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This article reviews three recent books covering a broad spectrum of deterrence research and uses them to argue for a properly constituted field of Deterrence Studies. Having declined after the Cold War, research slowly revived after 9/11, and then picked up rapidly in the last decade with the rise of great power competition. Having been consigned to the academic margins for decades, such is the centrality of deterrence in international affairs, and the continued growth of multi- and interdisciplinary research on the topic, that it deserves its own field, rather than indefinitely remaining as a subset of other fields. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article examines the background to the provisions in the North Atlantic Treaty for the alliance's duration and member state withdrawal (Article 13). Studies of the Treaty have generally ignored Article 13 despite it being intensely debated during the treaty negotiations in 1948–1949. Addressing the views on duration and withdrawal that featured during these negotiations fills important gaps in the historical literature on the Alliance. In particular, understanding how consensus was reached on these clauses highlights the important role played by both strategic and domestic political considerations. In particular, the wording of the clause was directly linked with deterrence of military aggression and reassurance of Allies. It was also linked with the American preference for a treaty of relatively short duration, which was perceived to be a necessity in winning Senate ratification. In addition, this article traces a number of subsequent diplomatic controversies associated with Article 13, including the 1966 French withdrawal from the Alliance's integrated military structure and, more recently, President Donald Trump´s reported interest in a US withdrawal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars focused on NATO nuclear strategy during the Cold War have devoted little attention to the dynamics of how the Alliance would decide to use nuclear weapons. This article aims to fill this gap by examining the internal debates about how a nuclear use decision would be taken, particularly balancing the desire to ensure adequate consultation of the non-nuclear members without undermining the credibility of NATO's nuclear deterrent by giving them a veto. To avoid undermining Alliance cohesion, the nuclear use decision process was kept deliberately vague, despite the problems that would almost certainly have arisen in a war. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]