Search

Supply chain operations traditionally involve a variety of complex decision making problems. Over the last few decades, supply chains greatly benefited from advances in computation, which allowed the transition from manual processing to automation and cost-effective optimization. Nonetheless, business operators still need to spend substantial efforts in explaining and interpreting the optimization outcomes to stakeholders. Motivated by the recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs), we study how this disruptive technology can help bridge the gap between supply chain automation and human comprehension and trust thereof. We design OptiGuide -- a framework that accepts as input queries in plain text, and outputs insights about the underlying optimization outcomes. Our framework does not forgo the state-of-the-art combinatorial optimization technology, but rather leverages it to quantitatively answer what-if scenarios (e.g., how would the cost change if we used supplier B instead of supplier A for a given demand?). Importantly, our design does not require sending proprietary data over to LLMs, which can be a privacy concern in some circumstances. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework on a real server placement scenario within Microsoft's cloud supply chain. Along the way, we develop a general evaluation benchmark, which can be used to evaluate the accuracy of the LLM output in other scenarios.

Routing is, arguably, the most fundamental task in computer networking, and the most extensively studied one. A key challenge for routing in real-world environments is the need to contend with uncertainty about future traffic demands. We present a new approach to routing under demand uncertainty: tackling this challenge as stochastic optimization, and employing deep learning to learn complex patterns in traffic demands. We show that our method provably converges to the global optimum in well-studied theoretical models of multicommodity flow. We exemplify the practical usefulness of our approach by zooming in on the real-world challenge of traffic engineering (TE) on wide-area networks (WANs). Our extensive empirical evaluation on real-world traffic and network topologies establishes that our approach's TE quality almost matches that of an (infeasible) omniscient oracle, outperforming previously proposed approaches, and also substantially lowers runtimes., Comment: To appear at NSDI 2023

Many resource management problems require sequential decision-making under uncertainty, where the only uncertainty affecting the decision outcomes are exogenous variables outside the control of the decision-maker. We model these problems as Exo-MDPs (Markov Decision Processes with Exogenous Inputs) and design a class of data-efficient algorithms for them termed Hindsight Learning (HL). Our HL algorithms achieve data efficiency by leveraging a key insight: having samples of the exogenous variables, past decisions can be revisited in hindsight to infer counterfactual consequences that can accelerate policy improvements. We compare HL against classic baselines in the multi-secretary and airline revenue management problems. We also scale our algorithms to a business-critical cloud resource management problem -- allocating Virtual Machines (VMs) to physical machines, and simulate their performance with real datasets from a large public cloud provider. We find that HL algorithms outperform domain-specific heuristics, as well as state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods., Comment: 52 pages, 6 figures

Cloud computing customers often submit repeating jobs and computation pipelines on \emph{approximately} regular schedules, with arrival and running times that exhibit variance. This pattern, typical of training tasks in machine learning, allows customers to partially predict future job requirements. We develop a model of cloud computing platforms that receive statements of work (SoWs) in an online fashion. The SoWs describe future jobs whose arrival times and durations are probabilistic, and whose utility to the submitting agents declines with completion time. The arrival and duration distributions, as well as the utility functions, are considered private customer information and are reported by strategic agents to a scheduler that is optimizing for social welfare. We design pricing, scheduling, and eviction mechanisms that incentivize truthful reporting of SoWs. An important challenge is maintaining incentives despite the possibility of the platform becoming saturated. We introduce a framework to reduce scheduling under uncertainty to a relaxed scheduling problem without uncertainty. Using this framework, we tackle both adversarial and stochastic submissions of statements of work, and obtain logarithmic and constant competitive mechanisms, respectively., Comment: To appear in TheWebConf 2022

The cloud computing industry has grown rapidly over the last decade, and with this growth there is a significant increase in demand for compute resources. Demand is manifested in the form of Virtual Machine (VM) requests, which need to be assigned to physical machines in a way that minimizes resource fragmentation and efficiently utilizes the available machines. This problem can be modeled as a dynamic version of the bin packing problem with the objective of minimizing the total usage time of the bins (physical machines). Earlier works on dynamic bin packing assumed that no knowledge is available to the scheduler and later works studied models in which lifetime/duration of each "item" (VM in our context) is available to the scheduler. This extra information was shown to improve exponentially the achievable competitive ratio. Motivated by advances in Machine Learning that provide good estimates of workload characteristics, this paper studies the effect of having extra information regarding future (total) demand. In the cloud context, since demand is an aggregate over many VM requests, it can be predicted with high accuracy (e.g., using historical data). We show that the competitive factor can be dramatically improved by using this additional information; in some cases, we achieve constant competitiveness, or even a competitive factor that approaches 1. Along the way, we design new offline algorithms with improved approximation ratios for the dynamic bin-packing problem., Comment: 30 pages

Cloud computing has motivated renewed interest in resource allocation problems with new consumption models. A common goal is to share a resource, such as CPU or I/O bandwidth, among distinct users with different demand patterns as well as different quality of service requirements. To ensure these service requirements, cloud offerings often come with a service level agreement (SLA) between the provider and the users. An SLA specifies the amount of a resource a user is entitled to utilize. In many cloud settings, providers would like to operate resources at high utilization while simultaneously respecting individual SLAs. There is typically a tradeoff between these two objectives; for example, utilization can be increased by shifting away resources from idle users to "scavenger" workload, but with the risk of the former then becoming active again. We study this fundamental tradeoff by formulating a resource allocation model that captures basic properties of cloud computing systems, including SLAs, highly limited feedback about the state of the system, and variable and unpredictable input sequences. Our main result is a simple and practical algorithm that achieves near-optimal performance on the above two objectives. First, we guarantee nearly optimal utilization of the resource even if compared to the omniscient offline dynamic optimum. Second, we simultaneously satisfy all individual SLAs up to a small error. The main algorithmic tool is a multiplicative weight update algorithm, and a primal-dual argument to obtain its guarantees. We also provide numerical validation on real data to demonstrate the performance of our algorithm in practical applications.

Cloud computing has reached significant maturity from a systems perspective, but currently deployed solutions rely on rather basic economics mechanisms that yield suboptimal allocation of the costly hardware resources. In this paper we present Economic Resource Allocation (ERA), a complete framework for scheduling and pricing cloud resources, aimed at increasing the efficiency of cloud resources usage by allocating resources according to economic principles. The ERA architecture carefully abstracts the underlying cloud infrastructure, enabling the development of scheduling and pricing algorithms independently of the concrete lower-level cloud infrastructure and independently of its concerns. Specifically, ERA is designed as a flexible layer that can sit on top of any cloud system and interfaces with both the cloud resource manager and with the users who reserve resources to run their jobs. The jobs are scheduled based on prices that are dynamically calculated according to the predicted demand. Additionally, ERA provides a key internal API to pluggable algorithmic modules that include scheduling, pricing and demand prediction. We provide a proof-of-concept software and demonstrate the effectiveness of the architecture by testing ERA over both public and private cloud systems -- Azure Batch of Microsoft and Hadoop/YARN. A broader intent of our work is to foster collaborations between economics and system communities. To that end, we have developed a simulation platform via which economics and system experts can test their algorithmic implementations.

We study online mechanisms for preemptive scheduling with deadlines, with the goal of maximizing the total value of completed jobs. This problem is fundamental to deadline-aware cloud scheduling, but there are strong lower bounds even for the algorithmic problem without incentive constraints. However, these lower bounds can be circumvented under the natural assumption of deadline slackness, i.e., that there is a guaranteed lower bound $s > 1$ on the ratio between a job's size and the time window in which it can be executed. In this paper, we construct a truthful scheduling mechanism with a constant competitive ratio, given slackness $s > 1$. Furthermore, we show that if $s$ is large enough then we can construct a mechanism that also satisfies a commitment property: it can be determined whether or not a job will finish, and the requisite payment if so, well in advance of each job's deadline. This is notable because, in practice, users with strict deadlines may find it unacceptable to discover only very close to their deadline that their job has been rejected.

In this paper we introduce a novel flow representation for finite games in strategic form. This representation allows us to develop a canonical direct sum decomposition of an arbitrary game into three components, which we refer to as the potential, harmonic and nonstrategic components. We analyze natural classes of games that are induced by this decomposition, and in particular, focus on games with no harmonic component and games with no potential component. We show that the first class corresponds to the well-known potential games. We refer to the second class of games as harmonic games, and study the structural and equilibrium properties of this new class of games. Intuitively, the potential component of a game captures interactions that can equivalently be represented as a common interest game, while the harmonic part represents the conflicts between the interests of the players. We make this intuition precise, by studying the properties of these two classes, and show that indeed they have quite distinct and remarkable characteristics. For instance, while finite potential games always have pure Nash equilibria, harmonic games generically never do. Moreover, we show that the nonstrategic component does not affect the equilibria of a game, but plays a fundamental role in their efficiency properties, thus decoupling the location of equilibria and their payoff-related properties. Exploiting the properties of the decomposition framework, we obtain explicit expressions for the projections of games onto the subspaces of potential and harmonic games. This enables an extension of the properties of potential and harmonic games to "nearby" games. We exemplify this point by showing that the set of approximate equilibria of an arbitrary game can be characterized through the equilibria of its projection onto the set of potential games.