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The idea that “consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function” has never been popular among physicists. The main reason being that the alleged interaction makes the resulting theory mysterious and in tension with physicalism. The Subjective-Objective Collapse (SOC) model attends these worries. SOC is an objective collapse model where the collapse operator depends upon a physical property that either is identical to consciousness or perfectly correlates with it. This allows the construction of an empirically adequate model of the evolution of the wave function in which the collapse depends on consciousness. This paper reviews the SOC model, discusses its advantages and evaluates its commitments and challenges.

In this paper we investigate which of the main conditions proposed in the moral responsibility literature are the ones that spell trouble for the idea that Artificial Intelligence Systems (AISs) could ever be full-fledged responsible agents. After arguing that the standard construals of the control and epistemic conditions don’t impose any in-principle barrier to AISs being responsible agents, we identify the requirement that responsible agents must be aware of their own actions as the main locus of resistance to attribute that kind of agency to AISs. This is because this type of awareness is thought to involve first-person or de se representations, which, in turn, are usually assumed to involve some form of consciousness. We clarify what this widespread assumption involves and conclude that the possibility of AISs’ moral responsibility hinges on what the correct theory of de se representations ultimately turns out to be.

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness (PFP-Awareness): a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects.

There is a substantive disagreement with regard to the characterization of pre-reflective self-awareness despite the key role that is supposed to play for the distinction between conscious and unconscious states. One of the most prominent ones—between egological and non-egological views—is about the role that the subject of experience plays.I show that this disagreement falls short to capture the details of the debate, as it does not distinguish phenomenological and metaphysical disputes. Regarding the former, the contenders disagree on whether pre-reflective self-awareness concerns the subject of experience or the experience itself. I first argue that such an awareness has to be indexical—de se or de mentis respectively—, and then show that de se awareness can straightforwardly address classical objec­tions against egological views, whereas de mentis awareness fails to support epistemological arguments in favor of non-egological ones. The metaphysical commitments of a phenomenologically egological view depend on what the corresponding de se awareness demands from reality. I consider two alternatives, the structural and the representational approach and offer some consid­erations in favor of the later and its prima facie neutrality with regard to the metaphysical dispute.

In occupational exposure to vibration, the risk assessment process is defined through a regulatory framework that presents some relevant metrological problems. This framework considers methods based on estimation and on measurements. Estimation methods could employ existing information that is provided for each manufacturer to each individual tool or application to carry out such estimation. The use of estimation methods has some problems, such as substantial uncertainty. When using measurement methods, some metrological aspects are not fully defined. Therefore, a new and emerging risk appears due to certain methodologic limitations. Consequently, the variation between the estimated and the actual values could overestimate the level of occupational exposure to vibrations. Thus, with this paper, a critical analysis of this emerging metrological problem is provided. For this, a critical analysis of the metrological requirements regarding European standards is developed. To this end, the estimation method and measure method are investigated, considering, in both cases, the main factors related to uncertainty, reliability, and traceability. With this structure, a set of metrological limitations have been identified, thus pointing towards future lines of research that allow the improvement of the process of assessing the level of occupational exposure to vibrations. This work was funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness, with the title: “Analysis and Assessment of technological requirements for the design of a New Emerging Risks standardized management SYStem (A2NERSYS)” with reference DPI2016-79824-R.

Ever since the early days of quantum mechanics it has been suggested that consciousness could be linked to the collapse of the wave function. However, no detailed account of such an interplay is usually provided. In this paper we present an objective collapse model (a variation of CSL) where the collapse operator depends on integrated information, which has been argued to measure consciousness. By doing so, we construct an empirically adequate scheme in which superpositions of conscious states are dynamically suppressed. Unlike other proposals in which "consciousness causes the collapse of the wave function," our model is fully consistent with a materialistic view of the world and does not require the postulation of entities suspicious of laying outside of the quantum realm., Version accepted for publication in Synthese

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols following certain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computational system—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its commands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body in which the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. From a representationalist framework regarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognition constitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will argue that in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum, representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience is de se. I show that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective character of the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodily activity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied.

Higher-order thought (HOT) theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal (in: Liu, Perry (eds) Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness.

Industrial heritage, as a historical and cultural heritage typology, can be considered a new opportunity to generate tourism interest in a zone. Along the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century, the oriental coast of Málaga (Spain) was considered a reference area in the sugar cane cultivation and manufacturing. Nowadays, different sugar cane factories assets remain. These assets can be considered an opportunity to increase visitors and to improve the economy of this area. In this work, six sugar cane factories have been evaluated. Different characteristics has been proposed and a value has been assigned to each one. Finally, a route to visit the proposed sugar cane factories has been designed. The main advantage of this tourism route is that can be done in one day, reinforcing the current touristic offer and attracting new visitors to this area.

espanolEn un articulo publicado recientemente (2014) en esta revista, Javier Vidal argumenta que toda creencia de primera persona es una creencia consciente, una conclusion que pone en jaque ciertas teorias de la consciencia, como el mismo expone. El razonamiento de Vidal se basa en un argumento que muestra que uno conoce toda creencia de primera persona que tiene y en un principio (SC*) que vincula conocimiento y consciencia. Mi objetivo en este trabajo es mostrar que el razonamiento de Vidal no es solido. En particular, hago patente que el argumento depende de rechazar la relacion ampliamente aceptada en epistemologia entre creencia y conocimiento. Ademas, argumento que SC* o bien prejuzga la cuestion o bien involucra una nocion de consciencia no relevante para la discusion. EnglishIn a recent paper in this journal (2014), Javier Vidal has argued that every first-person belief is a conscious one, a conclusion that jeopardizes certain theories of consciousness as he shows. Vidal’s reasoning is builded upon an argument to the effect that one knows all first person beliefs that one has and a principle (SC*) that links knowledge and consciousness. My aim in this paper is to show that Vidal’s reasoning is unsound. In particular, I show that the argument depends upon the rejection of the relation, widely accepted in epistemology, between belief and knowledge. Moreover, I argue that SC* either begs the question or involves a notion of consciousness that is not relevant for the discussion.

In this essay we discuss recent attempts to analyse the notion of representation, as it is employed in cognitive science, in purely informational terms. In particular, we argue that recent informational theories cannot accommodate the existence of metarepresentations. Since metarepresentations play a central role in the explanation of many cognitive abilities, this is a serious shortcoming of these proposals.

Since the international governmental institutions required and/or recommended (according to the regulations of each country and continent) all public works to be certified in the BIM (Building Information Modeling) methodology, public and private institutions and universities have sought to integrate BIM into their production and educational processes. This requires the university academic environment to focus its efforts on training students in this methodology, as they will need to apply it in any future work activities related to architecture and construction. This article seeks to analyze which methods are being used by higher education institutions around the world to integrate BIM implementation in AEC (architecture, engineering, and construction) degrees and to determine if a set of regulatory guidelines exists that could serve as a common foundation for institutions to improve this integration process. To this end, a systematic literature review was carried out on WOS and SCOPUS by applying the PRISMA statement methodology. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were selected based on keywords, abstracts, and full content of the articles. In the end, 23 articles were thoroughly studied, the integration and evaluation methods analyzed, and results obtained. The analysis shows a consensus on the need to develop common academic guidelines across university centers that define a strategy for curriculum modifications and teaching and learning strategies. Finally, future lines of research are identified.

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a...

Many philosophers and scientists have argued that the difference between phenomenally conscious states and other kind of states lies in the implicit self-awareness that conscious states have. Higher-Order Representationalist (HOR) theories, attempt to explain such a self-awareness by means of a higher-order representation. Consciousness relies on our capacity to represent our own mental states, consciousness depends on our Theory of Mind. Such an ability can, at least conceptually, be decomposed into another two: mindreading and metacognition. In this paper I will argue that consciousness cannot depend on mindreading. The tenability of HOR theories depends, therefore, on the relation between mindreading and metacognition. I analyze several views on such a relation and argue that none of them seem to be a plausible option for HOR theories.; Muchos han argumentado que la diferencia entre estados fenoménicamente conscientes y otros tipos de estados reside en la auto-conciencia implícita que muchos estados conscientes poseen. Las Teorías de la Representación de Orden Superior (HOR) pretenden explicar esa auto-conciencia mediante representaciones de orden superior. La conciencia depende de nuestra capacidad de representar nuestros propios estados mentales: nuestra Teoría de la Mente. Se acepta en general que esta capacidad puede descomponerse en otras dos: la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Argumentaré que la conciencia no puede depender de la lectura de mentes. La sostenibilidad de las teorías HOR depende, por tanto, de la relación entre la lectura de mentes y la meta-cognición. Analizo algunas concepciones de esa relación y argumento que ninguna de ellas parece ser una opción plausible para las teorías HOR.

Representations are not only used in our folk-psychological explanations of behaviour, but are also fruitfully postulated, for example, in cognitive science. The mainstream view in cognitive science maintains that our mind is a representational system. This popular view requires an understanding of the nature of the entities they are postulating. Teleosemantic theories face this challenge, unpacking the normativity in the relation of representation by appealing to the teleological function of the representing state. It has been argued that, if intentionality is to be explained in teleological terms, then the function of a state cannot depend on its phylogenetical history, given the metaphysical possibility of a duplicate of an intentional being that lacks an evolutionary history (Swampman). In this paper, I present a method to produce, according to our current knowledge in genetic engineering, human-like individuals who are not the product of natural selection in the required sense. This variation will be used to shed light on the main replies that have been offered in the literature to the Swampman thought experiment. I argue that these replies are not satisfactory: representations should better not depend on natural selection. I conclude that a non-etiological notion of function is to be preferred for characterizing the relation of representation.

El interes por el conocimiento y proteccion del patrimonio industrial vive, en la actualidad, una etapa de crecimiento. Se han promovido iniciativas desde diferentes contextos y con distintos enfoques y alcance. La valoracion de este tipo de bienes, aunque todavia lejos de otras tipologias patrimoniales, empieza a encontrar su espacio. El Plan Nacional de Patrimonio Industrial, el afloramiento de asociaciones y organizaciones centradas en este campo, o la creciente presencia de estos temas en el ambito academico y cientifico, son sintomas de mejoria. Sin embargo, es necesario preguntarse si estos progresos son suficientes. La informacion disponible sobre esta materia, base fundamental para trabajos futuros y para la difusion de sus bienes, es muy heterogenea. El patrimonio industrial es un area de estudio que necesita ser analizada desde diferentes opticas, del mismo modo que su actividad y legado han contribuido a definir muy diferentes aspectos de nuestra sociedad actual. Pero quizas este necesario caracter multidisciplinar y la tradicional ausencia de los Ingenieros Industriales en esta labor han contribuido a una situacion que deberia corregirse. La documentacion de mayor caracter oficial es escasa o poco accesible, las diferencias entre las distintas regiones son evidentes y, sobretodo, existe una clara falta de criterios comunes para el estudio de estos bienes. Este trabajo expone las ventajas del establecimiento de criterios basicos de estudio comunes para cualquier bien analizado y propone una metodologia para su aplicacion. Ademas amplia significativamente el numero de elementos considerados frente a las muestras de bienes de los principales catalogos nacionales. Por ultimo, se exponen los analisis cruzados posibles gracias a la metodologia de trabajo descrita.

Representationalism maintains that the phenomenal character of an experience is fully determined by its intentional content. Representationalism is a very attractive theory in the project of naturalizing consciousness, on the assumption that the relation of representation can itself be naturalized. For this purpose, representationalists with naturalistic inclinations typically appeal to teleological theories of mental content. Not much attention has been paid, however, to the interaction between representationalism and teleological theories of content. This paper will provide reasons to think that such an interaction is not felicitous. In particular, I will argue that those who endorse the conjunction of these two theories are committed to the existence of impossible experiences.

Alleged self-evidence aside, conceivability arguments are one of the main reasons in favor of the claim that there is a Hard Problem. These arguments depend on the appealing Kripkean intuition that there is no difference between appearances and reality in the case of consciousness. I will argue that this intuition rests on overlooking a distinction between cognitive access and consciousness, which has received recently important empirical support. I will show that there are good reasons to believe that the intuition is misguided—at least on the reading that the conceivability arguments require—and hence that the arguments are unsupported. This, in turn, alleviates the Hard Problem but leaves us with what I think is a not easy problem.

Some philosophers, like David Chalmers, have either shown their sympathy for, or explicitly endorsed, the following two principles: Panpsychism—roughly the thesis that the mind is ubiquitous throughout the universe—and Organizational Invariantism—the principle that holds that two systems with the same (sufficiently) fine-grained functional organization will have qualitatively identical experiences. The purpose of this paper is to show the tension between the arguments that back up both principles. This tension should lead, or so I will argue, defenders of one of the principles to give up on the other.

Excellence in design is an important differentiating factor between competing products; establishing a key pillar for companies face up with safety the challenges ahead in global markets. The implementation of process management, in turn, has emerged as one of the tools for improving management more effective and its application to design product powering growth vectors, such as innovation and productivity. A project level, the management model of the design process for products manufactured according to BS 7000-2: 2008 can be compared with the models predictive of project management, mainly international PMBOK ® guide and the model developed in Europe, PRINCE2. Potential similarities to be established in comparison shall take into account an integrated vision focus on all levels according to processes as initiation, planning, implementation, monitoring and controlling, and closing.

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one’s own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call ‘Self-Involving’ (SI) and ‘Mental-State-Involving’ (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms.

El presente trabajo expone una nueva metodología para una adecuada utilización de herramientas virtuales 3D en procesos de fabricación y montaje. El sistema toma como referencia el modelo 3D del producto para generar el correspondiente entorno virtual 3D donde se diseña y valida el proceso de manera interactiva. Este sistema es capaz de generar todos los recursos necesarios para la realización del proceso de montaje, desde el diseño de la estación de trabajo hasta la incorporación del factor humano pasando por los factores productivos y ergonómicos. La aplicación práctica de esta metodología facilita una rápida adaptación a los posibles cambios del producto y favorece la mejora continua del proceso.

Besides traditional occupational risks, advanced manufacturing processes (AMP) can generate other risks described by the Eu ropean Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-OSHA) as “new and emerging risks” (NER) to occupational safety and h ealth. Several studies have been carried out by the EU-OSHA in order to identify all these risks. However, the direct use of this set of NER in identification procedures of occupational risks, generally applied in labour p rocesses and particularly in AMP, may result in the identification of traditional occupational risks rather than NER, mainly because they have been defined without following a risk reference model. To solve this problem a risk model has been developed that improves and complements the NER definition of EU-OSHA, from w hich a second model has been developed to analyze the structure of the considered set of NER. It is observed that with the results obtained, the current descriptions of these NER do not explain their quality of "new and "emerging". © 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. Peer-review under responsibility of DAAAM International Vienna.

The design and manufacturing of hot forged parts, using proposed of feasibility and optimization approaches that, based on technico-economics considerations, allow to evaluate numerically the rate of adaptation of the different morphologies at the forging process, is analyzed in this work. The integration of these approaches in an unique global adaptation coefficient, carried out considering the technical and economic importance of each factor, facilitates the selection of the best alternative. Also, the use of this coefficient allows, in studies of general nature, to make quantitative classifications of the analyzed parts, in studies facilitating a hierarchical order of the different alternatives, when groups and sub-groups according to characteristic parameters of each family, are established.

The design of industrial parts is a clear example of integrative effort that, with a focus of several disciplines, requires a detailed analysis of the different scientific and technological knowledge implied in its conception and development. Inside this performance context, the present work approaches the problem of the project of hot forging parts, proposing the use of criteria of viability and optimization that, based in technical and economical considerations, allow to value the adjusting degree of various alternative to the forge process, facilitating with it the selection of the most appropriate. Fixed these bases and with object of shortening times of answer and analysis in an application corresponding to parts with revolution symmetry, a computerized system has been introduced that, taking as started data the design of the part, geometrically simulates the forge process, allowing to calculate the adaptation coefficients in those morphologing that are possible according to the criteria of viability criteria. This system also provides a graphic representation of machined part, the forged part and the finished stamp.El diseño de piezas industriales supone un claro ejemplo de esfuerzo integrador que, con un enfoque interdisciplinar, requiere un análisis detallado de los diferentes conocimientos científicos y tecnológicos implicados en su concepción y desarrollo. Dentro de este marco de actuación, el presente trabajo aborda la problemática del proyecto de piezas estampadas en caliente, proponiendo la utilización de criterios de viabilidad y optimización que, fundamentados en consideraciones técnico-económicas, permiten valorar el grado de adecuación de las diferentes alternativas al proceso de forja, facilitando con ello la selección de la más adecuada. Fijadas estas bases y con objeto de acortar tiempos de respuesta y análisis en una aplicación correspondiente a piezas axisimétricas, se ha introducido un sistema informatizado que, tomando como dato de partida el plano de mecanizado de la pieza, simula geométricamente el proceso de estampación, permitiendo calcular los coeficientes de adecuación en aquellas tipologías que son posibles según los criterios de viabilidad. Este sistema también proporciona una representación gráfica de pieza mecanizada, pieza estampada y matriz de acabado.

Higher-Order Thought (HOT) theories of consciousness maintain that the kind of awareness necessary for phenomenal consciousness depends on the cognitive accessibility that underlies reporting.

One of the main problems for the scientific study of consciousness is methodological. At least prima facie, the kind of knowledge we have of our own experiences is direct and not mediated by an inference process. This kind of knowledge contrasts with the kind of knowledge we have of others’ experiences, which relies on the observation of their behavior and their reports.

This paper deals with the simulation of UNS A92024 aluminium alloy cutting processes. In particular, 2D and 3D Finite Element Method (FEM) simulations were carried out in order to estimate cutting forces and chip morphology during turning operations. The material is modelled with two different set of parameters for the Johnson—Cook’s (J‐C) constitutive equation and a failure Cockroft and Latham’s model exploited considers damage. The comparison between the predicted chip morphology and principal cutting forces at varying of J‐C parameters and cutting regimes with those experimentally found are presented and discussed. The paper shows the importance of damage criterion in the cutting forces, during the simulation, especially in 3D.

Titanium alloys are materials considered as extremely difficult to cut and titanium alloy Ti6Al4V is a reference in machining of titanium. The segmented (saw toothed) chip morphology has attracted great interest in researchers because the understanding of the saw‐toothed chip morphology helps to understand the chip formation mechanisms. In this study, the effect of different constitutive models on the saw‐toothed chip morphology is examined in machining Ti6Al4V. The paper presents the influence of eight material constitutive modelling in the simulation of segmented chip formation. A critical comparison of outstanding process outputs as cutting force, temperature and measurable parameters for segmented chips is carried out to compare and discuss the performance of the eight different material models to each other and with experimental data.

Virtual reality techniques use at industrial processes provides a real approach to product life cycle. For components manual assembly, the use of virtual surroundings facilitates a simultaneous engineering in which variables such as human factors and productivity take a real act. On the other hand, in the actual phase of industrial competition it is required a rapid adjustment to client needs and to market situation. In this work it is analyzed the assembly of the front components of a vehicle using virtual reality tools and following up a product‐process design methodology which includes every life service stage. This study is based on workstations design, taking into account productive and human factors from the ergonomic point of view implementing a postural study of every assembly operation, leaving the rest of stages for a later study. Design is optimized applying this methodology together with the use of virtual reality tools. It is also achieved a 15% reduction on time assembly and of 90% reduction in muscle—skeletal diseases at every assembly operation.