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Law-abiding firms often conceal their political activity (CPA). Our framework analyzes the circumstances that prompt firms to do so. Specifically, we investigate why socioeconomic stakeholders may object to firms' CPA; why policymakers may cater (or not) to these stakeholders; and how the broader institutional context shapes the preferences of stakeholders and policymakers. Our framework addresses multiple levels of analysis including firms, markets, state agencies, political issues, and institutional systems. We draw on multiple disciplines to derive propositions highlighting critical determinants of the focal firm's choice to conduct CPA more or less covertly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do we know about the politics of corporate governance in emergingmarkets? Although the state-level institutions have been amply explored, firm-leveldynamics remain under-theorized. Complementing the orthodox emphasison external finance as causal force behind the adoption of 'minority shareholderprotections', the article outlines an alternative mechanism for firms operating inpolitical settings with heightened risk of state intrusion. The Anglo-Saxon governanceinstitutions can serve domestic managers as a strategy to build alliances withforeign stakeholders so as to counteract a dirigiste government. Empirically, theauthor seeks to explain the implementation of internationally accepted standardsof corporate governance by Russia's big business between 1999 and 2004.The project disaggregates 'corporate governance' into specific institutions andexamines their quality at the firm level. The causal inference links the shift instate policy vis-a- -vis corporate property to the improved treatment of minorityowners by the company insiders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Law-abiding firms often conduct corporate political activity (CPA) covertly, yet such use of secrecy in CPA has not been matched by our understanding of the phenomenon. We rigorously conceptualize the phenomenon of relative ""secrecy"" or ""covertness"" in CPA. Our framework then analyzes the circumstances that prompt firms to conceal their CPA. Specifically, we investigate why socioeconomic stakeholders may object to firms' CPA; why policymakers may cater (or not) to these stakeholders; and how the broader institutional context shapes the preferences of stakeholders and policymakers. We build on theories from multiple disciplines: to understand stakeholders' preferences, we adopt both an economic perspective to examine material benefits or costs and a sociological perspective to examine perceptions of legitimacy; to understand policymakers' incentives and the institutional environment, we draw on scholarship in political science. Our framework addresses multiple levels of analysis including firms, markets, state agencies, political issues, and institutional systems. We argue that theory is particularly important for investigating consequential phenomena that yield scarce data -- it is theory which guides data discovery ex ante, helps assess bias ex post, and uncovers key insights that empirical analysis alone cannot generate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The fact that state-firm interactions matter for both public and private sectors is well accepted in multiple disciplines. Yet the mechanisms through which the state affects firms' strategies and how firms respond to the state's influence have been narrowly defined. Existing literatures have analyzed the role of the state to supply various institutions to regulate firms' economic activities. Accordingly, the main research focus in non-market strategy has been examining how firms lobby or participate in the political processes to influence regulations and legislations. However, most of this research tends to treat the state as the background while not providing a formal analysis on the internal process of the state and its autonomous agenda. At the same time, most of the non-market strategy studies tend to adopt a firm-centric perspective, while the success and the effectiveness of such non-market strategy highly depends on the politicians and officials who are making and implementing state policies. Given these two important gaps, this symposium aims to address two research questions in the context of France, China, Ukraine, etc.: 1) how does the state engage firms to achieve its social and political agenda? 2) How do the characteristics of the elected politicians or appointed government officials influence firms' non-market strategies? By doing this, this symposium contributes to literatures on state-firm interactions, non- market strategies, as well as institutional theory by highlighting the role of state agencies. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Institutions are one of the most important factors that determine corporate strategy. However, firm response is not homogeneous but heterogeneous to these institutions. Even firms try to strategize around the institutions to achieve better organizational outcomes, which creates strategic heterogeneity, a central tenet in strategic management. Many studies in management field have attempted to understand the interactions between institutions and corporate nonmarket strategy but our understanding is not full-fledged. Thus, the four papers to be presented in the symposium aim to address (1) how institutions, particularly those focused on activism/political ideology and culture, shape different types of corporate nonmarket strategy, and (2) how firms strategize around these institutions to achieve their strategic goals through nonmarket means. The collection of papers will enhance our understanding of the drivers of corporate nonmarket activities and firms' response to these institutional drivers. Activism, Ideology, and the Corporate Pursuit of Philanthropy Presenter: Hye Joon Park; Pennsylvania State U. Presenter: Razvan Lungeanu; Northeastern U. Are You Free From Your Home? Cross-National Cultural Distance and Strategic Lobbying Behavior Presenter: Jin Hyung Kim; George Washington U. Presenter: Jordan Siegel; U. of Michigan, Ross School of Business Going Dark: The Liability of Transparency and Drivers of Secrecy in Corporate Political Strategy Presenter: Nan Jia; U. of Southern California Presenter: Stanislav Markus; Darla Moore School of Business, U. of South Carolina Presenter: Timothy Werner; The U. of Texas at Austin The Friday Effect: FDA Drug Safety Alert (In)Effectiveness and Firm Lobbying Presenter: Benjamin Barber Iv; IE Business School Presenter: Luis Diestre; IE Business School Presenter: Juan Santalo; IE Business School [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Firms competing in international markets face a host of challenges. Understanding market conditions and risks is important, but equally salient are institutional issues. This symposium will feature a panel discussion among six experienced scholars whose work spans a variety of literatures, but who have all written extensively on the interface between firms and institutions, particularly formal institutions in cross-national settings. Given the broad range of extant research on institutions, our goal is to discuss whether or not a more structured and integrated approach to institutional research is desirable, and if so, how this might be achieved. The symposium will also address a series of related questions on research that focuses on the interface between firms and institutions. The discussion will cover theoretical questions such as whether or not institutional issues are better managed by firms through ex-ante or ex-post actions; empirical issues such as the validity of our measures of institutional characteristics; and applied questions such as, "what is the role of the manager vis-à-vis institutions?" Participants and audience members are expected to leave with a better understanding of the state of the art regarding institutional research, a better toolkit with which to address their own research in this area, and suggestions from the panelists for the unresolved but important questions that have yet to be tackled. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What political strategies do the so-called business oligarchs in modern developing countries pursue to succeed in a turbulent environment? Is the instrumental power of big business more effective than its structural power in protecting the asset value against shocks such as populist revolutions or authoritarian takeovers? These questions form the center of a broad research program on the politics of extreme wealth stratification. However, systematic individual-level data on the super-wealthy has been notably absent from the literature. In this paper, I present a unique original database of 177 Ukrainian oligarchs. Rather than extrapolating from select cases, I examine the full cohort of the wealthiest elite members from 2006 to 2012. Rather than juxtaposing the winners with the losing public or a dictator, I explore the dynamics of intra-oligarchic competition. Theoretically, I propose a new logic of flexibility to understand oligarchic behavior. This logic stresses adaptability and deniability, in contrast to the existing paradigm of commitment compensation that maintains that the oligarchs are driven by the lack of institutionalized commitment from the politicians with access to coercion. I find that a quarter of Ukrainian plutocrats has been elected to national parliament. Over one half of the plutocrats support political parties. Close to 60 percent of the oligarchs are likely to have engaged in state capture or business capture. I also explore the determinants of oligarchic dominance. Oligarchs who had made their initial fortunes during privatization and those who own media assets achieve significantly higher levels of business wealth, while business wealth of the oligarchs who support political parties is significantly more resilient to shocks. Meanwhile, business wealth of the oligarchs who had made their fortunes from scratch or during Kuchma's presidency, as well as those who had served in the government before becoming super-rich, is significantly less resilient. Legislative terms in the Rada do not affect either the level or the resilience of business wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What do we know about the politics of corporate governance in emerging markets? While the state-level institutions have been amply explored, firm-level dynamics remain under-theorized. Complementing the orthodox emphasis on external finance as causal force behind the adoption of "minority shareholder protections", the article outlines an alternative mechanism for firms operating in political settings with heightened risk of state intrusion. The Anglo-Saxon governance institutions can serve domestic managers as a strategy to build alliances with foreign stakeholders so as to counteract a dirigiste government. Empirically, the author seeks to explain the implementation of internationally accepted standards of corporate governance by Russia's big business between 1999 and 2004. The project disaggregates "corporate governance" into specific institutions and examines their quality at the firm level. The causal inference links the shift in state policy vis-à-vis corporate property to the improved treatment of minority owners by the company insiders. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]