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Existing research finds that leaders develop international reputations based on their past behavior on the international stage. We argue that leaders' domestic choices can also influence their international reputations, perhaps as much as their past foreign policy decisions do. Using formal theory and intuitive argumentation, we develop an overarching framework to predict how much any domestic choice will affect a leader's international reputation. We theorize that certain domestic choices can inform expectations about future international crisis behavior based on the extent to which (1) the costs at stake are similar to those of an international crisis and (2) the domestic issue is salient relative to foreign policy. We use conjoint experiments and other evidence to show that many domestic choices have significant international reputational effects. There is some evidence that the reputational effect of certain domestic choices may equal that of fighting in a previous international crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article introduces the latest iteration of the most widely used dataset on interstate conflicts, the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) 5 dataset. We begin by outlining the data collection process used in the MID5 project. Next, we discuss some of the most challenging cases that we coded and some updates to the coding manual that resulted. Finally, we provide descriptive statistics for the new years of the MID data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to the 'Madman Theory' promoted by Richard Nixon and early rationalist scholars, being viewed as mentally unstable can help a leader coerce foreign adversaries. This article offers the first large-N test of this theory. The author introduces an original perception-based measure of leaders' reputations for madness, coded based on news reports, and analyzes its effect on both general deterrence and crisis bargaining. The study also tests several hypotheses about the conditions under which perceived madness is expected to be more or less helpful. The author finds that perceived madness is harmful to general deterrence and is sometimes also harmful in crisis bargaining, but may be helpful in crisis bargaining under certain conditions. The analysis suggests that the harmful effect of perceived madness results from a commitment problem. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reconsiders the theoretical logic behind the "Madman Theory"—the argument that it can be beneficial in coercive bargaining to be viewed as mad, or insane. I theorize about how we can best define perceived madness in a way that is relevant for analyzing coercive bargaining. I identify four types of perceived madness, broken down along two dimensions. The first dimension is whether a leader is perceived to (a) make rational calculations, but based on extreme preferences, or (b) actually deviate from rational consequence-based decision making. The second dimension is whether a leader's madness is perceived to be (a) situational or (b) dispositional. I argue that situational extreme preferences constitute the type of perceived madness that is most helpful in coercive bargaining. I illustrate my argument using case studies of Adolf Hitler, Nikita Khrushchev, Saddam Hussein, and Muammar Gaddafi. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the impact of context on the ability of leaders to signal resolve in international disputes. Leaders make statements of resolve in various contexts, and the context in which a leader speaks affects the size and composition of the audience as well as how adversaries are likely to interpret the statements. I focus on comparing five main contexts in which leaders commonly make resolved statements: speeches to the nation, both scripted and unscripted interactions with the press, remarks to narrow audiences, and campaign events. I offer hypotheses regarding how the effectiveness of statements at conveying resolve will vary among these contexts and test them using a data set that codes resolved statements made by US presidents. I find that resolved statements made in national speeches and scripted remarks to the press have the most significant impact on dispute outcomes, suggesting greater effectiveness at conveying resolve. However, statements made in other contexts also appear to matter, and inconsistency among contexts can reduce the effectiveness of statements. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]