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The Workshop on China-Japan Reconciliation at the Australian National University in August 2006 concluded that to prevent a dangerous drift in Japan-China relations, it was crucial to identify policies and programs that would move their relations in a positive direction. The conferees worked in three groups, each exploring possible actions that might be undertaken at Track I (official), II (semi-official and nongovernmental), or III (public) levels. What follows in this report are my own views of the alternatives, though they owe much to the discussions that took place in Australia.1 Multilevel Activity An essential element of conflict resolution in a case as difficult as the China-Japan rivalry is that action needs to take place at multiple levels. Ultimately, of course, the two governments must make agreements and otherwise accept new courses of action. But at a time of competitive nationalisms and mutual dislike in public opinion, Chinese and Japanese leaders may be severely constrained in what they can do. Nongovernmental organizations-peace groups, business associations, newspapers, labor unions, environmental organizations-and prominent individuals, as well as government officials acting in their private capacities, may be in a better position than state leaders to launch initiatives. That is why Tracks II and III warrant attention. Moreover, we must also consider, within Track I, the positive role that multilateral groups can play, as well as third parties (especially the United States) that have a large stake in and influence over China-Japan relations. Hence, the action chart below encompasses unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral levels of action under Track I-steps that China or Japan could take on its own, steps that both might take simultaneously or reciprocally, and steps that the two countries might take within the context of new or existing groups. The chart, to be clear, is merely suggestive; its essential purpose is to move our thinking to tension reduction and conflict management, and away from worstcase hypothesizing. An Action Menu Following is an elaboration of some of the proposals that are in the chart. I have selected those that strike me as being particularly important, not because their chances of being implemented any time soon are high, but because each step may generate the kind of goodwill and trust that will lead to other positive steps- such as those that address the most difficult issues of all, historical grievances. * Regularization of High-Level Diplomacy (Track I, Bilateral) Now that direct dialogue has resumed, Chinese and Japanese leaders should pledge to make it a regular occurrence, not just for the top leaders but also for cabinet officials and parliamentarians. A counterpart of such diplomacy might be the creation of a prevention- focused bilateral group to provide advance notification (for instance) of troop or ship movements. * Mutual Appreciation (Track I/Unilateral and Track II) Chinese government, media, and other institutions (including schools) can contribute to a positive atmosphere by expressing appreciation for Japan's generous contributions to China's economic rise. Although expressions of appreciation have been made from time to time, they are often diluted by bitter reminders of the past and suggestions that Japanese business has also benefited from the aid. The Japanese side therefore has an obligation too: to acknowledge the benefits it has received, and to consider new ways to contribute to China's development that also benefit Japan, such as an extension of environmental protection programs when official development assistance (ODA) ends in 2008. * Affirmations of Good Intentions (Track I, Bilateral) Although words can never replace deeds, professions of friendly intentions and mutual respect, apologies for past conduct, and a positive common vision of future relations do serve good purposes. …

The election campaign produced nary a word about China. Rest assured, once the new administration is in place, we will be hearing a great deal about the "China challenge." The central question has not changed: whether to engage China on equal terms, or treat it as a potentially hostile competitor. Judging from the substantial number of Clinton-era appointees on Presidentelect Barack Obama's foreign-policy team, the answer will be engagement. Nevertheless, how engagement is practiced- whether it is a philosophical commitment or simply a reversible tactic, for instance-compels attention to the fundamental guidelines of China policy. Here, then, are thoughts about the guidelines: * The People's Republic of China and the U.S. have fundamentally different approaches to international affairs. As a PRC official once told visiting Americans, "China is more concerned with its own internal development and the U.S. is most concerned with trying to maintain international order." In a word, China is rising, but the United States has risen; and for China, the overwhelming priority is to continue promoting rapid economic development, not challenge the United States for Asian or global leadership. * Despite the two countries' numerous intersecting interests, starting with a high degree of economic interdependence, mutual concerns about global warming, and restraining North Korea's nuclear-weapons development, many senior Chinese leaders and analysts view the United States with suspicion. As Wang Jisi, a top PRC America watcher, has written: "The Chinese-U.S. relationship remains beset by more profound differences than any other bilateral relationship between major powers in the world today." That view is shared by both China's so-called fourth and fifth generation of leaders. * Thus, while appeals from American officials to China to join the United States as a "responsible stakeholder" in world affairs are a positive development, they have not been backed by consistent action. Each country has its own view of what global responsibility means. And each has taken steps-e.g., China with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, arms deals with Russia, and a missile buildup opposite Taiwan; the United States with two wars in the Middle East, Central Asian basing, security ties with Japan, and continued arms sales to Taiwan-that are regarded by the other as irresponsible. * Marring the opportunity to really engage China is a view, which runs especially deep in the Pentagon, that China represents a threat to the United States-because of its economic power, its energy needs, and its increasing military spending. …

Introduction 1. The Bush Doctrine and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis 2. The Bush Nuclear Doctrine in Asia 3. Talking American, Acting Taiwanese 4. The Bush Doctrine: Chinese Perspectives and Responses 5. The Bush Doctrine, Russia and Korea 6. The Bush Doctrine: Japan 7. The Bush Doctrine: Australia 8. The Bush Doctrine: The Dangers of American Exceptionalism in a Revolutionary Age 9. The Bush Doctrine and Asian Regional Order 10. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis Conclusion

ship to Taiwan's development into a modern, progressive state. Politically, Taiwan remained a tight little island as it went through a fourth general election. The special "Temporary Provisions" of the constitution enabled President Chiang to gain pro forma approval from the National Assembly for a fourth six-year term (March 21). To the surprise of many observers, Chiang chose as his running mate the comparatively young (62) Yen Chia-kan, the premier (as president of the Executive Yuan) and former minister for economic affairs and finance. Although a good choice from the standpoints of age and ability, Yen lacks an independent power base, thus making Defense Minister Chiang Ching-kuo still the logical heir to his father's power. Moreover, Yen's continuation as premier was a blow to those reform-minded individuals who had hoped to see a reduction of presidential control over the Executive Yuan through the selection of a new man to the premiership. The impact of Yen's election was further offset by the selection of a cabinet little different in freshness or quality from previous ones. Chiang's post-election call for new talent in the Party seems, in retrospect, to have been intended more for domestic consumption than for actual implementation. Taiwan is guided in its international relations by the overpowering goal of reconquering the mainland. In 1966 that goal was no closer to achievement, and Chiang was moved to remark that unless the Communists were unseated by 1968, only the U.S. would be in a position to effect the recovery because of Peking's anticipated nuclear delivery capability. This admission of the KMT's growing inability to achieve its paramount national goal is founded also upon the knowledge that the U.S. will not assist

As President Chiang Kai-shek celebrates his eightieth birthday (by the Western calendar), the Republic of China (ROC) has considerable cause for optimism. Official Taipei, viewing the mainland's "great cultural revolution" with remarkable restraint, apparently sees the possibility of a dramatic change in leadership in Peking that could evolve into a breakup of centralized power and provide appropriate conditions for the long-awaited return of the Nationalists. New government structures have been set up to deal with that potentiality. At the same time, Taiwan, as the "base" for any recovery operation, continues its forward economic thrust characterized by impressive achievements in national growth, external trade and other areas. President Chiang set the tone of caution in a 1967 New Year's message in which he placed an armed counterattack second to political measures evidently intended to smooth the transition from Communist to Nationalist rule. "The question of the recovery of the mainland today is how to tidy up the calamitous situation which Mao has left behind; when to counterattack the mainland and how to bury Mao have become secondary questions," the generalissimo said. "Political means," he explained, are "even more important" than military preparations, although the latter should not for a moment be relaxed.' Chiang gave the strong impression that it is no longer necessary for the ROC to launch a lightning strike against the mainland inasmuch as Mao's extremist measures to save his regime are bound to produce similar effects, and at less cost. The meaning of Chiang's reference to "political means" became clear in February with the announcement of the establishment of a National Security Council under Vice-Premier Huang Shao-ku. Besides enhancing the President's personal powers in this, the so-called "period of rebellion," the NSC itself has been given broad functions embracing national reconstruction planning, strategy and defense, post-recovery political administration, and mobilization.2 Thus, the Council, dominated by members of the Kuomintang Central Committee and the military, could be used as easily to promote internal political change as to engineer the military and political logistics of supplanting the Communist mainland regime.

Ever since the conquest of the mainland by Communist forces, the foreign policy of the Republic of China has revolved about a single goal: recovery of the mainland. Recovery of the mainland is, in fact, the reason d'être of the Chiang Kai-shek régime; should the government ever admit doubts about its ability or desire to return, the entire basis for KMT rule would be irrevocably undercut. It is therefore not surprising that, in the last two years no less than in the more distant past, the theme of an imminent return has dominated the pages of Formosa's newspapers, with new evidence being brought forward regularly to demonstrate that the mainland régime is on the verge of collapse. The cultural revolution has brought about important changes in the “return” theme. It has not reduced its relevance, but seems to have induced recalculations in ROC official circles over the timing and nature of the mainland recovery operation.