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In a world divided by irreconcilable ideological differences into the capitalist West and the socialist East, Yugoslavia itself has, since the early fifties, faced a permanent choice between two options, on the borderline between those two opposing blocs. Coerced by political circumstances, the country's leadership had chosen its own path into communism, formulated through the idea of worker self-management that secured the belief among the people of Yugoslavia that they did not belong to either of the sides divided by the iron curtain. Although it was initially promoted as an expression of authentic Marxism, these unique political projects inevitably lead to an increasing openness toward the western world. The reduction of central government control over the economy, opening of borders, freedom of movement inside and outside the country, freedom of companies to trade abroad, permissible limited private property etc. allowed for easier access to elements of a consumer society that were coming from the West. Getting closer to the western world, as a cultural and an economic process, in the early 1960s also became a subject of Yugoslavian cinematography, which had after a string of years of partisan films begun to deal with modern (urban) life. Through an anthropological analysis of the most popular domestic films made during that period, such as: Zajednicki stan, Nema malih bogova, Ljubav i moda and Na mesto građanine pokorni, in this paper I observe how ideological dilemmas concerning the first experiences of abandoning 'pure' socialism and the gradual acceptance of consumerism manifested in society (just prior to the economic reform of 1965.), the vision of some future society that came to exist and the encounter with the taste of its values and lifestyle (the appearance of market mentality where new rules become important - competition and a fight for personal interest, individualism opposed to collective socialist solidarity etc.). [Projekat Ministarstva nauke Republike Srbije, br. 177026]

The anti-Chinese protests that were organized throughout European cities fol­lowing the route of the Olympic torch from Athens to Beijing, and the conflicts that erupted with strong emotions on both sides between the protestors and the Chinese citizens, will without a doubt remain a lasting memory of the 2008 Olympic games. Regardless of these protests' justified motives, there is a visible paradoxical role-switch in the scenes that circled the globe for months: the Olympic torch and Olympic idea, were being defended by China as a highest value and the source of their own past and identity, and attacked by the people (Europeans) on whose land that very idea had been created and nurtured for over a hundred years. How should these contradictory images be understood? How did it come to this that the Chinese view themselves as the keepers of the Olympic tradition, that the pride of the Chinese nation, focused in that flame, gets hurt in attempts of European protestors to put it out? The modern Olympic Games, founded in 1896, were one of the echoes of a centuries' long Western European fascination with the Antique. This phenomenon of the Antique admiration has brought about a redefining of the European civilization's past, the abandoning the biblical narrative and the gradual creation of a secular story that we call modern history, in which Greece and Rome have become the main references of origin. The same process influenced the formation of national states that perceive, apart from their own histories, a collective cultural origin in Ancient Greece. Of course, the Galls, Francs or Germans had little in common with ancient Greeks; but modern European nations unite this fictional image of the Antique with the firm belief that it is the source of their cultural identity. For instance, not only did the 18th century French and English believe that they originated from ancient Greece but they managed to successfully 'sell' that story to modern Greeks, and later the entire world. In that sense, it is impossible not to see a parallel with China today. As it adopted the Western model in almost every respect during the course of its development, starting with accepting the communist ideology in the early stages of its westernization, and then liberal economy, and finally the Olympics, China has implicitly adopted the European identity narrative. Critics, on the other hand, fail to see the magnitude of the discrepancy that this country with such a rich tradition has made towards the West in the last several decades. To the (still living) arrogant European colonial state of mind it goes without saying that China should want to be 'like us' and accept the Olympic tradition. This same arrogance fails to ask itself if, for instance, He Kexin's Olympic gold medal in gymnastics is a victory for China or for the West.

It is without doubt that the 2008 Olympic Games in Peking will be remembered as the most grandiose, most spectacular and most expensive sport manifestation ever organized. Ratings are uniform: it will be very difficult to attain a standard posed by Peking in any recent time. Again, through the organization of this manifestation, China resurfaced as a powerful, wealthy and modern country, ready for the challenges of the 21st century. However, a shadow is cast upon China, in spite of its economic power, due to the country's autocratic political system. China's lack of democracy, human rights and liberties and position of minorities have provoked a harsh criticism among the Western countries, reflected at the time when China was granted Olympic games for 2008. Since then, the criticism continues especially directed at the decision of the Olympic committee, with several calls to boycott the Games itself. Anti-Chinese rallies were intensified this spring, when the Olympic torch started its way from Greece to Peking. Thousands of demonstrators worldwide- defenders of the Tibet's freedom- have tried to stop the carriers of the torch, trying to put out 'the eternal flame' and disable its route to the final destination. The torch has changed its route many times in order to deceive the protestors and takeover was also a subject to change and many manipulations. In any case, the broadcasted scenes of conflict between the demonstrators and Chinese official escorts and citizens, charged with emotions at both sides, will remain as a recall of the Olympic Games 2008 for a long time. Regardless of the possible justified cause of this protest, in the worldwide broadcasted scenes for many months there was a totally paradoxical change of roles: the Olympic flame, as well as the idea, China has defended as its own, as a highest value and also as a source and holiness of its own past and identity, while the Europeans, on whose territory that same idea and values were once created, attacked fiercely those same notions. How are we to understand these contradictory images? How it came about that China experience itself as heiress of the Olympic tradition and how it happened that the pride of the Chinese nation concentrated in the flame, be hurt by the attempts of the European demonstrators to put it out? Modern Olympic Games, founded in 1896, presented itself as one of the echoes of centuries' long fascination of the Antique era experienced by the Westerners. This phenomenon of the Antique admiration has brought about a new redefinition of the European past and civilization ranging from abandoning Biblical story and gradual building of the secular one which we came to call modern history. In that modern history, Ancient Greece and Rome became the two main references about origin. The same process has lead to formation of national states, which, besides making their own national history, had in common the perceived joint origin in the Ancient Greece. Of course, Gauls, Franks or Germanics had very little in common with the ancient Greeks; the common characteristics of the modern European nations are precisely the invention of the Antique images and a firm belief in it as a source of the cultural identity. For instance, the French and British have believed, at the end of the 18th century, they could trace their origin back to the Ancient Greece; in addition, they have managed to successfully 'sell' the story to the modern Greeks and afterward to the rest of the world. In this sense, it is not possible not to see the parallel with the modern China. Adopting the Western model in almost everything, from communist ideology as its first phase of westernization, to liberal economy, and finally to Olympic Games, China implicitly adopts the European story on origin. Critiques however, do not clearly see the range of this discrepancy that the country with such rich tradition has made in the last several decades toward the West. An arrogant colonial European mind holds it understandable that China accepts the Olympic tradition, since it wants to 'look like us'. This same arrogance fails to question, for example, if a golden medal in gymnastics that He Kexin won at this Games, is a victory for China or the West.

Among other things, intensification of process of European integrations has imposed the need for realization and strengthening of common European cultural identity, that is for creating a new set of values, which would be common to all European citizens and which would be the basis for their permanent feeling of community and an experience of belonging to Europe as a common area. What are the chances of such a project since, on one hand, Islam is appearing in Europe as a religion that does not know secularity and, on the other hand, an important part of European inhabitants is showing the rise of anti-immigrant and , especially, anti-Islamic feelings, opposition to the presence of foreigners, fear of majorization and the loss of one's own identity and the values of European culture? The existing conflict with Islam is, most often, described as a conflict between secularized West where religion is a matter of private choice and religious (primarily Islamic) world where religion is regulating every aspect of life. However, innumerable examples all around us (starting with the fact that the time is counted according to the Christian calendar, Christian holidays and iconography, Biblical myths, moral codes, architecture, toponims-to mention only few) constantly reminds how much Christianity (primarily as a cultural tradition) is strongly present in the lives of the secular Europeans, how much is that secular context in fact permeated with Christian story. Vestiges of that past, which are all around us, are not in fact perceived as a Christian story - in meeting with European secularism such recognition comes only to "others" to whom that story is not familiar. On what premises then can such a common forum be created on which all would really feel equally at home? In this work I will try to consider possible directions in which, considering the existing circumstances, Europe could move in search of the new common denominator. Since nations, according to the nature and the sense of the idea itself of Europe without borders, can not figure as elements of cohesion (multiethnicity, turning towards market laws, obligatory decrease of sovereignty of national states towards, etc.), there are two logical possibilities: 1) Strengthening of Christian identity, that is returning to the previous paradigm, which is for Europe Christian paradigm - hence Christianity as new/old collective identity, 2) An attempt to de-fine a new type of plural secularism, that is, to establish secular society of non-Christian type that would be inclusive also for members of other, non-Christian cultures.

The Jyllands-Posten Muhammad cartoons controversy began after twelve editorial cartoons, most of which depicted the Islamic prophet Muhammad, were published in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten on September 30, 2005. The newspaper explained that this publication was a contribution to debate regarding criticism of Islam and self-censorship. In response, Danish Muslim organizations held public protests and spread knowledge of Jyllands-Postens publication. As the controversy grew, some or all of the cartoons were reprinted in newspapers in more than fifty other countries, which led to violent protests, particularly in the Muslim world. Critics of the cartoons describe them as islamophobic and argue that they are blasphemous, intended to humiliate a marginalized Danish minority, and a manifestation of ignorance about the history of western imperialism, from colonialism to the current conflicts in the Middle East. Supporters of the cartoons claim they illustrate an important issue in an age of Islamic extremist terrorism and that their publication is a legitimate exercise of the right of free speech. They also note that similar cartoons about other religions are frequently printed, arguing that the followers of Islam were not targeted in a discriminatory way. The dispute has again pointed out to the relevance of religion and religious differences in the contemporary world. Again, several questions presented themselves as significant: citizen freedom, values and the rights to exercise them, secularism, tolerance, multiculturalism majority-minority relationships and so on. The resolution to these issues appears as of the outmost importance, considering the existing tendencies of united Europe to even more firmly establish cultural, economic, and political associations, in order to launch a one, joined European identity with vanishing national, ethnic and religious differences. Therefore, the question becomes: what could serve as a foundation for such a united identity? The reactions to the idea of "united Europe" that provoked rising nationalism xenophobia, and resistance towards immigrants in general show that a construction of the identity of this kind represents a very complicated undertaking, with still blurred ending. This paper, thus, discusses basics misunderstandings between "Euro-enthusiastic" and the ones who worry about their own national identity, and points out to the existence of some intrashared values that could serve as a foundation for a future, united European identity.

This paper discusses the doggedness of Orthodox Christianity in a present-day Serbia. Although the existing Constitution guarantees the separation of church and the state, the Serbian Orthodox Church has significant influence on political and social issues. In fact, backed by the top echelon of the government, prevailing Orthodox attitudes have acquired the status of a national ideology, affecting in this way many spheres of public life. Indeed, Church influence appears to be so profound and its authority so unquestionable, that many analysts rightly claim that Serbia is increasingly turning towards radical clericalism. In this paper I examine Orthodox Christianity as a national ideology in the public life. The main question posed is: what is the impact of glorified principles, founded on traditional values of patriarchal-tribal society, on collective identity among Belgrade youth? Based on research conducted among senior students in two Belgrade schools, I was able to survey ways in which a polarization on a social plane reflects the moral choices of these young people. A special segment of the paper is dedicated to the collision of female identities: that thought in religious courses and other forums for „getting close to the faith“ on the one hand, and modern female identity shaped in the secular context, on the other.

This paper is based on original research in two Belgrade elementary schools the subjects were boys and girls from senior grades. These boys and girls were asked to answer a few questions about their future professions; that is, how do they imagine their lives in the future. More than half of the questioned girls expressed the desire to become models, actresses, singers or to be involved in some similar occupations from the world of entertainment. Their dreams about their future life totally exclude professions that require hard studying and serious academic preparation. The girls showed no interest in so-called "serious" occupations or, as a matter of fact, in traditional female jobs and roles. Boys, on the other hand, have various and diverse plans and dreams concerning their future occupations. In brief, the girls put emphasis on professions where the body and its appearance count, while the boys emphasize everything else. This paper is an attempt to answer the question of why it is that the majority of girls on the doorstep of adolescence see the fulfillment of their dreams in such a stereotyped, narrow frame of glamour and physical attractiveness. The paper points out to the existence of pop-culture patterns that so greatly influence the daily lives of these young girls, through media, school and public life in general. In such pop-culture that broadcasts a "Cover Girl" image, images that could encourage girls' other ambitions and interests almost do not exist.

This paper casts a light on some aspects of the complex process of social maturing among teenage girls in Belgrade. In order to do so, paper traces the girls’ attitudes toward school, boys, appearance, popularity as well as their future expectations. The paper discusses the ways in which girls today’s adapt to the role of adult young women.