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Prospective secondary mathematics teachers are usually required to complete several university advanced mathematics courses before being certified to teach secondary mathematics. However, teachers usually do not find these courses to be valuable for their teaching. We designed an experimental real analysis course with the goal of making real analysis content useful and relevant to teaching. Our approach was to ground the real analysis content in pedagogical situations that problematized a secondary mathematics topic, where the nuances of teaching secondary mathematics could be informed by the real analysis that was covered. The experimental course was implemented in a graduate teacher education programme with 32 pre- and in-service teachers (PISTs). After the course, we conducted focus group interviews with 20 of these PISTs to get feedback on how the course was valuable to their teaching practice. Many PISTs found the course to be valuable for teaching secondary mathematics, as well as for their understanding of secondary mathematics and real analysis.

Future teachers often claim that advanced undergraduate courses, even those that attempt to connect to school mathematics, are not useful for their teaching. This paper proposes a new way of designing advanced undergraduate content courses for secondary teachers. The model involves beginning with an analysis of the curriculum and practices of school mathematics and its teaching, and then using those to build up to the advanced mathematics--in this case, real analysis. After developing definitions, examples, theorems, and proofs, the model then reconnects to practice, asking the teachers to translate ideas from real analysis in ways that are appropriate for teaching high school content to students. To illustrate the model, we provide and discuss two example tasks.

In this paper, we investigate mathematics majors' perceptions of the admissibility of inferences based on graphical reasoning for calculus proofs. The main findings from our study is that the majority of mathematics majors did not think that graphical perceptual inferences (i.e., inferences based on the appearance of the graph) were permissible in a proof, but the majority of mathematics majors did believe that graphical deductive inferences (i.e., inferences based on what must necessarily be entailed by a graph having a certain property) were permissible.

Conviction is a central construct in mathematics education research on justification and proof. In this paper, we claim that it is important to distinguish between absolute conviction and relative conviction. We argue that researchers in mathematics education frequently have not done so and this has lead to researchers making unwarranted claims about students' standards of conviction. We illustrate the importance of distinguishing between absolute conviction and relative conviction by critically examining claims based on qualitative evidence that researchers have made in the literature.

We argue that mathematics majors learn little from the proofs they read in their advanced mathematics courses because these students and their teachers have different perceptions about students' responsibilities when reading a mathematical proof. We used observations from a qualitative study where 28 undergraduates were observed evaluating mathematical arguments to hypothesize that mathematics majors hold four specific unproductive beliefs about proof reading. We then conducted a survey about these beliefs with 175 mathematics majors and 83 mathematicians. We found that mathematics majors were more likely to believe that when reading a good proof, they are not expected to construct justifications and diagrams, they can understand most proofs they read within 15 minutes, and understanding a proof is tantamount to being able to justify each step in the proof.

The received view of mathematical practice is that mathematicians gain certainty in mathematical assertions by deductive evidence rather than empirical or authoritarian evidence. This assumption has influenced mathematics instruction where students are expected to justify assertions with deductive arguments rather than by checking the assertion with specific examples or appealing to authorities. In this article, we argue that the received view about mathematical practice is too simplistic; some mathematicians sometimes gain high levels of conviction with empirical or authoritarian evidence and sometimes do not gain full conviction from the proofs that they read. We discuss what implications this might have, both for mathematics instruction and theories of epistemic cognition.

n a recent article, Inglis and Alcock (2012) contended that their data challenge the claim that when mathematicians validate proofs, they initially skim a proof to grasp its main idea before reading individual parts of the proof more carefully. This result is based on the fact that when mathematicians read proofs in their study, on average their initial reading of a proof took half as long as their total time spent reading that proof. Authors Keith Weber and Juan Pablo Mejía-Ramos present an analysis of Inglis and Alcock's data that suggests that mathematicians frequently used an initial skimming strategy when engaging in proof validation tasks. [See Inglis and Alcock's response to Weber and Mejía-Ramos ("Skimming: A Response to Weber and Mejia-Ramos") on pages 472-74. A download will include both articles.]

In a recent article published in this journal, Shanahan, Shanahan, and Misischia investigated the differences in how chemists, historians, and mathematicians read text specific to their disciplines. Unlike the chemists and historians, the pair of mathematicians in this study did not consider sources when reading and evaluating their text. In this response, we contend that most mathematicians regularly do consider sources when reading mathematical arguments and papers. We summarize the results of four empirical studies, which suggest that this is the case. (Contains 2 notes.)

In this article, we report two studies investigating what mathematicians value in a pedagogical proof. Study 1 is a qualitative study of how eight mathematicians revised two proofs that would be presented in a course for mathematics majors. These mathematicians thought that introductory and concluding sentences should be included in the proofs, main ideas should be formatted to emphasize their importance, and extraneous or redundant information should be removed to avoid distracting or confusing the reader. Study 2 is a quantitative study assessing the extent to which a larger group of mathematicians (N = 110) agreed or disagreed with the eight mathematicians interviewed in Study 1. This quantitative study confirmed the findings of Study 1 by demonstrating a high degree of agreement among mathematicians regarding how they would revise proofs for pedagogical purposes. (Contains 9 tables, 9 figures, and 2 footnotes.)