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Given its limited oil and gas resources compared to its neighbours, energy diversification has been Oman’s stated goal since at least the 1980s. Yet, this paper argues that, due to the country’s st...

Since the accession of Oman and the United Arab Emirates to the independence in the early 1970s, the building of both a state apparatus and a nation has lain at the heart of the political projects ...

This chapter analyzes the “oligarchic pact” and the relationship between political and business actors in Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, and Oman. Marc Valeri examines how state-business relations in these three case-studies have evolved as ruling families have become more involved in business and the private sector. This, Valeri argues, signifies an important shift away from the initial relationship between ruling and business elites that developed after the influx of large-scale oil revenues in the 1960s. The “unprecedented intrusion of ruling family members in the private sector” over recent years is likely to have implications for the social contract between ruler and ruled and, by extension, for domestic stability as the traditional ‘rentier bargain’ breaks down. Valeri draws out common themes from the study of three very different political economies and the nature and impact of the structural shift in the relationship between ruling and business elites in favor of the former.

Valeri’s analysis of the Persian Gulf region’s history suggests that the two shores of the Gulf of Oman saw population movements at an early stage. At the birth of Islam, Omani territory was divided between a coastal region under direct Sassanid rule and semi-autonomous Arab tribes in the interior, ruled for the Persians by the local dynasties. Valeri explains the relatively warm Omani-Iranian relations by three factors: (A) Sultan Qaboos’ gratitude for the shah’s (Iran’s) decisive military assistance in the 1970s during the Dhofar war. (B) Muscat’s difficulties to propose a new socioeconomic contract replacing the old patrimonial model based on the clientelist distribution of the rent at home. (C) Qaboos has been less inclined than his GCC counterparts to see in his domestic Shiite minority an Iranian Trojan Horse. Indeed, Shiite groups in Oman have traditionally been invaluable allies of the rulers and have vested interests in maintaining the existing political order.

Recent years have seen increasing attention being paid to the “heritage” of the Gulf states, whether by local populations, academic and other commentators, or governments. Some of this has appeared...

Since the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, one of the most popular reading grids of Middle East politics has been the increased impact of the Shiʿi issue on the national political agendas of Arab states. This article focuses on the place of one of the less studied Shiʿi groups, the Shiʿa of Oman, who represent around three percent of the national population, in the nation-building project initiated by Sultan Qaboos since 1970 to maintain political stability and legitimize his power. I argue that the special relationship the Shiʿa have maintained with the ruling elite in Oman and the prominent role some of them are enjoying in the Omani economy help explain their weak insertion into transnational Shiʿi networks in the Gulf and the fact that they have never questioned the validity of the Omani nation under Qaboos as a political framework. But the socioeconomic changes caused by the end of the rent-based welfare-state model has led recently to an increase in mutual prejudices and social grievances. The Shiʿa, because of their high socioeconomic visibility, are likely to find themselves at the center of other groups’ complaints.

Reidar Visser and Gareth Stansfield (eds), London, Hurst and Company, 2007, 274 + xxx pp. Maps. Index There are ten contributors to this study of ‘regionalism’ in Iraq which sets out to challenge t...

Since 1970, building a new national identity by reunifying Oman's ethno-linguistic groups has been at the heart of Sultan Qaboos's political project. This paper focuses on the place of Omani who returned from the former colonies of Zanzibar and East Africa, responding to Sultan Qaboos's call to ‘nationals’ abroad. While they played a leading role in the modernization process of the Sultanate, these Swahili-speaking Omani faced prejudices from the population who stayed at home and were forced to give guarantees to the others of their full belonging to the nation. As a consequence, despite their internal differences, they have progressively developed a new collective identity, which has its raison d'etre within the framework of the modern Omani State, and can only be explained by the necessity to find their place in it.

The political promotion of a new national identity centred on the person of Qaboos has decisively served the ruler’s strategy of legitimisation since the end of the 1970s. Nevertheless, this process of substitution of identities from the “local” to the “national” was not supposed to lead to the extinction of local solidarities (tribes, ethno-linguistic groups etc.). Far from eradicating them, the regime has worked to tame them and neutralise their impact by encapsulating them within the state and making them more and more dependent on a game controlled by the central state.

This Summary Report contains synopses of chapters written for the “Sectarian Politics in the Gulf” research initiative over two working group meetings that took place in Doha. The central aim of this study is to examine the dynamic ways in which evolving sectarian identities and politics in the Gulf region intersect. Encompassing Iran and the states of the Arabian Peninsula, the research project includes topics that focus on how sectarian issues play out in the realms of domestic politics within Gulf states, as well as those that address sectarianism’s impact on inter-state relations within the region. This project brings together a renowned group of scholars to examine the issues of religious, communal, and ethnic identities in the Gulf, and how these impose themselves on both the domestic and international politics of the Gulf.

Quelque chose troublant les eaux calmes d’Oman. Reprise en main ou revitalisation de la Monarchie ?Alors que le sultanat d’Oman recherche des alternatives à un modèle économique fondé sur la seule rente pétrolière (nationalisation des emplois, diversification des ressources économiques, etc.), les réponses apportées par le pouvoir aux timides voix discordantes entendues depuis 2005, ainsi qu’aux pressions exercées par les États-Unis sur les régimes de la région dans le cadre de la « guerre contre le terrorisme », témoignent d’une évolution de la pratique de gouvernement. En cherchant à consolider sa légitimité personnelle et le lien direct qu’il entretient avec la population, le sultan Qabous souhaite effacer les doutes émis en Oman et à l’étranger sur son éventuelle prise de distance avec les affaires politiques.Changes in governing practices in Oman are indicated by a number of recent developments: on the one hand the regime is attempting to diversify the economy away from its complete dependence on oil revenues (through Omanisation of the labour force and a diversification of economic activities); on the other, the authorities’ reaction to the timidly dissenting voices which have emerged since 2005 reflects their response to the USA’s political pressures on the Gulf regimes within the framework of its ‘war against terrorism’. While seeking to consolidate his personal legitimacy and his direct link with his people, Sultan Qabous wants to wipe out any doubts about his possible withdrawal from politics.

Changes in governing practices in Oman are indicated by a number of recent developments: on the one hand the regime is attempting to diversify the economy away from its complete dependence on oil revenues (through Omanisation of the labour force and a diversification of economic activities); on the other, the authorities' reaction to the timidly dissenting voices which have emerged since 2005 reflects their response to the USA’s political pressures on the Gulf regimes within the framework of its ‘war against terrorism'. While seeking to consolidate his personal legitimacy and his direct link with his people, Sultan Qabous wants to wipe out any doubts about his possible withdrawal from politics. * Alors que le sultanat d’Oman recherche des alternatives à un modèle économique fondé sur la seule rente pétrolière (nationalisation des emplois, diversification des ressources économiques, etc.), les réponses apportées par le pouvoir aux timides voix discordantes entendues depuis 2005, ainsi qu’aux pressions exercées par les États‑Unis sur les régimes de la région dans le cadre de la “guerre contre le terrorisme”, témoignent d’une évolution de la pratique de gouvernement. En cherchant à consolider sa légitimité personnelle et le lien direct qu’il entretient avec la population, le sultan Qabous souhaite effacer les doutes émis en Oman et à l’étranger sur son éventuelle prise de distance avec les affaires politiques.

While the “Arab Spring” did not spare the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, it was in the Kingdom of Bahrain and the Sultanate of Oman, both of which possess less significant petroleum resources than their neighbors, that popular mobilizations were the most organized. These mobilizations did not, it is true, lead to any formal political change but they nevertheless had a profound and lasting impact on the political legitimacy of the two countries’ authoritarian regimes. Why did the strategies of legitimation implemented by the Bahraini and Omani regimes up till 2011 – strategies that had allowed them to respond to challenges threatening their stability – prove incapable starting in late 2010 of preventing or, later, countering popular protest ? A comparative analysis allows one to reconsider the true meaning of these events, a profound challenge to the mechanisms for consolidating authoritarian rule in these two Arab Peninsula monarchies. ■

Si la contestation populaire de l’ordre autoritaire qui a embrase le monde arabe depuis la fin de l’annee 2010 n’a pas epargne les monarchies du golfe Persique, ces dernieres n’ont pas ete amenees a entreprendre de changement politique d’envergure. Cet article analyse, dans une perspective comparee, les strategies de legitimation non coercitives mises en œuvre par le Bahrein (depuis l’arrivee au pouvoir du roi Hamad en 1999) et par le sultanat d’Oman pour consolider l’ordre politique en place. Une large place sera consacree a l’eclairage que les evenements du « Printemps arabe » apportent sur le fonctionnement interne de ces regimes et sur l’efficacite des strategies de legitimation auxquelles il a ete fait appel jusque-la.

Depuis 1996, le sultanat d’Oman dispose d’un parlement bicameral, le Conseil d’Oman, compose d’une chambre haute, le Conseil d’etat, nommee integralement par le sultan, et d’une chambre basse, le Conseil Consultatif, elue au suffrage universel tous les quatre ans. Ce texte s’interroge sur le role de cette institution, dans un pays gouverne depuis 1970 par un souverain (Qabous Al Said) qui a su concilier un developpement economique et social sans precedent avec la personnalisation du pouvoir la plus elaboree de toute la Peninsule arabique.