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Companies increasingly employ environmental compensation claims in their advertisements. This practice, however, has been criticized as being a form of greenwashing. In two studies, we examined associations between the exposure to abstract and concrete compensation claims, consumers' perceived greenwashing, environmental boycotting and buycotting intentions, and brand evaluation as well as purchase intentions. Further, we investigated the moderating role of consumers' environmental knowledge. In Study 1, findings from a two-wave panel survey (NW2 = 511) indicated that exposure to abstract compensation claims was positively related to perceived greenwashing, whereas exposure to concrete compensation claims was not. Environmental knowledge did not influence perceptions of greenwashing in either claim. Using experimental data, Study 2 (N = 423) showed that concrete compensation claims can also lead to perceived greenwashing but to a lesser extent than abstract ones. Furthermore, environmental knowledge helped consumers detect greenwashing in both claims. In both studies, perceived greenwashing positively predicted consumers' intention to join environmental boycotts but not buycotts. In addition, Study 2 showed that perceived greenwashing was negatively associated with purchase intentions. Theoretical and practical implications are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Targeted political advertising (TPA) on social media builds on tailoring messages to (groups of) individuals' characteristics based on user data. Questions have been raised about the impact of TPA on recipients and society. In this study, we focus on the fit of TPA, that is, the congruence between TPA and recipients' preferences, and draw on congruity theories, social identity theory (SIT), and persuasion knowledge. In a two-wave panel study (N = 428) during a Viennese state election, we investigated the relationships between individuals' perceived fit and misfit of TPA on perceptions about the manipulative intent as well as the benefits and harms for democracy. The findings showed that perceived fit of TPA at Time 1 decreased perceived manipulative intent and increased perceived benefits of TPA at Time 2. The perceived misfit of TPA at Time 1 did not influence individuals' perceptions at Time 2, and perceptions about the harms of TPA to democracy stayed stable. Findings imply that political campaigners might benefit from targeting but raise questions about individuals' defense mechanisms against the persuasive technique. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With the development of electric vehicles in the last years, the number of electric chargepoints are expanding rapidly. Accordingly, the aggregated load demand from different electric chargepoints is increasing significantly. Due to the unpredictability of charging behaviour, it is difficult to build white-box models to analyse the patterns and to predict the load profiles, which is essential for other tasks such as demand side management. Thus, in this work, four different models based on machine learning and deep learning algorithms namely Random Forest (RF), Support Vector Regression (SVR), Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) and Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) are applied to a massive real-world open dataset from the UK, published in 2018, to compare the forecast performance of each algorithm with the modified persistence model as the baseline. The raw data are first pre-processed to generate the aggregated load demand by hour and then used for training and forecasting with a predictive horizon of 72 hours. The results are compared by using two common descriptive statistics, i.e., normalized Root-Mean-Square Error (nRMSE) and Mean Absolute Percentage Error (MAPE). In comparison we find that the GRU generates the lowest prediction error with 5.12% MAPE and 8.24% nRMSE in January 2017 and the modified persistence model generates the overall lowest prediction error with 2.88% MAPE and 3.76% nRMSE in July 2017.

Citizen science research has been rapidly expanding in the past years and has become a popular approach in youth education. We investigated key drivers of youth participation in a citizen social science school project and the effects of participation on scientific and topic-related (i.e., political) interest and efficacy. Findings suggest that females, more politically and scientifically interested and more scientifically efficacious adolescents were more motivated to learn from the project. Science efficacy was also positively related to external reward motivation (i.e., winning an award). Both learning and external reward motivation increased the likelihood of participation. Pre- and post-measurement further indicated that participation in the project slightly increased science interest, but not science efficacy. However, it did increase both political interest and efficacy. Furthermore, our data revealed a decrease in science efficacy and interest in those who did not participate in the project, indicating an increasing gap in adolescents' scientific involvement.

Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia's pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to those observed for conspiracy thinking. Without downplaying a potential positive role for media interventions, the findings highlight the importance of a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of conspiratorial thinking. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To respond to consumers' rising concerns about environmental topics, airlines increasingly use green advertising. However, due to the environmental impact of flying, many green advertisements by airlines can be considered as "greenwashing" practices. In an experimental study with a quota-based sample (N = 329), we investigated the effects of two types of greenwashed advertisements for airlines: concrete compensation and abstract compensation (compared to a control condition). Following the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM), we also explored the moderating role of environmental knowledge in the ability of consumers to perceive greenwashing in airline advertising. Results indicated that concrete compensation claims did not increase greenwashing perceptions compared to the control condition. However, abstract compensation claims did, which, via perceived greenwashing, were negatively associated with brand outcomes and assessments of flying. Environmental knowledge did not moderate these effects. Implications for research on greenwashing, as well as practical conclusions for environmental communication, are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In information environments characterized by institutional distrust, fragmentation and the widespread dissemination of conspiracies and disinformation, citizens perceive misinformation as a salient and threatening issue. Especially amidst disruptive events and crises, news users are likely to believe that information is inaccurate or deceptive. Using an original 19‐country comparative survey study across diverse regions in the world (N = 19,037), we find that news users are likely to regard information on the Russian war in Ukraine as false. They are more likely to attribute false information to deliberative deception than to a lack of access to the war area or inaccurate expert knowledge. Russian sources are substantially more likely to be blamed for falsehoods than Ukrainian or Western sources – but these attribution biases depend on a country's position on the war. Our findings reveal that people mostly believe that falsehoods are intended to deceive them, and selectively associate misinformation with the opposed camp. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Given that terrorism is omnipresent on social media, it is imperative to study how seeing terror content online is related to individuals' attitudes, behaviors, and emotions. This study investigates how exposure to terrorism on social media associates with terror-related online self-disclosure and how self-disclosure, in turn, relates to fear of terrorism. A quota-based survey of young social media users (16- to 25-year-olds; N = 864) in Germany revealed that exposure to Islamist and far-right terrorism is related to higher online self-disclosure. Political ideology moderated the relationship between exposure to far-right terrorism and online self-disclosure, but not when exposed to Islamist terrorism. Attitudinal differentiation was negatively associated with self-disclosure. Additionally, we found an interaction effect of exposure to Islamist terrorism and attitudinal differentiation on self-disclosure. Finally, the results showed that online self-disclosure was positively related to fear of terrorism. By and large, our findings highlight the relevance of social media for the levels of fear. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper investigates how the acceptance of data-driven political campaigning depends on four different message characteristics. A vignette study was conducted in 25 countries with a total of 14,390 respondents who all evaluated multiple descriptions of political advertisements. Relying on multi-level models, we find that in particular the source and the issue of the message matters. Messages that are sent by a party the respondent likes and deal with a political issue the respondent considers important are rated more acceptable. Furthermore, targeting based on general characteristics instead of individual ones is considered more acceptable, as is a general call to participate in the upcoming elections instead of a specific call to vote for a certain party. Effects differ across regulatory contexts, with the negative impact of both individual targeting and a specific call to vote for a certain party being in countries that have higher levels of legislative regulation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Drawing on theories related to interpersonal and intergroup behavior, this study investigated effects of personality traits (i.e., empathy and identity insecurity) and attitudes (i.e., anti-migration attitudes and social dominance orientation) on the perceived severity of digital hate against immigrants in Austria. Findings of autoregressive path modeling using two-wave panel data revealed that empathic suffering and egalitarianism positively predicted perceived severity, while anti-migrant attitudes exhibited a negative prediction. In terms of interactions between personality and attitudes, we observed that the prediction of empathic suffering becomes less relevant for egalitarian individuals, which indicates an overwriting process that might be a promising way to counteract socially harmful digital hate perceptions. Implications for research on annotation tasks and hate interventions are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite increasing academic attention, several questions about fact-checking remain unanswered. First, it remains unclear to what extent fact-checks are effective across different political and media contexts. Second, we know little on whether features of the fact-check itself influence its success. Conducting an experiment in 16 European countries, this study aims to fill these gaps by examining two features of fact-checks that may affect their success: whether fact-checks include the political source of the misinformation, and the source of the fact-check itself. We find that fact-checks are successful in debunking misperceptions. Moreover, this debunking effect is consistent across countries. Looking at features of fact-checks, we find no indication that it matters whether fact-checks include the political source of the misinformation claim. Comparing fact-checks from independent organizations with those from public broadcasters, we do find, however, that who the fact-checker is matters, especially in combination with trust in this source. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

It can be difficult for citizens to discern factually accurate information from mis- and disinformation. Particularly in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the omnipresence of counterfactual narratives, propaganda, and partisan content may increase the likelihood that citizens select and accept mis -or disinformation. To assess citizens' performance in discerning false statements from factually accurate information on the war, we utilized original survey data across 19 countries (N = 19,037) with soft quotas for age, education, and gender to approximate population characteristics. Our main findings indicate that people perform relatively well in discerning factually accurate information from false statements and that self-perceived media literacy and the need for cognition corresponds with better performance. Stronger pro-Russia views on the war correspond with a lower performance in misinformation detection, whereas anti-Russia attitudes are associated with better evaluations of the statements' truthfulness. We find little cross-country variation in these patterns. As a key implication, we show that discernment between factually accurate information and mis- or disinformation is driven by both accuracy and partisan motivation and that these effects are similar across most different national contexts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scholars have expressed great hopes that social media use can foster the democratic engagement of young adults. However, this research has largely ignored non-political, entertainment-oriented uses of social media. In this essay, I theorize that social media use can significantly dampen political engagement because, by and large, young adults use social media primarily for non-political purposes, which distracts rather than mobilizes.