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Concerns that biological weapons will be used has focused attention on the need to develop a capability to independently investigate any allegation of use. The United Nations Secretary-General's Mechanism is one such tool, and efforts to revitalize and strengthen it have acknowledged a wide range of technical difficulties to overcome. This article emphasizes another aspect of the investigatory process: communicating the findings of an investigation. The article frames the investigation report as more than a technical recounting of what the investigators did and found, regarding it instead as the means by which the policy-making audience "makes sense" of the allegation. Drawing on literatures associated with science policy and "boundary objects," the article reflects on the guidance provided thus far and suggests there has been an implicit move toward seeing the reports as "boundary documents." The suggestion made here is that this implicit recognition should be now made explicit so that the critical position of the report is better appreciated. This has implications for the training of rostered experts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Treaties are more than just pieces of paper. In order to fulfill the obligations set forth on paper, a vitalized process is created that can be affected both positively and negatively by the actions of those who are members and by the geopolitical context in which the treaty resides. It is the actions of those who are party to a treaty that largely determine the success or failure, as each member periodically examines whether the benefits of being part of the treaty outweigh any negative obligations and other costs. In 2001, the members of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) decided upon a series of intersessional meetings which, although instigated as a rescue operation from a series of major internal and external shocks, were judged as useful, and a second series was approved. In December, States Parties to the BWC will gather for a seventh time to review the operation of the treaty and make decisions about the next five years, including whether to approve a third series of annual meetings. But would a third series in its current format be for the good of the BWC? Would a third intersessional process support States Parties in their evaluation that they are better off as members of the BWC? By reviewing the origins of the intersessional process and providing an analysis of activities thus far, the author offers suggestions to be considered for organizing a third intersessional review process. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]