Marta Łukowska, Andrea Serino, Roy Salomon, Thomas Metzinger, Jean-Paul Noel, Olaf Blanke, Nathan Faivre, Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience (LNCO), Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne (EPFL), Center for Neuroprosthetics [Geneva] (CNP), The Gonda Multidisciplinary Brain Research Center, Bar-Ilan University [Israël], Vanderbilt Brain Institute, Vanderbilt University School of Medicine [Nashville], Consciousness Lab, Institute of Psychology, Jagiellonian University, Cracow, Uniwersytet Jagielloński w Krakowie = Jagiellonian University (UJ), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne (CES), Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (UP1)-Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), Philosophisches Seminar/Gutenberg Research College, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, Mainz, Germany, Johannes Gutenberg - Universität Mainz (JGU), Frankfurt Institute for Advanced Studies (FIAS ), Dipartimento di Psicologia - Department of Psychology [Universita di Bologna] (PSI), Alma Mater Studiorum Università di Bologna [Bologna] (UNIBO), Department of Neurology, University Hospital, Geneva, Geneva University Hospitals and Geneva University, O.B. is supported by the Bertarelli Foundation, the Swiss National Science Foundation, and the European Science Foundation. A.S. is supported by W Investments S.A., Switzerland (industrial grant ‘RealiSM’), by Swiss National Science Foundation (PP00P3_163951), by the Leenards Foundation. R.S. was supported by the National Center of Competence in Research (NCCR) 'SYNAPSY – The Synaptic Bases of Mental Diseases' financed by the Swiss National Science Foundation (n° 51AU40_125759). NF is an EPFL Fellow co-funded by Marie-Curie and was supported by the EU Human Brain Project. J.P.N. was supported by a Fulbright Scholarship by the United States Department of State, Bureau of Education and Cultural Affairs. MŁ was supported by National Science Centre Poland (PRELUDIUM 7, grant no. 2014/13/N/HS6/02963)., European Project: 604102,EC:FP7:ICT,FP7-ICT-2013-FET-F,HBP(2013), Laboratory of Cognitive Neuroscience ( LNCO ), Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne ( EPFL ), Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne ( CES ), Université Panthéon-Sorbonne ( UP1 ) -Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique ( CNRS ), Dipartimento di Psicologia - Department of Psychology [Universita di Bologna] ( PSI ), Università di Bologna [Bologna] ( UNIBO ), and Johannes Gutenberg - Universität Mainz = Johannes Gutenberg University (JGU)
International audience; Recent studies have highlighted the role of multisensory integration as a key mechanism of self-consciousness. In particular, integration of bodily signals within the peripersonal space (PPS) underlies the experience of the self in a body we own (self-identification) and that is experienced as occupying a specific location in space (self-location), two main components of bodily self-consciousness (BSC). Experiments investigating the effects of multisensory integration on BSC have typically employed supra-threshold sensory stimuli, neglecting the role of unconscious sensory signals in BSC, as tested in other consciousness research. Here, we used psychophysical techniques to test whether multisensory integration of bodily stimuli underlying BSC also occurs for multisensory inputs presented below the threshold of conscious perception. Our results indicate that visual stimuli rendered invisible through continuous flash suppression boost processing of tactile stimuli on the body (Exp. 1), and enhance the perception of near-threshold tactile stimuli (Exp. 2), only once they entered PPS. We then employed unconscious multisensory stimulation to manipulate BSC. Participants were presented with tactile stimulation on their body and with visual stimuli on a virtual body, seen at a distance, which were either visible or rendered invisible. We found that participants reported higher self-identification with the virtual body in the synchronous visuo-tactile stimulation (as compared to asynchronous stimulation; Exp. 3), and shifted their self-location toward the virtual body (Exp.4), even if stimuli were fully invisible. Our results indicate that multisensory inputs, even outside of awareness, are integrated and affect the phenomenological content of self-consciousness, grounding BSC firmly in the field of psychophysical consciousness studies.