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This paper explores the prosaic deductive style developed by Melissus and Zeno. It first emphasizes the authors’ use of a systematic and reduced vocabulary solely dedicated to a priori deduction. In a second time, the paper delves into the systematic role of reductio ad absurdum in their reasoning and distinguishes several kinds of reductio employed by the authors. Through this analysis, the study shows how Melissus and Zeno not only developed and systematized certain aspects of Parmenides’ style but also introduced original features that significantly influenced the philosophical writing style.

This paper claims that the argument that Aristotle seems to ascribe to Melissus in Physics III.6 about infinity is different from Melissus' original argument. On scrutiny, it turns out that the Aristotelian version of the argument takes Melissus to suppose that being is unlimited because it is not in contact with anything else. I claim that this is not Melissus' notion of unlimitedness for being, and that the Aristotelian version hinges on a reversal of Melissus' own reasoning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Melissus’ fragment B9, where he claims that being has no body and no thickness, raises the question of how being can be extended and full and at the same time incorporeal. Most recent interpretations tried to avoid lending to “body” the meaning of “physical body”. My aim in this paper is to reconstruct Melissus’ notion of body, by examining its connection to “thickness”. I show that Melissus meant by “thick” something that has distinct parts and therefore supports in B9 the indivisibility of being. I then indicate that he relied on the contrast between soul and body for his conception of corporeality, by highlighting that by Presocratic thinkers, the soul was considered as “thin” and regarded as something that could be exempt of the division into parts. I conclude that even though Melissus’ notion of incorporeality is very different from the one Plato will develop, he made a huge step toward its conceptualization.

According to the Eleatic Principle, only items which have the capacity to affect or be affected are. Recently, there has been a question about what, if anything, is Eleatic about the Eleatic Principle (EP). I examine the purported origins of the EP in Plato’s Sophist and argue that the text presents three ways in which something can affect or be affected: (1) as tangible contact, (2) as Cambridge change, and (3) by being responsible for the way something else is. Next, I look to the historical Eleatics in search of precursors to the EP. Against recent work in this area, I argue that elements of the EP are present in Parmenides, Zeno, and Melissus. The poem of Parmenides is compatible with (1) and (2) through the interaction of Light and Night, and the characterization of what-is as knowable. Zeno’s moving arrow paradox employs elements of (2), while his argument from complete divisibility adds preconditions to (3). Finally, against the traditional view that Melissus denies the existence of the sensible world, I show that for Melissus, the sensible world exists alongside what-is. The causal link between what-is and the sensible world, along with Melissus’ commitment to what-is as the object of knowledge renders Melissus the Eleatic whose Eleaticism is most represented in the Eleatic Principle. Alternatives for the application of the EP in contemporary metaphysics and reasons for the inclusion of an Eleatic visitor as the main interlocutor of a dialogue that is often taken as a criticism of Eleaticism emerge.

The earliest mention of Melissus of Samos by name is found in the first chapter of the Hippocratic De natura hominis. In the following note, I attempt to examine what is meant by the reference Melissus’ ‘logos’ in this work and suggest, against previous accounts, including Galen’s, that it has little to do with his commitment to monism. Rather Melissus’ logos is better understood as his referring to his strategy for demonstrating such a conclusion, especially his use of a supplemental argument in his fragment B8. Polybus’ concern in this first chapter is not monism as such but the claims to knowledge monists make. Melissus is a prime example of a monist who fails to grasp what he claims to know.

Parmenides and Melissus employ different deductive styles for their different kinds of argumentation. The former’s poem flows in an interesting sequence of passages: contents foreword, methodological premises, krisis, conclusions and corollaries. The latter, however, organizes an extensive process of deduction to show the characteristics of what is. In both cases, the strength of their argument rests on their deductive form, on the syntactical level of their texts: the formal structure of their reasonings help to identify the features and logical intersections of their thoughts. On the one hand, Parmenides uses modal reasoning, enforcing the employment of the principle of the excluded middle. On the other hand, Melissus radicalizes the use of modal reasoning and employs counterfactual statements in order to develop his doctrine of what is. Despite their differences, both deserve a place in the Stone Age of logic and theory of argumentation due to their common ambition to demonstrate what is.

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This paper discusses the theoretical relationship between the views of Damascius and those of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite. While Damascius' De principiis is a bold treatise devoted to investigating the hypermetaphysics of apophatism, it anticipates various theoretical positions put forward by Dionysius the Areopagite. The present paper focuses on the following. First, Damascius is the only ancient philosopher who systematically demonstrates the first principle to be infinite (traditional Greek thought tended to regard the arkhē as finite). Second, Damascius modifies the concept and in several important passages shows the infinite to be superior and prior to the finite (previously this assumption was held only by Melissus and, sporadically, by Gregory of Nyssa and Plotinus). Third, Damascius' theory of being (infinite, endless and ultrarational) is the strongest ancient articulation of the nature of the One which is a clear prefiguration of the negative theology developed by Dionysius the Areopagite. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The present paper makes the following points. (1) The summary given in Sextus Emp. Math. VII is of much greater value than usually acknowledged, since it preserves several key elements of Gorgias’ communicational strategy. (2) A sketchy trilemma is available in the opening sentence of Philolaos (DK 44B2) as well as in a passage of Plato’s Parmenides. This is evidence in favor of the hypothesis that the very first known trilemma was devised by Gorgias and not by Sextus himself or Aenesidemus. (3) Not unlike Zeno, Gorgias enjoyed to be neither serious nor joking, but remained somewhat halfway. This point is seldom acknowledged, though it is crucial in order to understand that he pretends to claim (e.g. that p), but his claims do not amount to any points of doctrine. (4) That he remains halfway should not prevent us from appreciating some of his ideas, but, at the same time, we should not expect full intellectual adhesion to what he tells us. Besides, something similar occurs in most of Plato’s dialogues. (5). Gorgias owes a lot to Melissus.

The traditional interpretation of Eleatism has it (1) that Melissus was a disciple of Parmenides (albeit with some divergences) and (2) that Parmenides believed in the timeless eternity of Being. It seems, on the contrary, (3) that Melissus acknowledged the reality of time by conceiving eternity as infinite time. Failing to justify this particular divergence from Parmenides’ approach, certain authors held that it was necessary to reinterpret the Melissan eternity as a form of infinite timelessness. This paper attempts to demonstrate that this reading is groundless and that if the traditional interpretation is questioned then one should reconsider the assumptions (1) and (2) but not (3).

With respect to Parmenides’ thought Melissus was regarded as a dissident thinker already in antiquity. His polemical introduction of the concept of void and the relative idea of infinite Being seemed particularly controversial. The aim of the present paper is to examine the origins of the Melissian understanding of void in order to trace its philosophical genesis to the criticism of the Atomist Leucippus. According to the philosopher from Abdera, the Eleatic fundamental principles had to conform to the obviousness of bodies’ motion, which is why the Eleatic not-Being had to be understood as void. Melissus took issue with this view and criticized the idea of the void’s reality by means of a methodical argument. In the course of doing so, the philosopher from Samos distorted the original Parmenidean ontology, which is why his theories were often criticized severely as theoretically weak.

The first book of the Aristotelian Physics may be considered as a sort of general introduction to the whole work. In particular, chapters 2 and 3 result very interesting for the foundation of the science of nature according to Aristotle; indeed, in these two chapters, the Stagirite criticizes the position of the Eleates Parmenides and Melissus. These two philosophers are considered as those who claim that change does not exist because the existence of the not-being is impossible to suppose. For this reason, since the Eleates deny that motion and change really exist, the refutation of their thesis results essential for the logical and ontological foundation of the Aristotelian science of nature. This paper wants to make light on the argumentations that Aristotle uses against Parmenides and Melissus. Indeed, since the Stagirite makes often use of his philosophical categories (like substance; the categories, the continuum and so on), it seems that his critics sound a little bit anachronistic. In many passages of the text is seems that Aristotle “simply” replace the presupposition of the Eleatic philosophy (i.e. the being is and not-being does not) with the thesis of the evidence of moving and plurality, in general. The aim of this contribution is to reflect on the critics present in Ph. I 2–3 in order to underline the importance of the Eleatic philosophy for the Aristotelian science of nature.

There is discussion among critics about the authenticity of Pseudo-Aristotle's account on Melissus in the De Melisso, Xenophane, Gorgia, and especially about the refutation of mixture that he attributes to the latter. For there is no clue in the other testimonies and in the fragments that the Eleatic made such a refutation. In this article, I aim to show that the argument as it is presented is not genuinely Melissean, but inspired by some of Aristotle's considerations on colour-mixture in the De sensu. I then claim that taking this source into account solves many of the difficulties inherent to this demonstration against mixture, and reveals something on Pseudo-Aristotle's doxographical approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]