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DOD has emphasized innovative and low-cost approaches to build the defense capacity of foreign partners, and it uses its five Regional Centers to administer programs to foster partnerships and deepen foreign officials' understanding of U.S. objectives. The conference report accompanying the fiscal year 2013 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 112-705) mandated GAO to conduct a study of the Regional Centers. GAO's report does the following: (1) describes how the Regional Centers' activities compare with those of other DoD training and education organizations, and (2) evaluates the extent to which DoD has developed and implemented an approach to oversee and assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. This report also provides information on the process used to approve Regional Center requests to waive reimbursement of the costs for nongovernmental and international organizations that participate in the Regional Centers' activities. GAO reviewed public law and departmental directives and conducted an analysis comparing aspects of the Regional Centers with other selected DoD training and education institutions. GAO recommends that DoD develop measurable goals linked to key programming priorities for the Regional Centers, metrics for assessing performance against these goals, and a methodology to assess the Regional Centers' progress in achieving DoD priorities. DoD generally agreed with the recommendations., Report to Congressional Committees.

Over the past few years, the United States has increased its emphasis on training and equipping foreign police as a means of supporting a wide range of U.S. foreign-policy goals, including countering terrorists overseas and stopping the flow of narcotics to the United States. Funding for these activities has increased significantly since we last reported on these issues in 1992. In response to your request, this report provides estimates of the funding the U.S. government provided for activities to train and equip foreign police, hereafter referred to as "police assistance," during fiscal year 2009. We defined "police" as all law-enforcement units or personnel with arrest, investigative, or interdiction authorities. We analyzed documents and interviewed officials of the Departments of State (State), Defense (DOD), Energy (DOE), Justice (DOJ), Homeland Security (DHS), the Treasury, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). We also reviewed past GAO reports, relevant legislation, and congressional budget submissions. We limited our review to fiscal year 2009 because of the limited availability of comparable funding data from the agencies in other years. Our estimate of U.S. funds provided for this purpose incorporates budget estimates, appropriations, obligations, allotments, and expenditures because the agencies did not provide uniform funding data. Enclosure I provides more information on our scope and methodology.

Since 2001, Congress has appropriated about $640 billion for the global war on terrorism, the majority of it for operations in Iraq. In January 2007, the President announced "The New Way Forward" to stem violence in Iraq and enable the Iraqi government to foster national reconciliation. This new strategy established goals and objectives to be achieved over 12 to 18 months, or by July 2008. GAO discusses progress in meeting the following key goals of "The New Way Forward": (1) improve security conditions; (2) develop capable Iraqi security forces; and (3) help the Iraqi government enact key legislation, spend capital budgets, and provide essential services. GAO also discusses U.S. strategies for Iraq. GAO reviewed documents and interviewed officials from U.S. agencies, the United Nations, and the Iraqi government. GAO also had staff stationed in Baghdad. Since May 2003, GAO has issued over 130 Iraq-related audits which have provided baseline information for this assessment. GAO prepared this report under the Comptroller General's authority. GAO recommends that the Departments of Defense and State, in conjunction with relevant U.S. agencies, develop an updated strategy for Iraq that defines U.S. goals and objectives after July 2008, and addresses the long-term goal of achieving an Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself., Report to Congressional Committees.

On June 30, 2004, the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) intends to transfer power in Iraq to a fully sovereign Iraqi interim government. CPA and the Iraq Governing Council took a fundamental step toward this goal in March 2004, when they signed the "Law of Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period" (hereafter referred to as the transitional law). The transitional law is intended to govern the affairs of Iraq until Iraqis approve a permanent constitution and a permanent Iraqi government takes office. GAO has ongoing and completed work reviewing various aspects of the U.S. effort to reconstruct Iraq. For this report, GAO describes the following information as it exists at this time: (1) the time frames and Iraqi governmental structures established by the transitional law; (2) arrangements in the law for the U.S.-led multinational force, Iraqi security forces, and militias; and (3) mechanisms in the law for resolving disputes over property and territories within Iraq. In each of these areas, GAO also explains the transitional law's references to other Iraqi laws and legal provisions that help implement the transitional law. Where legal provisions to address these issues have not been completed, they describe the progress toward their completion or other actions to address the issues. GAO recognize's that the situation is fluid and that there are ongoing efforts to address unresolved issues. To address these objectives, they examined the transitional law and related CPA regulations, orders, and memoranda, as well as assessments of Iraqi institutions prepared by the Department of Justice and nongovernmental organizations. They met with officials from the Departments of State, Defense (DoD), and Justice, and from CPA to clarify provisions of the transitional law. They also discussed with these officials progress toward completing provisions referred to in the transitional law, such as the annex and electoral laws.

As of the late 198Os, the former Yugoslavia was a diverse federation of six republics, comprised of many different ethnic groups that were often based on religious affiliation. The dissolution of the former Yugoslavia in 1991 led to two sets of extended armed conflict, the first in Croatia and Bosnia from 1991 through 1995 and the second in and around Serbia's province of Kosovo from early 1998 through mid-1999. The warring parties to the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia-specifically, Yugoslavia, Croatia, Croatian Serbs, and Bosnia's three major ethnic groups-were all fighting over control of specific territories tied to each group's own definition of its state, with some groups fighting for ethnically pure states. During and after the Kosovo conflict, the local combatants- Kosovar Albanian insurgents and Yugoslav security forces-had mutually exclusive goals. While the insurgents fought for the independence of Kosovo, Yugoslav security forces, most of whom are Serb, fought to retain Yugoslavia's sovereignty over the province. NATO entered this conflict on March 24, 1999, when it initiated a bombing campaign against Yugoslavia to force an agreement that would end Yugoslavia's aggression in Kosovo. The international community reached agreements with the former warring parties that ended the conflicts and allowed the establishment of large, complex peace operations, first in Bosnia and later in Kosovo. Each operation included a large NATO-led force to enforce the military aspects of the agreements, as well as a substantial international civilian presence. These operations were designed, among other things, to assist the parties in complying with the agreements and to build democratic, multiethnic institutions., Briefing Report to the Chairman, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives.