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This article aims to stimulate dispute about the justification of Paul Ricœur’s hermeneutic reading of John Rawls. Offering a close, methodically point-for-point textual engagement, I shall propose that Ricœur’s misreading of certain hermeneutic circularities in Rawls is owed to some confusion about the role of the procedural nature of Rawls’ theory. Generally speaking, the problems with Ricœur’s interpretations center on the question of whether there is something “pre-understood” within the formal theoretical understanding of the procedural theory of justice and the substantive convictions and judgments that figure within the reflective equilibrium of deliberations about the terms of justice. Arguably, Ricœur has not made a satisfactory case that the difference and liberty principles are considered convictions that anticipate their discovery and establishment. Ultimately, Ricœur has not demonstrated that there is a single presuppositional form that renders Rawls’ procedure self-defeating. Instead, he has proposed to us several potential forms of damaging presupposition, each of which is based on a questionable reading of Rawls’ text.

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Distributive justice concerns the moral principles by which we seek to allocate resources fairly among diverse members of a society. Although the concept of fair allocation is one of the fundamental building blocks for societies, there is no clear consensus on how to achieve "socially just" allocations. Here, we examine neurocognitive commonalities of distributive judgments and risky decisions. We explore the hypothesis that people's allocation decisions for others are closely related to economic decisions for oneself at behavioral, cognitive, and neural levels, via a concern about the minimum, worst-off position. In a series of experiments using attention-monitoring and brain-imaging techniques, we investigated this "maximin" concern (maximizing the minimum possible payoff) via responses in two seemingly disparate tasks: third-party distribution of rewards for others, and choosing gambles for self. The experiments revealed three robust results: (i) participants' distributive choices closely matched their risk preferences--"Rawlsians," who maximized theworst-off position in distributions for others, avoided riskier gambles for themselves, where as "utilitarians," who favored the largesttotal distributions, preferred riskier but more profitable gambles; (ii) across such individual choice preferences, however, participants generally showed the greatest spontaneous attention to information about the worst possible outcomes in both tasks; and (iii) this robust concern about the minimum outcomes was correlated with activation of the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), the region associated with perspective taking. The results provide convergent evidence that social distribution for others is psychologically linked to risky decision making for self, drawing on common cognitive-neural processes with spontaneous perspective taking of the worst-off position. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Several rules for social choice are examined from a unifying point of view that looks at them as procedures for revising a system of degrees of belief in accordance with certain specified logical constraints. Belief is here a social attribute, its degrees being measured by the fraction of people who share a given opinion. Different known rules and some new ones are obtained depending on which particular constraints are assumed. These constraints allow to model different notions of choiceness. In particular, we give a new method to deal with approval-disapproval-preferential voting. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We introduce and analyze the following variants of the Borda rule: median Borda rule, geometric Borda rule, Litvak's method as well as methods based on forming linear combinations of entries in the preference outranking matrix. The properties we focus upon are the elimination of the Condorcet loser as well as several consistency-type criteria. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper provides a comparison of three voting rules, the Borda rule, the Copeland rule and the maximin rule. Our analysis based on the rankings derived from those voting rules will shed new light on existing comparisons based on “closeness” between the three voting rules under investigation. In particular it will be shown that both, the rankings derived from the Borda rule and the maximin rule and the rankings derived from the Copeland rule and the maximin rule, will be exactly the opposite for certain preference profiles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]