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Models of statistical discrimination typically assume that employers make rational inference from (education) signals. However, there is a large amount of evidence showing that most people do not update their beliefs rationally. We use a model and two experiments to show that employers who are conservative, in the sense of signal neglect, discriminate more against disadvantaged groups than Bayesian employers. We find that such non-Bayesian statistical discrimination deters high-ability workers from disadvantaged groups from pursuing education, further exacerbating initial group inequalities. Excess discrimination caused by employer conservatism is especially important when signals are very informative. Out of the overall hiring gap in our data, around 40% can be attributed to Bayesian statistical discrimination, a further 40% is due to non-Bayesian statistical discrimination, and the remaining 20% is unexplained or potentially taste-based. This paper was accepted by Marie Claire Villeval, behavioral economics and decision analysis. Funding: F. Mengel thanks the European Research Council for financial support [Starting Grant 805017]. P. Campos-Mercade acknowledges funding from the Danish National Research Foundation [Grant DNRF134 (CEBI)]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2023.4824. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We survey the literature on preferences for redistribution. We discuss different ways the literature has measured these preferences and review literature on the different determinants of preferences for redistribution. These range from institutions and demographic factors to fairness views and social preferences. Income inequality is, perhaps unsurprisingly, one of the most important determinants of preferences for redistribution. While our survey is largely focused on the economics literature, we also review some work from political science, sociology, and psychology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Excessive risk-taking in markets can have devastating consequences as the latest financial crises have highlighted. In this paper, we ask whether markets as an institution encourages such excessive risk-taking. To establish causality, we isolate the effects of market interaction in a laboratory experiment keeping other possibly confounding factors constant. We find that the opposite is true. Markets decrease participants' willingness to take risks. This finding can be explained by social comparison utility in the presence of negatively correlated risks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]