BACKGROUNDWe know a great deal about the historical fertility transition at the macro level. The dominating focus on the macro level in previous research on the fertility transition means, however, that to a large extent we lack knowledge about details of the decline and empirical tests of the leading explanatory frameworks.OBJECTIVEOur aim is to explore socioeconomic fertility differentials in an industrializing community, to gain insight about the details and discuss possible mechanisms. The study starts well before industrialization and finishes at the end of the transition.METHODWe use longitudinal individual-level data from the Scanian Economic-Demographic Database, which contains demographic as well as socioeconomic information, including occupation, landholding, and income. In the analysis we use hazard regressions with shared frailty at the family level.RESULTSThe transition involved not only parity-specific stopping but also spacing. While the upper social strata had higher fertility prior to the transition, they started to control their fertility earlier, by the 1880s, and also more consistently. Farmers, the middle class, and skilled workers followed in the decades after, and unskilled workers with some additional delay.CONCLUSIONSThese findings are partly inconsistent with several of the major explanations in the literature, such as mortality decline, increased female labor force participation, and a quantity-quality trade-off, but consistent with an innovation process where new ideas and attitudes about family limitation spread from the elite to other social groups.COMMENTSFurther studies are required to empirically test the innovation-diffusion theory.1. IntroductionOne of the major demographic changes during the past 200 years has been the emergence of the two-child norm as part of the creation of the modern family. In most parts of Western Europe this process started in the late nineteenth century and was completed by the 1930s. In Sweden marital fertility started to decline around 1880, and after about 50 years, total fertility had declined to below two children per woman (Hofsten and Lundstrom 1976). Since then completed fertility has remained quite stable at around two births per woman, despite large variations in birth rates, giving empirical support for the two-child ideal of modern families.We know a great deal about the historical fertility transition at the macro level. It was fairly simultaneous in Western Europe, France excluded, starting in the late nineteenth century, and earlier in urban areas than in rural. At the micro level we also know a great deal about fertility before the transition, but less on the transition itself, and even less integrating the pre-transitional period with the transition. We therefore still lack a fundamental understanding of the whole process of fertility decline (cf. Guinnane 2011). There has been much theorizing and generalization of empirical evidence around the fertility transition with a number of influential explanatory frameworks emerging. In most cases, however, the empirical support is rather weak. Examples include the quantity-quality trade-off, the cost-of-time hypotheses, and the innovation-diffusion hypothesis, as well as mortality decline as the main trigger of fertility decline. Sometimes the hypothesis in itself has been used to explain other outcomes, as in the case of the quantity-quality trade-off, which has been viewed as instrumental in the transition from preindustrial economic stagnation to modern economic growth (see Galor 2011).The aim of this paper is to look at fertility patterns by socioeconomic status before and during the fertility transition in order to gain new insights into the explanations of the transition. Rather than performing direct tests of different hypotheses about the transition, for which we lack sufficient data, we will discuss likely socioeconomic patterns that could be derived from the standard explanations, and put these to an empirical test using high-quality individual level data with information on socioeconomic status derived from occupation and land holding. …