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Research on the COVID-19 pandemic has revealed some previously concealed links between underlying health conditions like obesity, diabetes, and heart disease and COVID-19 fatalities. This raises questions about the importance of healthy diets and lifestyles for the survivability of COVID-19 infections and possibly other infectious diseases. We statistically examine the connections between social determinants of health, reported health outcomes, and COVID-19 survivability using available data from over 3000 counties across the United States. Our study shows that preexisting conditions such as diabetes and cardiovascular disease reduce the observed survivability of COVID-19 prior to the broad availability of vaccines. Furthermore, we test several of the social determinants of health identified in the literature and find them to be statistically correlated with negative health outcomes with the expected sign. For example, improved food security and better access to exercise correlate with lower observed diabetes rates and improved cardiovascular health. Our findings also indicate the positive impact of food assistance programs like the so-called food stamps program of the United States Department of Agriculture, however, some of our findings differ between rural and urban counties across the United States. Based on our findings, we estimate that twenty-two-thousand (22,000) lives could have been saved in 2020 if residents in all U.S. counties were as healthy as those in the healthiest counties found in our sample. We further estimate that reducing food insecurity, and improving access to exercise could have prevented ten-thousand-eight-hundred (10,800) fatalities attributed to COVID-19 in 2020.

The European Commission (EC) unveiled its Farm to Fork and Biodiversity Strategies that would impose restrictions on European Union (EU) agriculture through targeted reductions in the use of land, fertilizers, antimicrobials, and pesticides. The proposal also pledges to use EC trade policies and other international efforts to support this vision of sustainable agri-food systems, suggesting intentions to expand the reach of the policy beyond the EU. To examine the economic implications of the proposal, we performed a range of policy simulations on several of the proposed targets using three progressively broader adoption scenarios of the EC’s initiative. Under all these scenarios, we found that the proposed input reductions affect EU farmers by reducing their agricultural production by 7 to 12 percent and diminishing their competitiveness in both domestic and export markets. Moreover, we found that adoption of these strategies would have impacts that stretch beyond the EU, driving up worldwide food prices by 9 (EU only adoption) to 89 percent (global adoption), negatively affecting consumer budgets, and ultimately reducing worldwide societal welfare by $96 billion to $1.1 trillion, depending on how widely other countries adopt the strategies. We estimate that the higher food prices under these scenarios would increase the number of food-insecure people in the world’s most vulnerable regions by 22 million (EU only adoption) to 185 million (global adoption).

Summary This paper examines the implications of productivity improvements in agriculture, industry, and services for global poverty. We find that, in poor countries, increases in agricultural productivity generally have a larger poverty-reduction effect than increases in industry or services. This differential declines as average incomes rise, partly because agriculture becomes smaller as a share of the economy, and partly because agricultural productivity growth becomes less effective in reducing poverty. The source of the poverty-reduction benefits from agricultural productivity growth changes as innovations are more widely adopted—moving from increases in producer returns to reductions in consumer prices.

The volume-based Special Safeguard Mechanism was proposed as essential for small, poor farmers and became the proximate cause of the collapse of the Doha Agenda negotiations in 2008. But is it helpful for these farmers, given that it is likely to be applied when farm output is depressed and many poor farmers in developing countries need to buy food? Stochastic simulations for 31 countries suggest that use of this safeguard in line with the proposed World Trade Organization rules would raise the world poverty headcount by an average of 24 million. The adverse poverty impact of the duty is larger when the quantity safeguard is triggered than it would be in other years, because lower farm output levels reduce or reverse the benefits to poor farm households from higher prices.

Rapid changes in global food prices in recent years are widely viewed as a serious threat to global development. While various sources of price instability in agriculture have been identified, little attention appears to have been given to the importance of changes in trade policies that insulate domestic prices from world markets as a source of volatility in world prices. A contribution of this paper is to show that these interventions are dynamically more complex than simple proportional insulation. Insulation against an initial price increase in world prices increases the magnitude of that increase, while subsequent adjustments to the level of protection change the fundamental nature of price volatility. We find such policies are widespread and increase the volatility of world prices while not reducing the volatility of domestic prices because of the collective action problem involved in this form of policy intervention.

Food price volatility—and in particular price spikes—can create serious problems for vulnerable individuals and groups. One quick, simple approach for governments to deal with this problem is to insulate their domestic market from changes in world prices. It turns out that many governments do this to a large degree, resulting in their domestic prices becoming much less volatile than world market prices. But if changes in international prices are sustained for a few years, policymakers appear to pass through most of these changes. Such sustained increases in food prices appear to be helpful in reducing poverty and to have had favorable impacts on global poverty since 2006. To individual policymakers, this approach of using short-term insulation and long-term pass-through seems to be very practical and useful, even though they know that insulation measures, like export restrictions and import tariff reductions, are beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Collectively, however, this policy approach appeared to be ineffective in reducing poverty during the 2006–2008 price spikes because price insulation contributed substantially to increasing food price volatility.

Global food prices have increased substantially since mid-2010, as have prices in many developing countries. In this study we assess the poverty impact of the price changes between June and December 2010 in twenty-eight low and middle income countries. This is done by gathering detailed information on individual households' food production and consumption levels for thirty-eight agricultural and food commodities to assess the impacts on household welfare. This study estimates that this sudden food price surge increased the number of poor people globally, but with considerably different impacts in different countries. The heterogeneity of these impacts is partly related to the wide variation in the transmission of global prices to local prices and partly to differences in households' patterns of production and consumption. On balance, the adverse welfare impact on net buyers outweighs the benefits to net sellers resulting in an increase in the number of poor and in the depth of poverty. We estimate that the average poverty change was 1.1 percentage points in low income countries and 0.7 percentage points in middle income countries with a net increase of 44 million people falling below the $1.25 per day extreme poverty line.

The Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region is expected to benefit more than most other regions from continued rapid growth in China and India. This paper analyzes the trade-related implications of this growth for the MENA countries using a global general equilibrium model, modified to take into account the focus of China and, increasingly, India on exports of manufactures from global production chains. To obtain a better idea of the implications for key countries in the region, we developed a database with expanded coverage of Middle-Eastern countries. We find that most of the gains to the MENA region come from improvements in the terms of trade, particularly linked to increasing demand for energy. Exports from the Middle East as a whole are expected to decline although exports from the non-oil economies will likely expand. Fuelled by higher incomes and by increases in the competitiveness of China and India, imports into MENA are expected to increase. In the oil-exporting countries of the Middle East, Dutch-disease effects increase the importance of policies to promote adjustment to the changing world environment.

In many poor countries, the recent increases in prices of staple foods raise the real incomes of those selling food, many of whom are relatively poor, while hurting net food consumers, many of whom are also relatively poor. The impacts on poverty will certainly be very diverse, but the average impact on poverty depends upon the balance between these two effects, and can only be determined by looking at real-world data. Results using household data for ten observations on nine low-income countries show that the short-run impacts of higher staple food prices on poverty differ considerably by commodity and by country, but, that poverty increases are much more frequent, and larger, than poverty reductions. The recent large increases in food prices appear likely to raise overall poverty in low income countries substantially.

With the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) over the past decade, demand for quantitative analysis of their likely impacts has surged. The main quantitative tool for performing such analysis is Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling. Yet these models have been widely criticized for performing poorly (Kehoe, 2002) and having weak econometric foundations (McKitrick, 1998; Jorgenson, 1984). FTA results have been shown to be particularly sensitive to the trade elasticities, with small trade elasticities generating large terms of trade effects and relatively modest efficiency gains, whereas large trade elasticities lead to the opposite result. Critics are understandably wary of results being determined largely by the authors’ choice of trade elasticities. Where do these trade elasticities come from? CGE modelers typically draw these elasticities from econometric work that uses time series price variation to identify an elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and composite imports (Alaouze, 1977; Alaouze, et al., 1977; Stern et al., 1976; Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera, 2003). This approach has three problems: the use of point estimates as “truth”, the magnitude of the point estimates, and estimating the relevant elasticity. First, modelers take point estimates drawn from the econometric literature, while ignoring the precision of these estimates. As we will make clear below, the confidence one has in various CGE conclusions depends critically on the size of the confidence interval around parameter estimates. Standard “robustness checks” such as systematically raising or lowering the substitution parameters does not properly address this problem because it ignores information about which parameters we know with some precision and which we do not. A second problem with most existing studies derives from the use of import price series to identify home vs. foreign substitution, for example, tends to systematically understate the true elasticity. This is because these estimates take price variation as exogenous when estimating the import demand functions, and ignore quality variation. When quality is high, import demand and prices will be jointly high. This biases estimated elasticities toward zero. A related point is that the fixed-weight import price series used by most authors are theoretically inappropriate for estimating the elasticities of interest. CGE modelers generally examine a nested utility structure, with domestic production substitution for a CES composite import bundle. The appropriate price series is then the corresponding CES price index among foreign varieties. Constructing such an index requires knowledge of the elasticity of substitution among foreign varieties (see below). By using a fixed-weight import price series, previous estimates place too much weight on high foreign prices, and too small a weight on low foreign prices. In other words, they overstate the degree of price variation that exists, relative to a CES price index. Reconciling small trade volume movements with large import price series movements requires a small elasticity of substitution. This problem, and that of unmeasured quality variation, helps explain why typical estimated elasticities are very small. The third problem with the existing literature is that estimates taken from other researchers’ studies typically employ different levels of aggregation, and exploit different sources of price variation, from what policy modelers have in mind. Employment of elasticities in experiments ill-matched to their original estimation can be problematic. For example, estimates may be calculated at a higher or lower level of aggregation than the level of analysis than the modeler wants to examine. Estimating substitutability across sources for paddy rice gives one a quite different answer than estimates that look at agriculture as a whole. When analyzing Free Trade Agreements, the principle policy experiment is a change in relative prices among foreign suppliers caused by lowering tariffs within the FTA. Understanding the substitution this will induce across those suppliers is critical to gauging the FTA’s real effects. Using home v. foreign elasticities rather than elasticities of substitution among imports supplied from different countries may be quite misleading. Moreover, these “sourcing” elasticities are critical for constructing composite import price series to appropriate estimate home v. foreign substitutability. In summary, the history of estimating the substitution elasticities governing trade flows in CGE models has been checkered at best. Clearly there is a need for improved econometric estimation of these trade elasticities that is well-integrated into the CGE modeling framework. This paper provides such estimation and integration, and has several significant merits. First, we choose our experiment carefully. Our CGE analysis focuses on the prospective Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) currently under negotiation. This is one of the most important FTAs currently “in play” in international negotiations. It also fits nicely with the source data used to estimate the trade elasticities, which is largely based on imports into North and South America. Our assessment is done in a perfectly competitive, comparative static setting in order to emphasize the role of the trade elasticities in determining the conventional gains/losses from such an FTA. This type of model is still widely used by government agencies for the evaluation of such agreements. Extensions to incorporate imperfect competition are straightforward, but involve the introduction of additional parameters (markups, extent of unexploited scale economies) as well as structural assumptions (entry/no-entry, nature of inter-firm rivalry) that introduce further uncertainty. Since our focus is on the effects of a PTA we estimate elasticities of substitution across multiple foreign supply sources. We do not use cross-exporter variation in prices or tariffs alone. Exporter price series exhibit a high degree of multicolinearity, and in any case, would be subject to unmeasured quality variation as described previously. Similarly, tariff variation by itself is typically unhelpful because by their very nature, Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs are non-discriminatory in nature, affecting all suppliers in the same way. Tariff preferences, where they exist, are often difficult to measure – sometimes being confounded by quantitative barriers, restrictive rules of origin, and other restrictions. Instead we employ a unique methodology and data set drawing on not only tariffs, but also bilateral transportation costs for goods traded internationally (Hummels, 1999). Transportation costs vary much more widely than do tariffs, allowing much more precise estimation of the trade elasticities that are central to CGE analysis of FTAs. We have highly disaggregated commodity trade flow data, and are therefore able to provide estimates that precisely match the commodity aggregation scheme employed in the subsequent CGE model. We follow the GTAP Version 5.0 aggregation scheme which includes 42 merchandise trade commodities covering food products, natural resources and manufactured goods. With the exception of two primary commodities that are not traded, we are able to estimate trade elasticities for all merchandise commodities that are significantly different form zero at the 95% confidence level. Rather than producing point estimates of the resulting welfare, export and employment effects, we report confidence intervals instead. These are based on repeated solution of the model, drawing from a distribution of trade elasticity estimates constructed based on the econometrically estimated standard errors. There is now a long history of CGE studies based on SSA: Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison and Vinod, 1992; Wigle, 1991; Pagon and Shannon, 1987) Ho

Purpose This chapter examines the long-run behavior of real food prices and the impact of food prices on poor and vulnerable households. It also examines the price policy responses of governments to high and volatile food prices, and the impact of food prices and policies on the poorest in the society. Methodology/approach We focus on the impacts of food price changes on individual households, particularly on those living near the poverty line using the standard World Bank measure of poverty at US$1.25 per day in purchasing power. Findings We found that the effect of an exogenous increase in food prices typically raises poverty in the short run when many poor households are net buyers of grain and wage rates do not have time to fully adjust. In the long run, higher food prices increase food output and raise the wage rates of poor households from unskilled off-farm labor. The end result is that higher food prices can contribute to long-run poverty reduction. Practical implications Combining the impact of the price changes and government policy responses allows an assessment of the overall impact of higher world food prices on poverty.

Increasingly economists are being called on to assess not only the national implications of global trade and environmental policies, but also the subnational consequences, including the impacts on low income and food insecure households. Bridging global, national and subnational scales within a single analytical framework presents great challenges. The purpose of this Technical Paper is to outline in detail one approach to this problem. By nesting a poverty module within the GTAP modeling framework, users are able to assess the impact of global trade and environmental policies, as well as prospective climate change, on poverty across seven different strata or sub-populations within the focus countries. The application demonstrated here that of multilateral trade reforms demonstrates that the poverty impacts of global policies can be quite heterogeneous and sometimes unexpected. Since the initial publication of this Technical Paper, others have sought to extend the sample of countries covered in the GTAP-POV module. This has led to the development of improved techniques for dealing with challenges posed by the household survey data. This revised version of the technical paper includes four appendices which provide STATA code to accomplish key steps in the process of constructing a GTAP-POV module for an individual country. We have also included a new section at the end of part 3 of the paper in which we compare patterns of poverty across the full range of countries available to us at this point in time. Our hope is that this Technical Paper will continue to inspire members of the GTAP network, as well as others, to contribute additional poverty modules. Eventually we hope to cover most developing countries. This would permit more definitive analysis of the poverty impacts of global economic and environmental policies.

Cet article analyse les repercussions de la liberalisation commerciale multilaterale sur les menages pauvres pour le Bresil et le Chili, en combinant les resultats d’une etude originale de la consommation en coupe internationale avec des donnees de revenus disponibles issues d’enquetes aupres des menages. L’etude met l’accent sur le court terme, ou le capital et le travail independant sont consideres comme immobiles entre secteurs, avec l’emploi salarie comme seul facteur de production mobile. Le resultat montre que la pauvrete recule au Bresil comme au Chili. Toutefois, alors que les populations specialisees dans l’agriculture connaissent dans les deux pays une nette reduction de la pauvrete, les menages de travailleurs independants non agricole et de salaries subissent un accroissement de la pauvrete.Classification JEL : F02 ; F11 ; F13.

The impacts of global trade reform on poverty are a key concern in the current trade negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda. The aggregate poverty impacts of trade reform are, in turn, strongly linked to the impacts of such reforms on the rural population as they constitute the overwhelming majority of the poor in almost all developing countries. This paper uses a new micro-simulation methodology designed to analyze this critical issue. The methodology is first explained, and then applied to three developing countries of particular interest-Chile, Malawi, and Vietnam. A key feature is the distinction between the short-run impacts of reform, where many factors-most importantly selfemployed labor of the poor-tend to be immobile between sectors, and the longer-run impacts when factors find their highest return, regardless of the sector of employment. This distinction makes an enormous difference and

This paper uses a global computable general equilibrium framework with new detail on six Levant countries – the Arab Republic of Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, the Syrian Arab Republic and Turkey – to quantify the direct and indirect economic effects of the Syrian war and the advance of the Islamic State on the Levant. Syria and Iraq bear the brunt of the direct economic costs, while the other Levant countries lose in per capita but not in aggregate terms as the inflows of refugees increase the size of their populations. The war has undermined progress towards deeper regional trade integration, thus adding to varying degrees to the direct costs sustained by the Levant economies and, in the cases of Syria and Iraq, doubling their welfare losses. All Levant countries are foregoing opportunities to expand intra‐Levant trade and the associated gains in economic efficiency. The average welfare effects are not indicative of the distributional effects of war within countries.

This study uses household models based on detailed expenditure and agricultural production data from 31 developing countries to assess the impacts of changes in global food prices on poverty in individual countries and for the world as a whole. The analysis finds that food price increases unrelated to productivity changes in developing countries raise poverty in the short run in all but a few countries with broadly-distributed agricultural resources. This result is primarily because the poor spend large shares of their incomes on food and many poor farmers are net buyers of food. In the longer run, two other important factors come into play: poor workers are likely to benefit from increases in wage rates for unskilled workers from higher food prices, and poor farmers are likely to benefit from higher agricultural profits as they raise their output. As a result, higher food prices appear to lower global poverty in the long run.

Constraints on land and water resources, growth in population, and an apparent slowdown in agricultural productivity raise concerns that food prices may rise substantially in the coming decades. A key question is whether policies aimed at increasing agricultural productivity may be effective in reversing the long-run trend and bringing about significant reductions in food prices. This article uses a global general equilibrium model and a set of microeconomic household models for a sample of 26 developing countries to assess potential implications of higher agricultural productivity--such as through the adoption of genetically modified plants--for household incomes, farmer profits, and poverty. Higher agricultural productivity resulting from increased investments in research and development is found capable of significantly lowering poverty by lowering the cost of consumption of the poorest households without significantly hurting farmers' returns. We also found that raising agricultural productivity among the developing countries only is sufficient to achieve most poverty reduction in the global scenario.

This book presents a comprehensive analysis of current trends of trade and economic growth in Asia, assessing how they are likely to develop in the future. It examines the evolving patterns of Asian economic development with the emergence of China, including since China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001. It is written by experts specialising in economic growth and regional and global trade/investment issues, alongside country specialists who have examined the development path of Asian economies. It discusses the significance of a export-oriented growth strategy on the Asian region, and the likely patterns of intra-regional specialisation given China’s rise. The book examines the degree to which the remarkable growth of China is likely to affect other Asian countries in terms of global market share, and growth prospects. The book explores how the rise of intra-industry trade is affecting patterns of specialisation in the region, and appraises the role of multinational corporations and foreign direct investment. Informed by the latest empirical economic thinking, this book is a rigorous examination of the influence of an emerging economic superpower, and the future for economic growth in Asia. Readers interested in the implications of the rise of China, the effect on the economic development path of the most successful developing nations of our time and the lessons to be heeded from China’s integration with the global economy will find this a thorough yet accessible account of the influence of an emerging economic superpower.

Continuing rapid growth of China and India can be expected to raise incomes in Russia, but also to put adjustment pressure on Russian firms. The impacts of the rapid growth of China and India on the Russian economy are explored by examining a baseline projection using a global general equilibrium model, and then assessing the implications of higher-than-expected growth in China and India. The authors find that a major source of benefits to Russia is likely to be terms-of-trade improvements associated with higher energy prices - a quite different channel of effect from that for many developing countries that benefit primarily through expanded opportunities to trade directly with these emerging giants. Taking into account the likely improvements in the quality and variety of exports from China and India, the gains to Russia increase substantially. The expansion of the energy sector and the contraction of manufacturing and services are a sign of a Dutch disease effect that will increase the importance of policies to encourage adaptation to the changing world environment.

The breakdown of the WTO negotiations under the Doha Development Agenda has inspired critics to highlight the lack of effort on the part of rich countries to reform their agricultural policies. In this paper, we focus instead the poverty impacts of developing country tariff cuts – particularly those in agriculture. We argue that the Doha Development Agenda is fundamentally less poverty-friendly than it could be -- in large part due to the absence of tariff cuts on staple food products in developing countries. Such cuts would give the poor access to food at world prices, thereby reducing the cost of living at the poverty line. We also explore the contention that such tariff cuts will hurt the poor working in agriculture. Based on our analysis of the impacts of multilateral trade policy reforms on a sample of fifteen developing countries, we find there is some evidence of poverty increases in agriculture. However, such effects are minimized by ensuring that agricultural tariffs are cut in all developing countries. Overall, the poverty-reducing impact of lower food prices dominates; we conclude that the Doha Development Agenda would be more poverty friendly if it were to include deeper cuts in developing country agricultural tariffs. This contrasts sharply with calls for special products exemptions by many developing country advocates.

Rich countries' agricultural trade policies are the battleground on which the future of the WTO's troubled Doha Round will be determined. Subject to widespread criticism, they nonetheless appear to be almost immune to serious reform, and one of their most common defenses is that they protect poor farmers. The authors' findings reject this claim. The analysis uses detailed data on farm incomes to show that major commodity programs are highly regressive in the United States, and that the only serious losses under trade reform are among large, wealthy farmers in a few heavily protected subsectors. In contrast, analysis using household data from 15 developing countries indicates that reforming rich countries' agricultural trade policies would lift large numbers of developing country farm households out of poverty. In the majority of cases these gains are not outweighed by the poverty-increasing effects of higher food prices among other households. Agricultural reforms that appear feasible, even under an ambitious Doha Round, achieve only a fraction of the benefits for developing countries that full liberalization promises, but protect U.S. large farms from most of the rigors of adjustment. Finally, the analysis indicates that maximal trade-led poverty reductions occur when developing countries participate more fully in agricultural trade liberalization.

Most researchers examining poverty and multilateral trade liberalization have had to examine average, or per capita effects, suggesting that if per capita real income rises, poverty will fall. This inference can be misleading. Combining results from a new international cross-section consumption analysis with earnings data from household surveys, this article analyzes the implications of multilateral trade liberalization for poverty in Indonesia. It finds that the aggregate reduction in Indonesia's national poverty headcount following global trade liberalization masks a more complex set of impacts across groups. In the short run the poverty headcount rises slightly for self-employed agricultural households, as agricultural profits fail to keep up with increases in consumer prices. In the long run the poverty headcount falls for all earnings strata, as increased demand for unskilled workers lifts incomes for the formerly self-employed, some of whom move into the wage labor market. A decomposition of the poverty changes in Indonesia associated with different countries' trade policies finds that reform in other countries leads to a reduction in poverty in Indonesia but that liberalization of Indonesia's trade policies leads to an increase. The method used here can be readily extended to any of the other 13 countries in the sample.

With the proliferation of Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) over the past decade, demand for quantitative analysis of their likely impacts has surged. The main quantitative tool for performing such analysis is Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) modeling. Yet these models have been widely criticized for performing poorly (Kehoe, 2002) and having weak econometric foundations (McKitrick, 1998; Jorgenson, 1984). FTA results have been shown to be particularly sensitive to the trade elasticities, with small trade elasticities generating large terms of trade effects and relatively modest efficiency gains, whereas large trade elasticities lead to the opposite result. Critics are understandably wary of results being determined largely by the authors’ choice of trade elasticities. Where do these trade elasticities come from? CGE modelers typically draw these elasticities from econometric work that uses time series price variation to identify an elasticity of substitution between domestic goods and composite imports (Alaouze, 1977; Alaouze, et al., 1977; Stern et al., 1976; Gallaway, McDaniel and Rivera, 2003). This approach has three problems: the use of point estimates as “truth”, the magnitude of the point estimates, and estimating the relevant elasticity. First, modelers take point estimates drawn from the econometric literature, while ignoring the precision of these estimates. As we will make clear below, the confidence one has in various CGE conclusions depends critically on the size of the confidence interval around parameter estimates. Standard “robustness checks” such as systematically raising or lowering the substitution parameters does not properly address this problem because it ignores information about which parameters we know with some precision and which we do not. A second problem with most existing studies derives from the use of import price series to identify home vs. foreign substitution, for example, tends to systematically understate the true elasticity. This is because these estimates take price variation as exogenous when estimating the import demand functions, and ignore quality variation. When quality is high, import demand and prices will be jointly high. This biases estimated elasticities toward zero. A related point is that the fixed-weight import price series used by most authors are theoretically inappropriate for estimating the elasticities of interest. CGE modelers generally examine a nested utility structure, with domestic production substitution for a CES composite import bundle. The appropriate price series is then the corresponding CES price index among foreign varieties. Constructing such an index requires knowledge of the elasticity of substitution among foreign varieties (see below). By using a fixed-weight import price series, previous estimates place too much weight on high foreign prices, and too small a weight on low foreign prices. In other words, they overstate the degree of price variation that exists, relative to a CES price index. Reconciling small trade volume movements with large import price series movements requires a small elasticity of substitution. This problem, and that of unmeasured quality variation, helps explain why typical estimated elasticities are very small. The third problem with the existing literature is that estimates taken from other researchers’ studies typically employ different levels of aggregation, and exploit different sources of price variation, from what policy modelers have in mind. Employment of elasticities in experiments ill-matched to their original estimation can be problematic. For example, estimates may be calculated at a higher or lower level of aggregation than the level of analysis than the modeler wants to examine. Estimating substitutability across sources for paddy rice gives one a quite different answer than estimates that look at agriculture as a whole. When analyzing Free Trade Agreements, the principle policy experiment is a change in relative prices among foreign suppliers caused by lowering tariffs within the FTA. Understanding the substitution this will induce across those suppliers is critical to gauging the FTA’s real effects. Using home v. foreign elasticities rather than elasticities of substitution among imports supplied from different countries may be quite misleading. Moreover, these “sourcing” elasticities are critical for constructing composite import price series to appropriate estimate home v. foreign substitutability. In summary, the history of estimating the substitution elasticities governing trade flows in CGE models has been checkered at best. Clearly there is a need for improved econometric estimation of these trade elasticities that is well-integrated into the CGE modeling framework. This paper provides such estimation and integration, and has several significant merits. First, we choose our experiment carefully. Our CGE analysis focuses on the prospective Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) currently under negotiation. This is one of the most important FTAs currently “in play” in international negotiations. It also fits nicely with the source data used to estimate the trade elasticities, which is largely based on imports into North and South America. Our assessment is done in a perfectly competitive, comparative static setting in order to emphasize the role of the trade elasticities in determining the conventional gains/losses from such an FTA. This type of model is still widely used by government agencies for the evaluation of such agreements. Extensions to incorporate imperfect competition are straightforward, but involve the introduction of additional parameters (markups, extent of unexploited scale economies) as well as structural assumptions (entry/no-entry, nature of inter-firm rivalry) that introduce further uncertainty. Since our focus is on the effects of a PTA we estimate elasticities of substitution across multiple foreign supply sources. We do not use cross-exporter variation in prices or tariffs alone. Exporter price series exhibit a high degree of multicolinearity, and in any case, would be subject to unmeasured quality variation as described previously. Similarly, tariff variation by itself is typically unhelpful because by their very nature, Most Favored Nation (MFN) tariffs are non-discriminatory in nature, affecting all suppliers in the same way. Tariff preferences, where they exist, are often difficult to measure – sometimes being confounded by quantitative barriers, restrictive rules of origin, and other restrictions. Instead we employ a unique methodology and data set drawing on not only tariffs, but also bilateral transportation costs for goods traded internationally (Hummels, 1999). Transportation costs vary much more widely than do tariffs, allowing much more precise estimation of the trade elasticities that are central to CGE analysis of FTAs. We have highly disaggregated commodity trade flow data, and are therefore able to provide estimates that precisely match the commodity aggregation scheme employed in the subsequent CGE model. We follow the GTAP Version 5.0 aggregation scheme which includes 42 merchandise trade commodities covering food products, natural resources and manufactured goods. With the exception of two primary commodities that are not traded, we are able to estimate trade elasticities for all merchandise commodities that are significantly different form zero at the 95% confidence level. Rather than producing point estimates of the resulting welfare, export and employment effects, we report confidence intervals instead. These are based on repeated solution of the model, drawing from a distribution of trade elasticity estimates constructed based on the econometrically estimated standard errors. There is now a long history of CGE studies based on SSA: Systematic Sensitivity Analysis (Harrison and Vinod, 1992; Wigle, 1991; Pagon and Shannon, 1987) However, to date, all of these studies have taken their parameter distributions “from the literature”. None of these studies has been accompanied by an econometric study aimed at estimating the key parameters and their distributions at the relevant level of aggregation used in the CGE analysis. For this paper, we use the Gaussian Quadrature (GQ) approach to SSA, which has proven to be the most efficient and unbiased approach to systematically assessing the sensitivity of model results to parametric uncertainty (DeVuyst and Preckel, 1997; Arndt, 1996). We find that many of the results are qualitatively robust to uncertainty in the trade elasticities. In those cases where our findings are not robust, we explore the source of underlying uncertainty. In this way, the paper addresses the fundamental question: How Robust are CGE Analyses of Free Trade Agreements?