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The Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) is a measure of analytical reasoning that cues an intuitive but incorrect response that must be rejected for successful performance to be attained. The CRT yields two types of errors: Intuitive errors, which are attributed to Type 1 processes; and non-intuitive errors, which result from poor numeracy skills or deficient reasoning. Past research shows that participants who commit the highest numbers of errors on the CRT overestimate their performance the most, whereas those with the lowest error-rates tend to slightly underestimate. This is an example of the Dunning-Kruger Effect (DKE). The present study examined how intuitive vs. non-intuitive errors contribute to overestimation in the CRT at different levels of performance. Female undergraduate students completed a seven-item CRT test and subsequently estimated their raw score. They also filled out the Faith in Intuition (FI) questionnaire, which is a dispositional measure of intuitive thinking. Data was separated into quartiles based on level of performance on the CRT. The results demonstrated the DKE. Additionally, intuitive and non-intuitive errors predicted miscalibration among low, but not high performers. However, intuitive errors were a stronger predictor of miscalibration. Finally, FI was positively correlated with CRT self-estimates and miscalibration, indicating that participants who perceived themselves to be more intuitive were worse at estimating their score. These results taken together suggest that participants who perform poorly in the CRT and also those who score higher in intuitive thinking disposition are more susceptible to the influences of heuristic-based cues, such as answer fluency, when judging their performance.

Health information sources and the level of trust in a particular source may influence the subsequent adoption of advocated health behaviors. Information source preference and levels of trust are also likely to be influenced by sociodemographic (culture, age, gender) variables. Understanding these source-trust-behavior relationships across various national and cultural contexts is integral to improved health messaging. The present study identified the sources most frequently consulted to obtain information about COVID-19 during the pandemic's early stages in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The study quantified levels of trust across an array of information sources, factoring in sociodemographic variables. Finally, the study explored the relationship between sociodemographic variables, levels of trust in information sources, and the adoption of COVID-19 related protective behaviors. Participants (n = 1585) were recruited during the first 2 weeks of April 2020 via announcements in the UAE media and through email networks. All participants completed a web-based survey presented in English or Arabic, as preferred. The most frequently consulted information sources were websites (health information websites), social media, government communications, and family and friends. The sources rated most trustworthy were: personal physicians, health care professionals, and government communications. There were differences in the use of sources and levels of trust according to age, gender, and education. The levels of trust in sources of information were associated with the adoption of protective behaviors, significantly so for citizens of the UAE. These findings may help inform the improvement of pandemic–related health messaging in multicultural contexts.

The present study has two aims (1) to identify the type of sources of information mostly used to obtain information about COVID-19 and the level of trust in those sources according to sociodemographic variables in the context of the COVID-19 in UAE and (2) to explore if the level of trust on sources of information, and citizenship are predictors of the adoption of protective behaviors to reduce the risk of being infected, considering age, gender and education as covariates. Participants (N = 1585) were recruited in April 2020 via announcements in the UAE media and through email networks. The findings indicated that the most used sources were Websites, social media, government sources, and family and friends. The sources considered more trustworthy were personal doctors, health care professionals, and government. There were differences in the use of sources and levels of trust according to age, gender, and education. Concerning the adoption of protective behaviors, there were no gender differences; however, age, education, and citizenship were significant, younger groups reported lower scores on protective behaviors, and higher educated participants reported higher adoption of protective behavior. National citizens reported lower scores on the adoption of protective behavior. The level of trust in sources of information and citizenship were predictors of the adoption of protective behavior. The use of sources of information and the level of trust vary from traditional to newly-developed sources, which can influence the adoption of protective behaviors for COVID-19. The findings suggest that the COVID-19-related contents need to be adjusted to different types of medium, considering the characteristics of the population and culture, to ensure that it is helping individuals to understand risks and develop their knowledge and skills to face the pandemic by adopting protective behaviors.

Target detection is faster when search displays repeat, but properties of the memory representations that give rise to this contextual cueing effect remain uncertain. We adapted the contextual cueing task using an ABA design and recorded the eye movements of healthy young adults to determine whether the memory representations are flexible. Targets moved to a new location during the B phase and then returned to their original locations (second A phase). Contextual cueing effects in the first A phase were reinstated immediately in the second A phase, and response time costs eventually gave way to a repeated search advantage in the B phase, suggesting that two target-context associations were learned. However, this apparent flexibility disappeared when eye tracking data were used to subdivide repeated displays based on B-phase viewing of the original target quadrant. Therefore, memory representations acquired in the contextual cueing task resist change and are not flexible.

We agree that the self is constructed through a collaborative dialog. But hostile interlocutors could use various cognitive techniques to hijack the dialog, resulting in beliefs, values, and even selves that are out of line with reality. The implications of this problem are dire, but we suggest that increased metacognitive awareness could help guide this process to a truthful conclusion.

The uncertainty response has grounded the study of metacognition in nonhuman animals. Recent research has explored the processes supporting uncertainty monitoring in monkeys. It has revealed that uncertainty responding, in contrast to perceptual responding, depends on significant working memory resources. The aim of the present study was to expand this research by examining whether uncertainty monitoring is also working memory demanding in humans. To explore this issue, human participants were tested with or without a cognitive load on a psychophysical discrimination task that included either an uncertainty response (allowing the participant to decline difficult trials) or a middle-perceptual response (labeling the same intermediate trial levels). The results demonstrated that cognitive load reduced uncertainty responding, but increased middle responding. However, this dissociation between uncertainty and middle responding was only observed when participants either lacked training or had very little training with the uncertainty response. If more training was provided, the effect of load was small. These results suggest that uncertainty responding is resource demanding, but with sufficient training, human participants can respond to uncertainty either by using minimal working memory resources or by effectively sharing resources. These results are discussed in relation to the literature on animal and human metacognition.

Research in non-human animal (hereafter, animal) cognition has found strong evidence that some animal species are capable of meta-cognitively monitoring their mental states. They know when they know and when they do not know. In contrast, animals have generally not shown robust theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. Comparative research uses methods that are non-verbal, and thus might easily be labelled ‘implicit’ using the terminology of traditional human cognition. However, comparative psychology has developed several non-verbal methods that are designed to test for aspects of meta-cognition that – while perhaps not fully explicit – go beyond the merely implicit or associative. We believe similar methods might be useful to developmental researchers who work with young children, and may provide a sound empirical alternative to verbal reports. Comparative psychology has moved away from all-or-none categorical labels (e.g., ‘implicit’ vs. ‘explicit’) towards a theoretical framework that contains a spectrum of mental abilities ranging from implicit to explicit, and from associative to cognitive to fully conscious. We discuss how this same framework might be applied to developmental psychology when it comes to implicit versus explicit processing and ToM.

Participants produce steep typicality gradients and large prototype-enhancement effects in dot-distortion category tasks, showing that in these tasks to-be-categorized items are compared to a prototypical representation that is the central tendency of the participant’s exemplar experience. These prototype-abstraction processes have been ascribed to low-level mechanisms in primary visual cortex. Here we asked whether higher-level mechanisms in visual cortex can also sometimes support prototype abstraction. To do so, we compared dot-distortion performance when the stimuli were size constant (allowing some low-level repetition-familiarity to develop for similar shapes) or size variable (defeating repetition-familiarity effects). If prototype formation is only mediated by low-level mechanisms, stimulus-size variability should lessen prototype effects and flatten typicality gradients. Yet prototype effects and typicality gradients were the same under both conditions, whether participants learned the categories explicitly or implicitly and whether they received trial-by-trial reinforcement during transfer tests. These results broaden out the visual-cortical hypothesis because low-level visual areas, featuring retinotopic perceptual representations, would not support robust category learning or prototype-enhancement effects in an environment of pronounced variability in stimulus size. Therefore, higher-level cortical mechanisms evidently can also support prototype formation during categorization.

Some metacognition paradigms for nonhuman animals encourage the alternative explanation that animals avoid difficult trials based only on reinforcement history and stimulus aversion. To explore this possibility, we placed humans and monkeys in successive uncertainty-monitoring tasks that were qualitatively different, eliminating many associative cues that might support transfer across tasks. In addition, task transfer occurred under conditions of deferred and rearranged feedback—both species completed blocks of trials followed by summary feedback. This ensured that animals received no trial-by-trial reinforcement. Despite distancing performance from associative cues, humans and monkeys still made adaptive uncertainty responses by declining the most difficult trials. These findings suggest that monkeys’ uncertainty responses could represent a higher-level, decisional process of cognitive monitoring, though that process need not involve full self-awareness or consciousness. The dissociation of performance from reinforcement has theoretical implications concerning the status of reinforcement as the critical binding force in animal learning.

In an early dissociation between intentional and incidental category learning, Kemler Nelson (1984) gave participants a categorization task that could be performed by responding either to a single-dimensional rule or to overall family resemblance. Humans learning intentionally deliberately adopted rule-based strategies; humans learning incidentally adopted family resemblance strategies. The present authors replicated Kemler Nelson's human experiment and found a similar dissociation. They also extended her paradigm so as to evaluate the balance between rules and family resemblance in determining the category decisions of rhesus monkeys. Monkeys heavily favored the family resemblance strategy. Formal models showed that even after many sessions and thousands of trials, they spread attention across all stimulus dimensions rather than focus on a single, criterial dimension that could also produce perfect categorization.

Some studies of nonhuman animals' metacognitive capacity encourage competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of trial-decline responses by animals in uncertainty-monitoring tasks. To evaluate the force of these behavioral descriptions, the authors presented 6 capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) with 2 density discrimination tasks between sparse and dense stimuli. In one task, difficult trials with stimuli near the middle of the density continuum could be declined through an "uncertainty" response. In the other task, making a "middle" response to the same stimuli was rewarded. In Experiment 1, capuchins essentially did not use the uncertainty response, but they did use the middle response. In Experiment 2, the authors replicated this result with 5 of 6 monkeys while equating the overall pace and reinforcement structure of the 2 tasks, although 1 monkey also showed appropriate use of the uncertainty response. These results challenge a purely associative interpretation of some uncertainty-monitoring performances by monkeys while sharpening the theoretical question concerning the nature of the psychological signal that occasions uncertainty responses.

Previous research suggests that high functioning children with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) sometimes have problems learning categories, but often appear to perform normally in categorization tasks. The deficits that individuals with ASD show when learning categories have been attributed to executive dysfunction, general deficits in implicit learning, atypical cognitive strategies, or abnormal perceptual biases and abilities. Several of these psychological explanations for category learning deficits have been associated with neural abnormalities such as cortical underconnectivity. The present study evaluated how well existing neurally-based theories account for atypical perceptual category learning shown by high functioning children with ASD across multiple category learning tasks involving novel, abstract shapes. Consistent with earlier results, children’s performances revealed two distinct patterns of learning and generalization associated with ASD: one was indistinguishable from performance in typically developing children; the other revealed dramatic impairments. These two patterns were evident regardless of training regimen or stimulus set. Surprisingly, some children with ASD showed both patterns. Simulations of perceptual category learning could account for the two observed patterns in terms of differences in neural plasticity. However, no current psychological or neural theory adequately explains why a child with ASD might show such large fluctuations in category learning ability across training conditions or stimulus sets.

The behavioral uncertainty response has grounded the study of animal metacognition and influenced the study of human psychophysics. However, the interpretation of this response is debated--especially whether it is a behavioral index of metacognition. The authors advanced this interpretation using the dissociative technique of response deadlines. Uncertainty responding, if it is higher level or metacognitive, should depend on a slower, more controlled decisional process and be more vulnerable to time constraints. Humans performed sparse-uncertain-dense or sparse-middle-dense discriminations in which, respectively, they could decline difficult trials or positively identify middle stimuli. Uncertainty responses were sharply and selectively reduced under a decision deadline, as compared to primary perceptual responses (i.e., "sparse," "middle," and "dense" responses). This dissociation suggests that the uncertainty response does reflect a higher-level, decisional response. It grants the uncertainty response a distinctive psychological role in its task and encourages an interpretation of this response as an elemental behavioral index of uncertainty that deserves continuing research.

University students’ beliefs about tobacco and nicotine were assessed before an educational intervention aimed at correcting tobacco-related misinformation. Beliefs were again measured immediately after the intervention, and then again after a 2-, 4-, 6-, or 8-week retention interval. Initially, participants showed significantly more accurate beliefs about tobacco than pre-intervention, but this improvement decreased after the retention interval. Results suggest that methods currently used in an attempt to alleviate tobacco misinformation in the public may be effective for short-term, but not long-term retention. The current study accents the need to design tobacco programs that optimize retention of belief change so that people may use that knowledge confidently in future health-related decisions.

Humans can feel consciously uncertain and know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition. It is a natural question whether nonhuman animals share this sophisticated cognitive capacity, and, thus, animal metacognition is an active research area within contemporary comparative psychology. This chapter summarizes this research area. We illustrate the area's original studies and describe recent approaches that addressed possible flaws in the original studies. We summarize the current empirical status of the field. We discuss the phylogenetic breadth of metacognition and consider the appropriate psychological interpretation of uncertainty responding by animals. Finally, we discuss the potential for animal metacognition research to reveal the evolutionary emergence of reflective mind more broadly construed.

The uncertainty response has been influential in studies of human perception, and it is crucial in the growing research literature that explores animal metacognition. However, the uncertainty response’s interpretation is still sharply debated. The authors sought to clarify this interpretation using the dissociative technique of cognitive loads imposed on ongoing discrimination performance. Four macaques (Macaca mulatta) performed a Sparse-Dense discrimination within which an uncertainty response let them decline difficult trials or a middle response let them identify middle stimuli. Concurrent memory tasks were occasionally overlain on ongoing discrimination performance. The concurrent tasks disrupted macaques’ uncertainty responses far more than their sparse, middle, or dense discrimination responses. This dissociation suggests that the uncertainty response is a higher-level, decisional response that is particularly dependent on working memory and attentional resources. This is consistent with the theoretical possibility that the uncertainty response is an elemental behavioral index of uncertainty monitoring or metacognition.

Research in non-human animal (hereafter, animal) cognition has found strong evidence that some animal species are capable of meta-cognitively monitoring their mental states. They know when they know and when they do not know. In contrast, animals have generally not shown robust theory of mind (ToM) capabilities. Comparative research uses methods that are non-verbal, and thus might easily be labelled ‘implicit’ using the terminology of traditional human cognition. However, comparative psychology has developed several non-verbal methods that are designed to test for aspects of meta-cognition that – while perhaps not fully explicit – go beyond the merely implicit or associative. We believe similar methods might be useful to developmental researchers who work with young children, and may provide a sound empirical alternative to verbal reports. Comparative psychology has moved away from all-or-none categorical labels (e.g., ‘implicit’ vs. ‘explicit’) towards a theoretical framework that contains a spectrum of mental abilities ranging from implicit to explicit, and from associative to cognitive to fully conscious. We discuss how this same framework might be applied to developmental psychology when it comes to implicit versus explicit processing and ToM.

A central question in categorization research concerns the categories that animals and humans learn naturally and well. Here, the authors examined monkeys' (Macaca mulatta) and humans' (Homo sapiens) learning of the important class of exclusive-or (XOR) categories. Both species exhibited--through a sustained level of ongoing errors--substantial difficulty learning XOR category tasks at 3 stimulus dimensionalities. Clearly, both species brought a linear-separability constraint to XOR category learning. This constraint illuminates the primate category-learning system from which that of humans arose, and it has theoretical implications concerning the evolution of cognitive systems for categorization. The present data also clarify the role of exemplar-specific processes in fully explaining XOR category learning, and suggest that humans sometimes overcome their linear-separability constraint through the use of language and verbalization.

Children with autism spectrum disorder process many perceptual and social events differently from typically developing children, suggesting that they may also form and recognize categories differently. We used a dot pattern categorization task and prototype comparison modeling to compare categorical processing in children with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder and matched typical controls. We were interested in whether there were differences in how children with autism use average similarity information about a category to make decisions. During testing, the group with autism spectrum disorder endorsed prototypes less and was seemingly less sensitive to differences between to-be-categorized items and the prototype. The findings suggest that individuals with high-functioning autism spectrum disorder are less likely to use overall average similarity when forming categories or making categorical decisions. Such differences in category formation and use may negatively impact processing of socially relevant information, such as facial expressions. A supplemental appendix for this article may be downloaded from http://pbr.psychonomic-journals.org/content/supplemental.

Is metacognition a uniquely human trait? Comparative studies suggest that the answer is no. To test metacognitive abilities in non-human animals, researchers have used a variety of methods. In the retrospective confidence judgment paradigm, animals have to provide a low or high confidence response following a first-order task. In the “search for information” behavioral paradigm, animals sometimes need to look for missing information in order to complete a task. In the uncertainty responding paradigm, animals can choose to perform trials varying difficulty, or they can choose to avoid a particular trial and move to a new one. Studies of metacognition in non-humans based on these paradigms show that animals can evaluate their meta-perceptual uncertainty. However, several methodological and theoretical objections have been raised against the possibility for non-speaking animals to be attributed metacognitive abilities. Animal subjects might be using associative mechanisms between exteroceptive stimuli rather than basing their judgments on evaluations of their own uncertainty. We address this criticism by summarizing recent studies in our laboratory using the uncertainty response method in which associative cues are minimized by making stimuli unpredictable, by dissociating specific responses from external feedback cues, and by using transfer tests.

Results that point to animals' metacognitive capacity bear a heavy burden, given the potential for competing behavioral descriptions. In this article, formal models are used to evaluate the force of these descriptions. One example is that many existing studies have directly rewarded so-called uncertainty responses. Modeling confirms that this practice is an interpretative danger because it supports associative processes and encourages simpler interpretations. Another example is that existing studies raise the concern that animals avoid difficult stimuli not because of uncertainty monitored, but because of aversion given error-causing or reinforcement-lean stimuli. Modeling also justifies this concern and shows that this problem is not addressed by the common practice of comparing performance on chosen and forced trials. The models and related discussion have utility for metacognition researchers and theorists broadly, because they specify the experimental operations that will best indicate a metacognitive capacity in humans or animals by eliminating alternative behavioral accounts.

The authors compared the performance of humans and monkeys in a Same-Different task. They evaluated the hypothesis that for humans the Same-Different concept is qualitative, categorical, and rule-based, so that humans distinguish 0-disparity pairs (i.e., same) from pairs with any discernible disparity (i.e., different); whereas for monkeys the Same-Different concept is quantitative, continuous, and similarity-based, so that monkeys distinguish small-disparity pairs (i.e., similar) from pairs with a large disparity (i.e., dissimilar). The results supported the hypothesis. Monkeys, more than humans, showed a gradual transition from same to different categories and an inclusive criterion for responding Same. The results have implications for comparing Same-Different performances across species--different species may not always construe or perform even identical tasks in the same way. In particular, humans may especially apply qualitative, rule-based frameworks to cognitive tasks like Same-Different.

That humans can categorize in different ways does not imply that there are qualitatively distinct underlying natural kinds or that the field of concepts splinters. Rather, it implies that the unitary goal of forming concepts is important enough that it receives redundant expression in cognition. Categorization science focuses on commonalities involved in concept learning. Eliminating “concept” makes this more difficult.

We agree with Carruthers that evidence for metacognition in species lacking mindreading provides dramatic evidence in favor of the metacognition-is-prior account and against the mindreading-is-prior account. We discuss this existing evidence and explain why an evolutionary perspective favors the former account and poses serious problems for the latter account.