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COVID-19 has forced us into social distancing, isolation and quarantine. These conditions are likely fostering widespread anxiety and loneliness in our cities. However, they've also made the need for socially connected, vibrant public spaces obvious to all. We offer four strategies for rebuilding social connectivity and emotional well-being in our cities, once restrictions are lifted.

There are paradigmatic differences in the study of morality between the disciplines of philosophy and sociology. On the surface, this could be understood as a distinction over the study of what ethics are in the former (Prinz 2004b; Rawls 1971), from what they do in the latter (Bauman 1994; Durkheim 1973; Turner & Stets 2006). A similar claim could be made about the study of emotion in late modernity in these disciplines, as philosophers have generally focused on questions about what emotions are and where they come from, while sociologists have given greater attention to the impact and role of emotion in matters of social interaction, power and identity. When bringing together questions about emotions and morality, a number of important genealogical differences between sociology and philosophy surface. Enlightenment philosophers like Immanuel Kant and Jeremy Bentham have historically treated emotions as an encumbrance to ethical theory, as emotionality has been associated with irrationality and clouded judgement. One resulting narrative has treated emotion as something to overcome, as an untrustworthy and hot-headed co-pilot to the logical and rational mind. While these views were common among the Classical and Enlightenment era philosophers, they no longer stand up against contemporary understandings of the mind and emotion in late modernity (Denzin 1980; Holmes 2010; Prinz 2006).

Research focusing on the management of emotion features prominently in studies of employee attrition, gender inequality and workplace satisfaction, but rarely in research on worker solidarity. Against a backdrop of increasing individualisation within late modern society, research about workplace management of emotion has become bifurcated along sociological or organisational psychology lines. Within the sociology literature, management of emotion is theorised as a commercialised, relational and (often) alienating experience. Within organisational psychology literature and research, the emphasis is on harnessing individual traits and skills (e.g. emotional intelligence) to regulate emotions for increased productivity and employee retention. In this article, the authors call for a new research agenda that prioritises the examination of solidarity between workers alongside the analysis of emotion management. This call is based in a critical reading of the sociological and organisational psychology scholarship addressing the management of emotions. Through the example of teaching work, the authors provide a critique of scholarship on workplace strategies that promote highly individualised understandings of managing emotions through resilience training and other simplified techniques. They argue that workplaces should recognise the dangers of uncritically adopting individualised strategies for managing emotions, and propose a research agenda that seeks to understand how emotion management can affect worker solidarity.

This systematic search and review of international literature (1979-2017) finds links between emotion management and gender (in 1/2 the studies), and teaching attrition outcomes (1/3). Results contextualise these connections, suggesting female teachers use deep acting strategies, though experience more emotional exhaustion and unpleasant emotions. Male teachers practice distancing and surface acting, and experience depersonalisation, but also success in controlling disruptions and stimulating subject interest. Studies are limited by self-reported data and omission of school context, but highlight important teacher organisational identifications, suggesting future research use observational methods for understanding emotion management as an embedded, interactionist phenomenon.

This article develops a model of relational happiness that challenges popular individualized definitions and emphasizes how it can enhance the sociological analysis of inequality. Many studies of happiness suggest that social inequalities are closely associated with distributions of happiness at the national level, but happiness research continues to favour individual-level analyses. Limited attention has been given to the intersubjective aspects of happiness and the correlations between it and higher social equality. Conversely, key theoretical debates about inequalities, such as Axel Honneth and Nancy Fraser's exchanges, have only indirectly touched on happiness. A relational approach to happiness is not new, but what this article offers is a new combination of a relational understanding of happiness as an intersubjectively, culturally experienced complex of emotions with discussions about recognition of marginalized groups and redistribution of material resources. This combined approach can further debates about understanding and remedying social inequalities. It argues that theories and measurements of happiness must consider how it can be achieved collectively through working at mutual respect as well as greater material equality.

Based in a novel 'meta-reflexive' review of sociology of emotions (SoE) articles, we suggest that there are two primary SoE theoretical traditions that function within geographic silos: the USA is distinctly social psychological, while in the UK and Australia, SoE is more aligned with the humanities. In both traditions, parallel calls are emerging for interdisciplinarity and further engagement with physiological and pre-personal elements of emotion. Based in Archer's and Bourdieu's concepts of reflexivity, we assert the merits of reflexively examining SoE, and then identify key changes in SoE that have emerged across time and geography. Using Kuhn's work on paradigm shifts, we conclude that SoE is entering a stage of growth and change, and raise important questions about the subdiscipline's future direction.

While the pursuit of happiness in the present pervades popular narratives of happiness and the good life, the work of Adorno and Arendt casts doubt on the possibility of this lucrative goal. For Adorno, happiness occurs only in memory, while Arendt is sceptical about the possibility of experience between past and future and uses happiness to demonstrate her suspicion. Meanwhile, GH Mead offers an alternative that rejects these counter-intuitive perspectives by reaffirming that all experiences necessarily take place in the present. This article will assess each of these claims alongside the view that contemporary happiness discourse favours the pragmatic notion of happiness in the present. The article will then conclude by considering the potential for Simmel's transcending theory of experience - set out in his final major work View of Life (1918) - to resolve these tensions and support a theory of time, experience, emotion and knowledge that is capable of responding to the challenges set out by Adorno, Arendt and Mead.

This paper argues that ambivalence can serve as a proxy for consensus-based debates in public discourse as it allows for individuals to maintain flexible and analytic perspectives on matters that otherwise appear contradictory. In particular, an affirmative understanding of ambivalence will be presented to supplement the highly influential Habermasian approach by drawing from sociological theories of ambivalence found in the work of Simmel, Bauman and Kołakowski. While the theme of ambivalence is not completely absent from Habermas's work on the public sphere, it is typically described as a structural consequence of contradiction rather than a form of action that is capable of working with and around inconsistencies in ethics, knowledge and social values. This allows for participation to be sustained through contradiction, rather than being withdrawn in frustration, while also encouraging open-minded judgements capable of avoiding forms of fanaticism.

In early 2013 Europe was subject to a moral panic regarding the presence of horse flesh in beef products. Posited as a 'scandal' and often referred to in the media as 'the horsemeat scandal', this topic amassed a large amount of media reports and commentary as well as eliciting police investigations, raids and arrests along with a UK-wide survey of authenticity by the British food safety watchdog, the Food Standards Agency. At the time of writing (and the 'scandal' continues) 'mislabled' meat products have been found in the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom (UK), France, Norway, Austria, Switzerland, Sweden and Germany. Commentators have argued that the 'scandal' demonstrates the complexity of the food industry's supply chains in a globalized world while others have been quick to claim that neo-liberal, free market profiteers are to blame (Hutton, 2013).

This book offers an original account of the good life in late modernity through a uniquely sociological lens. It considers the various ways that social and cultural factors can encourage or impede genuine efforts to live a good life by deconstructing the concepts of happiness and contentment within cultural narratives of the good life. Although empirical studies have dominated the discourse on happiness in recent decades, the emphasis on finding causal and correlational relationships has led to a field of research that arguably lacks a reliable theoretical foundation. Deconstructing Happiness offers a step toward developing that foundation by offering characteristically sociological perspectives on the contemporary fascination with happiness and well-being. In doing so, it seeks to understand the good life as a socially mediated experience rather than a purely personal or individually defined way of living. The outcome is a book on happiness, contentment and the good life that considers the influence of democracy, capitalism and progress while also focusing on the more theoretical challenges of self-knowledge, reason and interaction.

Despite the enormous growth in happiness research in recent decades, there remains a lack of consistency in the use of the terms happiness, satisfaction, contentment and well-being. In this article I argue for a sociologically grounded distinction between happiness and contentment that defines the former as positive affect and the latter as positive reflection. Contentment is therefore understood as a fulfilling relationship with the self and society (to borrow from G.H. Mead's terminology) and happiness involves pleasurable experiences. There is a history of similar distinctions in philosophy and psychoanalysis, but much of the contemporary discourse fails to distinguish between individual and collective definitions of happiness. This article will argue that happiness and contentment ought not to be treated as competing approaches to the good life, but as complimentary forms of emotional experience. Further, I argue that the current interest in happiness can be linked to larger culture shifts involving neoliberalism and individualism.

Sociological approaches to friendship and happiness focus on how broader social and cultural conditions influence friendship and happiness. Long-standing debates about the 'good life' on which sociological theory draws, include some attention to friendship as an important intimate relationship in promoting well-being. Sociologists note that friends confer social and emotional capital that has the potential to enhance happiness, offering opportunities to network, as well as emotional support, information, trust, financial support, and influence. Sociological perspectives examine the changing historical definitions of happiness and friendship and critically evaluate whether friendship and happiness contribute to individual subjective well-being or are used in social control. Sociological attention to friendship and happiness also debates their contribution to social cohesion versus the ways in which they may exacerbate social inequalities. What a sociological contribution to happiness and friendship can offer is further illustrated using two examples of friendship and happiness in different social spheres; one taken from a study of friendships at work and the other from research into how friendships are navigated through online social media like Facebook

This article will argue that a decentering process occurs in the intersubjective connections between individuals, and that through the acknowledgement of this process researchers can better understand the potential for distortions to occur in the development of self-understanding. The concept of decentered intersubjectivity discussed in this article is the result of prior research on happiness and contentment, yet a range of emotions such as trust, guilt, shame, and disappointment could also be considered. In each case, the concept of a decentered intersubjectivity can connect the personal and emotional experiences of the individual, with a shared social experience that is deeply sociological in nature.

Critical theory is a project of revisionist Marxism envisioned to consider the emancipation of individuals from hegemonic power in post-Enlightenment society. Aside from a select handful of consistent themes and concerns shared among the key figures of critical theory, there are some crucial distinctions between the models employed by different theorists.

Daniel Bell's multidimensional view of modern social life as a disjunction of differing realms provides an effective example of a sociological analysis that defies typical notions of Left/Right and radical/conservative. Within this framework, Bell moves between traditional alliances, and his unwillingness to take sides makes it difficult to place him within traditional categories. Using Bell as an example, this paper will question the relevance of Right and Left in sociological discourse, and suggest that the distinction between conservative and radical is more substantive.