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We use a general equilibrium model to show that a decrease in workers’ bargaining power amplifies the contribution to the output gap of adjustments along the extensive versus intensive margin of labour utilization. Under standard assumptions on the disutility of labour, this mechanism reduces the cyclical movements of inflation relative to those of the output gap. Micro-level evidence, based on a survey of Italian firms, provides support to the relationship between bargaining power and adjustments along the extensive margin versus the intensive one, as well as to attenuated price response when firms adjust labour input mainly through the extensive margin. A Bayesian estimation using Italian aggregate data for the samples 1970–1990 and 1991–2014 confirms that the decline in workers’ bargaining power has weakened the inflation–output gap relationship.

This paper illustrates the tools used at Banca d’Italia (BI) to monitor the evolution of inflation expectations. The paper also surveys the analyses conducted at BI to assess how inflation expectations affect agents’ choices and the economy. The first part discusses the measures of inflation expectations derived from the prices of inflation-linked financial instruments and from the surveys of professional forecasters. The second part focuses on the measures of households’ and firms’ inflation expectations collected by BI, along with analyses presenting empirical evidence that expectations do indeed drive agents’ economic choices. The last part analyses the overall effect of exogenous changes of inflation expectations on the real economy, through the lens of the macroeconomic models used at BI.

We use the Bank of Italy's Survey on Inflation and Growth Expectations to explore how the COVID-19 shock affects firms’ pricing policies and their inflation expectations. We find that the longer the time deemed necessary to return to their normal business levels and the greater the attention they pay to their competitors’ pricing policies, the more likely firms are to reduce their own product prices. Moreover, firms' inflation expectations react to the expected persistence of the macroeconomic effects of the shock. We rationalize this evidence through the lens of a general equilibrium model.

We use a general equilibrium model to show that a decrease in workers’ bargaining power amplifies the relative contribution to the output gap of adjustments along the extensive margin of labour utilization. This mechanism reduces the cyclical movements of marginal cost (and inflation) relative to those of the output gap. We show that the relationship between bargaining power and adjustments along the extensive margin (relative to the intensive margin) is supported by microdata. Our analysis relies on panel data from the Italian survey of industrial firms. The Bayesian estimation of the model using euro-area aggregate data covering the 1970-1990 and 1991-2016 samples confirms that the decline in workers’ bargaining power has weakened the inflation-output gap relationship.

Professional forecasters failed to anticipate the sharp fall in inflation in the euro area in 2013–2014. We investigate whether this forecasting failure can be partly attributed to a break in the elasticity of inflation to the output gap. Using structural break tests and time-varying parameter models, we find that this elasticity has indeed increased substantially in the past 2 years. We offer two (observationally equivalent) interpretations of this result. The first is that the increase in the cyclicality of inflation has stemmed from lower nominal rigidities or weaker strategic complementarities in price setting. A second possibility is that current output gap estimates are understating the amount of spare capacity in the economy. We estimate that, in order to reconcile the observed fall in inflation with the historical correlation between consumer prices and the business cycle, the output gap should be wider by around one third.

We consider a standard result of customer market theory: if firms have stable customer relations and face financial frictions, they may keep prices relatively high in times of low demand and vice versa. Indeed, during recessions, when firms have low cash flow and greater difficulty in raising external funds, they may set higher prices on their locked-in shoppers to maintain short-term profits at the expense of future market shares. We extend this theoretical framework so that the countercyclical behaviour of price margins is strengthened by the expected persistence of the downturn and the procyclicality of competitive pressures. We test these predictions for Italian firms participating in the 2014 Wage Dynamics Network Survey. All things being equal, financially constrained firms charge higher markups when faced with low demand; this behaviour is more evident when demand is perceived as being persistent. Our findings suggest that the severity of financial constraints in Italy was one of the causes of the sustained growth of prices in 2010-2013, notwithstanding the considerable slack in the economy.

We investigate the determinants of inertia in Italian inflation, estimating a Phillips curve derived from a general equilibrium business-cycle model that allows for intrinsic and extrinsic sources of inflation persistence, along with trend inflation, and that encompasses both nominal and real rigidities as key factors of the output-inflation trade-off. We perform the estimation over two different sub-samples, 1981:Q1–1998:Q4 and 1999:Q1–2012:Q3, to take into account the structural break represented by the starting of the Economic and Monetary Union. We find that in the period between 1999:Q1 and 2012:Q3, the dependence of Italian inflation on its own past diminished and the slope of the Phillips curve dropped relative to the years before 1999. The latter is a consequence of increased strategic complementarity in price setting, due in turn to higher sensitivity of demand elasticity to firms’ relative prices, on top of lower trend inflation and an increase in the average duration of prices.

In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach, Blanchard and Gali (in J. Gali and M. Gertler (eds.) 2009, International Dimensions of Monetary Policy, University of Chicago Press, pp. 373–428) argued that this reflected a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. They then argued that this change could be due to a combination of three factors: a smaller share of oil in production and consumption, lower real wage rigidity, and better monetary policy. Their argument, based on simulations of a simple new-Keynesian model, was informal. Our purpose in this paper is to take the next step, and to estimate the explanatory power and contribution of each of these factors. To do so, we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of two samples (pre- and post-1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response functions and those implied by a new-Keynesian model. Our empirical results point to an important role for all three factors.

Assessing underlying inflation developments is crucial for a correct calibration of the monetary policy stance. To monitor the adjustment in the path of euro area inflation towards the ECB’s definition of price stability, we select a number of indicators of price dynamics in the area. We then construct a composite index summarizing the information contained in those indicators by estimating several univariate probability models. The index, which provides a synthetic measure of inflationary pressures net of the most volatile components, can be interpreted as gauging the probability of inflation returning to 1.9 per cent or over within a given time horizon. Our findings, which are based on the information available in July 2017, signal that, despite the improvement in price dynamics since the beginning of the year, the adjustment of inflation rates towards levels below, but close to, 2 per cent over the medium term is still limited and far from being sustained.

The inclusion of labor market frictions in the new Keynesian DSGE model overcomes the main drawbacks of the baseline framework. In this paper we show that this extended model, by assuming real wage rigidities, does not replicate the correct wage dynamics and the negative conditional correlation between technology shocks and employment observed in the data, known as the “productivity–employment puzzle” . We show also that these empirical limitations can be overcome by replacing real wage rigidities with nominal wage rigidities, without sacrificing other appealing features of the model. We adopt a Bayesian perspective to estimate the dynamic properties of the model with real wage rigidities and compare them with those of the model with nominal wage rigidities. We show that the evidence favors this latter construction.

The fall in the US labor force participation during the Great Recession stands in sharp contrast with its parallel increase in the euro area. In addition to structural forces, cyclical factors are also shown to account for these patterns, with the participation rate being procyclical in the US since the inception of the crisis and countercyclical in the euro area. We rationalize these diverging developments by using a general equilibrium business cycle model, which nests the endogenous participation decisions into a search and matching framework. We show that the “added worker” effect might outweigh the “discouragement effect” if real wage rigidities are allowed for and/or habit in consumers’ preferences is sufficiently strong. We then draw the implications of variable labor force participation for inflation and establish the following result: if endogenous movements in labor market participation are envisaged, then the degree of real wage rigidities becomes almost irrelevant for price dynamics. Indeed, during recessions, the upward pressures on inflation stemming from the lack of downward adjustment of real wages are offset by an opposite influence from the additional looseness in the labor market, due to the higher participation associated with wage rigidities.

Between 2013 and 2014, following the recession triggered by the sovereign debt crisis, euro-area inflation decreased sharply. Although a fall in the inflation rate was to be expected, given the severity of the recession, professional forecasters failed to anticipate it. A possible explanation for this forecast failure lies in a break in the cyclicality of inflation, which was unaccounted for in forecasting models. We probe this explanation in the context of a simple backward-looking Phillips curve and find that the sensitivity of inflation to the output gap has recently increased. We rationalize this result through a structural model, in which a steepening of the Phillips curve arises either from lower nominal rigidities (a decrease in the average duration of prices) or from fewer strategic complementarities in price-setting due to a reduction in the number of firms in the economy.

A shift in the design of labor compensation occurred at around the mid-1980s in the U.S. and deals with an increased role of performance pay in driving the cyclical movements of wages. Using a DSGE model we show that this structural change accounts at least qualitatively for many observed changes in the U.S. labor market dynamics. It generates the disappearance of the procyclical response of labor productivity to non-technology shocks and the reduction of the contractionary effects of technology shocks on hours. Moreover, it is conducive to a drop in the volatility of output, a parallel increase in the volatility of wages and to changes in unconditional correlations consistent with what documented in the U.S. between the pre- and post-1984 periods.

I consider an economy growing along the balanced growth path that is hit by an adverse shock to its capital accumulation process. The model integrates efficiency wages due to imperfect monitoring of the quality of labor in a search and matching framework with methods of dynamic general equilibrium analysis. I show that, depending on the firms' abilities to assess workers' performance, the discipline device role of unemployment may account for sharp declines in employment and jobless recoveries driven by exceptional increases in the work effort of employees. The model also explains why rigid real wages may prevail in equilibrium: the large movements in unemployment are indeed associated with real wage rigidity, which is generated endogenously by efficiency wages.

In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach, Blanchard and Gali (2009) argued that this reflected a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. They then argued that this change could be due to a combination of three factors, namely, a smaller share of oil in production and consumption, lower real wage rigidity and better monetary policy. Their argument, based on simulations of a simple new-Keynesian model, was informal. Our purpose in this paper is to take the next step, and to estimate the explanatory power and contribution of each of these factors. To do so, we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of two samples (pre- and post-1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response functions and those implied by a new-Keynesian model. Our empirical results point to an important role for all three factors.

A coincidence in time between the volatility break associated with the "Great Moderation" and large changes in the pattern of conditional and unconditional correlations between output, hours and labor productivity was detected by Gal� and Gambetti (2009). We provide a novel explanation for these findings, based on the major changes that occurred in the U.S. design of labor compensation around the mid-1980s. These include a substantial increase in the incidence of performance pay coupled with a higher responsiveness of real wages to the business cycle. We capture this shift in the structure of labor compensation in a Dynamic New Keynesian (DNK) model and show that, by itself, it generates the disappearance of the procyclical response of labor productivity to non-technology shocks and a reduction of the contractionary effects of technology shocks on hours worked. Moreover, it accounts for a large share of the observed drop in output volatility after 1984 and for most of the observed changes in unconditional correlations.

In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, and at least until the end of 2007, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach Blanchard and Gali (2007a) argued that this has reflected in large part a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. In order to shed light on the possible factors behind the decrease in the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks, we develop a new-Keynesian model, with imported oil used both in production and consumption, and we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of the two samples (pre- and post 1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response functions and those implied by the model. Our results point to two relevant changes in the structure of the economy, which have modified the transmission mechanism of the oil shock: vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of monetary policy. The relative importance of these two structural changes depends however on how we formalize the process of expectations formation by economic agents.

The labour market is receiving increasing attention in the New Keynesian literature. In this paper, I critically survey this literature in order to highlight the role played by wage rigidities in the explanation of fluctuations caused by technology shocks. To this aim, I present a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with sticky prices, nominal wage rigidities and hiring costs. The comparison between this model and that of Blanchard and Gali highlights the non-trivial differences which exist in the way nominal wage and real wage rigidities drive the economy's dynamics. My conclusion is that models incorporating nominal wage rigidities and some degree of price stickiness provide a better account of macroeconomic dynamics than models with real wage rigidities. Copyright © 2009 Blackwell Publishing Ltd.

A shift in the correlation structure of U.S. macroeconomic series has been documented by Galí and Gambetti (2009) with corresponding changes in the dynamic responses to shocks. We provide an explanation of these findings based on the observed change in the structure of labor compensation and, in particular, on the higher incidence since 1980s of performance-related pay schemes, which has increased the performance sensitivity of compensation. We capture this feature in a DSGE model of the New Keynesian type and show that this interpretation alone can account for the observed changes in the pattern of responses to shocks. In particular, with a higher sensitivity of compensation to workers performance, the response of labor productivity to a non-technology shock switches sign from positive to negative values and the contractionary effect on hours of a technology shock becomes of a smaller size in absolute terms. Alternative explanations of the Great Moderation based on structural changes fall short of accounting for both these documented changes in the dynamic responses to shocks.

In the 1970s, large increases in the price of oil were associated with sharp decreases in output and large increases in inflation. In the 2000s, and at least until the end of 2007, even larger increases in the price of oil were associated with much milder movements in output and inflation. Using a structural VAR approach Blanchard and Gali (2007a) argued that this has reflected in large part a change in the causal relation from the price of oil to output and inflation. In order to shed light on the possible factors behind the decrease in the macroeconomic effects of oil price shocks, we develop a new-Keynesian model, with imported oil used both in production and consumption, and we use a minimum distance estimator that minimizes, over the set of structural parameters and for each of the two samples (pre and post 1984), the distance between the empirical SVAR-based impulse response functions and those implied by the model. Our results point to two relevant changes in the structure of the economy, which have modified the transmission mechanism of the oil shock: vanishing wage indexation and an improvement in the credibility of monetary policy. The relative importance of these two structural changes depends however on how we formalize the process of expectations formation by economic agents.

The introduction of labor market frictions into the New Keynesian DSGE model solves some of the main drawbacks of the baseline framework. In this paper we show that this extended model, by assuming real wage rigidities, fails to replicate the correct wage dynamics and the observed negative conditional correlation between supply shocks and employment, known as "productivity-employment puzzle". We then show that these empirical limitations can be overcome by replacing real wage rigidities with nominal wage rigidities, without discarding other appealing features of the model. By adopting a Bayesian perspective, we estimate the dynamic properties of the model with real wage rigidities and confront them with those of the model with nominal wage rigidities, concluding that there is decisive evidence in favor of the latter.

The introduction of labor market frictions into the New Keynesian DSGE model solves some of the main drawbacks of the baseline framework. In this paper we show that this extended model, by assuming real wage rigidities, fails to replicate the correct wage dynamics and the observed negative conditional correlation between supply shocks and employment, known as “productivity employment puzzle†. We then show that these empirical limitations can be overcome by a model incorporating nominal wage rigidities in addition to price rigidities and hiring costs. Adopting a Bayesian perspective, we estimate the dynamic properties of the model with real wage rigidities and confront them with those of the model with nominal wage rigidities, concluding that there is decisive evidence in favor of the latter.

The labor market is receiving increasing attention in the New Keynesian literature. In this paper I critically survey this literature in order to highlight the role played by wage rigidities in the explanation of fluctuations caused by technology shocks. To this aim, I present a DSGE model with sticky prices, nominal wage rigidities, and hiring costs. The comparison between this model and Blanchard and Gali (2006) highlights the non trivial differences which exist in the way nominal wage and real wage rigidities drive the economy’s dynamics. My conclusion is that models incorporating nominal wage rigidities and some degree of price stickiness provide a better account of macroeconomic dynamics than models with real wage rigidities.