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Populist and authoritarian leaders are increasingly coming to power in large countries. They often have a climate sceptic approach and do away with mitigation policies when coming to power. Increasing impacts of extreme meteorological events linked to climate change could lead to a situation where the supporters of the populist leader or elites crucial for the survival of an authoritarian regime are pushing to do something to address climate change. In order not to lose power, the leader may look for quick and cheap solutions. In such a context, solar radiation modification (SRM), for example, by stratospheric aerosol injection (SAI), will become very attractive as it is likely to have low costs and rapid effects. Populist or authoritarian governments are unlikely to care for negative impacts of SRM abroad as they often act nationalistically with an explicit disdain for multilateral solutions. We discuss the incentive structure and political economy that populist and authoritarian leaders may face regarding unilateral use of SRM and elaborate how the international community could try to prevent or at least ‘contain’ such unilateral uses of SRM. Unfortunately, such ‘containment’ is contingent on the most powerful states not being populist or authoritarian regimes.

Over the past two decades, the emergence of multiple carbon market segments has led to fragmentation of governance of international carbon markets. International baseline-and-credit systems for greenhouse gas mitigation have been repeatedly expected to wither away, but show significant resilience. Still, Parties to the Paris Agreement have struggled to finalize rules for market-based cooperation under Article 6, which are still being negotiated. Generally, there is tension between international top-down and bottom-up governance. The former was pioneered through the Clean Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol and is likely to be utilized for the Article 6.4 mechanism, while the latter was used for the first track of Joint Implementation and will be applied for Article 6.2. Voluntary carbon markets governed bottom-up and outside the Kyoto Protocol by private institutions have recently gained importance by offering complementary project types and methodological approaches. The clear intention of some Parties to use market-based cooperation in order to reach their nationally determined contributions to the Paris Agreement have led to an ongoing process of navigating the alignment of these fragmented carbon market instruments with the implementation of nationally determined contributions and Paris Agreement’s governance architecture. We discuss emerging features of international carbon market governance in the public and private domain, including political and technical issues. Fragmented governance is characterized by different degrees of transparency, centralization, and scales. We assess the crunch issues in the Article 6 negotiations through the lens of these governance features and their effectiveness, focusing on governance principles and their operationalization to ensure environmental integrity and avoid double counting.

Carbon markets – both emission trading systems and baseline and credit systems – are an increasingly common policy instrument being introduced to address climate change mitigation. However, their design is crucial to ensure that they deliver cost-effective emission reductions while maintaining environmental integrity. This Element puts together a comprehensive, principle-based overview of the risks and abuses to environmental integrity and cost effectiveness that have emerged for carbon markets at all jurisdictional levels around the world, provides concrete examples, and offers effective policy and governance solutions to overcome such risks. This title is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.