Search

When do judges defer and when do they defy? This paper examines the conditions under which individual judges overrule their appointers under conditions of increasing authoritarianism. While studies of judicial decision-making under job insecurity, dictatorship, and transition conditions have been undertaken (Helmke 2002; Moustafa 2007; Herron and Randazzo 2003), there is a need to investigate judicial behavior in hybrid regimes. In this type of political settings, when do courts bless, and when do they bite? The paper develops a theoretical framework to explain the behavior of judges in cases involving the government in hybrid regimes. Those theoretical contentions are then tested, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the case of the Philippines. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Civil wars are often the result of long, deep-seated antagonisms that eventually explode into the surface. The struggle is often searing, vicious, and severe. While most of the literature has focused on mediation activities in inter-state relations, the effectiveness of such instrument on intra-state contestations has been relatively uninvestigated. Moreover, the literature tends to measure mediation "success" in terms of negotiated settlements. But in certain cases, the positions of the disputants seem intractable and the clashes interminable. DeRouen and Bercovitch (2007) referred to these domestic conflicts as "enduring internal rivalries" (EIR). Given the highly contentious nature of civil wars, it can be averred that "successful" mediation in EIRs may not sealed by the signing of a parchment of paper but by the gradual changing of perceptions. This paper seeks to advance the literature by incorporating the concept of EIR into our "two timeframe" approach to mediation success. We intend to identify the determinants of mediation success in facilitating "formal" and "extended" peace among enduring rivals. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

States that the court as an institution seeks to advance its independence, influence and authority even in non-democratic settings. Belief that courts strive to attain some semblance of relevance within authoritarian settings; Role of the judiciary in the preservation of public order; Enhancement of the court's institutional legitimacy by acting against the powerful and for the weak.

When do judges rein in those who reign? Judiciaries in polities that have made the transition to democratic systems are expected to keep rulers "in check" and to defend the newly-constituted rules from violation by political players (Fried 1991; Newman 1986). In a democracy, the judiciary has the crucial task of protecting fundamental freedoms from the vagaries of the reigning majority. However, such actions can also lead to political collisions with the administration. The resulting instability can be employed by the ruling elite to justify a return to authoritarian rule (Halmai 2002; Sadurski 2002). Thus, it is of vital import to ask: when do judges defer and when do they defy? The objective of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework that explains the behavior of courts with regards to cases involving the government in new democracies. Those theoretical contentions are then tested, both qualitatively and quantitatively, in the cases of the Philippines and South Africa. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does increasing wealth produce courageous courts? Empirical studies have made the contention that certain factors, like respect for property rights and the development of the rule of law, have positive effects on economic development (Scully 1988; Henisz 2000; Bugaric 2001). However, it is also important to examine whether it is actually economic development that generates independent courts. If prosperity brings temerity, then we should expect courts in developing democracies to grow increasingly critical of the ruling administration, a process that could evolve into leadership or regime crises (Doronila 2001; Grimm 2004). Thus, this research has implications on corollary social processes like democratization and liberalization. This paper develops a multivariate model that seeks to explain how prosperity can bring judicial independence. The paper then tests the theoretical contentions using a process tracing study of the Philippines and the new dataset developed by Tate and Camp-Keith (2008) on judicial independence. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The courts of law in post-authoritarian settings have tended to employ reason in the service of power because of the daunting array of institutional and material weaponry that can be utilized by the state to retaliate against an "uncooperative" court (Herron and Randazzo 2003; Iaryczower et al. 2002). Newly-elected executives and legislators claim that their policies are the "democratic" positions and often view judicial review simply as a legitimation mechanism. Administrations could ignore the decision of the court, cut its budget, restrict its jurisdiction, or threaten judicial officials. Thus, it is of most import to ask: when do the courts invalidate the actions of state rulers? When do gavels bound the gun? Employing coded decisions of decisions made by the supreme court of the Philippines, this paper undertakes an empirical analysis of the key variables that enable judiciaries to stand up to the government amidst the uncertainties brought about by democratization. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Feminist scholars and activists have demonstrated how women are negatively affected by internal conflicts. This paper seeks to systematically examine these contentions and empirically test whether women are indeed differently impacted by civil wars. We seek to contribute to the conceptualization and operationalization of the different forms that violence can have in the context of civil wars. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The courts of law in post-transition polities have tended to employ reason in the service of power because of the daunting array of institutional and material weaponry that can be utilized by the state to retaliate against an "uncooperative" court. Newly-elected executives and legislators claim that their policies are the "democratic" positions and often view judicial review simply as a legitimation mechanism. Administrations could ignore the decision of the court, cut its budget, restrict its jurisdiction, or threaten judicial officials. Thus, it is of most import to ask: when do the courts rule against the policies of state rulers? Employing coded decisions of decisions made by the High Courts of the Philippines and South Africa, this paper undertakes an empirical analysis of the key variables that enable the judiciary to stand up to the government, amidst the uncertain context of democratic transition. ..PAT.-Unpublished Manuscript [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the effects of potential determinants of successful civil war mediation. It adopts a "two timeframe" approach to mediation success in civil wars; probing the impact of key variables to peace defined in "short" and "extended" terms. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When do courts develop the daring to rule against the state in authoritarian regimes? This paper provides an empirical assessment of why and when judiciaries "gamble" to rule against the government during periods of authoritarianism. ..PAT.-Conference Proceeding [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article asserts that opportunities to gain autonomy from the state may be opened by political and economic developments. Several variables that enable the courts to go against the government in authoritarian regimes using coded decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippines are examined. Malaysia has a dual legal structure, in which a political sphere is unbounded by legal parameters and an economic order regulated by law.

The article considers different theories of legal integration in the European Union. The theories presented are based on institutional legalism, neorealism, and the neofunctionalism. Validation of the claims of these competing theories was carried out through a quantitative examination of the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) treatment of various parties in litigation. This analysis shows that institutional legalist theory can best explain the legal integration of the EU.

One of the most controversial and discussed periods in the history of the world’s most prominent court, the United States Supreme Court, is the era of the Depression and the New Deal under Franklin Roosevelt. In that era, the Court encountered a rapid, Presidentially-inspired expansion of the role of government in the economy, implemented via an alphabet soup of new agencies set up to improve the economic and social well being of the populace. The Roosevelt Court first bitterly resisted, then, after the clichéd switch in time that saved nine, acknowledged the legitimacy of and developed doctrine to support government agency efforts to promote social welfare. That acknowledgement and doctrine did not guarantee that the Supreme Court would automatically support government social welfare policy when it reached the Court – we know that its tendency to do so has varied across time. They did, however, significantly change the Court’s agenda, leading to a diminution of the number and proportion of docketed cases involving economic regulation. In the wake of the Depression, litigation involving government social agencies has surely become commonplace in courts around the world. Whether such litigation ends up in the highest courts and what happens to it when it does is less certain. Our experience in coding and working with data from the countries included in the High Court Judicial Data Base suggests that High Court treatment of government social agencies is a matter for considerable theoretical and policy interest. (The High Courts Judicial Data Base is funded by National Science Foundation Law and Social Science awards to Stacia L. Haynie (Louisiana State University), Reginald Sheehan (Michigan State University), Donald R. Songer (University of South Carolina) and C. Neal Tate (Vanderbilt University). The goal of the project is to create a multinational public access data base of Supreme Court decisions that will support advances in research in the comparative study of courts and judges. The project is currently ongoing. Rodelio C. Manacsa is a graduate research assistant on the project.) We propose in this paper to conduct a preliminary analysis of the extent to which several national High Courts entertain litigation involving government social welfare agencies and how they treat claims made by or against those agencies. We will focus most extensively on the Supreme Court of the Philippines because available data make it possible to extend this analysis over 40 years of decision making and because we know from our work with the Philippine data that the Philippine Supreme Court has played an important role in shaping government social policy at the grass roots level. We also plan to analyze (as our data make possible) the experience of the Indian Supreme Court, an institution that has taken an explicit social policy stance in favor of the underprivileged. The experience of the Philippine and Indian Supreme Courts will be contrasted with that of the United States Supreme Court and, as time and data make possible, the Supreme Courts of Canada and South Africa. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]