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In its judgment in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission 2022 2 BCLR 129 (CC), the Constitutional Court declared section 10(1) of the Equality Act unconstitutional and invalid to the narrow extent that section 10(1)(a) refers to the intention to be "hurtful". The prohibition on hate speech passed constitutional muster in all other respects. In addition, the court purposively interpreted aspects of the application of section 10(1) so as to limit its impact on the right to freedom of expression. This contribution firstly welcomes the court's reliance on the transformative goals of the Constitution and the Equality Act as its primary framework in interpreting section 10(1). The severance of section 10(1)(a) and the conjunctive reading of sections 10(1)(b) and (c) ("be harmful or to incite harm" and ʺpromote or propagate hatred" respectively) also seem sensible considering the court's broad definition of "harm". The article further emphasises that the terms of section 10 call for a proper consideration of context. In this regard, the court rightly considered the extreme homophobia in the society addressed by Mr Qwelane, the particular vulnerability of the target group and the real threat of devastating imminent consequences to conclude that Qwelane's words were clearly intended to "incite harm" and "propagate hatred". Yet the court's view that the speaker's subjective intention is irrelevant in performing the requisite objective reasonableness assessment from the ambit of section 10(1) is arguably less judicious, as is the categorical exclusion of expression in private. Ultimately, the objective case-by-case reasonableness inquiry under section 10(1) should be whether a reasonable person in the speaker's position should have refrained from making the impugned harmful discriminatory utterances. This inquiry involves a determination of wrongfulness based on the constitutional duty not to discriminate unfairly. It invokes all the aspects of the Equality Act's definition of discrimination as well as all the elements of fairness analysis set out in section 14 of the Equality Act. Factors to be considered include the value of the particular expression, and the extent of the (potential) harm to individual members of a protected group and to society as a whole, as well as justification considerations such as the respondent's legitimate and bona fide exercise of the right to freedom of expression and to privacy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Background. Poor nutrition practices result in malnutrition, a public health concern that affects a third of children globally. In Zimbabwe, ~27.6% of children under-5 years old are stunted. Some of these children spend long hours in early childhood development centres (ECDCs). Children can receive half to two-thirds of their daily food intake while in care, making ECDCs an ideal entry point to influence child nutrition positively. There are no specific nutrition guidelines for ECDCs in Zimbabwe. Objective. The study aimed to investigate food provision at ECDCs of the Northern-Central District of Harare. Methods. A descriptive, cross-sectional study with an analytical component was conducted in 15 ECDCs. Fifteen ECD managers (ECDMs) and 14 food handlers (FHs) were included in the study. An observational checklist allowed recording of food preparation and hygiene practices. The Dietary Diversity Score (DDS) of the menu was calculated using the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) 9-group DDS sheet. Results. Inadequate food storage facilities and food handling practices were observed. Staff had minimal nutrition-related training. Staff displayed a positive attitude towards their role in providing healthy meals. Barriers to serving healthy meals were inadequate funds, children's food preferences, unrealistic parental expectations, and external factors. The mean DDS score for menus was 2.8. Meals consisted mainly of starchy items, legumes and meat, and lacked fruit and dairy items. Conclusion. National guidelines can improve children's dietary intake while in day care. In alignment with Sustainable Development Goals 2 and 3, food provision at ECDCs should be a priority. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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In November 2019 the Supreme Court of Appeal in Qwelane v South African Human Rights Commission ruled that section 10(1) of the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act (Equality Act) 4 of 2000, otherwise known as the "hate speech" prohibition, was unconstitutional. The court said it was vague, overbroad and therefore unjustifiably infringing the right to freedom of expression. This contribution argues that every person's duty to respect others is central to the hate speech prohibition, and should therefore also be a central consideration in its interpretation. Related duties are those of the state to enact legislation and of courts to interpret and apply the law to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights. References to relevant case law in various legal contexts provide the framework within which legal duties are examined in the context of unfair discrimination and, in particular, hate speech in terms of section 10(1) of the Equality Act. The constitutional obligations of the state, the courts and private persons to promote respect for the dignity of others are examined. The state's specific obligation in terms of section 9(4) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 to enact legislation to prevent or prohibit unfair discrimination on the grounds listed in section 9(3) is reiterated. Finally, these duties are related to the section 10(1) prohibition in the Equality Act. Refuting the Supreme Court of Appeal's ruling in Qwelane, the reasonableness standard is applied to conclude that the prohibition gives due effect to the duties of the state and every person, and that the courts are duty-bound to interpret it accordingly. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The responses to two comments about an article on the application of auxiliary information in correcting omitted-variables biased are described. It is argued that the comments authors' failed to grasp the meaning and approach presented in the study. It is also argued that prospective studies on the effects of lead exposure on children's IQ were not considered in the article because these lacked details to recover sample covariance matrices., We thank the two discussants for their contributions. Professor Vardi raises questions about applicability of MCMC methods and of the relevance of the likelihood ambiguities/biases issue under repeat sampling of [...]

We develop a classification to score the potential of corporate audit committees to be financially literate, as defined in this paper, based on listing requirements of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), as promulgated late in 1999. We score audit committees of approximately 300 large companies in 2000 and 2004, and of a subsample in 1996 as well. We find that scores did not change between 1996 and 2000 but have improved significantly since that time. The audit committees have room for improved financial literacy in the sense that we define. We find evidence of superior stock market returns to companies who have improved the potential for financial literacy, as we measure it, of their audit committees over the last four years. The improvers in our sample enjoyed annualized abnormal, excess returns of 4.6 percent per year more than those who did not improve. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This is a reply to a critique by Botha and Govindjee (2017 PELJ 1-32) of our interpretation of the hate speech provisions of the Equality Act (Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 4 of 2000) in Marais and Pretorius (2015 PELJ 901-942), in which we considered the constitutionality of section 10(1) of the Act, amongst other things. We address Botha and Govindjees' rejection of our view that hate speech is a form of unfair discrimination and that the most appropriate constitutional framework within which section 10(1) should be interpreted and assessed is sections 9 and 10 of the Constitution. We consider Botha and Govindjees' rejection of this point of departure, their opposing different interpretation of the role of the proviso in section 12 of the Act and, generally, their reasons for concluding that section 10(1) is unconstitutional. We maintain that Botha and Govindjee's proposals for reform unduly restrict the hate speech prohibition to cover exclusively expression that warrants criminalisation. In doing so, they fail to fully acknowledge the transformative obligation in terms of international law, the Constitution and the Equality Act, to prohibit and prevent unfair discrimination. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]