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Abstract The Chinese economy upheld a frail recovery in 2022 under the triple superposition of contraction of demand, disruption in supply, and weakening expectations, aggravated by unanticipated adverse shocks in the midst of global turmoil. Over the year, rising income uncertainty set off by the pandemic shock continued depressing household consumption and housing demand. Trade also saw slowing growth, along with consumption and investment, with sluggish residential investment awaiting policy stimulus to take force. Unemployment rate remained high, and was much higher for youth engendered by severe structural imbalances in the labor market. Local government debt burden worsened while revenue shrinking, only to exacerbate the local fiscal financial risk. It fared better on the price side. While growth in producer price index kept falling, consumer price index maintained steady growth. Renminbi depreciated against USD through fluctuations with larger swings, but the exchange rate remained in a manageable band. The Institute for Advanced Research‐China Macroeconomic Model projects the baseline growth rate in real gross domestic product to be 5.4% in 2023. We have also used the model to conduct alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations to assess the impacts of potential downside risks or favorable situations. Our findings call for a focus on economic construction with deepening reform and opening up more comprehensively and initiatively. Only by doing so can China spur market vitality, strengthen business confidence, and forge competitive advantages.

This paper analyses the COVID recession and the large fiscal policy response by modelling scenarios using a macro‐econometric model. The COVID recession mainly arose from lower household consumption of certain services under COVID social distancing. The fiscal response to compensate for income losses in those service industries meant that unemployment was around 2 percentage points lower for 3 years than otherwise would have been the case. However, there was over‐compensation: for every $1 of income the private sector lost under COVID, fiscal policy provided $2 of compensation. Following the end of social distancing, the aftereffects of over‐compensation and over‐prolonged loose monetary policy are modelled to have generated excess demand that temporarily added up to 3 percentage points to the annual inflation rate. Also, three forms of over‐compensation in the JobKeeper program that led the fiscal response created disincentive effects and inequities. The primary lesson for future pandemics is that fiscal policy should compensate, but not over‐compensate, for income losses, both in aggregate and at the program level. The secondary lesson is that monetary policy needs to take more account of the stimulus already provided by the fiscal response, so that interest rates do not remain very low for too long. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forecasts for key macroeconomic variables are almost always made simultaneously by the same organizations, presented together, and used together in policy analyses and decision-makings. It is therefore important to know whether the forecasters are skillful enough to forecast the future values of those variables. Here a method for joint evaluation of skill in directional forecasts of multiple variables is introduced. The method is simple to use and does not rely on complicated assumptions required by the conventional statistical methods for measuring accuracy of directional forecast. The data on GDP growth and inflation forecasts of three organizations from Thailand, namely, the Bank of Thailand, the Fiscal Policy Office, and the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council as well as the actual data on GDP growth and inflation of Thailand between 2001 and 2021 are employed in order to demonstrate how the method could be used to evaluate the skills of forecasters in practice. The overall results indicate that these three organizations are somewhat skillful in forecasting the direction-of-changes of GDP growth and inflation when no band and a band of ± 1 standard deviation of the forecasted outcome are considered. However, when a band of ± 0.5% of the forecasted outcome is introduced, the skills in forecasting the direction-of-changes of GDP growth and inflation of these three organizations are, at best, little better than intelligent guess work.

Abstract China's economy underwent a steady recovery in 2021. Investment grew steadily with structural improvement. Exports and imports surged while trade surplus expanded. On the other hand, although labor market conditions improved, income distribution worsened, contributing to sluggish growth in consumption, whereas the gap between consumer price index and producer price index widened, and the profits of enterprises of different sizes diverged, which may go beyond how they are correlated with the locations of the enterprises in the chain of production and trade. While proper liquidity was maintained with prudent monetary policy, risk spillover rose in the financial system, particularly for small and medium‐sized banks. Household and local government debts remained at relatively high levels, further dragging down growth in consumption and infrastructure investment. The “dual carbon” goals exerted downward pressure on near‐term growth in trading off their long‐term benefits. The economy also faced challenges in its external environment in the midst of the prolonged COVID‐19 pandemic aboard, trade protectionism, and the readjustment of the global value chain. Moreover, excessive supervision and inadequate implementation disturbed China's economy, resulting in declined market vitality and confidence of market participants. Based on the Institute for Advanced Research‐China Macroeconomic Model, the baseline real gross domestic product growth rate is projected to be 5.5% in 2022. Alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations are conducted, in addition to the benchmark forecast, to reflect the influences of various risks and possible favorable situations. The findings suggest that China should deepen reform and open up more comprehensively and initiatively, while special effort should be placed on providing accommodative policy and friendly public opinion environment, to facilitate steady growth and propel high‐quality development. A comprehensive macroeconomic governance framework with Chinese characteristics must be developed from systems thinking, to resolve the various issues, internal and external, cyclical and secular, structural and institutional, in an all‐inclusive and coherent manner.

We study the trade-off between "broad-based energy subsidy" and "subsidy reform and targeted transfer" in the developing country context. We analyze the incidence of an electricity tariff differential subsidy program in Pakistan and find that the greater share of subsidy benefit goes to relatively non-poor households. We then conduct a computable general equilibrium exercise of electricity subsidy reform and targeted transfer, and our results indicate that redistributing savings from electricity subsidy reform improves poor households' real income. However, this comes at the cost of short-term economic slowdown, before the economy returns to the benchmark level in the long term. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Value Added Taxes (VAT) constitute a major share of tax revenues in developing countries in which tax evasion is widespread. The literature on VAT evasion, however, is relatively scant. This paper develops a computable general equilibrium framework for analyzing endogenous VAT tax evasion. The analytical framework entails increasing enforcement through greater spending on the enforcement of tax revenue collection. We assume that there is an elasticity that connects the changes in enforcement to actual increases in VAT collection. We apply the model to Pakistan data and show the level of enforcement spending required to achieve certain VAT collection targets. We also examine the short-, medium-, and long-term macroeconomic outlooks, and real consumption distribution across household economic groups associated with higher enforcement spending. We calibrate the model using 2016 as the base year and then run the dynamic model forward for 20 years. We define the implicit VAT rate as that hypothetical statutory rate that, in the absence of evasion, would approximately generate the observed VAT collection. We assume zero additional spending on enforcement in the baseline and estimate two alternative scenarios of VAT revenue target of 8% and 15% of the GDP. The alternative scenarios require increase in enforcement spending by a compounded 46.4% and 322.4%, respectively. We find that the increased enforcement spending enhances the sustainability of the government's budget deficit without causing a decline in real GDP over the long-term. The interest and inflation rates are also lowered. However, there is a small regressive impact on households' real consumption. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Entering year 2020, the Chinese economy was struck by the COVID-19 outbreak. The unprecedented pandemic, entangled with the already elevated complexities in the nation's internal environment and external surroundings, aggravated its economic outlook. Internal factors including severe education mismatch in China's labor force, its vanishing demographic dividend, the declined purchasing power of its middle-income groups, risen leverage ratio of households and enterprises, and soared local government debt reinforced to weaken China's domestic demand. External factors, especially uncertainty in the China-US relation in the face of the re-shaping global value chain, dragged world economic recovery and thus China's exports and imports. This summary report highlights some major challenges and opportunities faced by the nation under its new development strategy that stresses internal circulation of domestic economy aided by its interaction with the globe. Our analyses based on IAR-CMM model provide a unified framework for addressing China's short-, medium-, and long-term issues in an internally coherent manner. Looking into year 2021, our benchmark projection reports an 8.4% annual real GDP growth rate. Alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations are conducted to assess the impacts of potential downside risks and the corresponding policy options for ensuring implicit targets. Through the lens of these analyses, we conclude that a refocus on effective management of internal demand, while deepening structural reforms on supply side and advancing orderly opening up, can help smooth the internal and external circulations of the Chinese economy to achieve high-quality development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Twenty nineteen (2019) marked another year of lethargic growth in the Chinese economy amidst escalated internal and external complexities. Internally, the country's macroeconomic landscape was overcast continuously by fallen consumption growth, plunged growth in manufacturing investment, rapid accumulation of household debt, risen income inequality, and the overhang of local government debt. The nation's external conditions did not fare any better, with drastically declined growth in imports and exports, continued trade tensions with the US, and weakened external demand. Based on the IAR-CMM model, which takes account of both cyclical and secular factors, the baseline real GDP growth rate is projected to be 6.0% in 2020 (5.9% using more reliable rather than the official data), with a downside risk. Alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations are conducted, in addition to the benchmark forecast, to reflect the influences of various internal and external uncertainties. The findings emanated from these analyses lead us to stress the importance and urgency of deepening reform to achieve competitive neutrality for China's transformation into a phase with sustainable and high-quality development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Faced with complicated external and internal challenges, China's economy continues to see sluggish growth in 2018. Rapid accumulation of household debts, exacerbation in income inequality, tightened real sector liquidity, escalated trade tensions with the US, and weakened external demand pose key problems in China's macroeconomic landscape. The status quo is exacerbated by soaring uncertainty and weakening confidence in the face of persistent resource misallocations and institutional distortions, which cast more shadow on the already dampened consumer sentiment, sluggish private investment growth, and fallen foreign reserves. This summary report highlights the urgency of deeper structural reforms for tackling the various internal and external problems. Based on the IAR-CMM model, with both cyclical and secular factors taken into consideration, our baseline forecast of real GDP growth rate is 6.4% (6.1% using more reliable instead of the official data) in 2019. Alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations are conducted to assess the consequences of possible downside risks and the corresponding policy options needed to ensure the assumed growth targets. These analyses lead us to conclude that comprehensively deepening reform and opening up, which should be both rule-of-law based and market-oriented, with well-designed and well-conceived strategies that properly weigh short-, medium-, and long-term benefits and costs, should continue to be set as the guidance for China's transformation into a phase with sustainable and high-quality growth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Leaving year 2017 China's macroeconomy is continuously characterized by unbalanced and inadequate development. Whereas some aggregate indicators have shown improvement over the year, the cumulative growth rates in consumption and fixed asset investment have continued their downward trajectories. Worsening income inequality and resource misallocations, both between secondary and tertiary industries, and within the latter, pose serious challenges, let alone the systemic risk associated with the flourishing shadow banking system, rapid credit growth and debt overhang that weigh on the Chinese economy like the Sword of Damocles. This summary report highlights both the status quo and the consequences of the unbalanced and inadequate development embodied in China's persistently distorted economic structure, and the role of deepening reforms of the institutions and governance in resolving the problems. Our analyses based on IAR-CMM model provide a unified framework for addressing China's short-, medium-, and long-term issues in an internally coherent manner. Looking into year 2018, our benchmark projection of real GDP growth rate is 6.7% (6.41% using more reliable rather than the official data). Alternative scenario analyses and policy simulations are conducted to reflect various aspects of the economic challenges in the short to long runs. Through the lens of these analyses we conclude that rule-of-law based and market-oriented structural reforms should continue to hold a center stage in China's transition from a phase of high-speed but unbalanced growth, to a stage of balanced and adequate high-quality development. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

China's macroeconomy is surrounded by increased uncertainties while facing persistent downward pressures entering year 2017. Major external challenges are imposed by the chaotic political climate and disorderly retreat from globalization of the US accompanied with the impending FED rate hikes, which may trigger a destructive trade war and exert pressures on RMB depreciation and capital flight. Remaining ingrained in major internal challenges are the gridlock risks accumulated from excessive financialization of real estate sector and swelling housing market bubbles amid escalating debt levels, and more fundamentally, the continued off-real-to-virtual movement in the general economy and ascendancy of government over market in resource allocation. Based on IAR-CMM model, which takes into account both cyclical and secular factors, the baseline real GDP growth rate is projected to be 6.5% in 2017 (6.13% using more reliable instead of official data). Counterfactual analyses and policy simulations are also conducted to highlight the convoluted uncertainties surrounding China's macroeconomy. Through the lens of these analyses, we identify a root cause of the weak outlook as the persistently distorted economic structure due to procrastination in reforms of the institutions and governance, which not only impairs China's growth potential but also limits the power of its recent stimulating policies while exacerbating their side effects. Key to successful economic restructuring in the face of adversely evolving demographics are market-oriented reforms, with well-designed strategies to balance short-term stabilization and long-run development. Such reforms should hold center stage in China's transition towards a modern free market economy and regulatory state. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Forecasts for key macroeconomic variables are almost always made simultaneously by the same organizations, presented together, and used together in policy analyses and decision-makings. It is therefore important to know whether the forecasters are skillful enough to forecast the future values of those variables. Here a method for joint evaluation of skill in directional forecasts of multiple variables is introduced. The method is simple to use and does not rely on complicated assumptions required by the conventional statistical methods for measuring accuracy of directional forecast. The data on GDP growth and inflation forecasts of three organizations from Thailand, namely, the Bank of Thailand, the Fiscal Policy Office, and the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council as well as the actual data on GDP growth and inflation of Thailand between 2001 and 2021 are employed in order to demonstrate how the method could be used to evaluate the skills of forecasters in practice. The overall results indicate that these three organizations are somewhat skillful in forecasting the direction-of-changes of GDP growth and inflation when no band and a band of ± 1 standard deviation of the forecasted outcome are considered. However, when a band of ± 0.5% of the forecasted outcome is introduced, the skills in forecasting the direction-of-changes of GDP growth and inflation of these three organizations are, at best, little better than intelligent guess work., Competing Interests: The authors declare that they have no known competing financial interests or personal relationships that could have appeared to influence the work reported in this paper., (© 2023 The Authors.)

The prudent macroeconomic management in the last few years has enabled Romania to recover in some measure from the global financial crisis that has struck the whole world at the end of 2007. The economic activity picked up beginning with 2013 and reached around 2.8% in 2014, driven by the gradual improvement in the domestic demand, led by the private consumption, and by exports, mainly to the EU. Because of the tight fiscal policy the budget deficit was reduced to close to 2.5 % of GDP and Romania exited from the EU's excessive deficit procedures in June 2013. So, to boost growth and provide fiscal space for co-financing of EU funded projects, the capital budget has been protected and total capital spending is expected to rise from 5.8 % of GDP in 2013 to 6.1% in 2015. In 2015, Romania continues to target a structural deficit of 1% of GDP, which should reduce government debt according to national legislation (excluding temporary financing) from about 40% of GDP in 2013 to 36% by 2018. Prudent monetary and fiscal policies are expected to anchor inflation expectations, maintain fiscal buffers, and reduce public debt. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]