Search

Psychopathy is a personality condition characterized by specific emotional traits and an antisocial lifestyle that has stimulated neuroethical investigations and debates. According to an established view, psychopaths lack or have a defective moral understanding due to certain emotional impairments. These shortcomings are taken to afflict their empathic or control responses and to correlate with neuropsychological peculiarities (Blair et al., 2005). This view has suggested philosophical conclusions on the nature of moral understanding and on the legal and moral culpability of psychopathic offenders (Malatesti & McMillan, 2010). More recently, however, it has been argued that neuropsychological research leaves undecided the issue of the moral understanding of psychopaths (Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018 ; Schaich Borg & SinnottArmstrong, 2013). Key experiments that offered evidence for the conclusion that psychopaths lack or have severely impaired moral understanding have not been replicated. Moreover, the validity of the experimental paradigms used in these studies as measures of moral understanding has been questioned. Finally, some argue that current diagnoses of psychopathy, being based on behaviours and inferred personality traits, individuate too heterogeneous classes of individuals to support firm conclusions on their capacities. They, thus, recommend the recategorization of individuals with antisocial personalities by means of bio-cognitive data (Brazil et al., 2018 ; Jurjako et al., 2020). We investigate, from a conceptual point of view, whether the methods of forensic narrative psychiatry (Adshead, 2014 ; Youngs & Canter, 2012) can be integrated with bio-cognitive data to individuate a class of individuals with antisocial conditions with significant impairments in their moral understanding. The central aim of our presentation is to tackle two general preliminary issues: (i) those relating to epistemic and referential status of narrative generally and psychiatric-forensic narratives in particular ; (ii) those relating to role that narrative can have in scholarly engagements with mental disorders.

Stilato in un linguaggio chiaro ed esplicativo, questo manuale insegna a scrivere saggi accademici argomentativi. Gli autori offrono soluzioni graduali e immediatamente applicabili per sviluppare le molteplici abilità necessarie per affrontare le differenti fasi di scrittura nei saggi di questo tipo. Ricco di esercizi ed esempi guidati, il manuale propone due approcci complementari alla scrittura - imparare ad argomentare con tesi chiare e persuasive e, di conseguenza, imparare a presentare queste argomentazioni in testi stilisticamente attraenti e coerenti. Un testo sicuramente utile a chi, in ambito accademico e oltre, vuole affinare le proprie capacità di scrittura o insegnarle all'interno di un percorso formativo.

Knjiga se bavi suvremenom raspravom o odnosu uma i tijela. Ova rasprava poprima svoj moderan oblik tijekom 17. stoljeća u radovima Renéa Descartesa. Stoga se u knjizi pregled ovih tema započinje razmatranjem znanstvene slike svijeta koja poprima novi oblik u Descartesovo vrijeme i načina na koji Descartes počinje razmišljati o prirodi uma i njegovom mjestu u svijetu. U knjizi se pokrivaju najvažnija stajališta u suvremenoj filozofiji uma i njihove argumente, odnosno protuargumente. Važna teza knjige je da su suvremene debate i dalje pod velikim utjecajem Descartesove argumentacije, naročito kada razmišljamo o prirodi svjesnih mentalnih stanja.

In this paper, we explore a proposal for a biocognition-informed recategorization of antisocial personality disorders aimed at differentiating accountable from not accountable offenders. We argue that we should not use syndrome-based categories for this task. These categories, as those used in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), are based on observed behaviour and inferences about unobservable characteristics and personality traits without aetiological considerations. Such categories have delivered small or no advances in treatment, they have low validity, they cover heterogeneous groups of people, include comorbidity, with low prospects of integration with neuroscience, genetics, and neuropsychological paradigms. In the paper we explore the prospects of a Research domain criteria (RDoC) type of approach for the legal case and discuss some of the conceptual problems it must address.

Advancements in the neurocognitive science of individuals with antisocial personality disorder might be of great significance for the application of insanity and similar defences in Law (Malatesti & McMillan 2010). However, so far, the investigation of whether psychopathic offenders or other individuals with antisocial personality disorders should be exculpated has reached stumbling blocks (Jalava & Griffiths, 2017 ; Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018). In this paper, to overcome these difficulties, we motivate and frame a proposal for a biocognition- informed recategorization of antisocial personality disorders aimed at differentiating accountable from not accountable offenders. We argue that we should not use syndrome-based categories for this task. These categories, as those used in the Diagnostic Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), are based on observed behaviour and inferences about unobservable characteristics and personality traits without aetiological considerations. The categories of this kind for antisocial personality disorder are problematic. In fact, they have delivered small or no advances in treatment, they have low validity, they cover heterogeneous groups of people, include comorbidity, with low prospects of integration with neuroscience, genetics, and neuropsychological paradigms (Lilienfeld, 2014). In our paper, we offer instead a Research domain criteria (RDoC) type of approach for the legal case and discuss some of the conceptual problems it must address. In psychiatry, RDoC research aims at providing valid measures of disorders by integrating the data on the genetic, neural, cognitive, and affective systems underlying psychiatric conditions (Lilienfeld, 2014). The goal is to use bottom-up neurobiological data to rebuild psychiatric categories (see Brazil et al., 2018). Similarly, we propose to rethink bottom-up certain legal categories, that are needed for insanity or similar types of defences, for a more effective use of available neuroscientific data and further research. Such an approach does not need to be reductive (Jurjako, Malatesti, Brazil 2020). However, it must strike a balance between the legal categories that are determined top-down by cognitive-behavioural classifications, and specific legal normative constraints, and neurocognitive bottom-up revisions of them. Specifically, our proposal needs to address the difficult interface problem of relating folk/psychological notions and explanations embedded in the legal formulation of defences and the data offered by neurocognitive science (Francken & Slors 2018). References Brazil, I. A., van Dongen, J. D. M., Maes, J. H. R., Mars, R. B., & Baskin-Sommers, A. R. (2018). Classification and treatment of antisocial individuals: From behavior to biocognition. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 91, 259–277. Francken, J. C., & Slors, M. (2018). Neuroscience and everyday life: Facing the translation problem. Brain and Cognition, 120(Supplement C), 67–74. Jalava, J., & Griffiths, S. (2017). Philosophers on Psychopaths: A Cautionary Tale in Interdisciplinarity. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology, 24(1), 1– 12. Jurjako, M., & Malatesti, L. (2018). Neuropsychology and the Criminal Responsibility of Psychopaths: Reconsidering the Evidence. Erkenntnis, 83(5), 1003–1025. Jurjako, M., Malatesti, L., & Brazil, I. A. (2020). Biocognitive classification of antisocial individuals without explanatory reductionism. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 15(4), 957– 972. Lilienfeld, S. O. (2014). The Research Domain Criteria (RDoC): An Analysis of Methodological and Conceptual Challenges. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 62, 129–139. Malatesti, L., & McMillan, J. (Eds.). (2010). Responsibility and Psychopathy: Interfacing Law, Psychiatry and Philosophy. Oxford University Press

A narrative approach to the “emotional landscape” of psychopaths is an important route to establish wether and how these subjects have deficits that are relevant for our legal and moral practices.

BOOK REVIEW: Davor Pećnjak, Tomislav Janović. PREMA DUALIZMU. OGLEDI IZ FILOZOFIJE UMA (Towards Dualism: Essays in Philosophy of Mind) Ibis grafika: Zagreb, 2016

Advancements in the neurocognitive science of individuals with antisocial personality disorder might be of great significance for the application of insanity and similar defences in Law (Malatesti & McMillan 2010). However, so far, the investigation of whether psychopathic offenders or other individuals with antisocial personality disorders should be exculpated has reached stumbling blocks (Jalava & Griffiths, 2017 ; Jurjako & Malatesti, 2018). In this lecture, to overcome these difficulties, we motivate and frame a proposal for a biocognition- informed recategorization of antisocial personality disorders aimed at differentiating accountable from not accountable offenders.

The harm usually associated with psychopathy requires therapeutically, legally, and ethically satisfactory solutions. Scholars from different fields have, thus, examined whether empirical evidence shows that individuals with psychopathic traits satisfy concepts, such as responsibility, mental disorder, or disability, that have specific legal or ethical implications. The present paper considers the less discussed issue of whether psychopathy is a disability. As it has been shown for the cases of the responsibility and mental disorder status of psychopathic individuals, we argue that it is undecided whether psychopathy is a disability. Nonetheless, based on insights from disability studies and legislations, we propose that interventions to directly modify the propensities of individuals with psychopathic tendencies should be balanced with modifications of the social and physical environments to accommodate their peculiarities. We also suggest how this social approach in some practical contexts that involve non-offender populations might be effective in addressing some of the negative effects of psychopathy.

The aim of the lecture is to use insights from analytic philosophy of psychiatry to investigate whether psychopathy is a mental disorder. I present the philosophical debate on mental disorder, an account of mental disorder, and advance a conceptual framework to investigate the hypothesis that psychopathy (in the unsuccessful individuals) is a mental disorder.

We conceptually develop a biocognitively based categorisation of antisocial individuals with the aim of making more precise assessments of their legal responsibility.

Ove bilješke nastoje ponuditi uvod u izbor pisanih materijala koji predstavljaju središnje trendove u suvremenoj analitičkoj filozofskoj raspravi o intencionalnosti. Navedeni tekstovi su prilično tehničke prirode, te nažalost, nisu dostupni na hrvatskom jeziku. Ova skripta predstavlja samo pomagalo u izravnom čitanju tako što nudi sažetke središnjih tema i argumenta. Osim toga, kada se to učinilo potrebnim, ove bilješke sadrže određenu količinu objašnjenja filozofskih i drugih tehničkih pojmova koji se pojavljuju u tekstovima te opis ostalih relevantnih filozofskih doktrina i argumenata.

The use of scientific neuropsychological evidence in the insanity defence raises important conceptual and methodological issues concerning the significance that the sciences of the mind/brain and behaviour should have for our self- image and specific legal decisions. The insanity defence partially or completely exculpates offenders who have certain cognitive or control incapacities that are due to a mental disorder. Legal scholars and philosophers debate in which measure general advancements in the study of the brain can inform our exculpatory practice. Some of these discussions concern issues of free will and responsibility. In this case, divergent general views on the relevance of science for understanding human action and motivation might be also at stake. However, certain discussions, that are more limited in scope, consider whether specific advancements concerning the neuropsychological underpinning of criminal behaviour would exculpate specific classes of offenders. These discussions consider recent neuropsychological scientific research is some detail and do not touch explicitly upon general issues concerning the nature and general significance of science of mind and behaviour for our self-image. However, in these discussions, there are underlying assumptions guiding the interpretations of empirical research and in extrapolating its significance for legal practice. In the course, we will focus on certain guiding assumptions and expectations concerning the scientific study of mind and behaviour that have determined that several scholars and philosophers, who have considered the issue of the criminal responsibility of offenders with antisocial personality, have overlooked several central methodological and conceptual issues. These issues centre around what can be termed the “legal instance” of the practical mind-body problem. This is the problem of establishing, in practically workable ways for the law, the bridging of the psychological incapacities that the law poses as precondition for the insanity defence, and advancements in neuropsychology of antisocial behaviour. We will consider general problems concerning the interaction between the notion of agency involved and the law and the scientific explanatory and descriptive apparatus of the neuropsychology of antisocial behaviour. In addition, we will consider the requirements that neuropsychological evidence should satisfy in order to be relevant for the insanity defence.

The study of the social impact of psychopathy should be and has been paired with investigations of the relevant ethical and legal dimensions. So far, empirical studies have mostly considered such responses within the scope of the criminal justice system (Kiehl and Sinnott-Armstrong, 2013). Consequently, the focus of earlier ethical and legal research was on how emotional and cognitive impairments that are correlated with psychopathy may affect the legal and moral accountability of the psychopathic offender (Kiehl and Sinnott- Armstrong, 2013 ; Malatesti & ; McMillan, 2010). A review of the literature indicates that the various emotional and cognitive peculiarities of psychopaths do not undermine their criminal responsibility (Jurjako and Malatesti, 2018). Relevant for this context is the multifaceted nature of psychopathy and its intricate relationship with antisocial behaviour that introduces an additional layer of complexity in the interpretation of empirical findings (Brazil et al., 2018). Recently, however, researchers have begun investigating the impact of community- dwelling individuals with elevated psychopathic tendencies in other settings besides that of criminal justice, such as in the corporate world (Babiak et al., 2010 ; Babiak and Hare, 2006 ; Boddy, 2011). In this paper, we will take an empirically informed philosophical perspective to reflect on so far neglected legal/ethical issues that arise from the latter research. We will consider whether community dwelling psychopaths have disabilities that legally or ethically would recommend specific responses. Although the emotional and cognitive disturbances seen in psychopathy have no definite implications for their moral or legal accountability, these disturbances are likely to play central roles in explaining their interpersonally maladaptive behaviors (Blair et al., 2005 ; Koenigs and Newman, 2013). These behaviors, even if not necessarily criminal, affect how other people perceive psychopathic individuals and respond to them (Lilienfeld, 2013). Specifically, if the emotional and cognitive impairments related to psychopathy are regarded as disabilities they might even grant special protective rights, as in the case of other disabilities (United Nations, 2006). For instance in the workplace, individuals with psychopathic tendencies might have a right not to be discriminated against and, instead, to have appropriate surrounding conditions that would minimise the possibility to harm others. To establish whether core psychopathic traits constitute a disability that should ground certain rights in non-clinical contexts, we will consider two issues. The first one is normative, and requires clarifying when a cognitive or emotional impairment can be labeled a disability (Shoemaker, 2010 ; Wasserman et al., 2016). We will argue that an impairment is a disability that grants special protective rights if it is i) not remediable and ii) affects the autonomy of the person. Autonomy refers to the ability of a person to act in accordance with personal reasons and motives. The second issue is whether the available scientific evidence on emotional and cognitive impairments are sufficient for drawing the conclusion that psychopaths indeed suffer disabilities of this kind. We will argue that currently available neuropsychological evidence does not warrant thinking that psychopathic individuals suffer from irremediable autonomy affecting cognitive and emotional disabilities. Accordingly, psychopathic individuals should not be granted special rights like other individuals with disability.

In this lecture, we provide an overview of the insanity defense as encoded in the Western legal tradition and discuss its philosophical aspects. Especially those pertaining to the role of mental disorder in determining the criminal responsibility of an offender.