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Management tools are traditionally depicted as rational and are therefore expected to reduce organizational complexity. However, the reflexive efforts deployed in the last 20 years has provided us with reliable insights on the need to go beyond this vision and recognize the extent to which these tools can trigger unforeseen and sometimes unwanted chains of reactions. This chapter is a participation to this reflexive effort, both at the empirical and theoretical levels. After introducing the reader to the existing literature on the topic, two case studies will be discussed. Centered on the deployment of safety performance indicators, these case studies provide additional empirical material confirming the role of complexity creator of management tools. These observations are then analyzed through the lenses of existing management concepts and models demonstrating their potential of reproducibility. In doing so, the mechanisms of complexity creation discussed in this paper are of potential interest for every organization interested in deploying new management tools.

International audience; Cet article s'intéresse à présenter une analyse multi systèmes effectuée dans le cadre du GTR Indicateurs de Performance sûreté et sécurité. Trois systèmes à risques (Industrie Seveso, système ferroviaire et système de santé) y sont décrits au travers des obligations réglementaires et des pratiques opérationnelles associées aux indicateurs. Il en ressort une très large variété de pratiques de mesure de performances qui s'avèrent être le résultat d'équilibres entre des approches réglementaires plus ou moins strictes et des choix de modèles de performance variés. Il en résulte que le travail sur les indicateurs en sécurité ne peut faire l'économie d'une analyse de l'ensemble du système de gouvernance associé aux systèmes à risques.

International audience; Cet article explore les implications des mutations actuelles sur la pratique et l’usage des analyses de risques (AR). Il introduit les dernières évolutions des AR dans le domaine des ICPE et introduit la question des limites des AR. Ensuite, plusieurs thèmes et travaux associés menés à l’Ineris depuis quelques années sont présentés. Ils concernent la cybersécurité, les natech (catastrophes naturelles ayant des effets sur les installations à risques), le management numérique de la sécurité, les conséquences environnementales et les effets domino. Considérés ensemble, ces thèmes constituent des évolutions notables dont les implications pour la pratique et l’usage des AR sont discutées.

This paper provides a synthesis of the benchmarks conducted by the Process safety indicators WG.Three risk systems (Seveso industry, railway and health system) are presented and analyzed in terms of legal requirements and operational practices relating to process safety measurement. Out of this benchmark emerges a large variety of safety performance management practices reflecting the subtle balance each system has reached by combining specific regulatory approaches as well as investigating various safety models. Out of this work, we plead for the analysis of safety performance indicators that is not limited to the operational practices of risk owners but to include also the global governance scheme in which these practices are embedded so to understand the mutual influences at hand., Cet article s’intéresse à présenter une analyse multi systèmes effectuée dans le cadre du GTR Indicateurs de Performance sûreté et sécurité. Trois systèmes à risques(Industrie Seveso,système ferroviaire et système de santé) y sont décrits au travers des obligations réglementaires et des pratiques opérationnelles associées aux indicateurs. Il en ressort une très large variété de pratiques de mesure de performances qui s’avèrent être le résultat d’équilibres entre des approches réglementaires plus ou moins strictes et des choix de modèles de performance variés. Il en résulte que le travail sur les indicateurs en sécurité ne peut faire l’économie d’une analyse de l’ensemble du système de gouvernance associé aux systèmes à risques.

International audience; Organizing multiple stakeholders' participation in decision processes is now a widespread request, especially in public contexts. Therefore, analysts are expected to provide policy makers (the clients) with scientifically sound and practically realizable approaches to deal with the complexity induced by inclusiveness requirements. Operational Research and Management Science (OR/MS) literature has been addressing these issues for a number of decades now, with a visible consequence being the expansion of analyst's role from problem solver to facilitator of stakeholder interactions. Within this evolutionary movement of the role of an analyst, this paper develops a literature analysis that goes beyond OR/MS to highlight an additional but complementary and vital role for today's analysts: that of an 'organisational designer'. Specifically, we claim that an analyst creates-consciously or otherwisethe organisation through which the set of stakeholders involved in the decision process interact, which in turn shapes the final decision recommendations and outcomes. We also claim that the ability of this organisation to fit contextual requirements is of utmost importance for the success of an analyst's intervention. Therefore, organisational design of stakeholder participation becomes a key issue to be explicitly addressed within OR interventions. This paper is organised to support these two claims. Firstly, it describes the terms of organisational design and the mechanisms through which it may influence the outcomes of decision processes. Secondly, we review how these aspects are already discussed within OR/MS literature in order to highlight current limitations and future possibilities for greater investigation of the place and role of organizational design in OR/MS research and practice.

International audience

International audience

The IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance describe key steps and associated methodologies for early identification and management of emerging risks. The process proposed in this report covers an overarching, flexible and adaptable set of guidelines designed to deal with complex, evolving and uncertain environments.

This appendix to IRGC's main report "guidelines for emerging risk governance" provides (a) a review of existing framework for the governance of emerging risks and (b) a review of theoretical foundations of IRGC's guidelines.

Technological and societal evolutions combined with an increased reluctance for risk taking put on the front page the issues of defining and managing emerging risks. The development of dedicated governance frameworks becomes therefore highly required. This paper introduces the key reflections conducted by IRGC and INERIS to elaborate in 2015 a set of guidelines structuring the way organizations should detect and treat emerging risks. It relies on a description of the very properties of emerging risks out of which the set of key steps and associated capabilities required by organizations to deal with emerging risks are suggested, La vitesse des évolutions technologiques et sociétales ainsi qu’une acceptabilité de plus en plus réduite font des risques émergents un sujet d’intérêt de plus en plus accru pour l’ensemble des acteurs de la société. A ce titre, des cadres de gouvernance adaptés aux spécificités de ces risques sont nécessaires. Le présent article s’intéresse à présenter le guide élaboré conjointement par l’IRGC et l’INERIS en 2015 sur la gouvernance des risques émergents. Il s’appuie sur la discussion des principales caractéristiques des risques émergents et en déduit les orientations adaptées à sa gouvernance. Ces orientations sont dans un second temps structurées dans un cadre méthodologique permettant de doter les organisation des processus et capacités organisationnelles adaptées aux défis spécifiques des risques émergents

Managing high risk systems is closely tied to the ability of continuously reviewing the potential gap between managers’ representations of their system’s strengths and weaknesses with its actual state. This gap can result from both natural systemic evolutions and the very consequences of previous decisions adopted and implemented. The deployment of performance assessment and reviewing to overcome, or at least reduce, this gap becomes therefore a key step of every safety management policy. This paper introduces and discusses the reflections conducted at INERIS with regard to the use of indicators for process safety performance assessment. It firstly uncovers the set of key hypotheses funding our work, especially when these orientations conflicts with previous reflections one may retrieve in scientific literature and operational practices. The second section is more operational and details how these funding orientations are translated in an operational and reproducible methodology for process safety indicators identification and deployment within organizations, Le pilotage des systèmes à risques implique la nécessaire et continue confrontation des représentations des gestionnaires avec les réalités du terrain, qu’elles soient issues des évolutions naturelles de ce dernier ou des conséquences de leurs propres décisions. Par conséquent, l’évaluation des performances sécurité est une phase clé de la boucle de régulation constituante de chaque démarche de gestion de la sécurité. Le présent article introduit et discute les travaux menés à l’INERIS sur le développement et l’utilisation des indicateurs à des fins de pilotage de la sécurité des procédés. Il s’appuie en premier lieu sur l’explicitation des principales hypothèses qui ont fondé notre travail avant de détailler la démarche d’aide à l’identification/conception d’indicateurs de sécurité adaptés aux spécificités de chaque organisation

Managing high risk systems is closely tied to the ability of continuously reviewing the potential gap between managers’ representations of their system’s strengths and weaknesses with its actual state. This gap can result from both natural systemic evolutions and the very consequences of previous decisions adopted and implemented. The deployment of performance assessment and reviewing to overcome, or at least reduce, this gap becomes therefore a key step of every safety management policy. Process Safety Indicators (PSI) are widely used to achieve performance assessment thanks to their synthetic and action oriented characters. However, they also bring simplifications and reduction of reality’s complexity which may become misleading for decision makers. It is therefore of upmost importance to ensure these PSI conception or selection results from a rationalized and contextually grounded approach. This paper suggests a new methodology for conceiving/selecting context adapted PSI. It differs from existing approaches in the sense that it does not assume a predefined theoretical safety model; it rather invites organizations to explore their own vision of safety so to deduce out of it the adapted PSI. The way these indicators are used is also discussed by acknowledging the need to move from a posture where achieved performances are simply compared to predefined norms to a more investigative process where performances assessed are used as basis for discussion so to achieve collective learning and trigger required changes. This paper is organized in four sections. After introducing the importance of performance assessment in safety management, the second section presents and discusses the set of funding hypotheses behind the methodological choices of the SPIS methodology. The thrd section will then be further detail the SPIS methodology before discussing in the last section the foreseen developments.

International audience; Depuis une cinquantaine d’années, progrès techniques, normes, et retours d’expérience ont permis d’élever très significativement le niveau de sécurité des organisations industrielles à risques. Cette amélioration a été suffisamment patente pour que l’on parle aujourd’hui de « systèmes ultra-sûrs ». Pourtant, des évènements récents, comme le naufrage de la plateforme pétrolière Deepwater Horizon, ou plus récemment l’explosion du Lac Mégantic, nous démontrent les limites de la sécurité de ces systèmes sociotechniques complexes. Chacun nouvel accident industriel majeur remet en cause le plan de maitrise des risques initial. Si aujourd’hui ces « big-ones » sont plus rares, leurs conséquences sont souvent beaucoup plus importantes. Ces constats sur les limites actuelles de la progression de la sécurité ne peuvent être satisfaisants. Nous nous intéressons ici au système de gestion de la sécurité (SGS). A l’interface entre manager intuitif, outil de gestion, risque, décision et responsabilité, le SGS est un outil central de la maitrise des risques industriel. Plus que déclencher la prise de décision d’anticipation, il doit la protéger et permettre l’adoption d’une posture de prudence, lorsque tous les signaux de risques démontrent la résistance du système. En outre, de nombreux documents sont aujourd’hui disponibles pour concevoir et mettre en œuvre un SGS. Face à cette boite à outil, le manager-décideur doit être soutenu dans son choix de modèle, afin de lui permettre de constituer un espace critique dans des écosystèmes décisionnels qui mêlent équivocité de la situation, contrainte de l’action, incertitude sur les effets, et responsabilité des conséquences.

When it comes to land use planning, risk acceptability can be assessed thanks to different types of representations: FN curves, individual or societal mapping. Whatever the representation tool adopted, it has to consider simultaneously risk assessments performed by experts on one hand and risk perceptions constructed by various stakeholders on the other hand. This paper will explore how the very choice of the risk representation tool is already influencing decision makers by highlighting some risk features over other ones. After deploying a risk assessment approach on a case study following the policies from various European countries, we will underline how the decision making fits quite well with the risk representation tool used. In addition, we will show that it would have been very difficult to enforce policies with different goals by using the same risk representation tools. Consequently, the paper acknowledges that when a risk governance policy is created, the decision-makers should first define very precisely the goals of the policy they want to enforce in order to select the tool which best fits their needs.

Safety performance indicators have for long been recognised as inescapable tools of process safety performances evaluation. The richness and variety of both academic and professional literature (OECD, 2008), (CCPS, 2010), (Cefic, 2011) demonstrate this fact. Still, this long history leaves a large set of challenges unanswered when it comes to how indicators should be designed and used for process safety performance assessment. Actually, a large part of the debate is currently occupied by two major issues being firstly the distinction between leading and lagging indicators and secondly the distinction between process and occupational safety indicators. Without denying the relevance of these two topics, this work investigates two other challenges that we believe highly relevant given the issue of safety performance assessment. The first issue relates to the often neglected and dismissed role of indicators as promoters and vehicles of safety values within the organisation. Actually, we claim that indicators are not only meant for bottom up collection of information on how objectives are achieved, they are also a top down information the workforce interprets in order to build its perceptions of what the management thinks is important when it comes to safety. Better understanding this mechanism is a key step in the path of ensuring acceptance of safety indicators and commitment in providing data that are required for their use. The second issue focuses on the need to ensure that safety performance indicators are put at the service of the organisation’s safety model. If the safety models defines what the organisations believes as means for controlling risks and achieving safety performance, it is crucial that indicators serve the wondering of whether this model is relevant for the organisation and put in practice by the various levels of management and workforce. This work aspires to raise awarness within the scientific and professional community on these issues to hopefully improve the relevance and added value of safety performance evaluation systems.

International audience; Process Safety Indicators (PSI) are key management tools when it comes to safety. Still, important limitations are pointed out when used in process industry. By analyzing the underlying models associated to PSI, we demonstrate the significant influence exerted by occupational safety although its determinants may heavily differ from process safety ones. In order to overcome this limitation, we carried a comparative analysis exploring various fields ranging from nuclear power plant to road and railway safety. Accordingly, we demonstrate how these various fields have developed specific safety models allowing the identification of context adapted safety indicators. Elaborating upon these fruitful experiences, we suggest a set of good practices and lessons learned with the aim of inspiring safety managers in the filed of PSIs. However, it is worth reminding that these suggestions should not be understood as recipes to be duplicated; they are rather inspirations to be contextualized and discussed in each case.; Les indicateurs de sécurité sont des outils importants de la gestion des installations présentant des risques majeurs. L’industrie des procédés chimiques a développé un certain nombre de pratiques et d’approches quant aux indicateurs de sécurité des procédés (ISP) que nous proposons de questionner à travers un benchmark impliquant des univers différents allant du nucléaire au transport routier et ferroviaire. Ainsi, après avoir démontré la très forte influence qu’exercent les modèles de sécurité au poste de travail sur la gestion des risques majeurs dans l’industrie chimique et les biais que cela introduit, nous illustrons comment d’autres domaines confrontés à des enjeux de sécurité semblables font appel à des modèles différents. Ainsi, les modèles de sécurité déployés dans l’industrie nucléaire et dans la sécurité routière ou ferroviaire ont su se focaliser sur les spécificités des risques majeurs et s’affranchir des biais résultant d’une importation de modèles. A travers cet exercice de comparaison, nous avons identifié un certain nombre de points forts et faibles des ISP ainsi que les leçons profitables issus des différents autres univers confrontés à des difficultés comparables.

International audience; We propose to question the link between safety management systems, and safety-related decision-making. Our focus on the contribution of the SMS on the decision making process. We performed a deep review of the literature from scientific corpus, as well as issues of industrial guidelines, to make a comparison between the different standards available. We used a three step methodology. The objective of the second step is the selection of standards. The third step allocated to the comparative analysis. As a result, we have identified similar elements and variables between SMS models. Construction and establishment of these management tools for the manager was also discussed. The proliferation of tools allows to gradually improves the management of safety. However, our study shows that several criteria for systems security management still need to be discussed.; Nous proposons ici de questionner le lien existant entre les systèmes de gestion de la sécurité, et la prise de décision. Plus précisément, quelle est la contribution du SGS à la construction de l’écosystème décisionnel ? Quelle est la capacité du SGS à faire face à un risque évolutif ? Nous nous appuyons sur une revue profonde de la littérature issue de corpus scientifiques, ainsi que celle issues des bonnes pratiques industrielles, pour réaliser une comparaison entre les différents référentiels disponibles. La méthode suivie pour la réalisation de cette analyse est composée de 3 étapes. La première étape est allouée à la construction de la grille d’analyse. L’objectif de la seconde étape est la sélection des référentiels. Ils sont principalement utilisés par les grandes entreprises. La troisième étape est l’analyse comparative des référentiels. Comme résultat, nous avons identifiés des éléments similaires et variables entre les modèles de SGS analysés. La construction et la place de ces outils de gestion pour le manager a également été discuté. La multiplication des outils permet d’améliorer graduellement la gestion de la sécurité. Pourtant, notre étude montre que plusieurs critères relatifs aux systèmes de gestion de la sécurité ont encore besoin d’être discuté.

International audience

Users of transport infrastructures nearby hazardous plants may represent important populations potentially impacted by a major accident. The Toulouse catastrophe in 2011 has been an illustrative example as it strongly impacted highway users. Therefore, transport infrastructure users (road and railway users mainly) represent a population to be protected within a land use planning policy as it is the case for inhabitants. Accordingly, this paper presents a decision support approach aiming to help local stakeholders identify the most cost effective measures to protect transport infrastructures from major accidental consequences. The suggested approach takes into account both technical and participatory constraints with the aim of offering an equal chance to all involved stakeholders to understand the issues under discussion and formulate opinions and values., Les Plans de prévention des risques technologiques (PPRT) ont depuis leur instauration en 2003 profondément modifié le paysage de la gestion des risques industriels majeurs en France. Si les impacts sur les riverains industriels et résidentiels ont été largement discutés et médiatisés, le cas des infrastructures de transport l’a été moins et pourtant les enjeux sont importants. Une voie ferrée ou une autoroute à forts trafics peuvent exposer plusieurs centaines d’usagers faiblement protégés ; le cas le plus critique étant l’occurrence de l’accident durant la période de saturation (embouteillages, arrêt du train etc). De plus, ces infrastructures peuvent s’avérer très coûteuses à protéger ou à dévier (de 25 000 à 300 000 euros par mètre linéaire selon les spécificités de construction). Enfin, selon leur importance et la complexité de leur gestion, chacune de ces infrastructures peut être au centre d’un large réseau d’acteurs économiques, sociaux et territoriaux. Pour apporter des réponses à la hauteur des défis techniques et sociétaux requis par la protection des usagers des infrastructures de transport dans le cadre des PPRT, l’INERIS a développé une démarche d’aide à la décision permettant d’évaluer différentes alternatives de protection disponibles. En plus d’un guide technique, cette approche suggère aussi un cadre participatif permettant aux différentes parties prenantes d’être associées à la prise de décision. Basée sur les apports des sciences de la décision d’une part, et des techniques de protection des infrastructures d’autre part, l’approche de l’INERIS se base sur quatre étapes.

International audience; Les indicateurs de sécurité sont des outils importants de la gestion des installations présentant des risques majeurs. L’industrie des procédés chimiques a développé un certain nombre de pratiques et d’approches quant aux indicateurs de sécurité des procédés (ISP) que nous proposons de questionner à travers un benchmark impliquant des univers différents allant du nucléaire au transport routier et ferroviaire. Nous tenterons ainsi d’identifier les points forts et faibles des ISP ainsi que les leçons profitables issus des différents autres univers confrontés à des difficultés comparables

International audience; Safety performance evaluation is an important issue of industrial risk management. If this statement is well accepted by the community, how to evaluate this performance does not meet consensus. The traditional incident-based approach has been shaken in 2007, after the Texas City refinery explosion. Accident report has pointed out confusion between personal safety and process safety, and between lagging and lagging indicators. Large number of thoughts and discussions has emerged regarding the use of safety performance indicators to measure level of risk. An indicator can be defined as a measurement, qualitative or quantitative, which provides information, in a specific objective of interpretation, in a particular context, for a specific actor. Almost 10 years after the Texas City accident, literature is now enriched with many proposals of set of indicators, emerging from scientific articles and industrial guidelines. Faced with this diversity of sources and management tools, we highlight the following question. What are the criteria for comparison, differentiation, and selection of these tools? Our study is based on an in-depth analytical review of the literature. As a result, several criteria seem to emerge: models used to design indicators, object of study, objectives of interpretation, terms of implementation and revision, actors affected by the outcome, and terms to validate the scientific relevance and operational feasibility. Multiplication of tools gradually improves the monitoring and driving of safety. However, our study shows that several criteria for indicators still need to be discussed, both theoretically and practically.

People see and evaluate risks in a very different way, this is probably the most changeable variable that we must take into account developing some public policy on risk. People's judgements depend on both their personal experiences and from the context in which they are, thus, these conditions make impossible to evaluate them a priori. In this paper we present a French real case on transport infrastructure and risk management, namely the safety of their users. The aim of this paper is to provide, on the one side, an example of public policy management in which people safety and economic constraints are involved. And on the other side, open a discussion about risk reduction and the policies achieving it.

International audience; In our rapid and global society, the complexity of dimensions entering in accidental sequences (new and emerging Technology, increasing interdependencies between systems, external constraints, and societal concerns) imposes to consider industrial accident through holistic and interdisciplinary approaches. Several scientific studies have validated this approach with models describing these systems as socio-technical and complex (Reason, 1990, Rasmussen, 2000, Leveson, 2004). In this context, classical management tools adopting systems decomposition (risk analysis, reliability, technical and organizational barriers...) strongly reduce the probability of major accident. However, they meet several limitations, and major accidents still occurring the most cases, study of accidents shows us that systems degradation is often associated with managerial failures showing up through several forms (lack of control, communication problems, deficiencies in the management of change...). Consequently, technical barriers are gradually losing their efficiency and systems safety performances are decreasing. In this process, tension is extreme in the resilience of systems, causing an intermediate phase of resistance, announcing the rupture. In these conditions, some particular operating phases (temporary period, maintenance shutdown, restarting) can no longer be contained until the major accident. This is during the period of crucial resistance that the system sends the most representative symptoms. This kind of precursor signals, known as weak signals, is broadly described in the literature. In this context, how to deal with the complexity of systems, and gather weak signals shown by organizations, to anticipate major accident? Our research question is the following. The literature demonstrates the existence of weak signals, and their relevance as accident precursors. Why these signals have not been taken into account? Our work should help to analyze the rupture between resilience and resistance and find the weak signals in organizations. Our study is based on the methodology of case study.. As result, our study enabled us to identify several filters that have hidden weak signals in organizations. Development of automatization, management focused on standards, involvement of stakeholders increasingly numerous, and economic issues freeze the intuitive perception of the system by the manager.. It is now in management systems that we must seek the weak signs of an announced catastrophe.

International audience

Organising participation of multiple stakeholders is nowadays a widespread request in decision processes, especially for organisations managing environmental risks. Therefore, analysts delivering decision support are expected to provide decision makers with scientifically sound and practically realisable approaches regarding this issue. One of the main challenges in dealing with participation is the definition of the organisation, the so called participative structure, through which stakeholders will contribute and interact during the decision process. Who should participate when and according to which rules are the main questions to be answered. Stakes associated to this challenge are of extreme importance for decision makers since decision legitimacy and acceptance strongly relies on the ability to demonstrate a real transparency and information disclosure during the whole decision process. This paper proposes the iterative comparison approach as a new and original frame to be used by an analyst supporting a client dealing with such questions. Through an unambiguous definition of cognitive artefacts to be constructed when designing participative structures, this paper provides a clear framework that organises an analyst intervention in participative contexts. Furthermore, it offers the opportunity to design tailored participative structures that integrate context specificities in one hand, and satisfies quality criteria being fairness, competence and efficiency on the other hand.

Natural-technological accidents, or NATECHs, reveal a particular exposure and vulnerability of industrial facilities to natural hazards and disasters. NATECH is seen as an emerging risk due to 3 main Emerging Risk issues. ERi 1 : Industry development in areas exposed to natural hazards or disasters : higher hazard potential, higher frequency of accidents ; ERi 2 : Growing complexity of the industrial system : higher dependency on vulnerable networks (telecom, transport, utilities, lifelines) ; ERi 3 : Climate change is believed to induce more severe/intense natural disasters, with subsequently growing impacts on industrial facilities. Within the iNTeg-Risk project, several tasks were dediated to investigate the NaTech issue (T1.5.3 - ERRA NATECH, and T2.5.4). ERi 1 and 3 were mainly considered within the work carried out. However, the (un)availability of safety barriers should be considered when establishing event trees and failure trees (accident risk; so-called bow-tie approach, etc.). In the paper, the developments made in the ERRA NATECH are presented : A new risk analysis methodology for NATECH events and a set of new KPIs are discussed and showed. The handbook of good Practices for NATECH mitigation will be a main output of the ERRA participants. A preliminary application of the results to a case-study was also carried out.

Management of systems requires, amongst many other things, a thorough and continuous understanding of the actual system's state and its development trends. To do so, managers need to rely on both descriptive and explicative models of the system's strengths and weaknesses. In case of complex systems, those needs become much more difficult to achieve because of the: interconnections between different dimensions or layers of the system ; holistic properties of the system making its final performances different from the sum of its elements' performances; External, and thus uncontrolled, factors affecting the system. Environment, Health and Safety (EHS) management of technological systems threatening humans and environment fits totally this description. Therefore, as complex systems, industrial installations require the development of dedicated monitoring systems aiming to ensure that EHS management is correctly designed and implemented. The development of indicators as monitoring tools has been widely documented in literature. Nevertheless, their use is still struggling with multiple challenges: How to find an adequate balance between the need for multiple indicators so to deal with the various factors affecting EHS in one hand, and minimize the number of indicators because of the reluctance of organizations to develop and implement numerous and too heavy indicators? How to coordinate the definition of indicators at various levels of the organization in order to help improving communication and common understanding of EHS issues? How to ensure that organizations take benefit of indicators without facing common side effects as misinterpretations, management by numbers... This paper will suggest an approach aiming to help organizations to develop a coherent and well adapted set of indicators for EHS management. According to a systemic vision, the various dimensions impacting EHS can be systematically addressed in an integrated way allowing a global optimization of the organization resources.

If science and technology bring more and more comfort into our everyday way of life, the technical, behavioral and social changes they introduce quickly modify the portfolio of risks we need to handle. Risk governance has thus entered an era where technical and organizational answers need to be brought as fast as the society evolves. More than that, it is sometimes highly preferable for risk governance to anticipate some of those changes so to avoid the emerging of adverse and irreversible consequences. The concept of emerging risks identifies all new or evolving risks that require new ways of dealing with. CO2 storage and sequestration, nanotechnologies or impacts of natural hazards on industrial facilities are examples of new or evolving risks. The iNTeg-Risk project in which INERIS has been highly involved aimed to develop, according to 17 real cases studies, an innovative and unified set of paradigm, framework and methodologies to help stakeholders dealing with all dimensions (technical, human, organizational and regulatory) related to those types of risks., Les évolutions technologiques modernes doivent répondre à un double objectif : poursuivre la recherche et offrir des solutions innovantes à des sociétés demandeuses de sécurité sans émergence de nouveaux risques. L’accompagnement de ces développements génère de multiples questions : risques sur les systèmes vivants ? Conséquences à court, moyen et long termes ? Quid des générations futures ? Quelles organisations mettre en place pour gérer ces risques ? Quelles réglementations ? Le délai de réponse à ces questions est souvent long, incompatible avec celui de mise sur le marché souhaité par les opérateurs économiques. Une telle incompatibilité donne lieu à des débats. La nécessité de développer des cadres, méthodes et modèles adaptés à ces risques, dits émergents, constitue un enjeu important dans lequel l’INERIS s’investit totalement. Ainsi, il participe au projet européen iNTeg-Risk, coordonné par le GEIE EU-VRi1 (plus de 70 partenaires, industriels, universités et organismes de recherche). Ce projet porte sur la détection précoce, la maîtrise et le management intégré des risques technologiques émergents.

International audience

Accidents can occur in both hazardous sites and during transportation of dangerous goods. Separate risk assessments for hazardous sites and dangerous goods transportation can lead to incoherent decisions that may increase global risk rather than reduce it. ''GLOBAL'' is a research project that started three years ago with the ambition of addressing the issue of dangerous goods logistics. As a result, a risk assessment approach that takes into account the risk generated by a whole supply chain of dangerous goods has been elaborated. Thus, the risks generated by the packaging, loading, storage and transportation of dangerous goods can be assessed within a unique and coherent framework. The relevance of such an approach can be justified in numerous ways. Firstly, it allows the industrial stakeholders to identify the best supply chains regarding, among other criteria, the resulting societal risks. It also makes it possible to have an homogeneous basis for land use planning regarding the risks generated by hazardous sites as well as logistics infrastructures of dangerous goods. The aim of this paper is to present the GLOBAL risk assessment approach and its scientific foundations in a first part, its limits and development perspectives in a second part