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Despite an extensive literature on the consequences of political and fiscal decentralization for a variety of outcomes, little is known about these reforms' effects on the parties that implement them and the ethnoterritorial parties that demand them. This paper approaches this question from the perspective that decentralization is not simply the multiplication of subnational offices as previously argued, but it is also a strategy to bolster a party's national vote share, by appeasing voters of threatening regionalist parties. Consistent with this appeasement theory, statistical analyses of election results in the subnational regions of 17 Western European countries find that governing parties gain support and ethnoterritorial parties lose support in national elections following significant decentralization. Token decentralization fails to satisfy decentralization voters and leads instead to further ethnoterritorial party vote gain and governing party vote loss in national elections. In subnational elections, ethnoterritorial parties benefit electorally from extensive decentralization, whereas the nationally focused governing parties lose support. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the past forty years, Western European countries have faced both pressures to decentralize and, conversely, pressures to transfer competencies to the supranational level of the EU. Despite the joint occurrence of these processes, the existing literature has typically explored only their separate effects. This paper begins to fill this lacuna by examining the effect of decentralization on the European electoral fortunes of some of decentralization's most prominent supporters, ethnoterritorial parties. Consistent with the claim that ethnoterritorial parties in decentralized regions still see the European Union as a useful arena for expressing enhanced regionalist identities and pursuing additional political and financial legitimacy, cross-sectional time-series analyses reveal that decentralization increases the vote shares of ethnoterritorial parties in European Parliamentary elections. Thus, counter to the fears that increasing the number of levels of government will create competing centers of power and serve to demobilize voters, these results suggest that - for at least some parties - these political environments prove complementary. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do governing parties voluntarily transfer significant political and/or fiscal powers to subnational authorities? Contributing to the literature on the origins of institutions, this paper views decentralization as an electoral strategy. Unlike existing strategic explanations, however, I argue that decentralization is a means to bolster a governing party's national-level electoral strength. It is a tool, akin to policy appeasement, used to co-opt pro-decentralization regionalist party voters. By conceiving of decentralization in this manner, we can understand why parties propose devolution reforms that would sabotage their control of the newly created subnational bodies. Because the costs of this institutional strategy are disproportionately concentrated at the subnational level, the policy will only be adopted and implemented by centralized parties that prioritize national-level power. I examine the power of the institutional appeasement theory by analyzing intranational variation in the degree and timing of decentralizing reforms across the regions of Great Britain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do national governments transfer political and fiscal powers to subnational authorities? This paper develops a theory of decentralization as an institutional strategy of appeasement, designed to boost the national vote of the governing party. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Why do governing parties voluntarily transfer significant political and/or fiscal powers to subnational authorities? Contributing to the literature on the origins of institutions, this paper views decentralization as an electoral strategy. Unlike existing strategic explanations, however, I argue that decentralization is a means to bolster a governing party's national-level electoral strength. It is a tool, akin to policy appeasement, used to co-opt pro-decentralization regionalist party voters. By conceiving of decentralization in this manner, we can understand why parties propose devolution reforms that would sabotage their control of the newly created subnational bodies. Because the costs of this institutional strategy are disproportionately concentrated at the subnational level, the policy will only be adopted and implemented by centralized parties that prioritize national-level power. I illustrate the power of the institutional appeasement theory by examining intranational variation in the degree and timing of decentralizing reforms in the regions of Great Britain. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We explore the role of issue ownership in individual vote choice in the 1997 & 2000 Canadian federal elections. As a correction to the original model, we find that issue ownership's effect on vote is conditional upon the salience of the issue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A spatial approach has long dominated theories of party behavior and political competition. However, recent findings on the importance of issue salience and ownership for a party’s electoral success introduce the possibility of non-programmatic conceptions of party strategy. Based on this observation, I construct a modified spatial theory of party interaction in which parties manipulate electoral support by shifting the salience and ownership of new issues for political competition. Consequently, competition is no longer restricted to ideologically-proximal parties; non-proximal parties play a critical role in determining the electoral fortunes of other actors. An examination of party competition in France and its effect on the electoral trajectory of the Front National confirms these claims. The phenomenal success of the French radical right party is a result not of the weak accommodative tactics of the proximal RPR but rather of the timely adversarial strategies of the distant PS. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how political decentralization has affected levels of voter engagement across Western Europe. Political actors have often justified processes of political decentralization as means to "bring government back to the people". While consistent with the literature on voter turnout, these expected shifts in voter attitudes and behavior do not emerge from aggregate-level analysis. Rather than signaling the relative unimportance of constitutional reform for voter engagement, this study finds that decentralization differentially affects members of the electorate. Using survey data to examine pre and post-decentralization voter participation in Scotland, I determine that partisans of the regionalist, Scottish National Party are more receptive to the effects of this institutional change than affiliates of the national, mainstream parties. This paper suggests, therefore, that institutions do not necessarily have an independent effect on voter behavior; their impact is mediated by the individual-level characteristics of those voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When and why are compulsory voting laws adopted? Using an original cross-national dataset, we find evidence that strategic considerations, whether parties believe they will benefit or be harmed under c.v. laws, shape the decisions to adopt them. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how political decentralization affects levels of voter engagement. Political actors have often justified processes of political decentralization as means to "bring government back to the people." While these claims are consistent with scholarly theories on voter turnout, aggregate-level analysis does not reveal the expected net shifts in voter attitudes and behavior in decentralized countries of Western Europe. Rather than signaling the relative unimportance of constitutional reform for voter engagement, this study finds that decentralization differentially affects members of the electorate. Using survey data to examine pre- and post-decentralization voter participation in Scotland, I determine that partisans of the regionalist, Scottish National Party are more receptive to the effects of this institutional change than affiliates of the national, mainstream parties. This paper suggests, therefore, that institutions do not necessarily have an independent effect on voter behavior; their impact is mediated by the individual-level characteristics of those voters. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]