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Based on Basel II Accord, loans paid to individuals and SMEs are included in retail portfolio and banks are permitted to choose standardized approach or internal rating based approach for calculating their credit risk capital requirements. In the case of IRB Implementation, banks should group their retail loans into homogenous risk pools. Particularly, IRB capital requirement function is related to probability of default (PD) and Loss given default (LGD) for each borrower. Mathematically, capital requirement function is concave in PD for a given LGD and for a widespread interval. As a result of capital requirement function concavity, banks could lower their overall capital requirement through classification of their loans into more homogenous risk pools. In this study, loans paid to individual retail customers of 1343 for one of the private banks during 1391-1392 have been classified into homogenous risk pools by the Classification and Regression Trees (CART) algorithm. As we go from level 0 to level 5 in customers' segmentation scheme, capital required for bank experiences a decline of 0.44%.

دیدگاه‌های مختلف و در برخی موارد متضادی در مورد اثر نوسانات نرخ ارز بر رشد اقتصادی مطرح می‌باشد. با بررسی دقیق دیدگاه‌های مختلف به نظر می‌رسد که علت این اختلافات تا حد زیادی مربوط به لحاظ نمودن یا لحاظ ننمودن نقش توسعه بازارهای مالی در تحلیل است. آقیون و همکاران با واردکردن صریح نقش توسعه مالی در بحث نظری اثر نوسانات نرخ ارز بر رشد اقتصادی بیان می‌کنند که توصیه به تثبیت نرخ ارز به منظور رشد اقتصادی بیشتر به سطح توسعه بازارهای مالی اقتصاد مورد بررسی بستگی دارد. در سطوح پایین توسعه بازارهای مالی اثر نوسانات نرخ ارز بر رشد اقتصادی منفی بوده و در سطوح بالا این اثر حتی می تواند مثبت باشد. در این پژوهش، با به‌کارگیری میانگین‌های 5 ساله داده‌های مربوط به 69 کشور نمونه و مدل‌سازی آن در قالب داده‌های تابلویی(Panel Data) این نظریه را آزمون کرده‌ایم. نتایج به دست آمده تأییدکننده نظر آقیون و همکاران می‌باشد.

In this paper, we study the restricting factors leading to the disequilibrium condition in the Iranian market for bank’s credit using the switching regression model for the period 1353-1383 (1974-2004). The results of our study show that the real banking interest rate, real money supply, real banks reserves in central bank, and monetary base have significant relationship with credit supply. Also, the estimation of credit demand shows a positive relationship between the lag of the real deposits and credit demand. The interesting point is the insignificant relationship between the credit demand and the banking interest rate in the study period, but a high significant relationship between supply and the banking interest rate . This implies that the restricting factor in the credit market is the supply side which has always been less than the demand. An estimation of the market clearing banking interest rates in comparison with the real observed interest rates in recent years also confirms the result .

In this paper, using ARDL method, price elasticity of demand for gasoline is estimated for period 1980-2002. The elasticity is forecasted for he period 2003-2015. The results show that there is a negative and weak relation between real price gasoline (RPG) and gasoline demand. If the RPG rises one unit (200 Rials in nominal price), the gasoline demand would fall 18.5 units (1850 million liters) per year. It seems the reason foe such a low effect is the government polices to keep nominal price of gasoline (NPG) lower than international one. At such a low price, the demand elasticity is very low. In order to forecast the gasoline demand elasticity, three scenarios for NPG rises are considered. The results indicate that, by a 10% annual rise in the NPG, the gasoline demand elasticity would decrease. By a 30% annual rise in the NPG per year, gasoline demand elasticity would increase slowly reaching -0.50 in the last year by forecast. By a 50% annual rise in the NPG per year, gasoline demand elasticity would increase rapidly and it would reach to less than -1.

In Iran, financial market is heavily dominated by the government. The big share of market is owned and run by government, particularly in banking sector. In effect the range of interest rates for different deposits and loans in banks are fixed by Islamic Republic of Iran Central Bank (IRICB). Since the rates are well below the equilibrium levels, selective credit policies are common components of financial restriction in Iran. In other words credit rationing is implemented in official market. Under such circumstances, a black marker for deposits & loans is formed. It operates with very higher interest rates, but very efficient with respect to decision making process. The two official and non- official (black market) markets form the two – sector financial system of Iran. Each sector is managed with different rules and policies. As a result some well known rules in monetary policy do not work in the expected way in Iran. In particular decreasing interest rate policy in official market does not boost the demand through investment. We show theoretically the subject by a modified version of Loanable Funds Theory for a two – sector financial market. Moreover an estimated Iran investment function confirms empirically the theoretical approach. Engle – Granger Test confirms the results too. Also financial repression in Iran causes some transfer payments by deposit owners to those receive loans in official market which could be as high as over %10 of GDP. The policy implication to be adopted by policy makers is a well known deregulation policy which results in integration of the two markets.