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How and why is working memory (WM) capacity limited? Traditional cognitive accounts focus either on limitations on the number or items that can be stored (slots models), or loss of precision with increasing load (resource models). Here, we show that a neural network model of prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia can learn to reuse the same prefrontal populations to store multiple items, leading to resource-like constraints within a slot-like system, and inducing a trade-off between quantity and precision of information. Such ‘chunking’ strategies are adapted as a function of reinforcement learning and WM task demands, mimicking human performance and normative models. Moreover, adaptive performance requires a dynamic range of dopaminergic signals to adjust striatal gating policies, providing a new interpretation of WM difficulties in patient populations such as Parkinson’s disease, ADHD, and schizophrenia. These simulations also suggest a computational rather than anatomical limit to WM capacity.

The basal ganglia (BG) play a key role in decision-making, preventing impulsive actions in some contexts while facilitating fast adaptations in others. The specific contributions of different BG structures to this nuanced behavior remain unclear, particularly under varying situations of noisy and conflicting information that necessitate ongoing adjustments in the balance between speed and accuracy. Theoretical accounts suggest that dynamic regulation of the amount of evidence required to commit to a decision (a dynamic "decision boundary") may be necessary to meet these competing demands. Through the application of novel computational modeling tools in tandem with direct neural recordings from human BG areas, we find that neural dynamics in the theta band manifest as variations in a collapsing decision boundary as a function of conflict and uncertainty. We collected intracranial recordings from patients diagnosed with either Parkinson's disease (PD) (n = 14) or dystonia (n = 3) in the subthalamic nucleus (STN), globus pallidus internus (GPi), and globus pallidus externus (GPe) during their performance of a novel perceptual discrimination task in which we independently manipulated uncertainty and conflict. To formally characterize whether these task and neural components influenced decision dynamics, we leveraged modified diffusion decision models (DDMs). Behavioral choices and response time distributions were best characterized by a modified DDM in which the decision boundary collapsed over time, but where the onset and shape of this collapse varied with conflict. Moreover, theta dynamics in BG structures modulated the onset and shape of this collapse but differentially across task conditions. In STN, theta activity was related to a prolonged decision boundary (indexed by slower collapse and therefore more deliberate choices) during high conflict situations. Conversely, rapid declines in GPe theta during low conflict conditions were related to rapidly collapsing boundaries and expedited choices, with additional complementary decision bound adjustments during high uncertainty situations. Finally, GPi theta effects were uniform across conditions, with increases in theta associated with a prolongation of decision bound collapses. Together, these findings provide a nuanced understanding of how our brain thwarts impulsive actions while nonetheless enabling behavioral adaptation amidst noisy and conflicting information.

The basal ganglia (BG) contribute to reinforcement learning (RL) and decision-making, but unlike artificial RL agents, it relies on complex circuitry and dynamic dopamine modulation of opponent striatal pathways to do so. We develop the OpAL* model to assess the normative advantages of this circuitry. In OpAL*, learning induces opponent pathways to differentially emphasize the history of positive or negative outcomes for each action. Dynamic DA modulation then amplifies the pathway most tuned for the task environment. This efficient coding mechanism avoids a vexing explore–exploit tradeoff that plagues traditional RL models in sparse reward environments. OpAL* exhibits robust advantages over alternative models, particularly in environments with sparse reward and large action spaces. These advantages depend on opponent and nonlinear Hebbian plasticity mechanisms previously thought to be pathological. Finally, OpAL* captures risky choice patterns arising from DA and environmental manipulations across species, suggesting that they result from a normative biological mechanism.

Adaptive sequential behavior is a hallmark of human cognition. In particular, humans can learn to produce precise spatiotemporal sequences given a certain context. For instance, musicians can not only reproduce learned action sequences in a context-dependent manner, they can also quickly and flexibly reapply them in any desired tempo or rhythm without overwriting previous learning. Existing neural network models fail to account for these properties. We argue that this limitation emerges from the fact that sequence information (i.e., the position of the action) and timing (i.e., the moment of response execution) are typically stored in the same neural network weights. Here, we augment a biologically plausible recurrent neural network of cortical dynamics to include a basal ganglia-thalamic module which uses reinforcement learning to dynamically modulate action. This "associative cluster-dependent chain" (ACDC) model modularly stores sequence and timing information in distinct loci of the network. This feature increases computational power and allows ACDC to display a wide range of temporal properties (e.g., multiple sequences, temporal shifting, rescaling, and compositionality), while still accounting for several behavioral and neurophysiological empirical observations. Finally, we apply this ACDC network to show how it can learn the famous "Thunderstruck" song intro and then flexibly play it in a "bossa nova" rhythm without further training.

Adaptive cognitive-control involves a hierarchical cortico-striatal gating system that supports selective updating, maintenance, and retrieval of useful cognitive and motor information. Here, we developed a task that independently manipulates selective gating operations into working-memory (input gating), from working-memory (output gating), and of responses (motor gating) and tested the neural dynamics and computational principles that support them. Increases in gating demands, captured by gate switches, were expressed by distinct EEG correlates at each gating level that evolved dynamically in partially overlapping time windows. Further, categorical representations of specific maintained items and of motor responses could be decoded from EEG when the corresponding gate was switching, thereby linking gating operations to prioritization. Finally, gate switching at all levels was related to increases in the motor decision threshold as quantified by the drift diffusion model. Together these results support the notion that cognitive gating operations scaffold on top of mechanisms involved in motor gating.

Adaptive behavior requires balancing approach and avoidance based on the rewarding and aversive consequences of actions. Imbalances in this evaluation are thought to characterize mood disorders such as major depressive disorder (MDD). We present a novel application of the drift diffusion model (DDM) suited to quantify how offers of reward and aversiveness, and neural correlates thereof, are dynamically integrated to form decisions, and how such processes are altered in MDD. Hierarchical parameter estimation from the DDM demonstrated that the MDD group differed in three distinct reward-related parameters driving approach-based decision making. First, MDD was associated with reduced reward sensitivity, measured as the impact of offered reward on evidence accumulation. Notably, this effect was replicated in a follow-up study. Second, the MDD group showed lower starting point bias towards approaching offers. Third, this starting point was influenced in opposite directions by Pavlovian effects and by nucleus accumbens activity across the groups: greater accumbens activity was related to approach bias in controls but avoid bias in MDD. Cross-validation revealed that the combination of these computational biomarkers were diagnostic of patient status, with accumbens influences being particularly diagnostic. Finally, within the MDD group, reward sensitivity and nucleus accumbens parameters were differentially related to symptoms of perceived stress and depression. Collectively, these findings establish the promise of computational psychiatry approaches to dissecting approach-avoidance decision dynamics relevant for affective disorders.

In cognitive neuroscience, computational modeling can formally adjudicate between theories and affords quantitative fits to behavioral/brain data. Pragmatically, however, the space of plausible generative models considered is dramatically limited by the set of models with known likelihood functions. For many models, the lack of a closed-form likelihood typically impedes Bayesian inference methods. As a result, standard models are evaluated for convenience, even when other models might be superior. Likelihood-free methods exist but are limited by their computational cost or their restriction to particular inference scenarios. Here, we propose neural networks that learn approximate likelihoods for arbitrary generative models, allowing fast posterior sampling with only a one-off cost for model simulations that is amortized for future inference. We show that these methods can accurately recover posterior parameter distributions for a variety of neurocognitive process models. We provide code allowing users to deploy these methods for arbitrary hierarchical model instantiations without further training.

In computer science, reinforcement learning is a powerful framework with which artificial agents can learn to maximize their performance for any given Markov decision process (MDP). Advances over the last decade, in combination with deep neural networks, have enjoyed performance advantages over humans in many difficult task settings. However, such frameworks perform far less favorably when evaluated in their ability to generalize or transfer representations across different tasks. Existing algorithms that facilitate transfer typically are limited to cases in which the transition function or the optimal policy is portable to new contexts, but achieving "deep transfer" characteristic of human behavior has been elusive. Such transfer typically requires discovery of abstractions that permit analogical reuse of previously learned representations to superficially distinct tasks. Here, we demonstrate that abstractions that minimize error in predictions of reward outcomes generalize across tasks with different transition and reward functions. Such reward-predictive representations compress the state space of a task into a lower dimensional representation by combining states that are equivalent in terms of both the transition and reward functions. Because only state equivalences are considered, the resulting state representation is not tied to the transition and reward functions themselves and thus generalizes across tasks with different reward and transition functions. These results contrast with those using abstractions that myopically maximize reward in any given MDP and motivate further experiments in humans and animals to investigate if neural and cognitive systems involved in state representation perform abstractions that facilitate such equivalence relations.

Humans routinely face novel environments in which they have to generalize in order to act adaptively. However, doing so involves the non-trivial challenge of deciding which aspects of a task domain to generalize. While it is sometimes appropriate to simply re-use a learned behavior, often adaptive generalization entails recombining distinct components of knowledge acquired across multiple contexts. Theoretical work has suggested a computational trade-off in which it can be more or less useful to learn and generalize aspects of task structure jointly or compositionally, depending on previous task statistics, but it is unknown whether humans modulate their generalization strategy accordingly. Here we develop a series of navigation tasks that separately manipulate the statistics of goal values ("what to do") and state transitions ("how to do it") across contexts and assess whether human subjects generalize these task components separately or conjunctively. We find that human generalization is sensitive to the statistics of the previously experienced task domain, favoring compositional or conjunctive generalization when the task statistics are indicative of such structures, and a mixture of the two when they are more ambiguous. These results support a normative "meta-generalization" account and suggests that people not only generalize previous task components but also generalize the statistical structure most likely to support generalization.

Learning should be adjusted according to the surprise associated with observed outcomes but calibrated according to statistical context. For example, when occasional changepoints are expected, surprising outcomes should be weighted heavily to speed learning. In contrast, when uninformative outliers are expected to occur occasionally, surprising outcomes should be less influential. Here we dissociate surprising outcomes from the degree to which they demand learning using a predictive inference task and computational modeling. We show that the P300, a stimulus-locked electrophysiological response previously associated with adjustments in learning behavior, does so conditionally on the source of surprise. Larger P300 signals predicted greater learning in a changing context, but less learning in a context where surprise was indicative of a one-off outlier (oddball). Our results suggest that the P300 provides a surprise signal that is interpreted by downstream learning processes differentially according to statistical context in order to appropriately calibrate learning across complex environments.

Computational modeling plays an important role in modern neuroscience research. Much previous research has relied on statistical methods, separately, to address two problems that are actually interdependent. First, given a particular computational model, Bayesian hierarchical techniques have been used to estimate individual variation in parameters over a population of subjects, leveraging their population-level distributions. Second, candidate models are themselves compared, and individual variation in the expressed model estimated, according to the fits of the models to each subject. The interdependence between these two problems arises because the relevant population for estimating parameters of a model depends on which other subjects express the model. Here, we propose a hierarchical Bayesian inference (HBI) framework for concurrent model comparison, parameter estimation and inference at the population level, combining previous approaches. We show that this framework has important advantages for both parameter estimation and model comparison theoretically and experimentally. The parameters estimated by the HBI show smaller errors compared to other methods. Model comparison by HBI is robust against outliers and is not biased towards overly simplistic models. Furthermore, the fully Bayesian approach of our theory enables researchers to make inference on group-level parameters by performing HBI t-test.

Motivation exerts control over behavior by eliciting Pavlovian responses, which can either match or conflict with instrumental action. We can overcome maladaptive motivational influences putatively through frontal cognitive control. However, the neurocomputational mechanisms subserving this control are unclear; does control entail up-regulating instrumental systems, down-regulating Pavlovian systems, or both? We combined electroencephalography (EEG) recordings with a motivational Go/NoGo learning task (N = 34), in which multiple Go options enabled us to disentangle selective action learning from nonselective Pavlovian responses. Midfrontal theta-band (4 Hz-8 Hz) activity covaried with the level of Pavlovian conflict and was associated with reduced Pavlovian biases rather than reduced instrumental learning biases. Motor and lateral prefrontal regions synchronized to the midfrontal cortex, and these network dynamics predicted the reduction of Pavlovian biases over and above local, midfrontal theta activity. This work links midfrontal processing to detecting Pavlovian conflict and highlights the importance of network processing in reducing the impact of maladaptive, Pavlovian biases.

The subthalamic nucleus (STN) is a small almond-shaped subcortical structure classically known for its role in motor inhibition through the indirect pathway within the basal ganglia. Little is known about the role of the STN in mediating cognitive functions in humans. Here, we explore the role of the STN in human subjects making decisions under conditions of uncertainty using single-neuron recordings and intermittent deep brain stimulation (DBS) during a financial decision-making task. Intraoperative single-neuronal data from the STN reveals that on high-uncertainty trials, spiking activity encodes the upcoming decision within a brief (500 ms) temporal window during the choice period, prior to the manifestation of the choice. Application of intermittent DBS selectively prior to the choice period alters decisions and biases subject behavior towards conservative wagers.

Humans are remarkably adept at generalizing knowledge between experiences in a way that can be difficult for computers. Often, this entails generalizing constituent pieces of experiences that do not fully overlap, but nonetheless share useful similarities with, previously acquired knowledge. However, it is often unclear how knowledge gained in one context should generalize to another. Previous computational models and data suggest that rather than learning about each individual context, humans build latent abstract structures and learn to link these structures to arbitrary contexts, facilitating generalization. In these models, task structures that are more popular across contexts are more likely to be revisited in new contexts. However, these models can only re-use policies as a whole and are unable to transfer knowledge about the transition structure of the environment even if only the goal has changed (or vice-versa). This contrasts with ecological settings, where some aspects of task structure, such as the transition function, will be shared between context separately from other aspects, such as the reward function. Here, we develop a novel non-parametric Bayesian agent that forms independent latent clusters for transition and reward functions, affording separable transfer of their constituent parts across contexts. We show that the relative performance of this agent compared to an agent that jointly clusters reward and transition functions depends environmental task statistics: the mutual information between transition and reward functions and the stochasticity of the observations. We formalize our analysis through an information theoretic account of the priors, and propose a meta learning agent that dynamically arbitrates between strategies across task domains to optimize a statistical tradeoff.

Catecholamines modulate the impact of motivational cues on action. Such motivational biases have been proposed to reflect cue-based, ‘Pavlovian’ effects. Here, we assess whether motivational biases may also arise from asymmetrical instrumental learning of active and passive responses following reward and punishment outcomes. We present a novel paradigm, allowing us to disentangle the impact of reward and punishment on instrumental learning from Pavlovian response biasing. Computational analyses showed that motivational biases reflect both Pavlovian and instrumental effects: reward and punishment cues promoted generalized (in)action in a Pavlovian manner, whereas outcomes enhanced instrumental (un)learning of chosen actions. These cue- and outcome-based biases were altered independently by the catecholamine enhancer melthylphenidate. Methylphenidate’s effect varied across individuals with a putative proxy of baseline dopamine synthesis capacity, working memory span. Our study uncovers two distinct mechanisms by which motivation impacts behaviour, and helps refine current models of catecholaminergic modulation of motivated action.

Reinforcement learning tasks are often used to assess participants' tendency to learn more from the positive or more from the negative consequences of one's action. However, this assessment often requires comparison in learning performance across different task conditions, which may differ in the relative salience or discriminability of the stimuli associated with more and less rewarding outcomes, respectively. To address this issue, in a first set of studies, participants were subjected to two versions of a common probabilistic learning task. The two versions differed with respect to the stimulus (Hiragana) characters associated with reward probability. The assignment of character to reward probability was fixed within version but reversed between versions. We found that performance was highly influenced by task version, which could be explained by the relative perceptual discriminability of characters assigned to high or low reward probabilities, as assessed by a separate discrimination experiment. Participants were more reliable in selecting rewarding characters that were more discriminable, leading to differences in learning curves and their sensitivity to reward probability. This difference in experienced reinforcement history was accompanied by performance biases in a test phase assessing ability to learn from positive vs. negative outcomes. In a subsequent large-scale web-based experiment, this impact of task version on learning and test measures was replicated and extended. Collectively, these findings imply a key role for perceptual factors in guiding reward learning and underscore the need to control stimulus discriminability when making inferences about individual differences in reinforcement learning.

The negative symptoms of schizophrenia (SZ) are associated with a pattern of reinforcement learning (RL) deficits likely related to degraded representations of reward values. However, the RL tasks used to date have required active responses to both reward and punishing stimuli. Pavlovian biases have been shown to affect performance on these tasks through invigoration of action to reward and inhibition of action to punishment, and may be partially responsible for the effects found in patients. Forty-five patients with schizophrenia and 30 demographically-matched controls completed a four-stimulus reinforcement learning task that crossed action ("Go" or "NoGo") and the valence of the optimal outcome (reward or punishment-avoidance), such that all combinations of action and outcome valence were tested. Behaviour was modelled using a six-parameter RL model and EEG was simultaneously recorded. Patients demonstrated a reduction in Pavlovian performance bias that was evident in a reduced Go bias across the full group. In a subset of patients administered clozapine, the reduction in Pavlovian bias was enhanced. The reduction in Pavlovian bias in SZ patients was accompanied by feedback processing differences at the time of the P3a component. The reduced Pavlovian bias in patients is suggested to be due to reduced fidelity in the communication between striatal regions and frontal cortex. It may also partially account for previous findings of poorer "Go-learning" in schizophrenia where "Go" responses or Pavlovian consistent responses are required for optimal performance. An attenuated P3a component dynamic in patients is consistent with a view that deficits in operant learning are due to impairments in adaptively using feedback to update representations of stimulus value.

Huntington's disease (HD) is genetically determined but with variability in symptom onset, leading to uncertainty as to when pharmacological intervention should be initiated. Here we take a computational approach based on neurocognitive phenotyping, computational modeling, and classification, in an effort to provide quantitative predictors of HD before symptom onset. A large sample of subjects-consisting of both pre-manifest individuals carrying the HD mutation (pre-HD), and early symptomatic-as well as healthy controls performed the antisaccade conflict task, which requires executive control and response inhibition. While symptomatic HD subjects differed substantially from controls in behavioral measures [reaction time (RT) and error rates], there was no such clear behavioral differences in pre-HD. RT distributions and error rates were fit with an accumulator-based model which summarizes the computational processes involved and which are related to identified mechanisms in more detailed neural models of prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia. Classification based on fitted model parameters revealed a key parameter related to executive control differentiated pre-HD from controls, whereas the response inhibition parameter declined only after symptom onset. These findings demonstrate the utility of computational approaches for classification and prediction of brain disorders, and provide clues as to the underlying neural mechanisms.

Convergent evidence suggests that the basal ganglia support reinforcement learning by adjusting action values according to reward prediction errors. However, adaptive behavior in stochastic environments requires the consideration of uncertainty to dynamically adjust the learning rate. We consider how cholinergic tonically active interneurons (TANs) may endow the striatum with such a mechanism in computational models spanning three Marr's levels of analysis. In the neural model, TANs modulate the excitability of spiny neurons, their population response to reinforcement, and hence the effective learning rate. Long TAN pauses facilitated robustness to spurious outcomes by increasing divergence in synaptic weights between neurons coding for alternative action values, whereas short TAN pauses facilitated stochastic behavior but increased responsiveness to change-points in outcome contingencies. A feedback control system allowed TAN pauses to be dynamically modulated by uncertainty across the spiny neuron population, allowing the system to self-tune and optimize performance across stochastic environments.

Freezing of gait (FOG) is a disabling symptom of advanced Parkinson’s disease (PD) that leads to an increased risk of falls and nursing home placement. Interestingly, multiple lines of evidence suggest that the manifestation of FOG is related to specific deficits in cognition, such as set shifting and the ability to process conflict-related signals. These findings are consistent with the specific patterns of abnormal cortical processing seen during functional neuroimaging experiments of FOG, implicating increased neural activation within cortical structures underlying cognition, such as the Cognitive Control Network. In addition, these studies show that freezing episodes are associated with abnormalities in the BOLD response within key structures of the basal ganglia, such as the striatum and the subthalamic nucleus. In this article, we discuss the implications of these findings on current models of freezing behaviour and propose an updated model of basal ganglia impairment during FOG episodes that integrates the neural substrates of freezing from the cortex and the basal ganglia to the cognitive dysfunctions inherent in the condition.

The diffusion model is a commonly used tool to infer latent psychological processes underlying decision making, and to link them to neural mechanisms based on reaction times. Although efficient open source software has been made available to quantitatively fit the model to data, current estimation methods require an abundance of reaction time measurements to recover meaningful parameters, and only provide point estimates of each parameter. In contrast, hierarchical Bayesian parameter estimation methods are useful for enhancing statistical power, allowing for simultaneous estimation of individual subject parameters and the group distribution that they are drawn from, while also providing measures of uncertainty in these parameters in the posterior distribution. Here, we present a novel Python-based toolbox called HDDM (hierarchical drift diffusion model), which allows fast and flexible estimation of the the drift-diffusion model and the related linear ballistic accumulator model. HDDM requires fewer data per subject / condition than non-hierarchical method, allows for full Bayesian data analysis, and can handle outliers in the data. Finally, HDDM supports the estimation of how trial-by-trial measurements (e.g. fMRI) influence decision making parameters. This paper will first describe the theoretical background of drift-diffusion model and Bayesian inference. We then illustrate usage of the toolbox on a real-world data set from our lab. Finally, parameter recovery studies show that HDDM beats alternative fitting methods like the chi-quantile method as well as maximum likelihood estimation. The software and documentation can be downloaded at: http://ski.clps.brown.edu/hddm_docs

Mounting evidence links the enjoyment of music to brain areas implicated in emotion and the dopaminergic reward system. In particular, dopamine release in the ventral striatum seems to play a major role in the rewarding aspect of music listening. Striatal dopamine also influences reinforcement learning, such that subjects with greater dopamine efficacy learn better to approach rewards while those with lesser dopamine efficacy learn better to avoid punishments. In this study, we explored the practical implications of musical pleasure through its ability to facilitate reinforcement learning via non-pharmacological dopamine elicitation. Subjects from a wide variety of musical backgrounds chose a pleasurable and a neutral piece of music from an experimenter-compiled database, and then listened to one or both of these pieces (according to pseudo-random group assignment) as they performed a reinforcement learning task dependent on dopamine transmission. We assessed musical backgrounds as well as typical listening patterns with the new Helsinki Inventory of Music and Affective Behaviors (HIMAB), and separately investigated behavior for the training and test phases of the learning task. Subjects with more musical experience trained better with neutral music and tested better with pleasurable music, while those with less musical experience exhibited the opposite effect. HIMAB results regarding listening behaviors and subjective music ratings indicate that these effects arose from different listening styles: namely, more affective listening in non-musicians and more analytical listening in musicians. In conclusion, musical pleasure was able to influence task performance, and the shape of this effect depended on group and individual factors. These findings have implications in affective neuroscience, neuroaesthetics, learning, and music therapy.

Stress may promote the onset of psychopathology by disrupting reward processing. However, the extent to which stress impairs reward processing, rather than incentive processing more generally, is unclear. To evaluate the specificity of stress-induced reward processing disruption, 100 psychiatrically healthy females were administered a probabilistic stimulus selection task enabling comparison of sensitivity to reward-driven (Go) and punishment-driven (NoGo) learning under either ‘no stress’ or ‘stress’ (threat-of-shock) conditions. Cortisol samples and self-report measures were collected. Contrary to hypotheses, the groups did not differ significantly in task performance or cortisol reactivity. However, further analyses focusing only on individuals under ‘stress’ who were high responders with regard to both cortisol reactivity and self-reported negative affect revealed reduced reward sensitivity relative to individuals tested in the ‘no stress’ condition; importantly, these deficits were reward-specific. Overall, findings provide preliminary evidence that stress-reactive individuals show diminished sensitivity to reward but not punishment under stress. While such results highlight the possibility that stress-induced anhedonia might be an important mechanism linking stress to affective disorders, future studies are necessary to confirm this conjecture.

The medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) is particularly reactive to signals of error, punishment, and conflict in the service of behavioral adaptation and it is consistently implicated in the etiology of Major Depressive Disorder (MDD). This association makes conceptual sense, given that MDD has been associated with hyper-reactivity in neural systems associated with punishment processing. Yet in practice, depression-related variance in measures of mPFC functioning often fails to relate to performance. For example, neuroelectric reflections of mediofrontal error signals are often found to be larger in MDD, but a deficit in post-error performance suggests that these error signals are not being used to rapidly adapt behavior. Thus, it remains unknown if depression-related variance in error signals reflects a meaningful alteration in the use of error or punishment information. However, larger mediofrontal error signals have also been related to another behavioral tendency: increased accuracy in avoidance learning. The integrity of this error-avoidance system remains untested in MDD. In this study, EEG was recorded as 21 symptomatic, drug-free participants with current or past MDD and 24 control participants performed a probabilistic reinforcement learning task. Depressed participants had larger mPFC EEG responses to error feedback than controls. The direct relationship between error signal amplitudes and avoidance learning accuracy was replicated. Crucially, this relationship was stronger in depressed participants for high conflict lose-lose situations, demonstrating a selective alteration of avoidance learning. This investigation provided evidence that larger error signal amplitudes in depression are associated with increased avoidance learning, identifying a candidate mechanistic model for hypersensitivity to negative outcomes in depression.