and sixty individuals participated in the study (mean age = 36.0 [SD = 10.8] years; 60.0% male) and completed the Cambridge-Chicago Compulsivity Trait Scale (CHI-T), along with measures of psychiatric symptoms and family history thereof. Participants also completed a task designed to measure reward-related attentional capture (n = 177).Results.CHI-T total scores had a normal distribution and acceptable Cronbach’s alpha (0.84). CHI-T total scores correlated significantly and positively (all p Conclusions. These findings suggest that the CHI-T is suitable for use in online studies and constitutes a transdiagnostic marker for a range of compulsive symptoms, their familial loading, and related cognitive markers. Future work should more extensively investigate the scale in normative and clinical cohorts, and the role of value-modulated attentional capture across compulsive disorders.

The exploitation-exploration (EE) trade-off describes how, when making a decision, an organism must often choose between a safe alternative with a known pay-off, and one or more riskier alternatives with uncertain pay-offs. Recently, the concept of the EE trade-off has been extended to the examination of how organisms distribute limited attentional resources between several stimuli. This work suggests that when the rules governing the environment are certain, participants learn to "exploit" by attending preferentially to cues that provide the most information about upcoming events. However, when the rules are uncertain, people "explore" by increasing their attention to all cues that may provide information to help in predicting upcoming events. In the current study, we examine how uncertainty affects the EE trade-off in attention using a contextual two-armed bandit task, where participants explore with both their attention and their choice behavior. We find evidence for an influence of uncertainty on the EE trade-off in both choice and attention. These findings provide support for the idea of an EE trade-off in attention, and that uncertainty is a primary motivator for exploration in both choice and attentional allocation.

A cue that signals reward can capture attention and elicit approach behaviors in people and animals. The current study examined whether attentional capture by reward-related cues is associated with severity of addiction-related and obsessive-compulsive behaviors. Participants were recruited via Mechanical Turk and included 143 adults (Mage = 34 years, SD = 8.5; 43% female) who had endorsed at least 1 addiction-related or obsessive-compulsive behavior in the past month. All assessment components were delivered via the Internet and included questionnaires to assess severity of compulsivity-related problems across addiction-related and obsessive-compulsive behaviors, as well as a visual search task to measure reward-related attentional capture. Reward-related attentional capture was associated with severity of compulsivity, transdiagnostically. These findings have implications for understanding the mechanisms that underlie compulsive behaviors and suggest that reward-related attentional capture is a promising transdiagnostic cognitive risk marker for compulsivity. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Physically salient but task-irrelevant distractors can capture attention in visual search, but resource-dependent, executive-control processes can help reduce this distraction. However, it is not only physically salient stimuli that grab our attention: Recent research has shown that reward history also influences the likelihood that stimuli will capture attention. Here, we investigated whether resource-dependent control processes modulate the effect of reward on attentional capture, much as for the effect of physical salience. To this end, we used eye tracking with a rewarded visual search task and compared performance under conditions of high and low working memory load. In two experiments, we demonstrated that oculomotor capture by high-reward distractor stimuli is enhanced under high memory load. These results highlight the role of executive-control processes in modulating distraction by reward-related stimuli. Our findings have implications for understanding the neurocognitive processes involved in real-life conditions in which reward-related stimuli may influence behavior, such as addiction.

Attention is shaped by our prior experiences with stimuli, and in particular by learning about their relationship with motivationally significant events: rewards and punishments. While it is typically adaptive to prioritize detection of signals of reward and punishment, recent evidence suggests that attentional prioritization of motivationally relevant information can be involuntary and inflexible, which can be counterproductive when circumstances change, and these signals are no longer the focus of a person’s goals. We review this literature, which suggests that attentional capture is promoted by learning about both rewards and punishments, though further research is required to probe for differences in the temporal dynamics of these processes. We also highlight the clinical relevance of interactions between appetitive and aversive motivation and perceptual-cognitive processes.

Laboratory stress-induction procedures have been critical in illuminating the effects of stress on human health, cognition, and functioning. Here, we present a novel stress induction procedure, the Simple Singing Stress Procedure (SSSP), that overcomes some of the practical challenges and conceptual limitations of existing procedures in measuring the causal influence of stress on psychological variables. In the stress condition of the SSSP, participants were instructed to sing a song in front of the experimenter while being video- and audio-recorded. Participants were also informed that they would have to sing again at the end of the experiment, and that this second performance would later be assessed by a panel of experimenters. Participants in a no-stress condition instead read lyrics in each phase. Our findings revealed that participants in the stress condition showed significantly higher blood pressure immediately following the initial singing session, as well as heightened salivary cortisol at a latency consistent with the initial singing session, than those in the no-stress condition. Our stress procedure also generated elevations in self-reported stress ratings immediately after the first singing session and subsequently in anticipation of the second singing session, relative to the no-stress condition. Collectively, these findings suggest that the SSSP is a simple and effective stress induction procedure that may be a promising alternative to existing protocols.

Rewards exert a deep influence on our cognition and behavior. Here, we used a paradigm in which reward information was provided at either encoding or retrieval of a brief, masked stimulus to show that reward can also rapidly modulate perceptual encoding of visual information. Experiment 1 ( n = 30 adults) showed that participants’ response accuracy was enhanced when a to-be-encoded grating signaled high reward relative to low reward, but only when the grating was presented very briefly and participants reported that they were not consciously aware of it. Experiment 2 ( n = 29 adults) showed that there was no difference in participants’ response accuracy when reward information was instead provided at the stage of retrieval, ruling out an explanation of the reward-modulation effect in terms of differences in motivated retrieval. Taken together, our findings provide behavioral evidence consistent with a rapid reward modulation of visual perception, which may not require consciousness.

Previous paradigms used to examine attentional distraction by task-irrelevant food words and food images were not suited for the investigation of involuntary and automatic attentional capture. In the current experiments we adapted a well-established visual-search paradigm (with eye tracking) to investigate involuntary attentional capture by food and drink rewards. We first used a satiety procedure to manipulate relative preference for different food and drink outcomes (potato chips and water in Experiment 1 and popcorn and chocolate Smarties in Experiment 2). Participants then performed the visual-search task where a coloured distractor signalled on each trial which of the two food and drink rewards was available for successful identification of the target. The signalled reward was cancelled, however, if any eye gaze was registered on the distractor. Participants were therefore motivated to try and control the automatic orienting of attention towards cues signalling valuable outcomes, in order to earn those outcomes. In both experiments we found that attention was more often captured by the distractor signalling the valuable (non-sated) outcome, replicating previous studies using this paradigm with monetary rewards. We also found that those scoring high on eating restraint (as measured with the Dutch Eating Behavior Questionnaire) were better at controlling reflexive orienting of attention to desirable food rewards. This paradigm offers a novel approach for understanding how reflexive attention and control relate to conflicts in everyday life around distracting food cues, and the moderating role of dietary restraint.

Contains fulltext : 224861pos.pdf (Author’s version postprint ) (Open Access) People have a strong tendency to attend to reward cues, even if these cues are irrelevant to their current goal or their current task. When reward cues are goal-irrelevant, their presence may impair cognitive performance. In this meta-analysis, we quantitatively examined the rapidly growing literature on the impact of reward-related distractors on cognitive performance. We included 91 studies (N = 2,362) that used different cognitive paradigms (e.g., visual search, conflict processing) and reward-related stimuli (e.g., money, attractive food). Overall, results showed that reward-related distractors impaired cognitive performance across different tasks and stimuli, with a small effect size (standardized mean change = .347). Between-study heterogeneity was large, suggesting that researchers can plausibly expect to sometimes find reversed effects (i.e., reward-related distractors boosting performance). We further showed that the average reward-driven distraction effect was robust across different reward-learning mechanisms, contexts, and methodological choices, and that this effect existed regardless of explicit task instructions to ignore distractors. In sum, the findings of this meta-analysis support the notion that cognitive processes can be thwarted by reward cues. We discuss these findings against the background of distraction-related phenomena as they are studied in clinical, educational, and work psychology. 28 p.

Attention refers to the set of cognitive mechanisms that facilitate the prioritization of incoming sensory information. Existing research suggests that motivationally salient stimuli, such as those associated with reward, are prioritized by the attention system and that this prioritization occurs independently of an observer's goals. Specifically, studies of visual search have shown that stimuli signalling the availability of monetary reward are more likely to capture eye movements, even when participants are motivated to ignore such stimuli. In the current study we ask whether reward magnitude influences only the likelihood that stimuli will capture spatial attention, or whether reward also influences the ease with which people can disengage attention from a location when they are motivated to move their attention elsewhere. Three experiments examined the time taken to disengage from a centrally presented distractor that signalled the availability of high or low reward. We found that participants took longer to move their eyes away from a high-reward distractor, even though this came at financial cost (Experiment 1), that participants were unable to suppress a high-reward distractor consistently presented at the central location (Experiment 2), that slower responding was not due to behavioural freezing in the presence of a signal of high reward (Experiment 3), and that slower responding persisted even when rewards were no longer available (Experiment 4). These results indicate that reward modulates attentional disengagement: signals of high reward hold attention for longer, even when this is counterproductive for performance of ongoing tasks. Our findings further highlight the role of reward in the conflict between automatic and goal-directed attentional processing.

Mechanisms of motor-sensory prediction are dependent on expectations regarding when self-generated feedback will occur. Existing behavioral and electrophysiological research suggests that we have a default expectation for immediate sensory feedback after executing an action. However, studies investigating the adaptability of this temporal expectation have been limited in their ability to differentiate modified expectations per se from effects of stimulus repetition. Here, we use a novel, within-participant procedure that allowed us to disentangle the effect of repetition from expectation and allowed us to determine whether the default assumption for immediate feedback is fixed and resistant to modification or is amenable to change with experience. While EEG was recorded, 45 participants completed a task in which they repeatedly pressed a button to produce a tone that occurred immediately after the button press (immediate training) or after a 100-msec delay (delayed training). The results revealed significant differences in the patterns of cortical change across the two training conditions. Specifically, there was a significant reduction in the cortical response to tones across delayed training blocks but no significant change across immediate training blocks. Furthermore, experience with delayed training did not result in increased cortical activity in response to immediate feedback. These findings suggest that experience with action–sensation delays broadens the window of temporal expectations, allowing for the simultaneous anticipation of both delayed and immediate motor-sensory feedback. This research provides insights into the mechanisms underlying motor-sensory prediction and may represent a novel therapeutic avenue for psychotic symptoms, which are ostensibly associated with sensory prediction abnormalities.

Reward-learning theory views habits as stimulus-response links formed through extended reward training. Accordingly, animal research has shown that actions that are initially goal-directed can become habitual after operant overtraining. However, a similar demonstration is absent in human research, which poses a serious problem for translational models of behavior. We propose that response-time (RT) switch cost after operant training can be used as a new, reliable marker for the operation of the habit system in humans. Using a new method, we show that RT switch cost demonstrates the properties that would be expected of a habitual behavior: (a) it increases with overtraining, (b) it increases when rewards are larger, and (c) it increases when time pressure is added to the task, thereby hindering the competing goal-directed system. These results offer a promising new pathway for studying the operation of the habit system in humans. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Outcome-selective Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT) refers to the finding that presenting Pavlovian predictors of outcomes can enhance the vigor of instrumental responding for those same outcomes. Three experiments examined the sensitivity of outcome-selective PIT to Pavlovian (stimulus-outcome) extinction. In Experiment 1, participants first learnt to perform different instrumental responses to earn different outcomes. In a separate Pavlovian training phase, certain stimuli were established as Pavlovian signals of the different outcomes. Some of these Pavlovian stimuli were then extinguished (they were presented alone, without any outcome), while others were not. A final transfer test measured the extent to which these Pavlovian cues biased instrumental response choice. Consistent with previous work, the observed PIT effects were immune to Pavlovian extinction; the non-extinguished and extinguished cues produced PIT effects that did not significantly differ in size. In Experiment 2, response choice was tested in the presence of compound stimuli that included both extinguished and non-extinguished cues. Response choice was highly sensitive to the extinction manipulation under these circumstances. Experiment 3 tested whether this sensitivity to Pavlovian extinction was a direct effect of the associative strength of the Pavlovian cues present, or an indirect effect of cue salience. The results provide unique evidence to suggest that PIT is a direct consequence of the strength of the Pavlovian associations. (PsycINFO Database Record

Can judgments be biased via passive monitoring of eye-gaze? We examined this question using a perceptual discrimination task (Experiment 1) and a complex moral judgment task (Experiment 2). Information about the location of participants' gaze at particular time-points in a trial was used to prompt responses. When there was no objective perceptual information available to decision-makers, the timing of the prompt had a small, but detectable effect on judgments (Experiment 1). However, this small effect did not scale up to more complex judgments about moral issues (Experiment 2). Our results are consistent with the well-established idea that participants' judgments are reflected in their eye-gaze, but do not support the recent bold claim of a causal link wherein the timing of a gaze-contingent response-prompt influences complex judgments. (PsycINFO Database Record

When people consider a series of random binary events, such as tossing an unbiased coin and recording the sequence of heads (H) and tails (T), they tend to erroneously rate sequences with less internal structure or order (such as HTTHT) as more probable than sequences containing more structure or order (such as HHHHH). This is traditionally explained as a local representativeness effect: Participants assume that the properties of long sequences of random outcomes—such as an equal proportion of heads and tails, and little internal structure—should also apply to short sequences. However, recent theoretical work has noted that the probability of a particular sequence of say, heads and tails of length n, occurring within a larger (>n) sequence of coin flips actually differs by sequence, so P(HHHHH) < P(HTTHT). In this alternative account, people apply rational norms based on limited experience. We test these accounts. Participants in Experiment 1 rated the likelihood of occurrence for all possible strings of 4, 5, and 6 observations in a sequence of coin flips. Judgments were better explained by representativeness in alternation rate, relative proportion of heads and tails, and sequence complexity, than by objective probabilities. Experiments 2 and 3 gave similar results using incentivized binary choice procedures. Overall the evidence suggests that participants are not sensitive to variation in objective probabilities of a sub-sequence occurring; they appear to use heuristics based on several distinct forms of representativeness.

Learning the causal relation between actions and their outcomes (AO learning) is critical for goal-directed behavior when actions are guided by desire for the outcome. This can be contrasted with habits that are acquired by reinforcement and primed by prevailing stimuli, in which causal learning plays no part. Recently, we demonstrated that goal-directed actions are impaired in schizophrenia; however, whether this deficit exists alongside impairments in habit or reinforcement learning is unknown. The present study distinguished deficits in causal learning from reinforcement learning in schizophrenia. We tested people with schizophrenia (SZ, n = 25) and healthy adults (HA, n = 25) in a vending machine task. Participants learned two action–outcome contingencies (e.g., push left to get a chocolate M&M, push right to get a cracker), and they also learned one contingency was degraded by delivery of noncontingent outcomes (e.g., free M&Ms), as well as changes in value by outcome devaluation. Both groups learned the best action to obtain rewards; however, SZ did not distinguish the more causal action when one AO contingency was degraded. Moreover, action selection in SZ was insensitive to changes in outcome value unless feedback was provided, and this was related to the deficit in AO learning. The failure to encode the causal relation between action and outcome in schizophrenia occurred without any apparent deficit in reinforcement learning. This implies that poor goal-directed behavior in schizophrenia cannot be explained by a more primary deficit in reward learning such as insensitivity to reward value or reward prediction errors.

Blocking refers to the finding that less is learned about the relationship between a stimulus and an outcome if pairings are conducted in the presence of a second stimulus that has previously been established as a reliable predictor of that outcome. Attentional models of associative learning suggest that blocking reflects a reduction in the attention paid to the blocked cue. We tested this idea in three experiments in which participants were trained in an associative learning task using a blocking procedure. Attention to stimuli was measured 250 ms after onset using an adapted version of the dot probe task. This task was presented at the beginning of each learning trial (Experiments 1 and 2) or in independent trials (Experiment 3). Results show evidence of reduced attention to blocked stimuli (i.e. “attentional blocking”). In addition, this attentional bias correlated with the magnitude of blocking in associative learning, as measured by predictive-value judgments. Moreover, Experiments 2 and 3 found evidence of an influence of learning about predictiveness on memory for episodes involving stimuli. These findings are consistent with a central role of learned attentional biases in producing the blocking effect, and in the encoding of new memories.

A large body of research has shown that learning about relationships between neutral stimuli and events of significance – rewards or punishments – influences the extent to which people attend to those stimuli in the future. However, different accounts of this influence differ in terms of the critical variable that is proposed to determine learned changes in attention. We describe two experiments using eye-tracking with a rewarded visual search procedure to investigate whether attentional capture is influenced by the predictiveness of stimuli (i.e., the extent to which they provide information about upcoming events) or by their absolute associative value (i.e., the expected incentive value of the outcome that a stimulus predicts). Results demonstrated a clear influence of associative value on the likelihood that stimuli will capture eye-movements, but the evidence for a distinct influence of predictiveness was less compelling. The results of these experiments can be reconciled within a simple account under which attentional prioritization is a monotonic function of the expected, subjective value of the reward that is signalled by a stimulus.

Aim Food restriction is argued to be a precursor for unhealthy preoccupation with food, possibly leading to the development of an eating disorder. We updated previous meta-analyses that examined the relationship between eating restraint and deficits in either general or food-related attentional and inhibitory control. We hypothesized that inconsistencies in the literature around eating restraint, impaired cognitive control, impulsivity and cognitive biases for food could be attributed to the scale used to measure eating restraint. Method A (preregistered) subgroup meta-analysis examined whether patterns of impaired cognitive control and cognitive bias for food in predominantly healthy (non-clinical) samples differed as a function of the scale used to measure eating restraint. A series of exploratory meta-analyses were carried out for specific attentional bias tasks. In total 57 datasets were included. Results The subgroup analysis did not provide evidence that the relationship between eating restraint and impaired or biased cognitions differed significantly as a function of restraint scale. Heterogeneity across studies was high. When examining specific attentional bias tasks there was no evidence that increased eating restraint was associated with increased attentional bias or distraction by food cues, regardless of which scale was used to measure eating restraint. Conclusions There is little experimental evidence for the common narrative that increased eating restraint is related to impaired cognitive control generally or increased cognitive bias for food, in non-clinical samples.

It has been suggested that attention is guided by two factors that operate during associative learning: a predictiveness principle, by which attention is allocated to the best predictors of outcomes, and an uncertainty principle, by which attention is allocated to learn about the less known features of the environment. Recent studies have shown that predictiveness-driven attention can operate rapidly and in an automatic way to exploit known relationships. The corresponding characteristics of uncertainty-driven attention, on the other hand, remain unexplored. In two experiments we examined whether both predictiveness and uncertainty modulate attentional processing in an adaptation of the dot probe task. This task provides a measure of automatic orientation to cues during associative learning. The stimulus onset asynchrony of the probe display was manipulated in order to explore temporal characteristics of predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional effects. Results showed that the predictive status of cues determined selective attention, with faster attentional capture to predictive than to non-predictive cues. In contrast, the level of uncertainty slowed down responses to the probe regardless of the predictive status of the cues. Both predictiveness- and uncertainty-driven attentional effects were very rapid (at 250 ms from cue onset) and were automatically activated.

Recent research has shown that perceptual processing of stimuli previously associated with high-value rewards is automatically prioritized even when rewards are no longer available. It has been hypothesized that such reward-related modulation of stimulus salience is conceptually similar to an “attentional habit.” Recording event-related potentials in humans during a reinforcement learning task, we show strong evidence in favor of this hypothesis. Resistance to outcome devaluation (the defining feature of a habit) was shown by the stimulus-locked P1 component, reflecting activity in the extrastriate visual cortex. Analysis at longer latencies revealed a positive component (corresponding to the P3b, from 550–700 ms) sensitive to outcome devaluation. Therefore, distinct spatiotemporal patterns of brain activity were observed corresponding to habitual and goal-directed processes. These results demonstrate that reinforcement learning engages both attentional habits and goal-directed processes in parallel. Consequences for brain and computational models of reinforcement learning are discussed.SIGNIFICANCE STATEMENTThe human attentional network adapts to detect stimuli that predict important rewards. A recent hypothesis suggests that the visual cortex automatically prioritizes reward-related stimuli, driven by cached representations of reward value; that is, stimulus–response habits. Alternatively, the neural system may track the current value of the predicted outcome. Our results demonstrate for the first time that visual cortex activity is increased for reward-related stimuli even when the rewarding event is temporarily devalued. In contrast, longer-latency brain activity was specifically sensitive to transient changes in reward value. Therefore, we show that both habit-like attention and goal-directed processes occur in the same learning episode at different latencies. This result has important consequences for computational models of reinforcement learning.

Comparative and cognitive psychologists interpret performance in different ways. Animal researchers invoke a dominant construct of associative learning. Human researchers acknowledge humans’ capacity for explicit-declarative cognition. This article offers a way to bridge a divide that defeats productive cross-talk. We show that animals often challenge the associative-learning construct, and that it does not work to try to stretch the associative-learning construct to encompass these performances. This approach thins and impoverishes that important construct. We describe an alternative approach that restrains the construct of associative learning by giving it a clear operational definition. We apply this approach in several comparative domains to show that different task variants change—in concert—the level of awareness, the declarative nature of knowledge, the dimensional breadth of knowledge, and the brain systems that organize learning. These changes reveal dissociable learning processes that a unitary associative construct cannot explain but a neural-systems framework can explain. These changes define the limit of associative learning and the threshold of explicit cognition. The neural-systems framework can broaden empirical horizons in comparative psychology. It can offer animal models of explicit cognition to cognitive researchers and neuroscientists. It can offer simple behavioral paradigms for exploring explicit cognition to developmental researchers. It can enliven the synergy between human and animal research, promising a productive future for both.