Search

Biocentric egalitarianism is the view that all living things share an equal fundamental moral status qua living things. In light of the well-known problems with past philosophical attempts to argue for this position, this paper proposes a way biocentric egalitarian claims might be understood and possibly vindicated. Relying on frameworks developed in recent discussions of the "basis of equality" in human-centered ethics, the paper argues that thinking of egalitarian claims as justified by (rather than as justifying) social ideals provides the best way of understanding the basis of biocentric egalitarian claims in environmental ethics. The paper first reviews arguments for biocentric egalitarianism and their central flaws and proceeds to survey different models for justifying egalitarian claims among humans. The paper argues the Social Ideal approach to justification is the one most likely to be helpful to biocentric egalitarians. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A literary criticism of the book "Mobilizing Hope" by Darrel Moellendorf is presented. It highlights that while Moellendorf's focus on global poverty and its central role in climate ethics is significant, his treatment of the Arcadian ideal and nonanthropocentric values raises concerns. It argues that Moellendorf's dismissal of the Arcadian ideal and his analogizing of nonanthropocentric ethics to art's value overlook nuanced ethical considerations.

An introduction is presented in which the guest editors discuss the theme of the issue, the International Society for Environmental Ethics, featuring five papers on environmental ethics, history, narratives, conservation, the Anthropocene, and activism.

Recent critics (Andrew Light, Bryan Norton, Anthony Weston, and Bruce Morito, among others) have argued that we should give up talk of intrinsic value in general and that of nature in particular. While earlier theorists might have overestimated the importance of intrinsic value, these recent critics underestimate its importance. Claims about a thing's intrinsic value are claims about the distinctive way in which we have reason to care about that thing. If we understand intrinsic value in this manner, we can capture the core claims that environmentalists want to make about nature while avoiding the worries raised by contemporary critics. Since the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value plays a critical role in our understanding of the different ways that we do and should care about things, moral psychology, ethical theory in general, and environmental ethics in particular shouldn't give up on the concept of intrinsic value.

On most understandings of what an ecosystem is, it is a kind of thing that can be literally, not just metaphorically, healthy or unhealthy. Health is best understood as a kind of well-being; a thing's health is a matter of retaining those structures and functions that are good for it. While it is true both that what's good for an ecosystem depends on how we define the system and that how we define the system depends on our interests, these facts do not force us to the conclusion that an ecosystem has no good of its own. Ecosystems and persons can have goods of their own in spite of the fact that the schemes we use to categorize them are matters that we decide upon.

Neosentimentalism provides environmental ethics with a theory of value that might be particularly useful for solving many of the problems that have plagued the field since its early days. In particular, a neosentimentalist understanding of value offers us hope for making sense of (I) what intrinsic value might be and how we could know whether parts of the natural world have it; (2) the extent to which value is an essentially anthropocentric concept; and (3) how our understanding of value could be compatible with both a respectable naturalism and a robust normativity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses various reports published within the issue, including one by Brigitte Nerlich on climategate and climate scepticism, one by Marion Hourdequin on issues involving climate change and its effect on the society as well as the individual ethical obligation and one by Kevin Behrens on African environmental ethics.