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This thesis examines the theoretical and practical aspects of simulation based acquisition (SBA). SBA may provide the Defense acquisition community with a means to improve the acquisition process by reducing both cost and acquisition cycle time, as well as leading to better system performance. In the past, the acquisition community applied computer models and simulations in a less than optimal manner. Recent use of computer models and simulations produced encouraging resource savings. However, the acquisition community has not yet fully realized the potential benefits of applying M&S to the acquisition process. This thesis also discusses lessons learned from application of SBA to commercial ventures that may help the Department of Defense develop an integrated set of computer models and simulations to improve weapon system acquisition across functional disciplines. Finally, this thesis discusses the need for an acquisition research laboratory and proposes a SBA laboratory environment as a means of further developing and implementing SBA, http://archive.org/details/thesimulationbas1094526764, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The U.S, Navy submarine force entered World War II with a defective primary weapon system, the Mark XIV Torpedo. It was developed in the mid 1920‘s, but never adequately developmentally or operationally tested prior to entering full rate production. After the inception of hostilities, submarine commanders reported multiple problems with malfunctioning torpedoes. This case study presents the Mark XIV‘s developmental history, initial combat performance, and the 21 month effort to find and remedy the three root causes that were significantly degrading the torpedo‘s combat effectiveness. The study subsequently analyses the derived lessons learned in requirements development, developmental testing, and operational testing, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The objective of this project was to investigate the impact that a wind turbine can have on the electromagnetic environment that affects communication systems. The power generation process in a wind turbine has the potential of creating radio frequency (RF) emissions and the tower/blades can reflect RF signals that can have a negative impact upon RF communication systems. This project involved measuring the RF environment before and after the wind turbine was constructed. RF signals between 2 MHz and 18 GHz were transmitted towards the location of the wind turbine using directional antennas and taking receive signal level measurements at different distances from the turbine. This was done after the wind turbine was fully operational. The effects of the wind turbine on the RF environment were based upon measurements taken before and after the turbine was constructed. Methods to mitigate effects encountered were explored. The effects that wind turbines have on the electromagnetic environment and referenced communication systems were documented in detail, along with suggestions on how to mitigate the effects.

The June 2003 release of the radically-revised CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 3170.01 promulgating the new Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) literally turned the legacy Service-initiated Requirements Generation System (RGS) upside down. The decades-old “threat-driven,” “bottom-up” development process of warfare-materiel requirements was summarily replaced by a “revolutionary,” “capabilities-driven,” “top-down” process. The author provides an analysis, from a Program Manager’s (PM) perspective, of the potential impacts of these changes upon the acquisition community in four distinct areas: Continuity with Service legacy requirements generation expertise, PM management challenges when other PMs are responsible for supplying critical subsystems and components that will enable satisfaction of Key Performance Parameters, Total Ownership Cost implications of deploying multiple, low-density materiel configurations, and potential disconnections between Presidential Budget Requests and Congressional enactment., Acquisition Chair of the Graduate School of Business & Public Policy at the Naval Postgraduate School.

y operating in or planning to operate in hostile environments. v., http://archive.org/details/contractorsonbat109451089, Department of the Army author (civilian)

As the Army develops and fields new or improved tactical equipment for the soldier, the challenge of providing for its security, unit-level maintenance, availability, and accountability will exceed the capacity of present systems. This new or improved tactical equipment will include a number of high-cost, technically advanced items that will present storage and other logistical challenges. In garrison, the fixed facilities at unit level are inadequate for the projected need (both quantitatively and qualitatively). Finally, there are no current systems specifically designed to provide security, protected storage, availability, and accountability of sensitive and high-value non-sensitive items during training or operational deployments This thesis uses a tailored application of the systems engineering process to develop a design for a U.S. Army secure storage system. This study investigates the user's requirements for such a system, as well as requirements and constraints derived from security regulations, military and commercial intermodal transportation methods, and current Army facilities and force structure. It then examines existing Government and commercial equipment to assess their suitability for satisfying secure storage and transportation requirements. Ultimately, this system engineering analysis produces a physical architecture of a mobile secure storage system, as well as selected items of the system architecture., http://archive.org/details/asystemsengineer109456021, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The purpose of this Joint Applied Project (JAP) was to determine, through data collection, any life-cycle cost savings of a synchronous training approach versus the more traditional on-site new equipment training (NET) approach. With Army units and equipment deployed throughout the world, the cost of providing on-site training can be prohibitive. The Army has made effective use of distance learning approaches to meet both career training objectives (e.g. Defense Acquisition University (DAU) and Naval Postgraduate School (NPS)) and workplace training requirements (e.g. ethics and security). Similar approaches to replace on-site training for equipment, especially NET, could result in not only cost savings, but also result in better use of training personnel due to reduced travel time. The primary concern with this synchronous training approach is the quality and effectiveness of training. By drawing on expertise of both Program Management Offices as well as other life-long learning-based institutions (i.e. DAU, Naval Postgraduate School personnel for expertise in distance learning, the Army acquisition programs could be able to replace a significant portion of on-site training with synchronous training.

The purpose of this study is to outline and analyze the acquisition and sustainment process for the current U.S. Marine Corps RQ-11B Raven Digital Data Link small unmanned aerial system program. The current sustainment of the Marine Corps Raven evolved from the support employed for its predecessor analog variant in 2008, which was originally supported by Marine organic assets below depot-level maintenance requirements. The Ravens manufacturer, AeroVironment Inc., now stations a field service representative in theater and has been since around June 2011 under a contractor logistics support contract after the Marine Corps struggled to implement organic support and sustain its Ravens at the organizational and intermediate levels. This report serves as a case study for insights into the acquisition strategies for future unmanned systems. I explore the advantages and limitations of organic versus contractor support options in the form of monetary, organizational, and logistical resource allocation by analyzing the spectrum of solutions throughout the supply and maintenance constructs. The analysis covers both operational and sustainment perspectives through the lens of doctrine, organization, training, material, leadership and education, personnel, and facilities implications.

The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter was initiated as the Light Helicopter Family (LHX) in 1982 when an Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis (AAMAA) identified the need for an armed reconnaissance aircraft. Eighteen years later, the program has yet to reach a Defense Acquisition Board Milestone II review. This thesis described the history of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter acquisition program during these ears. The research focused on the question of what significant events and issues have occurred over the course of the Comanche's development that have allowed it to remain a viable program. The research draws several conclusions from the analysis of the Comanche's history. Mainly, despite the significant duration of the program, a valid need for an armed reconnaissance platform still exists. Secondly, the innovative program management of Comanche has maintained a positive reputation for the program. Finally, the loss of Comanche at this point in time would severely impact the defense helicopter industrial base, http://archive.org/details/acasehistoryofun109457644, U.S. Army (USA) author

This thesis explores various acquisition and contracting issues relevant to the proposed United States Marine Corpsα CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter modernization. The research includes a preliminary cost and operational effectiveness analysis that identifies critical requirements issues and potential acquisition and contracting pitfalls. Cost and effectiveness modeling draws on multi-attribute decision analysis and simulation software to capture the complexities and uncertainties inherent in this modernization program. Based upon this analysis, literature research and interviews with acquisition managers and industry professionals, pertinent issues for developing an acquisition strategy are analyzed and discussed. Some acquisition strategy issues analyzed include risk management, cultural and institutional obstacles to success, competition, integrated contract management, opportunities for tailoring and streamlining, opportunities for exploiting the most recent revision of the Department of Defense 5000 Series, contractor logistic support, operating and support cost reduction and control and finally, political considerations. Various incentive arrangement structures are suggested to ensure programmatic success. Lessons and methodologies that can be extrapolated from this case study to other aging aircraft modernization programs are identified to aid in developing other acquisition strategies., US Marine Corps (USMC) author

Software development efforts have become the highest-risk element of modern program management. One way that we can mitigate this risk is through the use of metrics. Software metrics can give us insight about the progress, quality, and expected completion of a software development effort. In earlier software development efforts, programming was viewed as a "black art" and, consequently, software metrics were not commonly used. Today, it is generally accepted that a software development effort should be properly planned and that software metrics should be used to control the project. Program managers are no longer concerned about whether or not to use metrics, but are more concerned with which metrics to use and whether or not the ones chosen will be effective. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 Program provides valuable insight into the use of metrics. A principal finding of this research is that implementing an effective metrics program is extremely difficult, especially when the contractor is not experienced in developing software-intensive systems. Because this situation often exists, future and current program managers must assess their own knowledge of software development and plan to mitigate the effects of other factors they cannot influence. They must educate themselves on software issues and metrics and solicit assistance from independent agencies that specialize in software development, http://archive.org/details/softwaremetricsc109458974, Captain, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The focus of this paper is on improving the U.S. Navy's execution of technical authority. 1. Technical authority targets compliance with technical criteria and standards. 2. This targeting must be done at the earliest stages of program development and addressed during development of the program acquisition strategy. 3. An executable acquisition strategy must take into consideration the Navy's technical authority responsibility. 4. A successful strategy needs to provide the industry sufficient time to fully develop plans and deliver products, especially in high-risk program areas, and incorporate a system engineering process where the technical authorities can perform their mission. 5. History has shown that costs will increase if technical risks are not adequately addressed. The purpose of this focus -- on improving execution of technical authority -- is to reduce exposure to risks and costs. This thesis defines the relationship between program authority and technical authority, and improves the state of technical authority through common policy development and implementation., http://archive.org/details/improvingusnavys109453915, United States Navy Retired (USNR) author., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

With the price tag for environmental remediation over the past twenty years exceeding $1 trillion dollars and the costs expecting to exceed $500 billion over the next twenty years, there is a tremendous need to study the area of environmental remediation contracting. The concurrent tracts of increasing environmental scrutiny, a down-sizing defense industrial base, and a major effort to reform the Government acquisition system has generated an opportunity to review how the private sector contracts for environmental remediation and apply any applicable best practices to the Department of Defense contracting system. Key findings of this study are (1) there is no readily available process from either the commercial sector or the Department of Defense that will suffice as a template for all environmental remediation efforts, (2) the Department of Defense has no centralized repository of environmental remediation contracting knowledge, (3) Legislative and regulatory hurdles exist which impede assimilation of new initiatives in the remediation of former the Department of Defense facilities, and (4) the utilization of incentive type contracts for environmental remediation is not producing the expected innovation and improvements in contractor performance., http://archive.org/details/comparisonofenvi109455868, US Navy (USN) author

This thesis is a case study of the extent to which a series of factors influenced development of the U.S. Army Target Acquisition Designation System/Pilot Night Vision System (TADS/PNVS). This study is one of a series being prepared under an ongoing research effort sponsored by Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command (AMC). These studies will look at various weapon systems that participated in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and will study the effectiveness of their Development Strategies, for the purpose of later comparing system effectiveness in ODS. The TADS/PNVS was developed for the AH-64A Apache Helicopter, as a sighting system for the Hellfire missile system. This case study focuses on the system's three critical technologies, evaluates their technical maturity at various stages versus Technology Readiness Levels, and analyzes how that affected the later development and testing. The study also highlights funding stability, user involvement, integrated product teams, and testing strategies. The thesis focuses particular attention on testing, and whether testing of the TADS/PNVS system was sufficient and timely during development., http://archive.org/details/casestudyofdevel109453505, DB-03, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

Partnering the public and private sector for the performance of depot-level maintenance and repair is a relatively new concept. While partnering arrangements offer tremendous opportumties to increase the efficiency of the industrial base; to be successful, these arrangements require substantial effort and commitment from all involved parties. Partnering arrangements are complicated by their reliance upon full and open communication, plus their dependency on the total commitment of senior leadership from all involved organizations. Phase I of the Abrams Integrated Management for the Twenty-First Century (AIM XXI) program, a partnering arrangement between General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and Anniston Army Depot (ANAD), which called for the complete rebuild and modernization of 17 M1Als, offers valuable insight to acquisition professionals who are considering establishing a partnering arrangement. A principal finding of this research is the necessity for partnering arrangements to have the long-term commitment of senior management, and be thoroughly disseminated throughout the involved organizations, particularly to the mid-level managers who are responsible for executing the arrangement. Open and honest communication is the key to the success of partnering arrangements. Partnering is more than a new buzzword brought about by Acquisition Reform (AR). It is a new dimension to the relationship between the public and private sectors. Acquisition officials must ensure that the parties fully understand this, and the groundwork for this environment is established prior to approving requests to partner, http://archive.org/details/partneringdefens109458804, Captain, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The U.S. Army is beginning to field the first of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) and equip the organic Anti-Tank (AT) Company of the Brigade with the LAV III Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Platform and the Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided 2B (TOW 2B) missile system. A developmental effort is currently underway to replace the aging TOW 2B and Hellfire missile systems with a common missile that meets both ground and air requirements. With increased range, lethality, and target acquisition capability, the Common Missile (CM) is being designed as the primary weapon system for the Army's Comanche helicopter and is a candidate for the lethality system of the Future Combat System (FCS) within the Army's Objective Force. Additionally, the CM is designed to be "backwards compatible" with existing TOW 2B and Hellfire launch platforms. The objective of this research effort is to determine the increase in operational effectiveness through the employment of the CM in the AT company of the SBCT in three different scenarios, using the high-resolution Janus Combat Model. Operational effectiveness will be assessed and statistically analyzed using lethality, survivability, and engagement range for three measures of effectiveness (MOEs), http://archive.org/details/annalysisofcommo109453438, Major, United States Army, Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

field capabilities quickly enough to meet warfighter requirements. DoD acquisition can not keep pace with the rate of C4I technology growth and is encumbered by layers of procedural bureaucracy. Subsequently existing Programs of Record were harmed by the resulting non-standard acquisitions. More reform is neither necessary nor the panacea. Adequate processes and programs exist to expedite the fielding of new capabilities. Optimization of existing processes and programs combined with greater warfighter involvement are necessary to prevent future occurrences of non-standard acquisition. Adherence to existing rules and regulations when combined with reduction of bureaucracy will reduce future occurrences of non-standard COTS C4I equipment acquisition and speed the fielding of new capabilities., http://archive.org/details/impactsndconsequ109453288, Science Applications International Corporation author (civilian)., Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

The U.S. Navy submarine force entered World War II with a defective primary weapon system, the Mark XIV Torpedo. It was developed in the mid 1920s, but was never adequately tested developmentally or operationally prior to entering full-rate production. After the inception of hostilities, submarine commanders reported multiple problems with malfunctioning torpedoes. This case study presents the Mark XIV's developmental history, initial combat performance, and the 21-month effort to find and remedy the three root causes that were significantly degrading the torpedo's combat effectiveness. The study subsequently analyzes the derived lessons learned in requirements development, developmental testing, and operational testing., Acquisition Research Case Series.

The U.S, Navy submarine force entered World War II with a defective primary weapon system, the Mark XIV Torpedo. It was developed in the mid 1920‘s, but never adequately developmentally or operationally tested prior to entering full rate production. After the inception of hostilities, submarine commanders reported multiple problems with malfunctioning torpedoes. This case study presents the Mark XIV‘s developmental history, initial combat performance, and the 21 month effort to find and remedy the three root causes that were significantly degrading the torpedo‘s combat effectiveness. The study subsequently analyses the derived lessons learned in requirements development, developmental testing, and operational testing

It is critical that the Department of Navy (DON) acquisition personnel and Department of Defense (DoD) support contractors understand the impact to naval ships' weapons systems Total Ownership Cost (TOC) when procuring outfitting equipage and test equipment supporting the maintenance concept. This project focuses on reducing the logistics footprint of U.S. Naval ships through the optimization of weapon system Allowance Equipage Lists (AELs). After reviewing Integrated Logistics Support (ILS) data utilized to support and certify logistically the new construction ships' outfitting, it became apparent that there were many redundancies and other problems associated with the ILS data. The problems within the weapon system AELs include numerous redundancies, Hazardous Materials (HAZMAT) and items that should be on separate outfitting documents. Correcting these problems would circumvent unnecessary costs and would reduce the logistics footprint in the ships' outfitting. The intent of this project is to provide guidance and recommendations for the optimization in the outfitting of equipage, tools, consumables, and test equipment for ships' weapon systems, which will lead to a reduced logistics footprint and reduce TOC during ships' outfitting.

The focus of this paper is on improving the U.S. Navy's execution of technical authority. 1. Technical authority targets compliance with technical criteria and standards. 2. This targeting must be done at the earliest stages of program development and addressed during development of the program acquisition strategy. 3. An executable acquisition strategy must take into consideration the Navy's technical authority responsibility. 4. A successful strategy needs to provide the industry sufficient time to fully develop plans and deliver products, especially in high-risk program areas, and incorporate a system engineering process where the technical authorities can perform their mission. 5. History has shown that costs will increase if technical risks are not adequately addressed. The purpose of this focus -- on improving execution of technical authority -- is to reduce exposure to risks and costs. This thesis defines the relationship between program authority and technical authority, and improves the state of technical authority through common policy development and implementation.

The purpose of this project is to survey the acquisition workforce regarding recent GAO reports and statements made on Award and Incentive Fees. The reports entitled, "DOD Has Paid Billions in Award and Incentive Fees regardless of Outcomes" and 'DOD Wastes Billions of Dollars through Poorly Structured Incentive Fees" have questioned the acquisition methods' effectiveness. In order to analyze the reports, the researchers conducted background research on the proper use and facilitation of Award and Incentive Fees in accordance with Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) standards, DoD 5000 policy, and other applicable policies. The research team surveyed a sample size of contracting managers at the 45th Annual Aerospace and Defense Contract Management Conference. The focus of the Conference, "Rules, Risks, and Rewards: The Changing Outlook for Aerospace and Defense Contracting," presented an opportunity for the researchers to survey participants who felt strongly about the GAO reports. Because the survey was conducted in anonymity, the research team was able to gather both positive and negative feedback.

Test and Evaluation (TandE) is an integral part of every acquisition program, as such, it consumes considerable program resources. The Department of Defense (DoD) TandE program management requirements are written to meet the risk reduction needs of large acquisition programs, but do not provide the details needed to consistently scale TandE management efforts for smaller programs across DoD. This research study investigates ways that the TandE burden to programs differs based upon the Acquisition Category (ACAT), application of TandE oversight, and materiel commodity area. The primary data source for the study was each program's Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP). The majority of the programs evaluated are part of the DoD Chemical Biological Defense Program (CBDP). This research effort found ACAT-based patterns in requirements definitions and ACAT-induced variability in test site usage. The study also determined that the TEMP documentation burden was similar across all ACATs, and consistently higher than Service guidance. Future studies using this analysis methodology are required to determine whether the TandE burden to CBDP programs is typical or unique within DoD.

field capabilities quickly enough to meet warfighter requirements. DoD acquisition can not keep pace with the rate of C4I technology growth and is encumbered by layers of procedural bureaucracy. Subsequently existing Programs of Record were harmed by the resulting non-standard acquisitions. More reform is neither necessary nor the panacea. Adequate processes and programs exist to expedite the fielding of new capabilities. Optimization of existing processes and programs combined with greater warfighter involvement are necessary to prevent future occurrences of non-standard acquisition. Adherence to existing rules and regulations when combined with reduction of bureaucracy will reduce future occurrences of non-standard COTS C4I equipment acquisition and speed the fielding of new capabilities.

"Project management has passed through various stages over time, evolving in order to better meet the needs of particular projects. At present, the scope of project management covers a significant number of situational and sequential activiities. This necessitates a series of specific project manager competencies in order to implement projects successfully in terms of cost, schedule and performance. Several studies have been made in this field, resulting in various outcomes. Among them Dr. Owen Gadeken's research, published in 1997 in the Army RandD magazine, summarizes the competencies of outstanding program managers based upon preceding studies analyzing successful defence program managers. The present report uses the case of the Land Reserve Modernization Program (LRMP) at Meaford, Ontario, Canada, in order to explore the competencies identified in the aforementioned research. The LRMP was a large infrastructure program consisting of four projects, the first of which was the implementation of a militia training support center at Meaford. This report analyzes the LRMP project in terms of the program manager's comptencies and explores them by highlighting the events that necessitated those comptencies." -- p. v.

One of the foundations of military command and control is that authority must match responsibility. Yet in weapon system acquisition, a program manager is responsible to deliver capabilities to the warfighter without full control of the resources he needs to carry out this task. Successful program managers recognize their dependencies upon other actors and execute their programs using a network with a common goal of enhancing a specific warfighting capability. A hierarchical chain of command still exists, but the network enables the actors to carry out their objectives in an efficient and effective manner. This report describes how acquisition process purportedly works in hierarchical terms. It also introduces a process model to describe the set of activities actually used and the actors who are required to collaborate to deliver capabilities to the warfighter. The analysis of those activities between actors reveals that weapon system acquisition behaves like a network. Describing acquisition in network terms allows those involved in weapon system acquisition oversight, policy, and practice to have a new insights and measurement tools to understand how to improve the weapon systems acquisition process.

The goal of this MBA Project is to investigate possible disconnects between doctrine and practice in the employment of the Raven Small Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (SUAV). The Army's current Small UAV requirements are based upon the Future Combat System's Operations Requirements Document and has not been validated at the platoon or company level. The Raven SUAV is a Commercial off the Shelf (COTS) item that swiftly became the Army's Small UAV of choice for operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Doctrine and Techniques, Tactics, and Procedures (TTP) have been written for the Raven SUAV; however, it is not standard practice for all units operating the system abroad. The last review of the SUAV operational requirements was conducted in 2003 but did not specifically address its usage on the battlefield. In an attempt to fill that gap, this project focuses on real-world usage of the Raven SUAV system. We compare doctrine versus practice using the Department of Defense's (DOD) Doctrine, Organization, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities (DOTML-PF) model as the primary logic construct. The report begins by providing a background of the Raven SUAV, to include its evolution from a COTS item to the Army's SUAV of choice, and how it has impacted the warfighter. Next, the authors provide an overview of DOTML-PF in order to provide a basis for comparing doctrine and practice. The study then looks in-depth at doctrine and practice using DOTML-PF as the model for revealing differences between the two. Finally, the authors analyze these differences and recommend solutions to mitigate shortfalls in actual Raven SUAV usage on the battlefield.

The June 2003 release of the radically-revised CJCSI 3170.01C and CJCSM 3170.01 promulgating the new Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) literally turned the legacy Service-initiated Requirements Generation System (RGS) upside down. The decades-old threat-driven," bottom-up" development process of warfare-materiel requirements was summarily replaced by a "revolutionary," capabilities-driven," top-down" process. The author provides an analysis, from a Program Manager's (PM) perspective, of the potential impacts of these changes upon the acquisition community in four distinct areas: Continuity with Service legacy requirements generation expertise, PM management challenges when other PMs are responsible for supplying critical subsystems and components that will enable satisfaction of Key Performance Parameters, Total Ownership Cost implications of deploying multiple, low-density materiel configurations, and potential disconnections between Presidential Budget Requests and Congressional enactment., The original document contains color images.

With defense budgets shrinking throughout the world and coalition forces facing interoperability issues while conducting asymmetric warfare in a post Cold-War environment, many nations are seeking ways to acquire economical weapon systems that are interoperable with allies and coalition members. One method of addressing these concerns is International Cooperative Research and Development (ICRandD). This MBA Project will evaluate the current ICRandD process and make recommendations to enhance the ICRandD process by examining ICRandD between the U.S. and NATO Members, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. Case studies were used for comparisons in order to determine the advantages and concerns pertaining to ICRandD and to recommend appropriate ICRandD strategies.

The end of the Cold War signaled hard times ahead for both public and private manufacturers in the Nation's Defense Industry. Army-controlled manufacturing Arsenals, subject to Governmental control and requirements to maintain excess mobilization capacity, found themselves increasingly unable to compete with private industry on cost. Set-aside protectionist legislation, especially the Army Arsenal Act and the Stratton Amendments, played an increasing role in the ability of the Arsenals to obtain work. The Army Arsenal Act applies to "make or buy" decisions and the Stratton Amendment restricts the transfer of large-caliber cannon technology to foreign nations. The LW155 Joint Program Office has dealt with both statutes because it manages a multi-national weapon system with a large-caliber cannon and is scheduled for production by the Army. This report uses the LW155 Program as a case study to examine three areas of importance to a Program Manager: the application of the Army Arsenal Act to joint service programs; the prime contractor's ability to control the origin of component parts; and the constraints upon multi-national production caused by the Stratton Amendment.

The Japanese Defense Agency (JDA) and the Japanese Defense Industrial Base (JDIB) are in a transitory period. A recession in the Japanese economy, and an increasing requirement for participation by the Japanese military in regional and global venues has placed unprecedented demands on the JDA. The Department of Defense also finds itself in a transformational period, wherein implementation of acquisition reform initiatives is an imperative. Given this environment, this thesis seeks to both provide DoD Program Managers with a baseline economic analysis of the Japanese Defense Industry and identify potential synergies in U.S. - Japan acquisition efforts. An exposition of the Japanese Defense Industry's composition and status, and a targeted comparison to U.S. defense firms, frames the current acquisition environment. Economic factors at work in U.S. - Japan acquisition efforts are identified through examination of past and current acquisition interfaces such as: the FS-X aircraft co-development program, and the Theater Missile Defense program. Specific and general acquisition opportunities are discussed, and an assessment tool for evaluation of collaboration alternatives is proposed. This thesis finds that acquisition opportunities do exist for DoD within the JDIB, and optimization of these opportunities can facilitate DoD's effort to engage in "best-value" acquisition practices.

Government interest has increased in recent years regarding the viability of contracting out for the Life-Cycle Support of military weapon systems. This thesis addresses the legal ramifications and possible contracting avenues that Program Managers could use to obtain support for Army tactical missile systems. Congress has enacted numerous statutes that the Program Manager must adhere to regarding depot maintenance activities when considering Life-Cycle Contractor Support. Within the Program Executive Office (PEO), Tactical Missiles, two programs have received approval for contracting out support efforts. One program awarded a contract in 2000 and the second is in the planning stages. The potential exists for numerous programs to pursue this avenue for supporting DoD weapon systems.

Test and Evaluation of ballistic missile defense systems under development is required to assess system technical performance, design specifications, and maturity, and to determine if the defense systems are operationally effective, suitable, and survivable against the threat(s) identified in the System Threat Assessment Report (STAR). Acquisition of threat-representative ballistic missile targets that emulate threat systems, as detailed in the STARs, are required to test and evaluate defense systems under realistic operational environments. The evolving ballistic missile threat and the increased proliferation of ballistic missile systems have increased the urgency to develop and field missile defense systems capable of defeating all of these threats. Threat-representative ballistic missile targets and Foreign Military Acquisition targets play a critical role in assessing performance capabilities, system maturity, operational effectiveness, suitability, and survivability during developmental and operational test and evaluation of missile defense systems. This research identifies key management challenges experienced since 1990 by current and former target Product Managers and Project Managers. Recommendations are also included concerning how to manage these challenges based upon the lessons learned provided by experienced Product Managers and Project Managers.

Extremely high weapon system Operation and Support (OandS) costs have become one of the central issues within the Department of Defense. Historically, OandS Costs represent 60% to 80% of the total life-cycle cost of weapon systems. Consequently, minor increases in OandS Costs across many systems can have major impacts to the efficient execution of the defense budget, restrict the ability to maintain readiness, and deplete funding needed for modernization. The principal finding of this research is that the Chief Logistician of a developmental project office can radically reduce future OandS Costs by fulfilling several key roles during a short timeframe in the system life-cycle. These key roles include a number of strategic imperatives, a half-dozen unique activities related to both the design of the weapon system and the logistics plans for supporting the system, and a full understanding of the techniques to overcome existing inhibitors. Finally, suggestions are presented for over-hauling the Chief Logistician's status in a typical project office to more effectively deal with these difficult challenges of system development.

The U.S. Army is beginning to field the first of six Stryker Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) and equip the organic Anti-Tank (AT) Company of the Brigade with the LAV III Anti-Tank Guided Missile (ATGM) Platform and the Tube-Launched, Optically-Tracked, Wire-Guided 2B (TOW 2B) missile system. A developmental effort is currently underway to replace the aging TOW 2B and Hellfire missile systems with a common missile that meets both ground and air requirements. With increased range, lethality, and target acquisition capability, the Common Missile (CM) is being designed as the primary weapon system for the Army's Comanche helicopter and is a candidate for the lethality system of the Future Combat System (FCS) within the Army's Objective Force. Additionally, the CM is designed to be "backwards compatible" with existing TOW 2B and Hellfire launch platforms. The objective of this research effort is to determine the increase in operational effectiveness through the employment of the CM in the AT company of the SBCT in three different scenarios, using the high-resolution Janus Combat Model. Operational effectiveness will be assessed and statistically analyzed using lethality, survivability, and engagement range for three measures of effectiveness (MOEs)

This thesis is a case study of the extent to which a series of factors influenced development of the U.S. Army Target Acquisition Designation System/Pilot Night Vision System (TADS/PNVS). This study is one of a series being prepared under an ongoing research effort sponsored by Headquarters U.S. Army Material Command (AMC). These studies will look at various weapon systems that participated in Operation Desert Storm (ODS) and will study the effectiveness of their Development Strategies, for the purpose of later comparing system effectiveness in ODS. The TADS/PNVS was developed for the AH-64A Apache Helicopter, as a sighting system for the Hellfire missile system. This case study focuses on the system's three critical technologies, evaluates their technical maturity at various stages versus Technology Readiness Levels, and analyzes how that affected the later development and testing. The study also highlights funding stability, user involvement, integrated product teams, and testing strategies. The thesis focuses particular attention on testing, and whether testing of the TADS/PNVS system was sufficient and timely during development.

As the Army develops and fields new or improved tactical equipment for the soldier, the challenge of providing for its security, unit-level maintenance, availability, and accountability will exceed the capacity of present systems. This new or improved tactical equipment will include a number of high-cost, technically advanced items that will present storage and other logistical challenges. In garrison, the fixed facilities at unit level are inadequate for the projected need (both quantitatively and qualitatively). Finally, there are no current systems specifically designed to provide security, protected storage, availability, and accountability of sensitive and high-value non-sensitive items during training or operational deployments This thesis uses a tailored application of the systems engineering process to develop a design for a U.S. Army secure storage system. This study investigates the user's requirements for such a system, as well as requirements and constraints derived from security regulations, military and commercial intermodal transportation methods, and current Army facilities and force structure. It then examines existing Government and commercial equipment to assess their suitability for satisfying secure storage and transportation requirements. Ultimately, this system engineering analysis produces a physical architecture of a mobile secure storage system, as well as selected items of the system architecture.

y operating in or planning to operate in hostile environments. v.

This thesis identifies and offers solutions to many common issues and challenges facing a U.S. Government weapon system developer conducting a Test and Evaluation program using the Major Range and Test Facility Base. White Sands Missile Range was used as an example. Common requirements were addressed from the perspective of a first-time U.S. Government user. The Test and Evaluation process is complicated and requires a good understanding of the Major Range and Test Facility Base structure and basic procedures. This is particularly important for the manager of a relatively small developmental program which does not have an extensive test support infrastructure. Some topics include the Major Range and Test Facility Base organization and responsibilities, White Sands Missile Range organization and capabilities, and the Universal Documentation System. In addition, a presentation of practical lessons-learned from both Major Range and Test Facility Base users and operators provides a valuable resource base for all test program managers.

This thesis explores various acquisition and contracting issues relevant to the proposed United States Marine Corpsα CH-53E Super Stallion helicopter modernization. The research includes a preliminary cost and operational effectiveness analysis that identifies critical requirements issues and potential acquisition and contracting pitfalls. Cost and effectiveness modeling draws on multi-attribute decision analysis and simulation software to capture the complexities and uncertainties inherent in this modernization program. Based upon this analysis, literature research and interviews with acquisition managers and industry professionals, pertinent issues for developing an acquisition strategy are analyzed and discussed. Some acquisition strategy issues analyzed include risk management, cultural and institutional obstacles to success, competition, integrated contract management, opportunities for tailoring and streamlining, opportunities for exploiting the most recent revision of the Department of Defense 5000 Series, contractor logistic support, operating and support cost reduction and control and finally, political considerations. Various incentive arrangement structures are suggested to ensure programmatic success. Lessons and methodologies that can be extrapolated from this case study to other aging aircraft modernization programs are identified to aid in developing other acquisition strategies.

With the price tag for environmental remediation over the past twenty years exceeding $1 trillion dollars and the costs expecting to exceed $500 billion over the next twenty years, there is a tremendous need to study the area of environmental remediation contracting. The concurrent tracts of increasing environmental scrutiny, a down-sizing defense industrial base, and a major effort to reform the Government acquisition system has generated an opportunity to review how the private sector contracts for environmental remediation and apply any applicable best practices to the Department of Defense contracting system. Key findings of this study are (1) there is no readily available process from either the commercial sector or the Department of Defense that will suffice as a template for all environmental remediation efforts, (2) the Department of Defense has no centralized repository of environmental remediation contracting knowledge, (3) Legislative and regulatory hurdles exist which impede assimilation of new initiatives in the remediation of former the Department of Defense facilities, and (4) the utilization of incentive type contracts for environmental remediation is not producing the expected innovation and improvements in contractor performance.

Since the birth of the republic, the United States has relied on contractors on the battlefield to meet logistical shortfalls. The use of contractors has proven to be an integral part of the militarygass warfighting capability. Americagass forces are now deployed in greater frequency and length, than at the height of the Cold War. As a result of this phenomenon and other related factors, the military is now more reliant than ever on contractors. This thesis analyzes the legal issues associated with using Contracted Logistics Support in operational environments. These issues are: that the military does not possess the authority to discipline contractors, that the military can not command and control contractors, that commanders must ensure contractors maintain their noncombatant status, and commanders must consider the risk of contractor nonb1sperformance. This thesis also analyzes the decision process of employing contractors using the Recognitionb1sPrimed Decision Model. This research offers recommendations and conclusions on improving the use of Contracted Logistics Support from a legal standpoint. Recommendations include revising U.S. law to address the current jurisdictional gap, redefining contractors that accompany the force as combatants, and revising doctrine to reflect the recommended changes to U.S. law and the Law of War.

The Major Weapon Systems Acquisition Process requires the acquiring organizations to make long term resource commitments, whereas the defense budgets of many nations have declined over the past decade. Therefore, it is imperative for program managers and acquisition practitioners to make informed decisions not only considering the up-front costs, which are related to fielding of the system, but considering all the costs expected to be incurred throughout the system's planned life. In this study, the major systems acquisition process, and its underlying concepts, life cycle costing, and cost estimation techniques have been discussed, and the strategies that enable the PMO to optimize the life cycle cost of the system are studied in a case study approach. The ATACMS IA missile system has been chosen as the study case. The life cycle cost of the ATACMS IA missile system has been estimated; sensitivity and uncertainty analyses have been conducted by utilizing the Cost Analysis Strategy Assessment (CASA) estimating model in order to develop strategies which will eventually reduce the life-cycle cost of the system. The performance and cost figures used in the model are assumed by the author, due to sensitivity of the actual data. However, the model and the analysis results provide valuable guidance for the PMO, and the analysis methodology is applicable to any weapon systems acquisition program.

The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter was initiated as the Light Helicopter Family (LHX) in 1982 when an Army Aviation Mission Area Analysis (AAMAA) identified the need for an armed reconnaissance aircraft. Eighteen years later, the program has yet to reach a Defense Acquisition Board Milestone II review. This thesis described the history of the RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter acquisition program during these ears. The research focused on the question of what significant events and issues have occurred over the course of the Comanche's development that have allowed it to remain a viable program. The research draws several conclusions from the analysis of the Comanche's history. Mainly, despite the significant duration of the program, a valid need for an armed reconnaissance platform still exists. Secondly, the innovative program management of Comanche has maintained a positive reputation for the program. Finally, the loss of Comanche at this point in time would severely impact the defense helicopter industrial base

This thesis presents an analysis of how the United States Army can revolutionize the passage of critical chemical defense information on the battlefield. The current process for passage of this critical information is heavily dependent on short-range and stand-alone chemical detection systems, transmitted over secure radio vertically throughout the chain of command. These factors result in inaccurate, time-lagged information reaching command decision- makers, increasing the risk of contaminating additional soldiers and equipment. Through the insertion of new products, with integrated software to automate the passage of this hazard information, the Army is changing this process for the flow of chemical contamination information. The resulting new process is expected to increase battlefield awareness thereby decreasing the probability of spreading the contamination across the battlefield, maintaining the ability for soldiers to accomplish their missions. Analyzing this change using Davenport's model for large-scale innovation, the revised chemical process still requires additional equipment and cultural changes to maximize the effectiveness of the Army XXI soldier.

Software development efforts have become the highest-risk element of modern program management. One way that we can mitigate this risk is through the use of metrics. Software metrics can give us insight about the progress, quality, and expected completion of a software development effort. In earlier software development efforts, programming was viewed as a "black art" and, consequently, software metrics were not commonly used. Today, it is generally accepted that a software development effort should be properly planned and that software metrics should be used to control the project. Program managers are no longer concerned about whether or not to use metrics, but are more concerned with which metrics to use and whether or not the ones chosen will be effective. The Bradley Fighting Vehicle A3 Program provides valuable insight into the use of metrics. A principal finding of this research is that implementing an effective metrics program is extremely difficult, especially when the contractor is not experienced in developing software-intensive systems. Because this situation often exists, future and current program managers must assess their own knowledge of software development and plan to mitigate the effects of other factors they cannot influence. They must educate themselves on software issues and metrics and solicit assistance from independent agencies that specialize in software development

This thesis examines the theoretical and practical aspects of simulation based acquisition (SBA). SBA may provide the Defense acquisition community with a means to improve the acquisition process by reducing both cost and acquisition cycle time, as well as leading to better system performance. In the past, the acquisition community applied computer models and simulations in a less than optimal manner. Recent use of computer models and simulations produced encouraging resource savings. However, the acquisition community has not yet fully realized the potential benefits of applying M&S to the acquisition process. This thesis also discusses lessons learned from application of SBA to commercial ventures that may help the Department of Defense develop an integrated set of computer models and simulations to improve weapon system acquisition across functional disciplines. Finally, this thesis discusses the need for an acquisition research laboratory and proposes a SBA laboratory environment as a means of further developing and implementing SBA